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Summary and main conclusions (1)
An increasing variety of budgetary positions, with 
challenging overall developments
Actual deficits continued to increase in 2003 throughout
the EU, reflecting the protracted slowdown in growth
and the working of automatic stabilisers. In the euro
area, the deficit rose from 2.3 % of GDP in 2002 to 2.7 %
of GDP in 2003. If all 25 countries which are members
of the EU as of 1 May 2004 are taken into account, the
deficit has increased from 2.1 to 2.7 % of GDP. Cycli-
cally adjusted developments have started to evolve more
favourably, improving from 2.4 % of GDP in 2002 to
2.1 % in 2003. However, this reflects sizeable one-off
measures in several countries.
With 8 countries in surplus and 11 with deficits above
3 % in 2003, the EU by enlarging to 25 members sees the
variety of budgetary performances across Member
States increase. The most significant deficits are those of
Germany and France, given the size of both of the coun-
tries themselves and of their deficits, which heavily
affect the overall outcome of the euro area. The situation
in Italy, where the deficit stayed below 3 % only by dint
of sizeable one-off measures, is also a matter of concern
given its high government debt-to-GDP ratios. Outside
the euro area, actual balances deteriorated in a number of
countries, including the UK and Poland. In contrast with
these developments, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Finland
and Luxembourg (in the euro area) and Sweden, Den-
mark and Estonia in EU-25 recorded surpluses which
were maintained throughout the slowdown, attesting to
the soundness of their budgetary positions. Reflecting
the budgetary and growth developments in large coun-
tries, the government debt-to-GDP ratio increased in
2003 to reach 70.4 % in the euro area and 63.1 % in EU-
25. Here too, situations are quite diverse, with Italy,
Greece and Belgium having a government debt-to-GDP
ratio above 100 % and 14 countries with debt levels well
below 60 % of GDP.
Sound public finances will not be achieved in the near 
future in some countries
In spite of an improving growth outlook, budgetary pros-
pects for 2004 and 2005 are not very promising. Both the
actual and cyclically adjusted budget balances of the
euro area, according to the Commission spring 2004
forecasts, are projected to be broadly unchanged in 2004
and, on an unchanged policy basis, in 2005. At EU-25
level, the actual balance is projected to improve margin-
ally to 2.5 % of GDP in 2005. The public debt-to-GDP
ratio is projected to increase slightly in 2004 to 70.9 %
of GDP in the euro area and to 63.4 % in EU-25, and to
remain at the same level in both areas in 2005. At coun-
try level, the deficit is projected by the Commission to
remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004 in both France and
Germany. The two Member States are committed to
bring the deficit below 3 % in 2005. The deficit is also
expected to be above 3 % in 2004 in Greece, the Nether-
lands, and, if the expiry of one-offs is not compensated
by corrective measures, also in Portugal and Italy. The
budgetary situation in most new Member States is
expected to improve over the next two years.
The latest updates of the stability and convergence pro-
grammes show that a close-to-balance position in cycli-
cally adjusted terms will not be reached in several coun-
tries by 2007 (– 0.7 % of GDP for the euro area).
Germany, France, Portugal and the UK in particular will
still be far from a balanced budget at that point. This
means that there will be an inadequate safety margin to
prevent a breach of the 3 %-of-GDP reference value in
the event of adverse economic conditions. In addition,
the medium-term objectives of some euro-area Member
States are based on growth assumptions which appear to
¥1∂ The summary and main conclusions of this report have been adopted by the College of Commissioners in the form of a communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2004) 425, adopted on 24 June 2004.1
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the updates were realised, the budgetary targets seem
difficult to reach. The new Member States foresee in
their convergence programmes an ambitious consolida-
tion of their public finances.
Considering that the implementation record of the pro-
grammes has, in several cases, been poor — which has
led to a repeated postponement of the achievement of the
close-to-balance objective — it is clear that there is no
reason for complacency. It is vital for Member States to
reach budget positions which ensure that the automatic
stabilisers work freely, and decrease the risk of unsus-
tainable public finances in the light of ageing popula-
tions, and if the composition of the adjustment is right,
would contribute to achieving over the next few years
the Lisbon objectives of high growth and employment
rates. Past experience shows that significant efforts to
improve the underlying budget positions should be
undertaken as economic conditions improve: the diffi-
culties experienced in respecting the Treaty require-
ments in 2002 and 2003 reflect also the fact that coun-
tries did not make enough fiscal adjustment during the
good times in 1999 and 2000.
Increasing activation of the procedures 
for budgetary surveillance
By mid-2003, the number of countries placed in an
excessive deficit position increased to three, with France
joining Portugal and Germany. In spite of the measures
taken by France and Germany, it soon became evident
that deficits in these two countries, in contrast to Portu-
gal, would remain high in 2003, and that the probability
of bringing them below 3 % of GDP by the deadline of
2004 was very low in the light of the draft budgets sub-
mitted in autumn 2003. The Commission therefore
moved forward with the excessive deficit procedure with
the aim of urging France and Germany to take more deci-
sive measures in order to correct their deficits at least by
2005. In spring 2004, following the notification of budg-
etary data concerning 2003, the Commission started the
procedures for Greece, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, which registered deficits above 3 % of GDP
in 2003. At the same time, given that the deficit remained
below 3 % of GDP in 2003, the Commission proposed to
repeal the decisions placing Portugal in a position of
excessive deficit. On the basis of its forecasts, it recom-
mended that an ‘early warning’ be addressed to Italy,
given the substantial risk of breaching the 3 %-of-GDP
reference value in 2004. The Commission started the
excessive deficit procedure for several new Member
States following their accession to the EU. Recommen-
dations will be made to these countries to help pursue a
credible multi-annual adjustment path.
Tensions in the implementation of the fiscal 
framework led to uncertainty
While the procedures foreseen by the Treaty were used
smoothly in the run-up to EMU, since the birth of the
euro their implementation has become more difficult. In
February 2002, the Commission recommended that the
Council adopt an ‘early warning’ addressed to Germany
and Portugal. On that occasion, the Council did not fol-
low the Commission’s proposals, on account of commit-
ments made by these countries. Similarly, but at a more
advanced stage in the procedures, the Council at the end
of November of 2003 did not endorse the Commission’s
recommendations concerning France and Germany,
which extended by one year the deadline for correcting
the situation of excessive deficit and implied advancing
with the procedures.
The tensions which have arisen in the implementation of
the procedures of the Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), and the diverging interpretation of
the latter by the Community institutions, have created
uncertainty as to how budgetary surveillance should be
conducted. They have also shown that certain elements
of the framework should be reconsidered in order to
increase both its effectiveness and its credibility.
In response to the difficulties in implementing the fiscal
framework, the Commission announced a strategy aimed
at seeking legal clarity on the provisions of the Treaty
and the SGP, continuing budgetary surveillance, and
considering what steps are needed to strengthen eco-
nomic governance. Accordingly, at the end of January
2004 the Commission asked the European Court of Jus-
tice to annul the decisions taken by the Council and the
conclusions adopted at its November meeting. The Court
has decided to handle the case in an accelerated proce-
dure.
Meanwhile, in line with its strategy, the Commission
continued to conduct budgetary surveillance in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Treaty and the SGP. This
involved assessing the 2003 updates of the stability and
convergence programmes and preparing draft opinions
for the Council. The Commission also updated the broad
economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) including new
country-specific budgetary recommendations for seven
countries. It also moved ahead with the procedures for2
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pursued its efforts to improve the quality of surveillance.
At the same time, it started to reflect on how the frame-
work could be rejuvenated in order to tackle the short-
comings which have manifested themselves in the first
years of EMU.
Analytical improvements made within 
the framework for EU budgetary surveillance
The report on ‘Public finances in EMU — 2004’ high-
lights four areas where progress has been made in the
analysis of budgetary developments, including on (i) the
role of one-off measures for the assessment of budgetary
positions, (ii) the use of cyclically adjusted balances for
the assessment of the efforts countries have made, (iii)
the assessment of the long-term sustainability of public
finances, and (iv) the surveillance of contingent liabili-
ties.
The increased focus of multilateral surveillance on more
structural factors calls for temporary changes in budget-
ary positions to be clearly identified, particularly when
they are due either to the implementation of budgetary
measures with only temporary effects or to the economic
cycle.
(i) Among the sources of temporary changes in budgets,
‘one-off’ measures taken by governments warrant par-
ticular attention because they are becoming a frequent
and sizeable feature in EU countries. It is therefore
important to take account of such measures and the rea-
sons behind them in the surveillance process. This calls
for greater transparency of budget measures and a
clearer reporting of these measures by Member States,
including in the stability and convergence programmes.
(ii) A common methodology which provides figures for
the cyclically adjusted budget balances (CABs) is used
at EU level to disentangle changes in the budget which
reflect the economic cycle from those which do not, the
latter reflecting measures decided by policy-makers. The
CABs have proved to be a very useful instrument for
assessing the Member States’ budgetary policies. How-
ever, the CABs may not reflect discretionary fiscal
adjustment efforts entirely correctly. Unexpected
changes in potential output can also have an impact on
the results. The solution proposed is a simple correction
of CAB figures, excluding the small component of the
change attributable to unexpected changes in potential
growth.
(iii) In 2004, for the third year in a row, the EU budgetary
surveillance includes an assessment of the long-term
sustainability of public finances on the basis of the
updated stability and convergence programmes. This
year greater attention has been devoted to increase the
qualitative analysis supporting the interpretation of the
results obtained, which has significantly contributed to
giving the assessment a higher information value. Over-
all, the analysis shows that risks to long-term sustainabil-
ity are still present in nine countries. In five of them
(Belgium, Greece, Italy, Germany and France) the diffi-
culties are more serious, while the others face some risks
due either to medium-term budgetary developments
(Netherlands and the UK) or to the uncertainties over the
long-term projections of pension expenditures (Spain
and Portugal). Finally, six countries (Ireland, Denmark,
Finland, Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden) seem rela-
tively well placed to meet the cost of an ageing society
on the basis of current policies.
(iv) To get a comprehensive picture of the sustainability
of public finances, liabilities other than those included in
the Maastricht definition of gross debt should be consid-
ered. Among them are the so-called ‘contingent liabili-
ties’, which correspond to government obligations that
materialise only when particular events occur. The
importance of this issue in EU budgetary surveillance
has increased over the last years and in particular after
enlargement. The stock of contingent liabilities is in fact
relatively high in new Member States. Given the various
situations and trends in the EU, increasing disclosure and
monitoring of contingent liabilities would be a useful
step towards strengthening budgetary surveillance in the
EU.
Budgetary discipline and increased growth potential 
are consistent objectives
The EU budgetary rules aim at promoting medium- and
long-term budgetary discipline so as to ensure sound
budgetary positions. However, the EU framework has
been criticised for focusing too much on disciplinary
aspects, thereby not being growth-friendly. Against this
background, the report on ‘Public finances in EMU —
2004’ looks at the questions of how fiscal discipline and
the quality of public finances contribute to growth.
The benefits of fiscal discipline
During the tense debate which took place last year about
the implementation of the EU framework for fiscal sur-
veillance, many critics stressed that it imposes an exces-3
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rimental to growth. However, these criticisms are ill-
founded. Without the progress towards fiscal discipline
accomplished in the past decade thanks to the rules-
based framework, the European economy would proba-
bly have an even more disappointing growth perform-
ance. The report on ‘Public finances in EMU — 2004’
shows that, rather than being at the expense of growth,
fiscal discipline and sound public finances contribute to
a macroeconomic environment that fosters potential
growth. A fiscal framework, by preventing protracted
fiscal deficits, avoids the negative impact which such
deficits have on future income.
The mechanism at work is quite straightforward. When
deficits are protracted, a reduction in national savings
will follow. In turn, this translates either into a reduction
in private investment, or into a worsening of the current
account, or both. The extent of private investment
crowding-out will depend upon the sensitivity of
national savings to interest rates and the degree of inter-
national capital mobility, while the behaviour of govern-
ment investment will mainly depend upon the allocation
of total expenditure and the extent to which deficits are
used to finance current or capital expenditure. The real
issue, then, is not whether a loss of fiscal discipline will
translate over the medium term into lower future
incomes but by how much and through which channels.
Protracted budget deficits primarily reduce capital accu-
mulation and income prospects, mainly via higher inter-
est rates. The report on ‘Public finances in EMU —
2004’ shows, in line with empirical evidence, that an
additional deficit of 1 percentage point of GDP in euro-
area countries is on average associated with an increase
in the spread in the interest rate between long and short-
term government bonds of 15–20 basis points. Although
small, this increase is likely to have negative effects on
investment, which is influenced by long-term interest
rates, among other factors.
In addition, the analysis suggests that protracted large
budget imbalances in countries with high current
account deficits may be a cause of delay in the external
adjustment. This concern is of special importance for
new Member States, most of which have in recent years
been recording relatively large budget deficits coupled
with external imbalances. Though the latter may be
explained by catching-up dynamics, keeping budget def-
icits under control will be essential in order to maintain
stable currencies within ERM II as a necessary step
towards joining EMU.
In the debate about the EU fiscal framework, little analy-
sis has been conducted on the quantitative impact that
the presence of the framework has exerted on budget bal-
ances in EU countries. Simulations with the European
Commission QUEST II model indicate that, in the
absence of the EU fiscal framework, primary budget def-
icits for the euro area would have been higher by almost
0.9 GDP points per year over the 1994–2003 period.
This suggests that the EU fiscal framework has contrib-
uted to avoiding a sizeable build-up of euro-area govern-
ment debt, which in 2003 would have been about 8 GDP
percentage points higher than now. Furthermore, the
simulations suggest that higher deficits in the euro area
would have initially increased the income level by at
most half a percentage point of GDP, but this small
effect would have faded away quickly. However, taking
into account the impact of debt on risk premia, results
indicate that the gains from an absence of fiscal disci-
pline would have been even smaller in the short run and
negative in the medium term.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the budgetary adjust-
ment in the 1990s induced by the EU fiscal framework
implied a reduction in growth of limited magnitude and
duration but laid the foundations for better growth pros-
pects. In the absence of the framework, higher deficits
would have crowded out private investment and further
reduced potential growth compared with current figures.
Improving the quality of public finances
In view of the importance attached by the Lisbon strat-
egy to the quality of public finances, reflected in the
broad economic policy guidelines as well as in other
processes such as the employment guidelines and the
open method of coordination, the report on ‘Public
finances in EMU — 2004’ endeavours to clarify the role
of the quality of public finances within the EU frame-
work for economic policy coordination and investigate
possibilities for improving the quality of public finances
in practice.
Generally accepted definitions of quality are not avail-
able. The report uses a broad concept, whereby quality of
public finances concerns the allocation of resources and
the efficient and effective use of those resources in rela-
tion to identified strategic priorities. Regarding the latter,
for instance the EU Lisbon strategy identifies sustainable4
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tiveness as strategic priorities. A full discussion address-
ing the quality of public finances with respect to all these
aims is beyond the scope of the report. Therefore, as a
starting point for further and more complete analyses
and while recognising the partial nature of such an exer-
cise, it mainly focuses on the link between fiscal policy
and long-term growth. Accordingly, the report starts by
reviewing the recent literature on the link between the
composition of expenditure and revenue and long-term
growth. The findings of existing studies confirm the
importance of taking into account both the costs (i.e.
higher taxation) and benefits (i.e. reaching policy objec-
tives) of public spending. The major difficulties that
empirical studies have encountered concern the distinc-
tion between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ expendi-
ture. Although there is a certain degree of agreement that
a few categories of public expenditure can quite safely
be included among ‘productive’ public expenditures
because they are directly aimed at productivity improve-
ments (e.g. R & D, education and infrastructure invest-
ment) there is no consensus among researchers concern-
ing the impact of most expenditure items on long-term
growth and its timing. This lack of consensus is reflected
by the fact that available estimates of ‘productive’
expenditure in the EU range between 5 and 44 % of total
public expenditure.
In the light of these difficulties, the analysis of the com-
position of public expenditure across EU countries
focuses on what the changes in the compositions have
been and what factors drive these changes. Generally,
over the last decade social protection and healthcare
expenditure increased their share in total expenditure,
while the latter expressed as a share of GDP has gone
down. This suggests that the main drivers of expenditure
recomposition over the medium-/long-term are related to
underlying upward pressures such as those resulting
from ageing and that any framework for the definition of
strategic expenditure priorities must take such long-term
trends into account.
In recent years, several Member States have introduced
medium-term frameworks for expenditure control and
reforms to the budgetary process that aim at achieving
priorities in the most efficient and effective way by link-
ing public expenditure to policy outcomes (perform-
ance-budgeting). The analysis shows that, in countries
with more effective control of public expenditure, fiscal
consolidation in the run-up to EMU has been mainly
based on containing expenditure, rather than on raising
revenues, thereby contributing to a better long-run
growth performance.
Overall, this analysis implies that the allocation of
resources and the monitoring of action undertaken to
pursue identified priorities should have a greater role in
the analysis and conduct of fiscal policy. To this end, the
BEPGs should contribute more effectively, as well as
other EU processes, to improve the quality of public
finances.
Progress should include, first, the exchange of informa-
tion on how strategic priorities have been fixed with
respect to national budgets and what the experiences
with implementing them have been. Secondly, further
improvements in data availability are needed — in par-
ticular regarding the functional classification of govern-
ment expenditure — since this is a necessary condition
for an appropriate analysis of the contribution of public
finances to agreed priorities. Thirdly, a proper design
and implementation of medium-term expenditure frame-
works and progress in cost-benefit analysis and perform-
ance budgeting would help to improve both the control
and allocation of existing funds.
Finally, a contribution to the quality of public finances
can be given by the Union’s initiative for growth,
through which the European Council has established a
roadmap for increased investment at EU level in physi-
cal and human capital to complement structural reform.
Serious engagement by the EU institutions and Member
States is required in order to ensure that financially and
economically viable projects of major relevance are
undertaken in a sustained and timely way.
Strengthening the EU framework 
for economic governance
In 2003, the need for further and more decisive progress
in the EU framework for economic governance was
highlighted by the difficulties in maintaining budgetary
discipline and by the persistently low growth. In spite of
important advances made in budgetary surveillance, fur-
ther efforts are needed to improve the quality of public
finances and ensure fiscal discipline. In particular, a
number of issues that have arisen with the implementa-
tion of the EU framework for economic coordination and
fiscal surveillance deserve further attention as dealing
with them may strengthen the contribution of public
finances to growth and employment.5
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nomic policies in the EU have proven ineffective at
times and the EU coordination framework for economic
policy has been perceived as focusing almost exclusively
on achieving and maintaining balanced budgets. This
may be due to the weak link between the guidelines pro-
vided on economic policies and those on fiscal policy
(i.e. the links between the BEPGs and the Pact) and to
the different levels of stringency of the two processes.
This weak link between the two processes makes it more
difficult to look at fiscal policy in terms simultaneously
of fiscal discipline (budgetary balances) and of the con-
tribution of fiscal policy to growth and employment
(composition of the budget). In addition, it often appears
that the policy guidelines have a limited influence on
national budgets or on the priorities for the EU budget.
Secondly, the procedural and numerical rules which aim
at ensuring fiscal discipline as an instrument for higher
growth and stability have shown shortcomings. The
framework lacks both incentives for prudent behaviour
in good times and rewards for countries with sound
underlying budgetary positions. In some cases, the
framework has not been stringent enough. As a conse-
quence, some countries have not reduced their debt level
as fast as expected at the start of EMU, while others have
moved back to deficit levels above those required for
adopting the euro. The strict timetable and conditions
spelled out by the SGP concerning the excessive deficit
procedure have proven to be complex to implement.
These developments showed that both the framework
which applies to the conduct of national fiscal policies
and the processes underlying the coordination of eco-
nomic policies in the EU need to be reassessed. Making
the EMU macroeconomic framework more effective
would contribute to progress towards the objective of
higher growth. In this endeavour, the right balance has to
be found between the need to keep the economic govern-
ance framework stable and predictable and to improve
the system on the basis of past experience.
Various parts of the report on ‘Public finances in EMU
— 2004’ deal with these issues, without being either
conclusive or exhaustive.
Firstly, the economic arguments presented above show
that, by fostering discipline and quality in public
finances, the Treaty — with its numerical and procedural
rules — does make an important contribution to growth
while allowing room for a proper implementation of the
Lisbon strategy.
Secondly, as the Commission has put forward in its com-
munication on financial perspectives, the BEPGs could
assume a more prominent role in economic policy coor-
dination by providing better fiscal guidance to Member
States, therefore supporting the conduct of national pol-
icies and the definition of budgets. One possibility could
be to bring the national budgetary policy coordination
calendars more into line with the general policy coordi-
nation cycle, for example by having an EU six-month
period in which policy guidance would be formulated
and issued followed by a national six-month period dur-
ing which Member States would follow up. This would
also make it possible to set fiscal policy in the broader
context of increasing growth potential and addressing
the quality and sustainability of public finances.
Thirdly, in its communication of November 2002, the
Commission already expressed the importance of
improving the interpretation of the fiscal rules, in order
to take debt developments and country-specific circum-
stances more into account. The report on ‘Public
finances in EMU — 2004’ examines several options
such as: taking more account of growth developments, in
particular of protracted slowdowns, in the implementa-
tion of the procedures, including in the application of the
deficit criterion and in setting the deadlines for correct-
ing the excessive deficit; and increasing the focus on
debt in the surveillance of budgetary developments. The
report also elaborates on the concept, put forward in the
‘Public finances report 2001’, of reworking the defini-
tion of the medium-term objective for fiscal policy, to
cater for other (country-specific) circumstances and con-
sider debt levels and the overall sustainability of public
finances while ensuring that deficits remain below 3 %
of GDP in normal circumstances. It reviews other
options to improve the functioning of the SGP such as
strengthening the incentives to conduct prudent and
symmetric-over-the-cycle policies and achieve surpluses
in good times, or ensuring early action to correct inade-
quate developments. The report indicates that improving
the knowledge of government budgetary positions —
through the analysis of all elements which underlie bor-
rowing requirements and balance sheets and through a
reinforcement of the statistical framework — also
appears to be important. For the credibility and smooth
operation of the fiscal framework, the reliability of fiscal
statistics is crucial. To this end, it highlights the impor-
tance of strong monitoring of the quality of reported fis-6
S u m m a r y  a n d  m a i n  c o n c l u s i o n scal data and of consistency between the status and pre-
rogatives of national statistical authorities and their task
of ensuring the reliability and timeliness of statistics. To
this end the Council conclusions of 2 June 2004 lay
down minimum European standards for the institutional
set-up of statistical authorities. Full transparency will
allow the financial markets to better assess the credit-
worthiness of the different Member States.
Finally, the report addresses issues of enforcement at
both Community and national level. At Community
level, it recalls the advantages of clarifying the authority
and the instruments entrusted respectively to the Com-
mission and to the Council. The Commission’s role in
assessing developments and determining policy recom-
mendations contributes to efficiency. A better articula-
tion and differentiation of roles in the application of the
SGP resulting from changes agreed in the European
Constitution (such as the capacity of the Commission to
issue a formal ‘early warning’ directly and to adopt pro-
posals for the Council decisions launching the excessive
deficit procedure) is an important first step. The report
recalls the merits of the Community’s, and in particular
the Commission’s, power to effectively monitor the
application of the fiscal rules by Member States, espe-
cially concerning the preventive element of the frame-
work. At national level, it underlines the importance that
Member States ensure that institutions are appropriate to
the task of ensuring sustainable public finances. This
involves both improving budgetary procedures and
favouring the dialogue among all actors concerned. In
this context the role played in some Member States by
national counterparts for the monitoring function ful-
filled by the Commission at EU level appears relevant.
The Commission will build on the analysis presented in
this report and proceed with consultations, with the
objective to moving towards specific formal proposals
for rejuvenating the SGP and strengthening economic
governance.7

Part I
Current developments and prospects

Summary
In 2003, the fiscal deficit for the euro area continued to
increase for a third consecutive year, mainly reflecting
lower growth than previously expected. The nominal
deficit rose from 2.3 % of GDP in 2002 to 2.7 % of GDP
in 2003 and is, according to the latest Commission fore-
casts, projected to be roughly unchanged in 2004 and
2005. However, this aggregate outcome results from
diverse budgetary performances across Member States.
In 2003, five euro-area countries had budget positions in
balance or in surplus, both in nominal and cyclically
adjusted terms. In contrast, in four euro-area Member
States actual deficits were equal to or above 3 % of GDP
in 2003.
In Germany, despite significant consolidation efforts,
the general government deficit continued to deteriorate.
The actual deficit increased from 3.5 % of GDP in 2002
to 3.9 % of GDP in 2003. The deficit is projected to
remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004 and drop slightly
below 3 % in 2005. The actual deficit continued to dete-
riorate rapidly also in France, where it reached 4.1 % of
GDP in 2003. According to the latest Commission fore-
casts, the actual deficit should remain well above the 3 %
of GDP reference value also in 2004 and 2005. Portugal
managed to reduce the actual deficit below 3 % of GDP
in 2003 (to 2.8 % of GDP), as requested in the recom-
mendations made by the Council. The Portuguese
authorities continued, however, to rely on sizeable one-
off measures and on the basis of the current policies, Por-
tugal is projected to breach the threshold again in 2004.
The deficit remained high in Italy, at 2.4 % of GDP in
2003, in spite of sizeable one-off measures. The deficit
is projected to breach the 3 % of GDP reference value by
2004 and to approach 4 % of GDP in 2005. In the Neth-
erlands, the nominal deficit in 2003 amounted to 3.2 %
of GDP. Recent forecasts show an even higher deficit for
2004 at 3.5 % of GDP, which should decline to 3.3 % of
GDP in 2005. The nominal deficit has worsened sharply
in Greece, reaching 3.2 % of GDP in 2003 and, after
breaching the reference value in 2004, it is expected to
decline slightly below the reference value in 2005. Out-
side the euro area, nominal deficits breached the refer-
ence value in the UK (3.2 % of GDP in 2003), Cyprus
(6.3 %), the Czech Republic (12.9 %), Hungary (5.9 %),
Malta (9.7 %), Poland (4.1 %) and Slovakia (3.6 %). On
a more positive note, compared to the previous year the
nominal budget balances in 2003 in the euro area
improved in Belgium (improvement of 0.1 percentage
points (p.p.)), Spain (0.3 p.p.) and Ireland (0.4 p.p.). Out-
side the euro area, similar developments can be men-
tioned for Estonia (0.8 p.p.), Latvia (0.9 p.p.), Hungary
(3.4 p.p.), Slovenia (0.1 p.p.), Slovakia (2.1 p.p.) and
Sweden (0.7 p.p.).
In cyclically adjusted terms, the deficit in the euro area
decreased slightly in 2003 but remained high at 2.2 % of
GDP. In particular, it remained high in Germany and
France, while it deteriorated in Greece, Austria and the
UK. According to the latest Commission forecasts, the
cyclically adjusted balances (CABs) in the euro area and
EU-15 are projected to be roughly unchanged in 2004
and 2005. The budgetary consolidation process seems
therefore to have stalled. Past experience shows, how-
ever, that efforts to improve the underlying budget posi-
tions should be made as economic conditions recover in
order to ensure sufficient room for the automatic stabilis-
ers to operate when necessary.
After several years of moderate decline followed by a
stabilisation in 2002, the euro-area government debt/
GDP ratio increased to 70.4 % in 2003 and in EU-15 to
64.0 %. According to the Commission’s spring 2004
forecasts, the debt ratio is projected to increase slightly
in 2004 to 70.9 % of GDP and remain at the same level
in 2005. The aggregate average debt ratio in the new
Member States is lower than in the euro area. The ratio
is nevertheless projected to increase somewhat and reach
45.2 % of GDP in 2005. Among them, improvement is
expected only in Estonia and Hungary.11
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latest updates of the stability and convergence pro-
gramme, improve its CAB by slightly less than the
required 0.5 p.p. of GDP per year in the coming years.
Thus, a close-to-balance position in cyclically adjusted
terms would almost be reached by 2007 (– 0.7 % of
GDP). However, in the case of some Member States, the
projected budgetary adjustment is insufficient to ensure
that a close-to-balance budgetary position would be
achieved and that a sufficient safety margin to prevent a
breach of the 3 % of GDP reference value would be
reached before 2007. It should also be noted that the
medium-term objectives of some Member States are
based on growth assumptions which, in light of the Com-
mission’s spring forecast, appear to be overly optimistic.
Moreover, the implementation record of the programmes
has, in several cases, been below expectations, leading to
a repeated postponement of the achievement of the close-
to-balance objective. Budgetary targets set in the updates
seem, in some cases, to be too optimistic, even with
growth rates as expected in the updates. It is vital for
Member States to reach the SGP’s medium-term target in
order to ensure that the automatic stabilisers work freely
and to decrease the risk of unsustainable public finances
in light of ageing populations.
As far as the medium-term plans of the new Member
States are concerned, all the May 2004 convergence pro-
grammes foresee favourable growth prospects to be con-
tinued over the entire programme horizon. According to
the countries’ own estimates reported in the convergence
programmes, the expected development in the projection
period indicates a substantial consolidation of public
finances for all of them. Thus, by 2007, only the Czech
Republic and Hungary foresee general government defi-
cits still above the 3 % of GDP reference value. Particu-
larly strong deficit reductions are expected in the
countries with initially high deficits, such as Cyprus,
Malta and Hungary. Following a different path, Estonia
plans to move from the 2003 government surplus down to
balance in 2005. In contrast, Poland’s consolidation
endeavour looks backloaded as the government is still
pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy in 2004, hence
generating further deficit increases in the early years of
the programme, compensated by a consolidation between
2005 and 2007. According to the convergence pro-
grammes, all the new Member States except Latvia and
Lithuania are expected to improve their structural bal-
ances by 2007. Nevertheless, in Slovakia, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, the structural deficits are forecast to
stand at or above 3 % of GDP in 2007.
For the third year in a row, the EU budgetary surveil-
lance includes an assessment of the sustainability of pub-
lic finances on the basis of the updated stability and con-
vergence programmes submitted by EU-15 in late 2003.
This year’s assessment confirms the track record of con-
tinuous improvements in the way the sustainability is
assessed. For the quantitative indicators, the cyclical
component of the budget has been netted out in the first
year of the projection, so the long-term projections are
only affected by the more structural components of the
budget. Also, greater attention has been devoted this
year to qualitative features when making the assessment,
which has alleviated the mechanistic interpretation of the
results obtained and given the assessment a significantly
higher information value. Overall, the analysis shows
that risks to long-term sustainability are still present in
nine countries, in five of which (Belgium, Greece, Italy,
Germany and France) the difficulties are more serious,
while the other four (Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands
and the UK) face some risks from medium-term budget-
ary developments or from uncertainties over the long-
term projections of pension expenditures (Spain and Por-
tugal). Finally, six countries (Ireland, Denmark, Finland,
Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden) seem relatively well
placed to meet the cost of an ageing society, but never-
theless face budgetary challenges as a result of ageing
populations.12
1. Budgetary developments in the euro area 
and EU Member States
1.1. Short-term developments 
and prospects for the budget balance 
and public debt
In 2003, the budgetary position in the euro area deterio-
rated for the third year in a row (see Table I.1). Com-
pared to 2002, the nominal deficit increased by 0.4 per-
centage points and reached 2.7 % of GDP. This
development is largely explained by the functioning of
the automatic stabilisers in a macroeconomic environ-
ment which was considerably less favourable than previ-
ously expected. The aggregate nominal deficit also
worsened in the case of the new Member States (NMS)
by 0.8 percentage points and reached 5.7 % of GDP in
2003 (see Table I.2). Accordingly, the aggregate deficit
for EU-25 as a whole amounted to 2.7 % of GDP.
The aggregate outcome for the euro area as a whole
results from diverse budgetary performances across
Member States. In the case of Germany, France, Italy
and Portugal the budgetary positions in 2003 remained
weak with nominal deficits ranging from 2.4 % of GDP
in Italy to 4.1 % of GDP in France. As a result of the
developments in the course of 2002, Germany and
France have remained in excessive deficit positions,
while in Portugal, the deficit has been kept just under the
3 % of GDP reference value despite a shrinking econ-
omy (see Part II.2.3 of this report). In 2003, the nominal
deficit has also sharply deteriorated in the Netherlands
and Greece, and outside the euro area, in the UK, reach-
ing 3.2 % of GDP. Nevertheless, in spite of a protracted
period of low growth, seven EU-15 Member States, of
which five are euro-area countries, had nominal budget
positions in balance or in surplus. Overall, the nominal
budget balances in 2003 did not worsen (or did so only
marginally) compared to the previous year in the case of
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, Italy and as
already mentioned, in Portugal, although for the latter
two this is mainly due to sizeable one-off measures
amounting to around 2 % of GDP in each country.
The budgetary performance also differed across the
NMS. Nominal budget balances in 2003 varied from a
deficit of 12.9 % of GDP in the Czech Republic to a sur-
plus of 2.6 % of GDP in Estonia. In the case of Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slova-
kia, the nominal deficit in 2003 was above the reference
value of 3 % of GDP, and only Estonia had a surplus
budgetary position. Relative to 2002, the budget position
remained roughly unchanged or improved in four coun-
tries, while it deteriorated in Cyprus, the Czech Repub-
lic, Lithuania, Malta and Poland. The improvement was
particularly important in Hungary and Slovakia.
Looking ahead to 2004 and 2005, the Commission’s spring
2004 forecasts project that economic growth in the euro
area as a whole will return to potential by the end of 2004.
The nominal budget balance is expected to remain roughly
unchanged in 2004 as well as 2005. In light of an improve-
ment of the economic situation coupled with budgetary
consolidation, the aggregate nominal deficit for the NMS
is foreseen to decline to 5.0 % of GDP in 2004 and 4.2 %
of GDP in 2005. As a result, the aggregate budget position
for the EU as a whole would slightly improve during the
forecast period and reach 2.5 % of GDP in 2005.
At the Member State level, the budgetary positions in the
case of Belgium and Ireland are expected to deteriorate
into deficit positions in 2004. Under a no-policy-change
assumption, the deficits in both countries would con-
tinue to worsen in 2005. In contrast, Spain, Finland,
Denmark and Sweden are expected to maintain their
budgetary positions in surplus throughout the forecast
period. Among the NMS, this is also the case for Estonia.
On the basis of current policies, the Commission forecasts
project that the nominal deficits in Germany, Greece,13
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ing the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2004 and, except
Germany and Greece, also in 2005. In Germany, the nom-
inal deficit is projected to remain above 3 % of GDP in
2004 and move slightly below the reference value in 2005.
Similarly, in Greece, the nominal deficit is expected to
breach the 3 % of GDP in 2004 and decline slightly below
the reference value in 2005. The period of weak budgetary
situation in France is being prolonged, since the nominal
deficit is expected to remain well above the 3 % of GDP
threshold also in 2005. Although Portugal appears to have
complied with the terms of the excessive deficit recom-
mendation addressed to it in 2002, the nominal deficit is
foreseen to exceed 3 % of GDP again, in both 2004 and
2005. In Italy and the Netherlands, the nominal deficits are
expected to breach the reference value in 2004 and, in the
case of Italy, to deteriorate further in 2005.
The nominal deficit is projected to be high also in other
Member States. In the UK, it is foreseen to remain well
above 2 % of GDP during the forecast period and in Aus-
tria, the nominal deficit would be around 2 % of GDP. In
the NMS, the nominal deficit is expected to decline or
remain unchanged in five countries. In the case of
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia it is, however,
projected to deteriorate in 2004 and would stabilise or
decrease only by 2005.
In cyclically adjusted terms, the deficit in the euro area
decreased slightly in 2003, but remained high at 2.2 % of
GDP. According to the Commission’s spring 2004 fore-
casts, the cyclically adjusted budget balance is projected to
remain stable in 2004 and 2005. The budgetary consolida-
tion process seems thereby to have stalled. At the Member
State level, eight EU-15 countries, of which seven are in
the euro area, are foreseen to have cyclically adjusted def-
icits above 0.5 % of GDP by 2005. Among the countries
with higher cyclically adjusted deficits, deterioration is
expected in Greece, Italy, Austria and Portugal, while
improvements are foreseen in Germany, France, the Neth-
erlands and the UK. In the cases of France and Greece, it is
still projected to be above 3 % of GDP in 2005.
After several years of moderate decline followed by a sta-
bilisation in 2002, the euro-area government debt/GDP
ratio increased to 70.4 % in 2003 (see Table I.3 and Part
II.5 in this report). The debt ratio is, according to the Com-
mission’s spring 2004 forecasts, projected to increase
slightly in 2004 to 70.9 % of GDP and remain at the same
level in 2005. The primary surplus would not offset the
combined negative contribution from interest payments
and growth. The aggregate average debt ratio in the NMS
is on average lower in comparison to the euro area. How-
ever, the ratio is projected to increase somewhat  and
Table I.1
General government budgetary position — euro area, 2000–05
(% of GDP)
2000 (1) 2001 (1) 2002 (1) 2003 2004 2005
Total receipts (1) 47.3 46.6 46.1 46.3 45.8 45.5
Total expenditure (2) 47.1 48.2 48.4 49.0 48.6 48.1
Actual balance (3) = (1) – (2) 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.6
Interest (4) 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 4.2 2.3 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.8
UTMS proceeds 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
Cyclically adjusted balance (6) – 1.9 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance = (6) + (4) 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
Change in actual balance 1.5 – 1.8 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.0 0.1
Due to: — cycle 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.1
 — UMTS 1.1 – 1.1 0.0 0.0
 — interest 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
 — cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1
(1) Including UMTS receipts. UMTS receipts as a % of GDP would be equal in 2000 to 2.5 for DE, 0.1 for ES, 1.2 for IT, 0.7 for NL, 0.4 for AT, 0.3 for PT, 2.4 for
UK, 1.1 for the euro area and 1.2 for EU-15. In 2001 they would be equal to 0.2 for BE, 0.2 for DK, 0.5 for EL, 0.1 for FR, and 0 for the euro area and EU-15. In
2002 they would be equal to 0 for FR, 0.2 for IE and 0 for the euro area and EU-15.
NB: differences are due to rounding.
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts. For a number of countries, the calculated CABs differ marginally from those of the spring forecast due to data revisions.14
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sreach 45.2 % of GDP in 2005. The large negative contri-
bution from the primary balance and interest payments/
growth would only partly be compensated by stock-flow
operations. In 2005, the debt ratio for EU-25 is hence
expected to amount to 63.4 % of GDP.
Aggregate figures tend to hide different pictures
across countries. In 2003, Belgium, Greece and Italy
continued to have debt ratios above 100 % of GDP
and this would still be the case for the latter two by
2005. In addition to these three countries, six EU-25
Member States are projected to have debt ratios above
60 % of GDP in 2005. Poor growth performance is
expected to significantly affect the budgetary situa-
tion in Germany and Austria, as well as in France,
Portugal and Malta, where in addition, large primary
deficits are projected. In Cyprus, the combined posi-
tive contribution from interest payments and growth is
more than offset by a high primary deficit and stock-
flow operations.
Table I.2
Budget balances in EU Member States, 2002–05
(% of GDP)
Budget balance Cyclically adjusted budget balance
Cyclically adjusted 
primary balance
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
BE 0.1 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.0 – 0.5 6.2 6.3 5.1 4.3
DE – 3.5 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.7
EL(1) – 1.4 – 3.2* – 3.2 – 2.8 – 1.7 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.8 4.4 2.1 1.5 1.7
ES 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 – 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.0
FR – 3.2 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 3.6 – 3.8 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.3
IE – 0.2 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.9 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.5 1.5 1.1 1.2
IT – 2.3 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 4.0 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 2.6 – 3.6 3.5 3.4 2.4 1.6
LU 2.7 – 0.1 – 2.0 – 2.3 2.7 1.3 0.6 1.2 2.9 1.5 0.8 1.3
NL – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.7
AT – 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.8 3.1 2.2 2.3 1.2
PT – 2.7 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.6 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.5
FI 4.3 2.3 2.0 2.1 3.7 2.3 2.1 2.2 5.9 4.2 3.9 3.9
EUR-12 – 2.3 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
CZ – 6.4 – 12.9 – 5.9 – 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DK 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.0 2.1 1.4 1.5 3.8 4.7 3.9 3.7
EE 1.8 2.6 0.7 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY – 4.6 – 6.3 – 4.6 – 4.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LV – 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 2.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
LT – 1.4 – 1.7 – 2.8 – 2.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HU – 9.3 – 5.9 – 4.9 – 4.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
MT – 5.7 – 9.7 – 5.9 – 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL – 3.6 – 4.1 – 6.0 – 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SI – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 1.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SK – 5.7 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SE 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.7 – 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 2.4 2.9 2.6 3.2
UK – 1.6 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 1.5 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.3 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.2
EU-25 – 2.1 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
p.m. EU-15 – 2.0 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
p.m. NMS – 4.9 – 5.7 – 5.0 – 4.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(1) For Greece, a revision of the data on general government balance was done in April 2004.
NB: Excluding UMTS receipts for Ireland in 2002.
Cyclically adjusted figures are computed with the production function method, except for Germany, Spain and Austria, where the HP filter method has been used.
For a number of countries, the calculated CABs differ marginally from those of the spring forecast due to data revisions.
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.15
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The developments in the euro-area budgetary position are
derived from changes in expenditure and revenue ratios. On
the spending side, the euro-area expenditure-to-GDP ratio
increased in 2003, both in nominal and cyclically adjusted
terms, compared to the previous year (see Table I.4), which
is mainly due to a rise in public expenditures on social trans-
fers. According to the Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts,
the expenditure ratio is projected to decline during the fore-
cast period. However, interest payments are, after several
years of decline, foreseen to remain broadly neutral. On the
revenue side, the revenue/GDP ratio slightly increased in
2003, both in nominal and cyclically adjusted terms, but is
expected to decline in the coming years.
At Member State level, the patterns are generally similar
to that of the euro area (see Table I.5). Only in Ireland
Table I.3
Composition of changes in government debt ratio in EU Member States, 2002–05 
(% of GDP)
Government debt
Change in government 
debt 2003–05
Change in 2003–05 due to:
2002 2003 2004 2005 Primary balance
Interest 
and growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 105.8 100.5 97.4 94.3 – 6.2 – 8.7 2.5 0.1
DE 60.8 64.2 65.6 66.1 1.9 0.1 2.9 – 1.1
EL 104.7 103.0 102.8 101.7 – 1.3 – 5.1 – 2.7 6.6
ES 54.6 50.8 48.0 45.1 – 5.7 – 5.6 – 1.5 1.4
FR 58.6 63.7 (1) 64.6 65.6 2.6 1.2 1.5 0.0
IE 32.3 32.0 32.4 32.6 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.1 2.7
IT 108.0 106.2 106.0 106.0 – 0.2 – 3.0 2.3 0.5
LU 5.7 4.9 4.5 3.8 – 1.1 4.1 – 0.2 – 5.0
NL 52.6 54.8 56.3 58.6 3.8 1.0 3.6 – 0.8
AT 66.6 65.0 65.5 65.3 0.3 – 3.1 1.8 1.7
PT 58.1 59.4 60.7 62.0 2.6 1.3 1.7 – 0.3
FI 42.6 45.3 44.5 44.3 – 0.9 – 7.6 0.5 6.2
EUR-12 69.2 70.4 70.9 70.9 0.5 – 1.5 1.7 0.2
CZ 28.9 37.6 40.6 42.4 4.7 8.4 – 2.1 – 1.6
DK 47.2 45.0 42.3 40.0 – 5.0 – 7.4 1.2 1.1
EE 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 0.5 1.2
CY 67.1 72.2 74.6 76.9 4.7 n.a. n.a. 4.6
LV 15.5 15.6 16.0 16.1 0.5 2.6 – 0.8 – 1.2
LT 22.8 21.9 22.8 23.2 1.3 2.8 – 0.9 – 0.5
HU 57.1 59.0 58.7 58.0 – 1.0 1.4 – 1.0 – 1.4
MT 61.7 72.0 73.9 75.9 3.8 3.6 2.9 – 4.3
PL 41.2 45.4 49.1 50.3 4.9 4.1 0.2 0.7
SI 27.8 27.1 28.3 28.2 1.1 0.2 – 0.2 1.1
SK 43.3 42.8 45.1 46.1 3.3 2.4 – 1.0 1.9
SE 52.6 51.9 51.8 50.5 – 1.3 – 5.6 0.3 4.0
UK 38.5 39.9 40.1 40.6 0.7 1.2 – 0.1 – 0.4
EU-25 61.5 63.1 63.4 63.4 0.3 – 1.0. 1.3. 0.1
p.m. EU-15 62.5 64.0 64.2 64.2 0.2 – 1.2 1.2 0.2
p.m. EU-10 39.4 42.2 44.4 45.2 3.0 3.9 1.9 – 2.9
(1) For France, this figure was notified by France after the official EDP notification of 1 March 2004.
NB: Aggregates EU-25 and EU-10 for changes in government debt due to primary balances, interest and growth contribution and stock-flow adjustment do not include
Cyprus. 
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 economic forecasts.16
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and Poland, are expenditure ratios projected to increase
over the 2003–05 period. In contrast, large decreases are
expected in Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic and
Estonia over the same period. Revenue ratios are set to
increase slightly over 2003–05 in the case of Spain and
outside the euro area, in Lithuania and Poland, whereas
important reductions are foreseen in Belgium, Italy,
Austria and Estonia (1).
In the euro area, the projected decrease in tax revenues on
income and wealth, social contributions and other
resources, is being offset by an expected decline in
expenditure on collective consumption, interests, subsi-
dies. Such a development respects lessons from the past
showing that tax measures resulting in a decline of tax rev-
enues should be accompanied by expenditure cuts to
avoid the worsening of the general government balances.
Nevertheless, the composition of expenditure adjustment
should not constrain growth-enhancing spending items
such as public investment, education and R & D. In previ-
ous years, the reduction in interest payments has particu-
larly contributed to a better allocation of available
resources. While these seem to stay at a stable level in the
forecasting period, additional savings are expected from
collective consumption, social transfers and other expen-
ditures.
1.3. The fiscal stance and policy-mix
1.3.1. The fiscal stance and policy-mix 
in the euro area
An appropriate policy-mix can be defined as a combina-
tion of monetary and fiscal policies that ensures price
stability and keeps economic activity close to its poten-
tial level. In the euro area, given that monetary policy is
centralised and fiscal policies decentralised, it is of a par-
ticular importance to assess both the aggregate fiscal
stance at the euro-area level and national fiscal stances.
Namely, the aggregate fiscal stance affects the policy-
mix at the euro-area level, and is, therefore, one of the
elements to be considered by the ECB when setting the
monetary policy. Analogously, the policy-mix for the
euro area will have an impact on the national policy-mix
via the common interest rates with repercussions on eco-
nomic developments and prospects at national level.
¥1∂ The decreasing expenditure and revenue ratios in the case of Slovakia are
based on non-consolidated figures.
Table I.4
Euro-area government revenues and expenditures, 2001–05
(% of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total revenues 46.6 46.1 46.3 45.8 45.5
 — cyclically adjusted 46.0 46.0 46.7 46.2 45.8
Taxes on imports and production 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.5 13.6
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.6 11.5
Social contributions 16.0 16.0 16.2 16.1 15.9
 of which actual social contributions 14.9 14.9 15.0 15.0 14.8
Other resources 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.5
Total expenditure 48.2 48.4 49.0 48.6 48.1
 — cyclically adjusted 48.4 48.5 49.0 48.5 48.0
Collective consumption 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.2
Social benefits in kind 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.3 12.1
Social benefits other than in kind 16.6 16.9 17.2 17.1 16.9
Interest 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4
Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.6
Other expenditures 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to General government budgetary position — euro area, 2000–05.
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.17
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2 0 0 4Graph I.1 examines the fiscal stance (approximated by
the changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance,
CAPB) in relation to cyclical conditions (approximated
by the size of the output gap) (1). In this graph, fiscal
behaviour in accordance with the SGP would be repre-
sented by movements along the horizontal axis. In other
words, countries would achieve and maintain broadly
balanced budgets over the economic cycle. Thus,
changes in the output gap would not imply movements
in the CAPB. However, as long as a Member State has
not yet reached the medium-term target of the SGP, a
restrictive fiscal stance — that is a positive change in
CAPB — would be needed for a number of years.
According to the Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts,
the euro-area fiscal stance was broadly neutral in 2003
even though the output gap deteriorated sharply. This
Table I.5
Total revenue and expenditure in EU Member States, 2002–05
(% of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
BE 50.5 51.7 49.4 48.6 50.5 51.5 49.9 49.4
DE 45.0 45.0 44.5 44.3 48.5 48.9 48.0 47.1
EL 45.3 44.2 44.0 44.1 46.7 47.1 47.2 46.9
ES 39.9 39.9 40.0 40.1 39.9 39.5 39.6 39.5
FR 50.2 50.6 50.7 50.5 53.5 54.7 54.4 54.1
IE 33.1 34.6 34.3 33.7 33.3 34.3 35.1 34.7
IT 45.6 46.5 45.4 44.7 47.9 48.9 48.7 48.7
LU 47.0 47.1 46.8 46.8 44.3 47.3 48.8 49.1
NL 45.9 45.6 45.1 44.8 47.8 48.8 48.6 48.1
AT 51.0 49.9 49.5 47.7 51.2 51.0 50.7 49.7
PT 43.4 44.6 43.2 43.0 46.1 47.5 46.6 46.9
FI 54.4 52.7 52.6 52.2 50.1 50.5 50.7 50.1
EUR-12 46.1 46.3 45.8 45.5 48.4 49.0 48.6 48.1
CZ 45.6 45.0 45.0 44.1 52.0 57.9 50.9 49.2
DK 57.3 57.5 56.9 56.2 54.9 55.4 55.8 54.7
EE 39.6 41.2 43.4 42.2 37.9 38.6 42.8 42.2
CY n.a. n.a. 37.5 37.6 n.a. n.a. 42.1 41.7
LV 41.9 41.5 39.6 38.4 44.6 43.3 41.8 40.4
LT 33.8 33.9 34.7 34.7 35.2 35.6 37.4 37.3
HU 45.0 44.8 47.1 46.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
MT n.a. n.a. 40.2 40.4 n.a. n.a. 45.3 44.0
PL 41.3 41.0 40.8 41.2 44.9 45.1 46.8 45.7
SI n.a. n.a. 42.3 42.3 n.a. n.a. 44.0 44.0
SK 45.2 49.1 42.0 43.1 50.9 52.7 46.1 47.0
SE 58.1 59.5 59.1 58.9 58.1 58.8 58.9 58.3
UK 39.5 39.6 39.1 39.2 41.1 42.8 41.8 41.8
EU-25 n.a. n.a. 45.1 44.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
p.m. EU-15 45.5 45.8 45.2 45.0 47.5 48.4 47.8 47.4
p.m. EU-10 n.a. n.a. 42.5 42.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NB: Including UMTS receipts, see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
¥1∂ In line with the Council agreement, the output gap in this section is com-
puted with the production function method. It should be noted, however,
that changes in the output gap are equally relevant for the judgement of the
stance in relation to cyclical conditions. The changes in the gap can be
inferred in Graph I.1 by looking at the horizontal distance between years.18
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in a context of a large positive output gap in 2000 that
worsened in 2001 and 2002. Looking ahead to 2004 and
2005, the euro-area fiscal stance is projected to continue
to be broadly neutral (1). Lessons from the past show,
however, that efforts to improve the underlying budget
positions should be made as economic conditions
improve, in order to ensure sufficient room for the auto-
matic stabilisers to operate in the next downturn.
Graph I.2 illustrates the euro-area policy-mix, by plot-
ting the fiscal stance on the vertical axis and the mone-
tary stance (approximated by the change in the short-
term real interest rates) on the horizontal axis. Against
the background of a protracted slowdown in economic
activity, the monetary stance continued to loosen in
2003, although less than the year before. Overall, in
2003, the euro-area fiscal stance could be seen as neutral,
coupled with the growth-supportive monetary stance
thus contributing to a recovery of economic activity and
closing of the output gap. The policy-mix in the early
years of EMU has therefore been broadly appropriate to
support growth-enhancing economic conditions and
macroeconomic stability.
1.3.2. The fiscal stance and policy-mix 
at the national level
The aggregate fiscal stance for the euro-area results from
quite diverse fiscal stances across Member States,
despite fairly similar cyclical developments. Graph I.3
shows that most EU countries recorded a negative output
gap in 2003, with the exception of Greece, Ireland
(where it sharply deteriorated) and Sweden.
In 2003, several EU countries ran moderately counter-
cyclical or broadly neutral fiscal policies in a context of
negative output gaps. Policies were, however, clearly
counter-cyclical in the case of Luxembourg, Austria and
the UK. It is worth mentioning that the nominal budget
balances in these countries markedly worsened in the
course of 2003. Finland, which was benefiting from past
consolidation efforts and therefore had a large safety
margin, was also easing the fiscal stance.
The Netherlands and Portugal ran somewhat pro-cycli-
cal policies in 2003, reflecting consolidation efforts in
¥1∂ The forecasted potential growth rate in the euro area for 2004 is 2 % (the
Commission’s spring 2004 forecast).
Graph I.1:   Euro-area fiscal stance and cyclical conditions, 1999–2005
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
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2 0 0 4order to keep the nominal deficits below the 3 % of GDP
reference value. Denmark and Ireland tightened their fis-
cal stance, while the output gap quickly deteriorated.
Greece stands out for loosening the fiscal stance in spite
of a large positive output gap.
As pointed out above, the overall policy-mix in the euro
area has been slightly accommodative in 2003 with most
Member States experiencing a broadly neutral fiscal
stance accompanied by declining real interest rates (see
Graph I.4). The real interest rates fell in all countries,
with the exception of Finland.
While Graph I.4 refers to the changes in the real short-
term interest rates, its level is equally important when
assessing the policy-mix. After the reductions in the
nominal interest rate decided by the ECB in the course of
2003, the real interest rate for the euro area (i.e. the short-
term interest rate corrected by private consumption infla-
tion) amounted to 0.4 % in 2003. However, this aggre-
gate figure for the euro area conceals significant differ-
ences across Member States due to disparities in
inflation rates across countries. The real interest rates in
Germany and Austria were around 1 %, whereas in a
number of countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal) the interest rates were nega-
tive.
Regarding 2004, the fiscal stance is expected to be
broadly neutral in most Member States (see Graph I.5).
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Denmark are, however,
projected to loosen their fiscal stance, in the case of Italy,
as a result of the expiry of the one-off measures. Greece
is projected to continue the loosening of its fiscal stance
also in 2004, even though the output gap is expected to
be positive.             
Graph I.2:  Euro-area policy-mix, 1999–2003
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
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C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sGraph I.3:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in EU Member States, 2003
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
Graph I.4:  Policy-mix in EU Member States, 2003
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
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2 0 0 4Graph I.5:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in EU Member States, 2004
Source: Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts.
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2. Overview of the 2003 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes
2.1. The medium-term budgetary targets
The examination of the fifth round of updates of stability
and convergence programmes, covering the period up to
2007, was completed by March 2004.
In order to make an assessment of the budgetary targets
set by Member States in the 2003 updates of the pro-
grammes, it is necessary to examine the growth assump-
tions upon which the budgetary commitments are made.
Economic growth is, according to the updates, projected
to recover gradually over the coming years. The average
GDP growth in the euro area is expected to pick up to
2.0 % in 2004 and to reach around 2.5 % in 2005 and the
following years (see Table I.6).
In comparison with the 2002 updates of the programmes,
growth projections have been revised downwards (see
the lower half of Table I.6 and Table I.7).
The negative revisions concern the whole period, but in
particular 2003. Nevertheless, growth projections are still
more favourable than the Commission’s autumn 2003
forecasts, by on average 0.2 percentage points per year
between 2003 and 2005. This has been the case for the
previous updates as well (1). The growth projections also
seem to be optimistic in comparison to the Commission’s
spring 2004 forecasts (see last row of Table I.6).
The aggregate potential GDP growth in the euro area is
projected to be stable, around 2.1 %, throughout the pro-
gramme period. Accordingly, the euro-area output gap
would be – 1.1 percentage points of potential GDP in
2003, widen further in 2004 to – 1.2 % and thereafter
decrease in 2005 and onwards (see Graph I.6). In compar-
ison to the 2002 updates, the slowdown is projected to be
protracted with a more sizeable negative output gap that
does not fully disappear within the programme period.
Based on these growth assumptions, the nominal deficit in
the euro area would, according to the updated pro-
grammes, amount to 2.7 % of GDP in 2003, which is
almost 1 percentage point of GDP higher compared to the
previous updates (see Table I.8). The nominal deficit is,
however, projected to be gradually reduced to below 1 %
of GDP by 2007. The overall improvement relies strongly
on the budgetary consolidation projected in the large
Member States, such as Germany (2.5 percentage points
of GDP over the next four years), France (2.5 percentage
points) and Italy (2.5 percentage points). The excessive
deficits in Germany and France are foreseen to be cor-
rected by 2005 in the respective stability programme. Also
Greece, the Netherlands, and outside the euro area, Swe-
den and the UK foresee important improvements in the
budget balance. Ireland and Luxembourg are the only
Member States that project a budgetary deterioration
between 2003 and the end of the programme period.
A comparison between the projections provided by the
Member States (the left panel of Table I.8) and the Com-
mission’s autumn 2003 and spring 2004 forecasts (right
panels) shows that most updates are more optimistic
about budgetary developments in 2004 and 2005 than
the Commission forecasts, in particular those of Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The only countries
projecting less favourable budgetary developments are
Spain, Ireland and Finland reflecting among other things
more cautious growth assumptions.
The differences in budget balance projections between
the updates and the Commission forecasts are particu-
larly relevant for 2005. One obvious explanation for this
is that the budgetary projections in several programmes
are based on more optimistic growth assumptions. More-
¥1∂ The difference in the real GDP growth for the euro area between the 2001,
2002 and 2003 updates of the stability programmes and the Commission’s
autumn forecasts has for each period been on average 0.2 percentage
points of GDP.23
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projections intended policy measures, whereas the Com-
mission forecasts for 2005 are on a no-policy-change
basis.
All countries, except Spain, provided figures for the
CABs in the updates of the programmes (see left panel
of Table I.9). The central panel of Table I.9 shows the
CAB derived by the Commission, on the basis of the fig-
ures provided by Member States in the updates.
According to these figures, the cyclically adjusted deficit
for the euro area, which amounted to 2.1 % of GDP in
2003, is projected to improve by on average 0.4 percent-
age points of GDP annually in the coming years. This is
clearly more optimistic than the Commission forecasts.
According to the Commission calculations, of the eight
euro-area countries showing a cyclically adjusted deficit
in 2003, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria are
projecting to be in a close-to-balance position by 2007.
Some deficit countries plan to achieve an annual adjust-
ment in cyclically adjusted terms of 0.5 percentage
points of GDP over the coming years. However, the pro-
jected budgetary adjustment is in some cases insufficient
to ensure that a budgetary position close-to-balance is
achieved within the programme period and that a suffi-
cient safety margin to prevent a breach of the 3 % of
GDP reference value is reached before 2007.
Particular attention should be paid to the planned adjust-
ments in Member States in excessive deficits positions.
At the Ecofin Council of 25 November 2003, Germany
and France committed to reducing the cyclically
adjusted budget deficit by specified amounts. Respec-
tively, for 2004 and 2005, the adjustment in Germany
should be of at least 0.6 and 0.5 percentage points of
GDP, while in France of at least 0.8 and 0.6 percentage
points of GDP. According to the Commission calcula-
tions, Germany projects an improvement in the CAB by
0.7 and 0.4 percentage points of GDP in 2004 and 2005,
respectively. Concerning France, the Commission calcu-
lations indicate improvements in the CAB of 0.6 per-
centage points of GDP for both 2004 and 2005. In Portu-
gal the projected improvement in the CAB is, according
to the Commission calculations, slightly lower than the
Table I.6
Euro area: Growth projections and macroeconomic developments in the 2003 updates (percentage change on 
preceding year) and comparison with the 2002 updates and the Commission forecasts
(% of GDP)
Macroeconomic developments 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2003 updates of the stability programmes
Real GDP growth 0.9 0.6 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.5
GDP deflator 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
HICP change 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
employment growth 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.1
labour productivity growth 0.5 0.8 1.7
2002 updates of the stability programmes
Real GDP growth 1.0 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.6
Difference with the 2003 updates (1) – 0.1 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.1
Commission’s autumn 2002 forecast
Real GDP growth 0.9 0.4 1.8 2.3
Difference with the 2003 updates (1) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Commission’s spring 2004 forecast
Real GDP growth 0.9 0.4 1.7 2.3
Difference with the 2003 updates (1) 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2
(1) A positive value implies a higher growth forecast in the 2003 updates.
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding. The growth rates used for France are based on the cautious scenario. Since figures for the HICP were
not available in the German programme, the Commission forecasts have been used in order to obtain a representative aggregate. In the case of Greece (for 2004–
06) and Spain the private consumption deflator was used instead of the HICP.
Source: Commission services.24
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GDP growth projections in the 2003 updates
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Revision (1)
BE 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.8 2.5 2.1 – 0.5
DE 0.2 – 0.1 1.7 2.25 2.25 2.25 – 0.7
EL 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.8 0.2
ES 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 – 0.2
FR 1.2 0.5 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 – 0.9
IE 6.9 2.2 3.3 4.7 5.2 – 0.8
IT 0.4 0.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 – 1.2
LU 1.3 1.2 2.0 3.0 3.8 – 0.2
NL 0.2 0.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 – 0.9
AT 1.4 0.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 – 0.2
PT 0.4 – 0.8 1.0 2.5 2.8 3.0 – 1.5
FI 2.2 1.4 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 – 0.4
EUR-12 0.9 0.6 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.5 – 0.8
DK 2.1 1.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 0.1
SE 1.9 1.4 2.0 2.6 2.5 – 0.4
UK (2) 1.75 2.0 3.25 3.25 2.75 – 0.2
EU-15 1.1 0.9 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 – 0.6
(1) Difference with respect to the 2002 updates in average growth over 2003–05.
(2) Mid-point of the range provided in the programme.
Graph I.6:  Real and potential GDP growth and the output gap for the euro area derived 
from the 2003 updates, 2003–07
NB: Potential GDP growth and output gap calculated by the Commission on the basis of the data provided in the updates.
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2 0 0 4required minimum of 0.5 percentage points of GDP per
year. However, a close-to-balance position in cyclically
adjusted terms is almost reached by the end of the period.
The development in the general government balance
can be decomposed by sectors of government (see
Table I.10) (1). For the euro area as a whole, the budget
deficit of the general government is mainly the result of
a large deficit for the central government, with a far
smaller deficit for the local governments. The social
security sector is estimated to record a small surplus, in
particular in the case of Luxembourg, Finland and, out-
side the euro area, Sweden. France is the only Member
State expecting a deficit in the social security sector.
The government debt/GDP ratio in the euro area is, after
the increase recorded in 2003, projected to gradually
decline to just below 68 % of GDP by 2007 (see
Table I.11). The adjustment path is, however, slower in
comparison to the 2002 updates due to smaller primary
surpluses and lower nominal GDP growth.
Table I.11 shows also that the estimated stock-flow com-
ponent on average increases the debt ratio over the pro-
gramme period. Inter alia, this could stem from plans to
build up financial assets in some countries (for example
public pension reserve funds which are invested in non-
governmental assets) (2).
Table I.12 shows that six Member States expect the
debt level to be above the 60 % of GDP ceiling in
2006 (Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and
Austria). With the notable exception of Germany,
Table I.8
Actual budget balances in the 2003 updates and in the Commission forecasts 
(% of GDP)
2003 updates 
of stability and convergence programmes 
Commission’s autumn 2003 
forecasts (1)
Commission’s spring 2004 
forecasts 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
BE 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.7
DE – 3.5 – 4.0 – 3 – 2 – 2.0 – 1 – 4.2 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 2.8
EL – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 0.5 0.0 – 1.7 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 2.8
ES 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6
FR – 3.1 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 4.2 – 3.8 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 3.6
IE (2) – 0.2 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.2 – 1.1 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.0
IT – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 0.0 – 2.6 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 4.0
LU 2.4 – 0.6 – 1.8 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 0.1 – 2.0 – 2.3
NL – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.3
AT – 0.1 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.9
PT – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 3.9 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 3.8
FI 4.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.1
EUR-12 – 2.2 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.6
DK (3) 1.7 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.3 0.9 1.3 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.5
SE 1.1 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.6 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.7
UK (4) – 2.1 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 2.6
EU-15 – 2.1 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.4
(1) Based on pre-budget figures for Ireland and the UK. For 2005, on the assumption of unchanged policies.
(2) Including UMTS receipts of 0.2 % of GDP in 2002.
(3) Data relative to 2010 have been used for 2007 in the convergence programme.
(4) Financial years ending the following March for data in the convergence programme.
¥1∂ To simplify the presentation, Table I.10 presents the two sectors of State
and local government in one single row, given that the State government
sector is relevant only for four Member States. 
¥2∂ As in the previous updates, large contributions of the stock-flow over the
programme period are identified in Finland (with a yearly average around
4 % of GDP), Greece (around 3 %), Sweden (around 1.5 %) and Ireland
(around 1 %).26
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a lower debt level in 2006–07 compared to 2003. In
EU-15, the debt level is expected to be below 50 % of
GDP in seven Member States, namely Luxembourg,
Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Spain, Finland and Swe-
den, of which the former three will have debt ratios
below 40 % of GDP.
2.2. Composition of the budgetary 
adjustment
The updates of the programmes show that both reve-
nue and expenditure ratios are expected to decline
over the programme period (see Table I.13). In the
Table I.9
Cyclically adjusted balances in the 2003 updates and in the Commission forecasts 
on the basis of the production function method 
(% of GDP)
2003 updates 
of the programmes (1) 
Commission calculations based
on the 2003 updates (2)
COM autumn 
2003 forecasts (2)
COM spring 
2004 forecasts(2)(4)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
BE 0.8 0.6 0.1 – 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.1 – 0.2 0.7 0.0 – 0.5
DE – 3.1 –2.5 – 2.0 –1.5 – 1.0 – 3.2 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.5
EL – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 2.2 – 3.1 – 3.2 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.8
ES 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7
FR – 2.8 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 0.2 – 3.8 – 3.2 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 1.3 – 3.9 – 3.3 – 3.2 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
IE – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2
IT – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.5 0.1 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.4 0.1 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 3.2 – 1.9 – 2.6 – 3.6
LU 2.4 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.3 0.6 1.2
NL – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.3
AT – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.8
PT – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.4 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 2.0 – 2.1 – 2.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.6
FI 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2
EUR-12 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.2 – 2.2
DK (3) 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.4 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.1 1.4 1.5
SE 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.3 0.4 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.8
UK – 2.4 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.3
EU-15 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.1
(1) Since figures for the CAB were not available in the Spanish stability programme, the Commission calculations have been used to have a representative aggregate
for EUR-12 and EU-15.
(2) On the basis of the PF method, except in the case of Germany, Spain and Austria, where the HP filter method has been used.
(3) The structural budget balance (i.e. net of special items) in Denmark is, according to the programme, expected to be: 2.0 % of GDP in 2003, 1.7 % in 2004, 1.8 % in
2005, 1.9 % in 2006 and 2.1 % in 2010.
(4) For a number of countries, the calculated CABs differ marginally from those of the spring forecast due to data revisions. 
NB: Footnotes to Table I.8 apply here.
Source: Commission services.
Table I.10
Euro area: Net lending by subsectors in the 2003 updates
% of GDP 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government – 2.7 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.7
Central government – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.3
State plus local governments – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.2
Social security funds 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes.27
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Euro area: Government debt level and changes in the 2003 updates 
(% of GDP)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Government debt level 69.1 70.1 70.0 69.4 68.4 67.6
Change in government debt – 0.1 1.0 0.0 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.2
Previous updates of the programmes 69.7 68.7 67.0 65.7 63.7
Difference – 0.6 1.4 3.0 3.7 4.6
Contributions to change in government debt: 
 Primary balance – 1.4 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 2.5
 Interest payments 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
 Nominal GDP growth – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.6
 Other factors influencing the debt ratio (1) – 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7
(1) The programmes do not always contain enough information to identify directly the contribution from different factors to the development of the euro-area debt ratio.
Therefore, it has been necessary in some cases to identify the contribution from nominal GDP growth (GDP deflator plus real GDP growth multiplied by the debt
ratio). In this way, the stock-flow adjustment is derived as a residual.
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes.
Table I.12
Debt levels in the 2003 updates 
(% of GDP)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 106.1 102.3 97.6 93.6 90.1 87.0
DE 60.8 64.0 65.0 65.5 65.5 65.0
EL 104.7 101.7 98.5 94.6 90.5
ES 54.5 51.8 49.6 47.7 45.7 43.8
FR 59.0 61.4 62.8 63.2 62.8 61.8
IE 32.4 33.1 33.3 33.5 33.3
IT 106.7 106.0 105.0 103.0 100.9 98.6
LU 5.7 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.4
NL 52.4 54.0 54.5 53.7 53.0 52.2
AT 66.7 66.4 65.8 64.1 62.3 59.9
PT 58.1 59.5 60.0 59.7 58.6 57.0
FI 42.7 45.1 44.7 44.9 45.0 44.6
EUR-12 69.1 70.1 70.0 69.4 68.4 67.6
DK (1) 45.5 42.7 41.2 38.7 36.4 27.5
SE 52.7 51.7 51.5 50.0 48.3
UK (2) 37.9 39.3 40.2 40.8 41.1 41.4
EU-15 62.6 63.8 63.8 63.3 62.5 61.9
(1) Data relative to 2010 have been used for 2007 in the convergence programme.
(2) Financial years ending in the following March.28
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centage point of GDP between 2003 and 2006 to
around 45 % of GDP in 2006. This is more than com-
pensated by reductions in the expenditure ratio which,
over the same period, are expected to amount to
2.1 percentage points. Revenue ratios are projected to
decline in all Member States with the exception of
Spain and France, where they will remain unchanged
and outside the euro area in the UK, where it is set to
increase. Strong reductions in revenue ratios are pro-
jected in Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria. In the
case of France, Finland, Denmark and Sweden reve-
nue ratios are still expected to exceed 50 % of GDP.
Almost all Member States are set to decrease the
expenditure ratio, with the exception of Spain, Fin-
land and the UK. Strong reductions are planned by
Germany, Austria and Portugal.
Although the information in the updates of the
programmes on the budget components is not always
complete (1), it would seem that the reduction in taxes
which has taken place in earlier years in most euro-area
countries is not expected to continue. The tax-to-GDP
ratio is projected to remain constant at around 27 % over
the programme period (see Table I.14). Important reduc-
tions are expected in Luxembourg (in 2004 and 2005),
Austria (in 2005) and Finland (in 2004), while the UK
plans to increase the tax ratio. Social contributions in the
euro area are projected to be reduced as a share of GDP
in the medium term, in particular in Germany and the
Netherlands. Other revenues as a share of GDP are
expected to decrease slightly over the period.
As to the components of public expenditures, very lim-
ited data are provided for collective consumption.
¥1∂ No information was given in the French programme and only partial infor-
mation was given by Spain. 
Table I.13
Expenditure and revenue ratios in the 2003 updates
Total revenues Total expenditures
2003 2006 (1) 2003–06 (2) 2003 2006 (1) 2003–06 (2)
BE 50.5 48.4 – 2.1 50.2 48.4 – 1.8
DE 45.0 43.5 – 1.5 49.0 45.5 – 3.5
EL 43.7 43.5 – 0.2 45.2 43.5 – 1.7
ES 40.0 40.0 0.0 39.6 39.8 0.2
FR 50.3 50.3 0.0 54.3 52.4 – 1.9
IE 34.1 32.5 – 1.6 34.6 33.6 – 1.0
IT 45.8 44.4 – 1.4 48.4 47.0 – 1.4
LU 47.1 44.9 – 2.2 47.7 46.6 – 1.1
NL 45.5 44.8 – 0.7 47.6 45.9 – 1.7
AT 50.6 48.3 – 2.3 51.9 49.4 – 2.5
PT 44.1 42.9 – 1.2 47.0 44.5 – 3.5
FI 51.0 50.8 – 0.2 48.7 48.8 0.1
EUR-12 46.0 45.1 – 1.0 48.7 46.6 – 2.1
DK 55.2 54.2 – 1.0 54.0 52.3 – 1.7
SE 56.4 56.0 – 0.4 56.3 54.3 – 2.0
UK (3) 37.7 39.2 1.5 40.2 40.7 0.5
EU-15 45.1 44.7 – 0.4 47.6 46.5 – 1.1
(1) Concerns 2005–06 for the UK and 2005 for the EU.
(2) Concerns the period between 2003–04 and 2005–06 for the UK and between 2003 and 2005 for the EU.
(3) Financial years ending in the following March. Concerns total current revenue.
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes. Therefore, the net lending implied by this
table may be different from the one in other tables.29
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are projected to decrease by on average 0.3 percentage
points of GDP annually, mainly reflecting decreases in
Germany. Gross capital formation in the euro area is pro-
jected to remain constant around 2.4 % of GDP across
the programme period. For the countries with high defi-
cits, the budgetary consolidation strategy, based on
expenditure restraint, should not be achieved at the
expenses of the most ‘productive’ components of public
spending (such as public investment, education and
research expenditures). However, the composition of
expenditure adjustment in the case of Portugal suggests
that about a quarter of it falls on investment expendi-
tures. Public investment is also expected to decline
somewhat in Luxembourg and Finland, while a rela-
tively important increase is foreseen in the UK.
Graph I.7 presents the contribution to the change in the
budget balances from four budget components, namely
primary current expenditures, interest payments, gross
fixed capital formation and total revenues. A number of
remarks can be made.
Firstly, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and
Portugal, which had large deficits in 2003, project to
improve budget balances substantially via cuts in
primary current expenditures. However, excluding
France, further cuts on the revenue side are also fore-
seen. In the case of Portugal the budgetary adjustment
involves a decline in public investments. In contrast,
the UK plans to increase the expenditure ratio (nota-
bly public investments). This is financed by an
increase in the revenue ratio, which should help
reduce the deficit to closer to balance. Secondly, dete-
rioration in the budget balance over the period is
expected in Ireland and Luxembourg. The reduction
in revenues is partially compensated by cuts in pri-
mary current expenditures as well as public invest-
ments. Thirdly, several Member States with budgets
close-to-balance or in surplus in 2003 (Belgium, Den-
mark, Austria and Sweden) foresee cuts in primary
current expenditures as well as in taxes, thereby
reducing the size of the public sector while maintain-
ing sound budgetary positions.    
Table I.14
Euro area: Budget developments for the general government
% of GDP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Components of revenues
Taxes 27.1 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.9
Social contributions 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.1 14.9 15.1
Interest income
Other 4.1 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.5
Total receipts 46.1 46.0 45.7 45.3 45.0 45.1
Components of expenditures
Collective consumption
Social transfers in kind 14.7 14.0 13.6 13.5 13.3 13.7
Social transfers other than in kind 17.4 17.6 17.4 17.0 16.7 16.6
Interest payments 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1
Gross fixed capital formation 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3
Other 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9
Total expenditures 47.6 48.7 47.9 47.3 46.6 46.3
NB: Totals might not correspond to the sum of the components: while for totals information is available for all countries, several countries are not included in the aggre-
gation concerning budgetary components, which affects the ratio of the components. 
Source: 2003 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.30
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C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sGraph I.7:  Contributions to change in budgetary position, 2003–06 (% of GDP)
NB: A positive value indicates a positive contribution to the change in the budgetary position. A positive value in total variation of the budgetary position
(value is presented on top of columns) implies an improvement of the balance. For UK data refer to 2003–05. For France values of primary current
expenditures refer to primary expenditure. Net lending for Italy includes unspecified measures totalling 1.8 percentage points of GDP in 2006.
Source: 2003 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
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3. Overview of the 2003 updates of the 
pre-accession economic programmes 
and the 2004 convergence programmes
3.1. Introduction
The third set of pre-accession economic programmes
(PEPs) covering the period 2002–06 was submitted by
acceding countries in August 2003. Their assessment
was completed by the Commission in November 2003.
All documents followed the guidelines and principles set
up by the document ‘2003 pre-accession economic pro-
gramme: consolidated outline and external assump-
tions’, ensuring cross-country consistency and compara-
bility. The programmes presented data according to ESA
95 methodology.
The PEPs outlined the medium-term policy framework,
including public finance objectives and structural reform
priorities needed for EU accession. In doing so, the pro-
grammes strengthen the institutional and analytical
capacity necessary to participate in EMU with a deroga-
tion from the adoption of the euro upon accession, par-
ticularly in the areas of multilateral surveillance and
coordination of economic policies. All programmes
foresee an improvement in the economic climate in the
period covered by the plans. The areas of structural
reforms to be undertaken are well defined, although their
cost is not always quantified. As a result, the impact of
these reforms on the presented budgetary framework
cannot be fully assessed.
In mid-May 2004, the first set of convergence pro-
grammes covering in most Member States the period
2004–07 was submitted. The programmes present the
medium-term framework for fiscal adjustment. In some
countries, the aim is to obtain a budgetary position of
close to balance or in surplus to allow them to deal with
normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the govern-
ment deficit within the reference value of 3 % of GDP.
A brief comparison with the 2003 updates of the pre-
accession economic programmes on growth assump-
tions, budgetary targets and structural deficits as well as
debt levels is offered in the last section of this chapter.
3.2. 2003 updates of the pre-accession 
economic programmes
3.2.1. Medium-term budgetary developments
According to the PEPs, average growth in the NMS in
the 2003–06 period is expected to be the same as in the
period 1998–2002, which is overall somewhat more con-
fident than the growth prospects outlined in the 2002
programmes, although there are country differences.
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland revised the economic
growth projections for the period 2003–06 upwards,
while Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and
Slovenia revised them downwards. In the period 2002–
06, the level of inflation is expected to decline in all the
countries, except in Lithuania and Latvia. In Lithuania,
deflation will be replaced with moderate inflation. The
current account balance is to remain negative in all the
NMS, according to the PEPs, except in Slovenia, where
a continuous surplus is foreseen over the entire pro-
gramme period (see Table I.15).
In 2002, all the countries, with the exception of Estonia
(1.3 % of GDP surplus), were running general govern-
ment deficits (see Table I.16), in the one digit range, vary-
ing from the lowest deficit of Lithuania (1.4 % of GDP)
to the highest of Hungary and Slovakia (9.2 and 5.7 % of
GDP, respectively).
The expected developments in the PEPs period indicate
for all the NMS a substantial consolidation of their pub-32
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Malta and Poland foresaw general government deficits
above the 3 % of GDP reference value. Hungary is esti-
mated to deploy the strongest consolidation effort to
reduce its fiscal imbalance by 6.7 percentage points to
2.5 % of GDP by 2006, followed by Slovakia, expecting
to shrink its deficit in the same period by 4.3 percentage
points. Displaying a different path, Estonia plans to
bring the 2002 government surplus down to balance by
2006, while Poland’s consolidation endeavour looks
weak as the government is still engaged in expansionary
fiscal policy leading to further deficit increases in 2003
and 2004.
Contrary to such a general improvement, comparing the
latest data available with the Commission’s spring 2004
forecast, the adjustment path projected in the 2003 PEPs
may prove too optimistic. The spring 2004 fiscal notifi-
cation presented by the Czech authorities reported the
registration of one single imputed State guarantee of
about 6.3 % of GDP, which brought the general govern-
ment deficit to 12.9 % of GDP in 2003. In Malta, the
general government deficit went up to 9.7 % of GDP in
2003 due to a one-off outlay of 3.2 % of GDP related to
the restructuring operation of the shipyards. Similarly,
taking 2005 for comparison for most countries (e.g. not
the Czech Republic) deficit projections were lower in the
2004 PEPs than in the Commission’s spring 2004 fore-
cast.
In 2002, Hungary and the Czech Republic ran the high-
est primary deficit (5.5 and 5 % of GDP, respectively),
while Estonia and Cyprus reached a primary surplus
(1.6 and 1.4 % of GDP, respectively). Although Estonia
and Lithuania presented projections for a deterioration in
their respective primary balance at the end of the period,
their overall fiscal position is to remain relatively strong.
All other countries are expected to improve their primary
balance, albeit the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Slovakia will keep primary deficits.
When comparing the budgetary objectives between the
PEPs of 2002 and 2003, Estonia and Slovenia are the
only countries to revise their fiscal balance upwards,
whilst all other countries made downward revisions, thus
implying larger deficits. These modifications were par-
ticularly significant in Slovakia and Cyprus. In some
countries, the upward revision of the deficit is partially
related to the downward revision of growth, but in oth-
ers, such as Poland, the projected deterioration of the fis-
cal balance reflects an easing of the budgetary stance. 
Table I.15
Macroeconomics projections in the 2003 PEPs
 
Real GDP growth Consumer price inflation Current account balance
(Annual percentage change) (Annual percentage change) (% of GDP)
1998–2002 (1) 2003–06 (2) Revision (3) 2002 2006 2002 2006
CZ 1.5 3.0 – 0.7 4.7 3.4 – 6.5 – 6.2
EE 4.7 5.5 0.0 5.8 3.5 – 12.3 – 9.0
CY 4.2 3.8 – 0.4 2.0 2.0 – 5.3 – 1.4
LV 4.4 6.2 0.7 2.5 3.0 – 7.8 – 7.6
LT 5.8 6.4 1.1 1.3 4.1 – 5.3 – 5.6
HU 4.3 4.0 – 0.6 9.2 3.0 – 4.0 – 5.0
MT 2.8 2.7 – 0.8 2.9 2.4 – 4.7 – 4.4
PL 5.4 4.7 1.1 5.5 3.1 – 3.5 – 5.1
SI 2.8 3.9 – 0.6 8.4 4.6 1.7 1.1
SK 4.2 4.3 0.0 7.1 4.5 – 8.2 – 3.3
EU-10 4.3 4.3 0.3 5.8 3.3 – 4.4 – 4.9
(1) Annual average over the period 1998–2002.
(2) Annual average over the period 2003–06.
(3) Difference between the average rate of growth over the period 2003–05 in the 2002 and 2003 PEPs.
Source: 2002 and 2003 PEPs, Commission services.33
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period (not submitted by Malta and Estonia) suggest that
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia foresee sub-
stantial general government deficit reductions as a result
of the implementation of policy changes. On the other
side, Cyprus and Poland seem to rely on the effect of the
cycle for their respective fiscal position, while Slovakia
anticipates a narrowing of its budget deficit due to both
fiscal consolidation and upbeat economic developments.
Save for Poland, all the countries expect improved struc-
tural balances by 2006 as compared to 2002. In Slovakia,
Poland and the Czech Republic the cyclically adjusted
deficits are forecast to stand above 3.5 % of GDP in
2006. Overall, the NMS seem to be making some effort
for structural changes in the budget’s revenue and
expenditure to reach the targets set in the 2003 PEPs, and
the favourable economic conditions are also expected to
contribute to the planned adjustment
3.2.2. Government debt
The general government debt position widely contrasts
among the NMS. Most of them hold low levels of for-
eign debt and some programmes show a preference for a
steady reduction in external financing in order to lower
exchange risk exposure, widen domestic capital markets
and decrease the issuing costs. Thus, Estonia and Latvia
post very low levels of debt, in absolute and relative
terms (5.8 and 14.6 % of GDP, respectively), and their
debt is mainly owned by foreign creditors. On the other
side, the latest data available for 2003 (1) showed Cyprus
government debt running at 72.2 % of GDP and Malta’s
government debt attained 72 % of GDP, clearly exceed-
ing the 2003 PEP estimates and the 60 % of GDP thresh-
old. In addition, the level of government debt in Hungary
(56.3 % of GDP) is slightly below the Maastricht refer-
ence value.
Six countries anticipated in their PEPs a worsening of
their debt levels over the period. The Czech Republic’s
PEP reported a further deterioration of 12.4 percentage
points of GDP between 2003 and 2006, this projection
being worse than the one made in last year’s programme.
The reasons for this are the upward revision of the deficit
and the imputation of a State guarantee in 2003. Poland’s
government debt is forecast to increase by 7.3 percent-
age points up to 2005 and stabilise in 2006. This mainly
results from financing the high deficit of the State
budget, leading not only to debt increase in a given year
but also, due to debt servicing costs and refinancing, to
Table I.16
General government balances in the 2003 PEPs
(% of GDP)
Nominal balance Primary balance Cyclically adjusted balance (2)
2002 2006 Change Revision (1) 2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change
CZ – 6.7 – 4.0 2.7 – 0.1 – 5.0 – 2.4 2.6 – 6.5 – 4.1 2.4
EE 1.3 0.0 – 1.3 0.3 1.6 0.3 – 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY – 3.5 – 2.2 1.3 – 1.8 1.4 2.5 1.1 – 2.5 – 2.2 0.3
LV – 3.0 – 2.0 1.0 – 0.8 – 2.6 – 1.3 1.3 – 3.1 – 2.3 0.8
LT – 1.4 – 1.8 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 1.7 – 1.6 0.1
HU – 9.2 – 2.5 6.7 – 0.7 – 5.5 0.4 5.9 – 9.1 – 2.4 6.7
MT – 6.2 – 3.4 2.8 – 0.6 – 1.4 1.5 2.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL – 3.8 – 3.4 0.4 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.8 0.2 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 0.4
SI – 2.4 – 1.3 1.1 2.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.2 – 2.2 – 1.1 1.1
SK – 5.7 – 2.9 4.3 – 3.0 – 3.5 – 0.6 2.9 – 7.2 – 3.7 3.5
EU-10 – 5.1 – 3.1 2.1 – 0.6 – 2.4 – 0.7 1.7 – 4.8 – 3.2 1.6
(1) Difference between the average nominal balances over the period 2003–05 in the 2002 and 2003 PEPs.
(2) Countries’ own estimates as presented in the 2003 PEPs.
NB: Nominal balances for Lithuania and Slovakia for 2002 were revised subsequently.
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.
¥1∂ Fiscal notification presented in March 2004.34
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deficits, Slovakia estimates an increase in its debt level
by 2006. Malta, already running a debt/GDP ratio well
above 60 % of GDP, expects after an initial deteriora-
tion, the debt/GDP ratio to come down to 68.4 % of GDP
by 2006. This estimation seems somewhat optimistic in
light of the above mentioned one-off increase which
occurred in 2003.
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia expect a gradual
improvement of their debt ratios in accordance with their
fiscal consolidation path.
3.2.3. Composition of the adjustment
Unlike in the 2002 PEPs, where most countries proposed
to reduce the general government revenue in terms of
GDP, the programmes presented in 2003 indicate that
only Hungary, Malta and Slovakia are planning to shrink
public revenue. Slovakia reports the highest decline by
3.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2006, stemming
from a sizeable reduction in direct tax collection brought
about by tax reform. The most important increase takes
place in Cyprus, where revenues are expected to rise by
2.2 percentage points during the programme period, due
to a renewed effort by the current government to carry
out fiscal consolidation, improving tax administration
and collection and higher fees and royalties levied by the
government. Lithuania also plans to boost revenues by
1.8 percentage points by 2006, as the key points of a tax
reform are to be implemented by the end of 2004 and the
EU grants will contribute to the increase. Estonia esti-
mates an increase in revenues of 1 percentage point by
2006, as the revenue item — other receipts — compen-
sates for diminishing of both income tax revenues and
social contributions. Lithuania, Slovakia and Cyprus
will have budgetary revenues below 40 % of GDP, with
Lithuania the lowest, at 35.6 % of GDP in 2006. Other
countries’ revenues will exceed 40 % of GDP, Hungary
having the highest share (43.6 % of GDP), while still
below the EU-15 average (46.4 % of GDP in 2002).
On the expenditure side, Cyprus, Estonia and Lithuania
foresee higher spending in terms of GDP in 2006, reflect-
ing comparatively favourable starting conditions for the
relative weight of expenditure. The three countries had
expenditure-to-GDP ratios below 40 % of GDP in 2002
(the EU-15 average being 47.2 % of GDP), however, only
Lithuania foresees to stay below this level by 2006. At
46.8 % of GDP, the Czech Republic is expected to post
the highest level of expenditure by 2006, stemming from
the cost of industrial and financial restructuring and from
the burden of mandatory and quasi-mandatory expendi-
tures. The biggest reductions in the period are listed by
Slovakia, Hungary and Malta. Downward adjustments in
expenditure in the period come from reductions in social
transfers in Slovakia (– 3.2 percentage points) and Poland
(– 2.8 percentage points), in gross fixed capital formation
in Hungary (– 2.1 percentage points) and collective con-
sumption in Cyprus (– 1.6 percentage points). Poland and
Lithuania project to increase capital formation by 1.8 and
1.7 percentage points, respectively, and Cyprus reports an
increase in interest payments of 2.3 percentage points over
the period 2003–06.    
3.2.4. Risk considerations
Most PEPs have submitted a budgetary risk analysis
over the period with consideration of explicit and
implicit contingent liabilities. Also, the programmes
contained an analysis of the long-term sustainability of
public finances in the light of the envisaged trends in
pension and healthcare expenditures, although the exten-
sion and detail of the assessment varies among the coun-
tries.
The main source of risk is the existence of State guaran-
tees extended to semi-government institutions. Their
amount, composition and assessment of the actual risk
level are unevenly appraised among the acceding coun-
tries. The guarantees seem to be relatively high in Malta
(22 % of GDP) and somewhat more bearable in Cyprus
and the Czech Republic (around 10 and 12.2 % of GDP,
respectively), Slovenia (6.6 % of GDP) and Hungary
Table I.17
General government debt in the 2003 PEPs
(% of GDP)
2002 2006 Change
CZ 26.9 39.4 12.4
EE 5.8 4.6 – 1.2
CY 59.7 56.1 – 3.6
LV 14.6 17.4 2.8
LT 22.7 23.3 0.6
HU 56.3 54.0 – 2.3
MT 66.6 68.4 1.8
PL 41.8 49.1 7.3
SI 27.8 25.9 – 1.9
SK 44.3 48.5 4.2
EU-10 39.8 45.1 5.3
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.35
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2 0 0 4(5.4 % of GDP). In the case of Lithuania, other sources
of fiscal risk are related to deposit insurance, restitution
of real State ownership rights, debt of State-owned enter-
prises to banks and privatisation of State-owned assets.
In the Czech Republic, legal disputes potentially involv-
ing large compensation payments by the State are also
considered as a possible risk to the budget. In Poland, a
relatively prominent share of foreign debt, high risk of
servicing the domestic debt due its short-term average
maturity and the compensations to former real estate
Graph I.8:  Contribution to change in budgetary position 2002–06 according 
to the 2003 PEPs (% of GDP)
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.
Table I.18
General government revenue and expenditure in the 2003 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
 
Revenue
 
 
Expenditure
2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change
CZ 42.4 42.7 0.4 49.1 46.8 – 2.3
EE 39.7 40.7 1.0 38.4 40.7 2.3
CY 36.3 38.5 2.2 39.8 40.7 0.9
LV 41.9 42.2 0.3 44.9 44.2 – 0.7
LT 33.8 35.6 1.8 35.6 37.4 1.8
HU 44.5 43.6 – 0.9 53.7 46.1 – 7.6
MT 43.8 43.2 – 0.6 50.0 46.6 – 3.4
PL 42.1 42.1 0.0 45.9 45.5 – 0.4
SI 41.5 41.7 0.3 43.9 43.0 – 0.8
SK 41.8 38.3 – 3.5 49.0 41.2 – 7.8
EU-10 42.0 41.9 – 0.1 47.2 45.0 – 2.2
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.
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an important fiscal risk as well.
3.2.5. Social security reform
Almost all the countries indicated their awareness of the
negative impact of population ageing on the financing of
their social security, notably pension and healthcare sys-
tems. Through increases in pension and healthcare
expenditures, population ageing is expected to have a
negative impact on the medium and long-term fiscal sus-
tainability. This is one of the major fiscal risks as pen-
sion and healthcare spending are in many countries the
biggest single items among all budget expenditures.
When facing this problem, most countries have been
adapting their statutory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension
pillars with the primary objective of securing the future
financial balance of these schemes frequently through
linking pension benefits closer to pension contributions.
The measures include cuts in pension benefits, increases
in the retirement age, increases in pension contributions
in varying combinations. There are, however, some
exceptions to this general trend: in order to improve the
social situation of pensioners, the first pillar old-age pen-
sions are being improved in Hungary by introducing a
13th monthly pension payment gradually over four years.
Latvia plans to improve the indexation of pensions.
In addition to these changes to the PAYG schemes, sev-
eral of the new Member States from central and eastern
Europe introduced mandatory funded pillars managed
by the private sector and created the legislative frame-
work for voluntary funded provision. In the 2003 PEP,
Lithuania and Slovakia presented plans to move towards
such a ‘multi-pillar’ pension system (in 2004 and 2005,
respectively). The introduction of the second (obliga-
tory-funded) pillar requires a high degree of administra-
tive preparation in order to avoid implementation prob-
lems. For instance in Poland, the transfers of social
insurance contributions from the Social Insurance Insti-
tution (ZUS) to private pension funds were affected by
serious delays. In addition, the channelling of part of the
contribution revenue into privately managed funded
schemes reduces government revenues and increases
deficits. ESA 95 methodology places these schemes out-
side the general government sector.
Major motives behind reform steps in healthcare are to
increase the quality of healthcare services and to cut
healthcare costs that are likely to further increase in the
process of population ageing. Many countries mention
improvements in the healthcare sector as being important
for human capital development. Another motive for
healthcare reforms is to contribute to sound general gov-
ernment finances. Radical reform measures are in progress
in Slovakia, including private co-financing. Cyprus plans
to introduce a general health insurance scheme.
Table I.19
Composition of general government expenditure in the 2003 PEPs 
(% of GDP)
Collective 
consumption Social transfers Subsidies
Gross fixed capital 
formation
Others, including 
interest
2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change 2002 2006 Change
CZ 9.4 9.1 – 0.4 25.0 24.4 – 0.7 3.5 3.2 – 0.3 4.6 4.5 – 0.1 6.5 5.6 – 0.9
EE 7.2 7.3 0.1 14.4 15.0 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.2 4.3 4.5 0.2 11.4 12.6 1.2
CY 10.6 9.0 – 1.6 15.4 16.0 0.6 1.0 0.6 – 0.4 3.7 3.7 0.0 9.1 11.4 2.3
LV 9.3 - - 23.1 - - 0.8 - - 3.3 - - 8.4 - -
LT 8.0 7.9 – 0.1 22.0 22.2 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.4 2.5 4.2 1.7 2.5 2.0 – 0.5
HU 7.5 7.4 – 0.1 23.7 23.3 – 0.4 2.5 2.7 0.2 6.2 4.1 – 2.1 13.8 8.6 – 5.2
MT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.0 2.6 – 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL 10.4 9.9 – 0.5 25.4 22.6 – 2.8 0.3 0.2 – 0.1 2.9 4.7 1.8 7.0 8.1 1.1
SI 8.1 7.6 – 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1 1.4 0.3 2.5 2.7 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
SK 11.0 9.5 – 1.5 21.1 17.9 – 3.2 1.6 1.5 – 0.1 2.4 1.8 – 0.6 12.9 10.5 – 2.4
EU-10 9.5 8.9 – 0.7 22.9 20.8 – 2.1 2.6 2.4 – 0.2 3.7 4.2 0.5 7.9 7.2 – 0.7
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.37
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3.3.1. Growth projections
According to the programme projections, the average
GDP growth of the new Member States in 2004 is
expected to improve for a second consecutive year.
Compared to the average GDP growth rate in 2003
(3.6 %), an important acceleration is expected in the
course of 2004, to reach the average growth rate of 4.2 %
(see Table I.21). Further increases are expected in the
future as the average growth rate is estimated to reach
4.4 % in 2005 and 4.8 % in subsequent years.
Of the six new Member States for which an increase in
growth rates is expected in 2004, the acceleration is par-
ticularly important in Malta (2.8 percentage points),
Cyprus (1.5 percentage points), Slovenia and Poland
(both 1.3 percentage points). Deceleration of growth in
the same period is expected in four new Member States,
although marginally in the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia. In Latvia and Lithuania, despite the expected cool-
ing off, the economic growth is expected to remain very
buoyant. According to the convergence programmes,
favourable growth prospects are to be continued over the
entire programme horizon. In sum, the new Member
States with the lowest per capita GDP are expected to
grow at the fastest pace, accelerating the catching-up
process with higher-income Member States.
In comparison with the 2003 updates of the PEPs,
growth projections over the medium-term period have
been revised downwards in most new Member States
(see Table I.21). While downward revisions for the
entire period 2004–06 were made in five countries
(Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia), the
Czech Republic and Slovakia marginally lowered their
expected growth prospects for 2005 and the former also
for 2006. The growth projections presented in the con-
vergence programmes by the Member States are largely
in line with the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast
although somewhat higher in the cases of Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, and lower in the case of
Malta.
3.3.2. Budgetary developments and targets
The expected budgetary developments according to the
convergence programmes indicate a substantial consoli-
dation of public finances in all new Member States with
budgetary deficits. In aggregate terms, the deficit is
expected to decrease from its current level, estimated at
5.8 % of GDP in 2003, to 2.1 % of GDP in 2007. Both in
2004 and 2005, the aggregate budget deficit is expected
to decrease by 1 percentage point. The overall improve-
ment over the programme period relies strongly on the
expected budgetary consolidation in six new Member
States for which the excessive deficit procedure was
started in May 2004. Among these, particularly strong
reductions are expected in the countries with initially
high deficits, such as Cyprus (4.7 percentage points over
Table I.20
Main measures in the PEPs concerning pension reform
Funded pillar — 
developed Planned reforms
CZ ✕ First pillar: parametric reforms within fiscal consolidation, notional defined contribution 
reform foreseen for 2010. No plans for a compulsory funded pillar.
EE ✓
CY ✓ Parametric reforms in the first pillar.
LV ✓ More generous indexation rule in the NDC pillar.
LT ✓ Introduction of a voluntarily pillar as of 2004.
HU ✓ Gradual introduction of the 13th month pension.
Increase contribution rate to mandatory-funded pillar.
MT ✕ Reform of the first pillar planned.
No plans for the compulsory funded pillar.
PL ✓
SI ✕ Parametric reforms in the first pillar.
SK ✓ Introduction of a compulsory funded-pillar planned for 2005.
Source: 2003 PEPs and Commission services.38
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the period 2004–07) and Hungary (2.8 percentage points
over the period 2003–07). It has to be noted that the 2003
deficits in the Czech Republic and Malta were high due
to one-off measures (an imputed State guarantee in the
Czech Republic and a one-off outlay related to the ship-
yards restructuring operation and the appropriate
accounting treatment of associated debt assumed by the
general government sector in Malta). On the other hand,
in Poland and Slovakia, following an expected increase
in their deficits in 2004, the programmes foresee consid-
erable consolidation efforts for the rest of the pro-
gramme period (respectively, 4.2 percentage points and
2.0 percentage points).
Of the countries with budgetary deficits below the 3 % of
GDP reference value, Slovenia and Lithuania are
expected to reduce their deficits over the programme
period, however, in the latter, only after a substantial
worsening in 2004. Displaying a different path, the
budgetary deficit in Latvia is expected to fall only mar-
ginally, while Estonia plans to move from the 2003 gov-
ernment surplus to a balanced budget in 2005.
A comparison between the budgetary projections pro-
vided by the new Member States in their convergence
programmes and the 2003 PEPs (see Table I.22) shows
that nominal budgetary balances tend to be similar in the
medium term (by 2006). Only Hungary and Malta
present significant revisions compared to their PEPs.
Hungary reports higher deficits in the convergence pro-
gramme than in the 2003 PEP, while Malta foresees
lower deficits in its convergence programme. Slovenia
and Slovakia present slightly higher deficits in their pro-
grammes than in their PEPs by 2006.
All the countries provided figures for cyclically adjusted
budget balances (CAB) in the programmes. They are
presented in the left panel of Table I.23. The right panel
of the table shows the CABs submitted in the 2003
update of the PEPs. According to the programme fig-
ures, the aggregate CAB of the new Member States,
amounted to – 5.5 % of GDP in 2003 and is projected to
reach – 2.3 % of GDP in 2007.
This reflects the expected decline in the CABs from the
2003 levels in all new Member States, apart from Lithua-
nia and Latvia, where a modest increase is expected, and
Estonia, where the surplus in cyclically adjusted terms
(2.3 % of GDP) is forecast to decline and converge to
balance.
On the whole, despite the general plans for adjustment
in cyclically adjusted terms over the period 2003–07,
only Malta and Estonia are projecting to balance their
budgets by 2007, while in the Czech Republic, Hun-
Table I.21
Growth projections in the May 2004 convergence programmes and differences with the 2003 PEPs (1) 
(% of GDP)
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP
CZ 2.9 0.5 2.8 0.0 3.1 – 0.1 3.3 – 0.3 3.5
EE 4.7 0.2 5.3 – 0.3 5.8 – 0.2 5.6 – 0.4 5.9
CY 2.0 0.0 3.5 – 0.5 4.3 – 0.3 4.4 – 0.2 4.5
LV 7.5 1.0 6.7 0.6 6.7 0.7 6.5 0.5 6.5
LT 9.0 2.2 7.0 0.8 7.3 0.8 6.6 0.6 6.3
HU 2.9 – 0.6 3.3 – 0.2 3.6 – 0.4 4.0 – 0.5 4.3
MT – 1.7 – 3.0 1.1 – 1.4 1.7 – 1.5 2.1 – 1.5 2.1
PL 3.7 0.7 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 5.6
SI 2.3 – 0.8 3.6 – 0.3 3.7 – 0.3 3.8 – 0.6 3.9
SK 4.2 0.2 4.1 0.0 4.3 – 0.1 5.0 0.2 4.7
EU-10 3.6 0.3 4.2 0.0 4.4 – 0.1 4.8 – 0.2 4.8
(1) A positive value implies higher growth forecasts in the May 2004 convergence programme.
Source: Commission services.39
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Budget balances in the May 2004 convergence programmes and differences with the 2003 PEPs (1) 
(% of GDP)
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP CP-PEP CP
CZ – 12.9 – 5.3 – 5.3 0.6 – 4.7 0.1 – 3.8 0.2 – 3.3
EE 2.6 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY – 6.3 – 0.9 – 5.2 – 1.5 – 2.9 – 0.1 – 2.2 0.0 – 1.6
LV – 1.8 1.1 – 2.1 0.3 – 2.2 0.0 – 2.0 0.0 – 2.0
LT – 1.7 0.7 – 2.7 0.2 – 2.5 0.0 – 1.7 0.1 – 1.5
HU – 5.9 – 1.1 – 4.6 – 0.8 – 4.1 – 1.3 – 3.6 – 1.1 – 3.1
MT – 9.7 – 2.3 – 5.2 0.6 – 3.7 0.4 – 2.3 1.1 – 1.4
PL (2) – 4.1 0.0 – 5.7 – 0.7 – 4.2 – 0.2 – 3.3 0.1 – 1.5
SI – 1.8 0.2 – 1.9 – 0.3 – 1.8 – 0.2 – 1.5 – 0.2 – 0.9
SK (3) – 3.6 1.4 – 4.0 – 0.1 – 3.4 0.0 – 3.0 – 0.1 – 2.0
EU-10 – 5.8 – 4.8 – 3.9 – 3.2 – 2.1
(1) A positive value implies lower deficits in the May 2004 convergence programme.
(2) The deficit figures will have to be adjusted upwards if the open pension funds are excluded from the general government sector following the Eurostat decision on
the classification of funded pension schemes.
(3) The figures are net of the effect of the introduction of a funded pension pillar in 2005. The programme estimates this revenue-decreasing and hence, ceteris paribus,
deficit-increasing effect at 0.5 % of GDP in 2005, 0.9 % of GDP in 2006 and 1 % of GDP in 2007.
Source: Commission services.
Table I.23
Cyclically adjusted budget balances in the May 2004 convergence programmes and the 2003 PEPs (1) 
(% of GDP)
2004 convergence programmes PEPs 2003
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006
CZ (2) – 12.9 – 5.3 – 4.6 – 3.8 – 3.4 – 7.5 – 5.8 – 4.8 – 4.1
EE 2.3 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY – 4.0 – 4.7 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.2
LV – 1.7 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 2.3
LT – 1.5 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 2.6 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 1.6
HU – 5.9 – 4.5 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
MT – 8.6 – 3.6 – 2.1 – 0.9 – 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL – 3.7 – 5.5 – 4.1 – 3.4 – 1.7 – 3.6 – 4.7 – 4.0 – 3.8
SI – 1.3 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.1
SK – 3.5 – 4.0 – 3.9 – 4.1 – 3.1 – 5.1 – 4.1 – 4.2 – 3.7
EU-10 – 5.5 – 4.7 – 3.8 – 3.2 – 2.3 – 4.4 – 4.5 – 3.8 – 3.5
(1) Countries’ own estimates as presented in the May 2004 convergence programmes and the 2003 PEPs.
(2) Due to the 2004 revision of the statistical methodology regarding the calculation of GDP, the CABs from the two sources are not fully comparable.
Source: Commission services.40
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forecast to stand at or above 3 % of GDP in 2007.
Moreover, of the countries forecasting an improve-
ment in the CAB over the programme period, Slova-
kia is the only one projecting an improvement
after 2006.
3.3.3. Debt levels
In general, government debt is low in the new Member
States and is expected to increase steadily over the pro-
gramme period from 44.3 % of GDP in 2003 to 47.8 %
of GDP in 2006 before declining in 2007 (see Table
I.24). Overall, apart from the Czech Republic, Latvia,
Poland and Slovakia, new Member States are expected
to have lower debt levels in 2007 than in 2003. In Cyprus
and Malta, government debt is expected to stay above
the 60 % of GDP reference value over the entire pro-
gramme period, while although remaining below the ref-
erence value, a relatively rapid increase in debt levels is
projected in the Czech Republic and Poland. Finally, in
four countries, namely, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Slovenia, debt levels are expected to be kept below 30 %
of GDP.
Table I.24
Debt levels in the May 2004 convergence programmes 
(% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CZ 37.6 38.4 39.7 41.0 41.7
EE 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.7 3.4
CY 72.6 75.2 74.8 71.5 68.4
LV 15.3 16.2 16.8 17.3 17.7
LT 21.5 22.4 22.2 21.4 21.0
HU 59.1 59.4 57.9 56.8 55.6
MT 72.0 72.1 72.4 70.5 70.4
PL (1) 45.3 49.0 51.9 52.7 52.3
SI 28.6 29.1 29.5 29.4 28.4
SK 42.8 45.1 46.4 46.1 45.5
EU-10 44.3 46.2 47.5 47.8 47.3
(1) The debt figures will have to be adjusted upwards if the open pension funds are excluded from the general government sector following the Eurostat decision on the
classification of funded pension schemes.
Source: Commission services.41
4. The sustainability of public finances 
based on the 2003 updates of stability 
and convergence programmes
4.1. Introduction
Due to the growing concerns regarding the impact of
ageing populations, ensuring the long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances is a key objective in the EU. Since
the launch of the euro, in 1999, the Commission has
sought to integrate an examination of the sustainability
of public finances into the existing EU framework for the
surveillance of Member States’ economic and budgetary
policies, in line with the conclusions of the Stockholm
(March 2001) and Barcelona (March 2002) European
Council meetings and the March 2003 Ecofin Council.
The Commission therefore regularly produces the assess-
ment of long-term sustainability of public finances in the
context of the Stability and Growth Pact. This chapter
presents an overview of the assessment of the long-term
sustainability of the public finances based on the 2003
updates of stability and convergence programmes carried
out by the Commission for the third year in the row.
The assessment of long-term sustainability of public
finances is a multi-faceted issue and there is no unique
indicator which gives a clear response on whether a
country’s public finances are sustainable in the long run.
Thus, on the basis of the EPC 2003 report (1), the Com-
mission assessed long-term sustainability of public
finances using both quantitative indicators and qualita-
tive information. Although the approach followed was
broadly similar to the one used in previous assessments
(see European Commission, 2002a and 2003a for a
review of the first two assessments), it is important to
note a number of improvements undertaken in order to
enhance the quality of the assessment.
For what concerns the quantitative indicators, the cycli-
cal component of the budget has been netted out in the
first year of the projection, so the long-term projections
are only affected by the more structural components of
the budget. In practice, the tax to GDP ratio in the last
year of the programme has been corrected by the cyclical
component of the budget (2).
Also, a greater attention has been devoted to qualitative
features when making the assessment, which alleviated
the mechanistic interpretation of the results obtained. The
main qualitative features shaped into the assessment are
(i) current debt/GDP ratio; (ii) how the use of one-off
measures or contribution to pension reserve funds affect
the budget balance; (iii) the current level of tax ratios; and
(iv) the robustness of the long-term budgetary projections.
4.2. How the sustainability of public 
finances was assessed
4.2.1. The quantitative indicators
Table I.25 summarises the data included in the 2003
updates of stability and convergence programmes that
were used to run the sustainability indicators. The prior-
ity has been given to the national projections reported in
the programmes, complemented if necessary with the
commonly agreed EPC projections.
¥1∂ See the report ‘The impact of ageing populations on public finances: over-
view of analysis carried out at EU level and proposals for a future work
programme’ (October 2003), available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
economy_finance/epc/documents/2003/pensionmaster_en.pdf.
¥2∂ This makes this year’s results of the quantitative indicators not fully com-
parable with last year.42
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and education, carried out for the first time in 2003, were
added to the age-related expenditures for all countries that
did not provide such information in the programme (1).
Thus, at least four different age-related expenditure items
— pensions, healthcare, education and unemployment
benefits were included in the calculations of all the Mem-
ber States which contributed to increased comprehensive-
ness of the quantitative assessment.
On the revenue side, the level of revenue-to-GDP ratio was
kept constant at the (cyclically adjusted) level reached in the
last year of the programme period for most countries (2).
Table I.25
Data used to run the sustainability indicators
 
Age-related expenditure
Others
Total 
non-age-
related exp.
Total revenue
Pensions Healthcare Education
2008 2050 2008 2050 2008 2050 2008 2050 const. 2008 2050
BE 8.8 12.6 7.1 9.9 4.1 3.7 6.7 5.0 16.5 48.1 48.1
DK 5.5 6.9 8.0 10.4 8.7 8.4 9.3 11.2 18.1 53.1 55.6
DE 11.0 14.9 5.9 7.1 5.3 5.5 0.9 0.7 18.3 43.4 44.3
EL 12.3 22.6 5.1 6.6 3.3 3.2 0.4 0.2 17.2 43.0 43.0
ES 8.0 13.0 5.7 7.2 4.0 3.7 0.6 0.4 19.0 40.0 40.0
FR 12.7 14.5 6.4 7.4 5.9 5.5 1.0 0.7 22.8 51.6 51.6
IE 4.0 7.7 6.1 7.8 4.0 3.2 1.0 1.0 17.0 33.5 33.5
IT 14.0 14.1 6.4 8.1 4.6 4.2 0.4 0.3 13.4 44.1 44.1
LU 7.4 9.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.2 38.9 48.0 48.0
NL 5.2 8.7 7.5 10.5 5.0 4.9 6.6 6.9 18.4 44.7 47.6
AT 14.6 15.0 5.2 6.4 5.6 5.0 1.5 2.0 18.3 47.9 47.9
PT 11.3 12.1 5.3 6.1 5.4 5.1 0.5 0.5 18.1 43.9 43.9
FI 11.6 14.5 4.8 5.8 5.8 5.4 3.3 4.8 21.3 51.0 51.0
SE 9.0 9.9 11.0 13.4 8.2 8.7 6.8 9.7 16.8 56.3 56.7
UK 5.1 5.3 7.7 9.7 5.4 5.4 1.4 1.5 20.4 40.0 40.0
NB: Data refer to the first year of projections, 2008, unless specified differently. In all the countries, other age-related expenditure includes unem-
ployment benefits; where relevant, additional items are specified below. Total revenues refer only to the programme scenario. BE: Other
expenditures include family allowances, unemployment and early retirement transfers, work-related accidents and sickness and residual
regimes. DK: The starting data refer to 2011. Other expenditure items are childcare and old-age care. Concerning the change in tax revenues,
the net tax on net pension payments is projected to increase by 2.5 percentage points of GDP by 2050. Also, pension assets are projected to
increase from 124 % of GDP in 2005 to 217 % of GDP in 2050. DE: Pension projections were made by the BMGS (Statutory Pension Insur-
ance and Public Service Workers Pension). Tax revenues only concern taxation of future pension payments to private households made by the
German Institute for Economic Research. EL: The starting data refer to 2007. Healthcare only concerns acute healthcare. FR: Pension expen-
ditures are calculated from last year’s programme, including the impact of the pension reform as reported by the national authorities. IE: The
starting data refer to 2007. LU: The starting data refer to 2007. No projections on healthcare and education expenditures were reported.
Equally, the EPC projections for Luxembourg do not include information on these two items. NL: Projections on age-related items from a
report of CPB Netherlands, ‘Ageing in Netherlands’, 2003. Other age-related expenditure includes disability benefits. Net old-age-related
direct tax revenues are projected to increase by 2.8 percentage points between 2010 and 2050. AT: Other age-related expenditure includes care
expenditure. PT: The pension expenditure projections were reported in the national strategy report on the future of pension schemes. FI: Long-
term care expenditure is included in other age-related expenditures. Pension system assets are projected to increase from 67.3 % of GDP in
2006 to 78.4 % of GDP in 2050. SE: The starting data refer to 2007. Healthcare expenditure includes ill health and medical care expenditure.
Other age-related expenditures also includes labour market training grants and wage guarantee, childcare and care of elderly. The net old-age-
related tax revenues are projected to increase by 0.4 percentage points between 2010 and 2050. Pension system assets are projected to increase
from 28.4 % of GDP in 2006 to 29.6 % of GDP in 2050. UK: The starting data refer to 2009. Long-term care expenditure is included in other
age-related expenditures. The non-age-related expenditures are expected to decline by 0.9 percentage points between 2009 and 2050.
Source: EPC and national updated stability and convergence programmes (2003).
¥1∂ For a detailed analysis of long-term education expenditure see EPC (2003)
and Montanino, Przywara and Young (forthcoming, 2004).
¥2∂ Changes in the tax ratio were included for four Member States (Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) as these can largely be attributed
to the deferred tax revenues from contributions to funded pension systems
as well as accumulated earnings prior to disbursement.43
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and revenues between the first year of projections and 2050.
As expected, the projections of age-related expenditures
show that the pension and healthcare-related expenditures
are of the highest concern for the long-term sustainability of
public finances. In Denmark, Italy, Austria, Sweden and the
UK, healthcare spending is projected to grow faster than
pension spending. In turn, other age-related expenditures
— one of which is education — are projected to decline in
the majority of countries, although insufficiently to offset
the increase in pension and healthcare expenditures.
Table I.27 and Table I.28 present, respectively, the
extrapolation of debt/GDP ratio and the sustainability
gaps under two scenarios. Under a so-called ‘pro-
gramme’ scenario, the starting position in terms of the
cyclically-adjusted budget balance, the level of the debt/
GDP ratio, the primary spending and the tax revenues are
the figures reported by the Member State for the final
year of their 2003 updated stability or convergence pro-
gramme; for most Member States this is 2007.
The extrapolation of the debt/GDP ratio relies on several
assumptions:
• The tax burden remains constant as a share of GDP
unless there are foreseen increases of revenues due
to the design of the pension system. Thus, future
additional pension income resulting from the accu-
mulation of non-taxable contributions is included
while changes in revenues due to assumptions on
future trends in private consumptions or due to spe-
cial sources are not considered.
• Age-related expenditures evolve in line with the
available projections.
• Non-age-related primary expenditures remain con-
stant as a share of GDP at the 2007 level over the
projection period (1). These include mainly public
investment, other social expenditure apart from edu-
cation, health and pensions, purchases of goods and
services not due to age-related expenditures, com-
Table I.26
Projected changes in the expenditure and revenues between the first year of projections and 2050
Age-related expenditure
Tax revenues Net change
Pension Healthcare Education
Other age-
related 
expenditure
Total 
BE 3.8 2.8 – 0.4 – 1.7 4.5 0.0 4.5
DK (1) 1.4 2.4 – 0.3 1.9 5.4 2.5 2.9
DE 3.9 1.2 0.2 – 0.2 5.1 0.9 4.2
EL(2) 10.3 1.5 – 0.1 – 0.2 11.5 0.0 11.5
ES 5.0 1.5 – 0.3 – 0.2 6.0 0.0 6.0
FR 1.8 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.3 2.1 0.0 2.1
IE (2) 3.7 1.7 – 0.8 – 0.1 4.5 0.0 4.5
IT 0.1 1.7 – 0.4 – 0.1 1.3 0.0 1.3
LU (2) 1.9 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 1.8 0.0 1.8
NL 3.5 3.0 – 0.1 0.3 6.7 2.9 3.8
AT 0.4 1.2 – 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.0 1.5
PT 0.8 0.8 – 0.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3
FI 2.9 1.0 – 0.4 1.5 5.0 0.0 5.0
SE (2) 0.9 2.4 0.5 2.9 6.7 0.4 6.3
UK (3) 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.1 2.3 0.0 1.4
(1) 2011 replaces 2008 for Denmark.
(2) 2007 replaces 2008 for Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden.
(3) 2009 replaces 2008 for the United Kingdom.
Source: EPC and national updated stability and convergence programmes (2003).
¥1∂ Only in the case of the UK did the Commission take into account the decline
in non-age-related expendituresn, namely, the dynamics reflect the current
set of legislation in place. In addition, most non-pension social benefits will
rise in line with prices after 2007–08, reducing their share of GDP.44
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cation and healthcare sectors).
• The GDP deflator is fixed at 2 % for the whole pro-
jection period.
• The GDP real growth rate is country-specific and
relies on agreed EPC assumptions (1). It results from
both assumptions on employment trends and labour
productivity trends. However, labour productivity
growth is assumed to converge towards an annual rate
level of 1.75 % by 2030, although some leeway for
higher rates is provided for catching-up countries.
• The nominal interest rate converges towards an EU
average level of around 5–6 % in 2015. It is calculated
as the sum of the EU average real growth rate plus the
ECB inflation target (2 %) plus an interest rate growth
differential of 2. To avoid a discrete jump in the debt
projections, it is assumed that the implicit interest rate
on debt in the final year of the stability/convergence
programme converges towards the common nominal
interest rate in a linear fashion within 10 years.
The ‘programme’ scenario assumes that Member States
actually achieve the budget targets set down in their pro-
grammes. However, such an outcome is by no means
assured. In order to assess the relevance of the consoli-
dation processes in the medium term to achieve long-
term sustainability, a ‘2003 position’ scenario was run in
the same way as the ‘programme’ scenario, excepting
that the starting budget position is different since it is
based on budgetary data for 2003. Debt levels are extrap-
olated from 2008 to 2050 assuming that no budgetary
consolidation is achieved, i.e. the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary balance in 2008 remains the same as the 2003 level
and no stock-flow operations take place.
It is important to recall that the purpose of the debt
extrapolation is to signal possible imbalances on the
basis of current policies and projected age-related
expenditure trends. However, the limitations of this
exercise are clear and results need to be interpreted with
caution. Being a mechanical, partial equilibrium analy-
sis, projections are in some cases bound to show highly
accentuated profiles. As a consequence, the projected
evolution of debt levels is not a forecast of possible or
even likely outcomes and should not be taken at face
value. Instead, the indicators are a tool to facilitate policy
debate and at best provide an indication of the timing and
scale of emerging budgetary challenges that could occur
on the basis of ‘no policy change’.
Findings from the results of the quantitative assessment
can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, even assuming that all Member States achieve
their medium-term budgetary targets (programme sce-
nario) there is a risk of unsustainable public finances
(measured against the 60 % of GDP reference value)
emerging in at least one third of the EU-15 Member
States.
Secondly, debt developments for most EU-15 Member
States follow a U-shaped pattern. In the coming 20 or
25 years, debt levels are projected to decrease due to the
effect of maintaining balanced budget positions: however,¥1∂ See EPC (2001).
Table I.27
Results of the sustainability gap indicators
 
 
Programme scenario 2003 budget scenario
S1 S2 S1 S2
BE – 0.3 0.3 – 5.1 – 1.0
DK – 0.6 – 0.6 – 2.0 – 1.3
DE 2.2 2.6 4.4 4.4
EL 1.9 3.3 2.3 3.8
ES 0.4 1.3 – 0.3 0.6
FR 0.7 0.8 3.6 3.5
IE 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.5
IT – 0.7 – 0.7 1.1 1.3
LU 0.0 – 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.1
NL 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.7
AT 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5
PT – 0.8 – 0.4 1.6 1.8
FI 0.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 2.8
SE 0.6 0.2 1.4 1.0
UK 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.1
NB: S1 measures the difference between the current tax ratio and the tax ratio that
would ensure a debt level in 2050 as resulting from a balance budget position
over the projection period. A positive sustainability gap indicates that there is
a financing gap to reach this debt level in 2050. S2 indicates the change
needed in tax revenues as a share of GDP that guarantees the respect of the
inter-temporal budget constraint of the government, i.e. that equates the actu-
alised flow of revenues and expenses over an infinite horizon.
Source: Commission services.45
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of ageing starts to take hold, with the largest increase in
most countries expected between 2030 and 2050 (see
Table I.29 for the EU-15 aggregate).
Given the projected increase of debt levels, it is impor-
tant to use this window of opportunity and to contain the
emerging risks of increasing age-related expenditures
and debt levels.
Thirdly, the risk of unsustainable public finances
increases considerably if the Member States do not
achieve the SGP goal of budget positions of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’. An indication of this can be seen by
comparing the projected debt levels under the ‘pro-
gramme scenario’ with the ‘2003 budgetary position’
scenario. This issue is especially relevant for the six
euro-area countries with highest underlying cyclically
adjusted deficits in 2003, i.e. Germany, Greece, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Fourthly, the sustainability gap indicators provide some
order of magnitude to the budgetary adjustment needed
to ensure sustainable public finances. The sustainability
gap under the ‘programme scenario’ indicates that an
additional permanent budgetary adjustment of between
1.5 and 2.5 percentage points of GDP is needed in Mem-
ber States where the sustainability of public finances is a
concern (see Table I.27). The scale of budgetary adjust-
ment efforts could be even greater if account is taken of
the stated budgetary objectives of some Member States
such as a reduction in the tax ratio.
4.2.2. The qualitative considerations
The 2003 updated programmes contain useful informa-
tion to better qualify the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances. The level of government debt/GDP ratio in
2003 is a source of concern in at least three countries,
namely Italy, Greece and Belgium. In order to run it
down towards 60 % before the impact of ageing takes
place, these countries have to run sustained primary sur-
plus (above 4 %) over the next 10 to 15 years. Such a
requirement is subject to risk even if it cannot be
excluded a priori: pressures to reduce the tax burden or
to increase some expenditure items can arise in the near
future, putting at risk long-term sustainability.
Table I.28
Projected evolution of debt levels up to 2050 (1)
 
 
2003
Programme scenario 2003 budget scenario
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 102.3 74.8 11.5 – 5.0 67.2 – 35.7 – 114.0
DK 42.7 24.6 – 19.5 – 34.8 6.9 – 65.5 – 131.9
DE 64.0 62.2 86.5 175.7 74.3 156.5 336.6
EL 101.7 75.1 42.2 151.0 72.2 52.4 181.0
ES 51.8 36.3 – 1.6 36.6 31.6 – 21.4 – 12.4
FR 61.4 56.0 52.2 72.0 71.8 142.1 288.0
IE 33.1 26.7 36.4 105.0 27.0 50.1 138.4
IT 106.0 86.6 28.9 – 27.8 92.0 82.7 107.8
LU 4.9 – 0.9 – 9.4 1.2 – 3.9 – 35.7 – 47.8
NL 54.0 49.1 67.6 140.0 53.8 88.7 185.9
AT 66.4 53.9 24.4 15.9 55.1 26.1 18.4
PT 59.5 48.0 5.3 – 42.4 60.9 72.1 127.6
FI (2) – 4.6 – 33.4 – 30.1 6.0 – 52.8 – 79.5 – 88.6
SE (2) 33.0 16.4 – 0.4 46.7 15.2 19.8 97.6
UK 39.3 42.5 71.6 138.7 45.3 89.5 177.5
(1) The Commission took on board information on financial assets (other than government bonds) in designated pension funds, which are available for future debt
reduction. This is because these financial assets are either earmarked for financing future pension payments or debt reduction, and the amounts involved are sizeable
and thus have a material impact on the assessment of the sustainability of public finances. It was assumed that the yield on assets is the same as on debt.
(2) Adjusted government debt.
Source: Commission services.46
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sThe medium-term dynamic of the debt/GDP ratio is
affected, in particular in Italy and Greece, by stock-flow
operations. In the case of Greece, these financial opera-
tions are expected to run down the debt slower than pro-
jected from the pure development of the budget balance.
Should these operations continue in the future, imbal-
ances in the long-term will be amplified.
The current debt level puts several countries in a safer posi-
tion than what the purely quantitative indicators could
show. Ireland, the UK, Finland, Luxembourg, Denmark
and Spain have a relatively low level of debt/GDP ratio.
This gives some room to tackle the problem if future imbal-
ances arise. For other countries (namely Germany, France
and Portugal) a source of concern is not the very high level
of debt/GDP ratio but rather its recent upward trend. The
budgetary deterioration pushed debt up since 2001 (2000 in
Portugal) and it has quickly reached levels close to or above
the reference value of the Maastricht Treaty (1).
Another important issue to consider when assessing sus-
tainability is the role accumulated assets held by the pub-
lic sector can play to cope with future pension liabilities.
Several countries are accumulating liquid financial
assets for these specific purposes. In some cases (such as
Denmark, Sweden and Finland) the value of these assets
is particularly large (around or above 50 % of GDP).
Clearly, having prepared in time the impact of an ageing
population puts these countries on safer ground, regard-
less of the future trend of government debt. Other coun-
tries such as Spain and Ireland are also accumulating
funds. Their amount is still relatively limited but
increasing.
These assets are not netted out in the calculation of the
quantitative indicators because they are based on the
Maastricht definition of government debt (2). In principle,
the most appropriate measure would be the government
net worth but in practice most of the information is not
easily available, and more importantly difficult to project
into the future. A different solution could be to consider
the government debt development net of those assets that
are fully liquid (and therefore immediately disposable)
and locked up for future pension payments. However, in
practice it is difficult to project future flows to these funds
over the very long term because assuming a no-policy
change scenario can lead to an implausible high level of
assets. How the indicators of long-term sustainability of
Graph I.9:  Projection of future development in EU-15 (weighted average)
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ In particular in Germany the debt/GDP ratio has been on an increasing
path since the beginning of the 1990s. ¥2∂ Exceptions are Finland and Sweden.47
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funds on debt sustainability needs to be explored.
Budget balance trends in the medium term are affected
not only by the accumulation of reserve funds but also by
one-off measures with a temporary impact on the budg-
etary positions. A great recourse to one-off measures
helps in containing current imbalances but does not
improve significantly long-term sustainability. Indeed, if
one-off measures are put in place instead of structural
measures, the long-term sustainability of public finances
can even worsen. The cases of Italy and Portugal raise
particular concern due to the large recourse to one-off
measures in recent years. Since what counts for the long-
term trends of the debt/GDP ratio is the underlying
budget balance, i.e. net of all transitory effects on the
budget, the projected debt trend for these two countries
could be partially affected by the impact of these transi-
tory measures. In running the quantitative indicators, the
cyclically adjusted tax-to-GDP ratio at the end of the
programme period is kept constant, as are the non-age-
related expenditures. If at least one of these two compo-
nents of the budget is affected by one-off measures, the
application of the debt dynamic equation can lead to a
faster debt reduction than would be observed on the basis
of the underlying budget balance.
Another factor to be considered as a potential risk is
whether debt projections rely on a very high tax burden
compared with EU average or other industrialised coun-
tries. This is the case in Denmark and Sweden where the
tax burden is around 50 % of GDP. Even if each Member
State can decide over its optimal level of taxation, pres-
sures to reduce the tax burden cannot be excluded in the
future. In addition, there is less room to increase taxes
should imbalances appear in the future.
A final qualitative feature identified as critical in making
the assessment of long-term sustainability is the robust-
ness of projections. While uncertainty surrounds any
projection in the long term, there are cases where this is
a greater source of concern. In Spain, the projected pen-
sion expenditure by Spanish authorities is much lower
than what is projected by the EPC in its common exer-
cise (the difference is around 2.8 percentage points in
2050). These differences rely on a more favourable
demographic scenario regarding the future flows of
immigrants in active age and the assumption that aver-
age pensions will increase at only half the projected
increase of labour productivity (while the EPC assumes
an increase in the average pension equal to labour pro-
ductivity) (1). Given the uncertainties related to these
two assumptions, the possibility of having an even larger
increase in pension expenditure over the projected
period cannot be ruled out.
The projected increase of pension expenditure in France
and Portugal also warrants consideration. In both cases,
national authorities provided a set of projections up to
2050 which include the impact of the recent pension
reforms. This impact accounts for around 1 % of GDP.
For Portugal, it is not sufficiently clear if the pension
reforms already introduced will actually curb future pen-
sion expenditure. The calculation reported in the pro-
gramme update seems not to have taken into consideration
the impact of some measures which have already been
taken or are planned, notably the changes to the civil serv-
ants’ pension regime ratified at the beginning of 2004, the
phased convergence of the lowest pensions towards frac-
tions of the minimum wage, and the planned capping of
social security contributions. Therefore it is doubtful that
the pension reforms already introduced will actually suf-
fice to curb future growth in pension expenditure.
Thanks to the recent pension reform, France is in a con-
siderably better position to meet the budgetary costs of
an ageing population. The reform will indeed not only
increase the average retirement age and thus reduce pen-
sion expenditures but it will also probably lead to an
increase in participation rates among the elderly with
positive effects on potential growth. However, it is too
early to draw firm conclusions on the related savings and
the implementation of the reform should be monitored.
Concerns on the robustness of the projections regard also
those included in the UK updated programme, and in
particular the scenario for the next 10 years (age-related
expenditures are expected to have only a slight impact on
public finances). Healthcare and education expenditure
are expected to increase by more than 2 percentage
points of GDP in the next 10 years. This is compensated
by an increase of revenues of 1.8 percentage points of
GDP during the same period. The increase in revenue
takes place in a no-policy change scenario and it is
mainly due to fiscal drag, i.e. the increase of revenues (as
a share of GDP) resulting from a higher median income.
While spending plans are hard to change once approved,
the revenue gains are instead only hypothetical. In addi-
tion, implicit nominal interest rates are assumed to
¥1∂ This is a common assumption in the EPC projections.48
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They move from 5.1 to 4.6 % despite the increase, dur-
ing the same period, of the GDP deflator which would be
expected to push up the nominal interest rates.
4.3. Policy conclusions per Member State
Despite the fact that each country faces country-specific
problems, for the purpose of summarising the main
results it is possible to group countries according to the
main source of potential budget imbalances and the seri-
ousness of the risk as follows.
Very high-debt countries (Belgium, Italy). The source
of risks for these countries is mainly the level of debt/
GDP ratio. At first sight, the quantitative indicators sug-
gest that these countries appear to be relatively well
placed to meet the costs of ageing populations. This is
because they are currently running high primary sur-
pluses in order to meet their Treaty and SGP commit-
ments: hence there is more scope to reduce interest pay-
ments in the future and thus offset future expected
increases in spending due to ageing populations. How-
ever, this result needs to be interpreted with caution, as
the assumption of a constant tax ratio introduces a degree
of fiscal illusion based on an implicit assumption that
very high-debt countries are able to sustain large primary
surpluses over several (15–20) years. This will imply
running actual budget surpluses, which inevitably leads
to the challenge of competing budgetary pressures for
tax cuts and/or increased public expenditures.
High-deficit countries (France, Portugal and Germany).
These countries recently passed a number of pension
reforms which aim at better controlling expenditure in
the long run and the projections run by the Commission
fully included the savings estimated by Member States.
However, there are uncertainties regarding the budgetary
impact of the pension reforms. In addition, a comprehen-
sive strategy to ensure long-term sustainability must
include budgetary consolidation in the medium term.
Otherwise, any effort to control age-related expenditures
will be offset by raising interest payments and debt/GDP
ratio is likely to show explosive paths.
Countries with risks due to pension developments
(Greece and Spain). These two countries face a similar
pattern in age-related expenditure in the long term. In
particular, pension expenditure is foreseen to increase at
a faster pace than any other EU country. This means that
in addition to a policy of running down debt (where
Spain is performing particularly well) measures to better
control future trends of pension expenditure should be
envisaged. Risks rely also on the uncertainties surround-
ing pension projections. A number of factors contribute
to put Spain in a safe position but there are large differ-
ences between the EPC projections and the Spanish pro-
jections on future pension expenditures.
Countries with some risks due to the uncertainties
over the medium term (UK, Netherlands). These coun-
tries face risks mainly linked to the medium-term budg-
etary developments. Both the UK and the Netherlands
appear relatively well placed to meet the cost of an age-
ing population. However, the increasing deficit in the
medium term raises concern and the current safe position
can easily become less stable. Also, projections in the
medium term rely on several assumptions. In the case of
the Netherlands, the assumption that current policies will
lead to sustainability over the long run relies upon the
costs of the pension reform that temporally increases the
actual deficit. Since these transitional additional costs
are protracted beyond the programme period, there is
some element of uncertainty on when the costs will be
fully contained. For the UK, the medium-term projec-
tions foresee a shift from a slight primary deficit in 2003
to a primary surplus (of less than 1 %) in 2012 despite a
high increase of healthcare and education spending
implied by the spending review during the same period
and no policy changes on the revenue side.
Countries with limited or no risk (Finland, Sweden,
Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland and Denmark). They
share a number of common characteristics, including
sound budget positions, and reforms of their pension sys-
tems that have strengthened the link between contribu-
tions and entitlements, increased the share of pensions
that are financed on a funded basis, and increased the
capacity of pension systems to cope with demographic
developments such as changes in life expectancy. For
some of these countries the development of government
debt does not reflect properly the soundness of their
budgetary position due to the accumulation of liquid
financial assets to cope with future challenges. This is
particularly relevant for Ireland.
The following table summarises the main conclusions
reached by the Ecofin Council in its opinion on the stability/
convergence programmes on the basis of the Commission
assessment. It shows how, for a number of countries, the
long-term budgetary position improved thanks to structural
reforms or the increased focus on long-term challenges.49
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Policy conclusions on the sustainability of public finances
Are public finances sustainable? What are the sources of concern? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
BE It still presents some risks of
long-term unbalances, linked to
the consequences of ageing.
The outstanding level of debt requires attention and
maintaining high primary surpluses in the next 10 to
15 years as planned is necessary to keep Belgium on a
sustainable path.
Policy conclusions do not differ so much and rely on
the fact that a high debt/GDP ratio will entail budg-
etary challenges for still some time before consider-
ing Belgium in a safe position. This year’s assessment
puts more emphasis on healthcare expenditure
trends, which warrant consideration since they are
increasing at a faster pace than expected. 
DK Denmark is in a good position
to handle the impact of the
ageing population.
The large net assets projected for both the govern-
ment and pension funds put Denmark in a safe posi-
tion.
No.
DE Risks of imbalances in the long
term cannot be ruled out.
Germany made progress in the reform of the public
pension system and to a smaller extent in reforming
the health sector. Although such reform steps are
welcomed, the expected effects may not suffice to
offset the long-term demographic impact on pension
and healthcare expenditures. Also, the high deficit
and the rising debt are sources of concern.
This year’s policy conclusions are very similar. The
budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is
only partially compatible with improving the sustain-
ability of public finances.
EL There is a serious risk of severe
budgetary imbalances emerging
in Greece in the future due to an
ageing population.
Taking also into account the high debt ratio, the
budgetary challenges posed by an ageing population
should be tackled through a comprehensive strategy
that includes further reform of the pension system.
The assessment is in line with last year’s conclusions,
i.e. that a deficit adjustment towards close to balance
is not sufficient.
ES Spain seems relatively well
placed to cope with the budg-
etary costs of ageing popula-
tions but several uncertainties
surround the future budgetary
trends. 
Given the risks surrounding long-term projections
and the large increase of pension expenditure pro-
jected in the very long term, current policies need to
be supplemented by measures to prevent the emer-
gence of unsustainable trends, in particular a com-
prehensive reform of the pension system.
This year’s policy conclusions are rather different. The
Commission concluded that Spain is placed relatively
well to meet the budgetary costs of an ageing popula-
tion. Differences are mainly due to an even better
medium-term budgetary scenario than last year, the
accumulation of reserve funds to meet future budget-
ary challenges, the regular review by the Permanent
Commission of the Toledo Pact on progress in the pen-
sion system towards financial sustainability, the devel-
opment of supplementary private pension schemes
and the new system for setting medicine prices should
improve healthcare expenditure controls and help con-
tain expenditures.
FR Risks of imbalances in the long
term cannot be ruled out.
While France is in a considerably better position than
before the reform to meet the budgetary costs of an
ageing population, securing an adequate primary sur-
plus will be essential to ensure that the public finances
are on a sustainable footing. This should be comple-
mented, particularly in the context of the reform of
the health insurance system to be designed and imple-
mented in the course of 2004, by measures aimed at
controlling the evolution of age-related spending.
Not very different. Despite improvements due to the
pension reform, France still presents risks of imbal-
ances due to the high deficit.
IE There is a risk of budgetary
imbalances emerging in the
future due to an ageing popula-
tion but it has to be noted that
the Irish debt ratio is currently
quite low and that assets are
being built up at a rate of 1 % of
GNP annually in the National
Pensions Reserve Fund.
Securing an adequate primary surplus is essential to
ensure that the public finances are on a sustainable
footing.
This year’s policy conclusions are the same. While
some risks cannot be excluded, the low level of taxa-
tion gives enough room to cover possible financing
gap. As with last year, they suggest pursuing a policy
of budget balance.
IT There is a risk of budgetary
imbalances emerging in the
future due to an ageing popu-
lation.
Securing an adequate primary surplus is essential if
the debt reduction is to make a noticeable contribu-
tion towards meeting the costs of ageing. This should
be complemented by measures to raise employment
rates, especially among older workers and women,
and control the evolution of age-related spending.
The plans to reform the pension system unveiled in
late 2003, if implemented, would contribute to
achieve these objectives.
This year’s policy conclusions are very similar, point-
ing out risks of imbalances. Among others, the actual
level of debt/GDP ratio, the recent trends of health-
care expenditures, the outstanding projected
increase in female participation rates are the main
factors behind the risks. 
(Continued on the next page)50
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The historical record of the quantitative assessments con-
tributes to the understanding of the developments related to
the long-term sustainability of public finances. In making
the comparison with last year’s results, the two main
changes in the input data should be borne in mind: (i) other
age-related expenditures than pension and healthcare were
included in the exercise for all EU-15 countries; (ii) budg-
etary positions at the end of the programme have been
adjusted to net out the cyclical component (see above).
Both factors tend to reduce the impact of ageing. As
shown in Table I.26, projected education and other age-
related expenditures show a decline over the period and
at least partly counter the projected increase in pension
and healthcare expenditures. In addition, most countries
forecast a positive output gap at the end of the pro-
gramme period so that the cyclically adjusted balance is
better than actual figures.
Table I.30 presents why this year’s results of the quanti-
tative indicators differ from last year’s ones. It analyses
reasons for such development, based on pure compari-
son of the projections used in the two years for the ‘pro-
gramme’ scenario.
Table I.29 (continued)
Are public finances sustainable? What are the sources of concern? Do policy conclusions differ from last year?
LU No risks of unsustainable pub-
lic finances in the long term.
The total net asset position is favourable in view of
the substantial financial assets accumulated over past
years with fiscal surpluses.
No.
NL The risk of budgetary imbal-
ances emerging in the future
cannot be ruled out.
Securing an adequate improvement in the primary
surplus before ageing reaches its peak, together with
the necessary measures to stem the long-term
increase in expenditure, is essential to ensure that
the public finances are kept on a sustainable footing.
This year’s policy conclusions stress higher risks of
imbalances and are somewhat different from last year.
The higher deficit foreseen in the programme for the
period (2003–05) and the failure to reach a budgetary
position of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ by the end
of the programme period raises concern, deteriorating
the long-term trend of the debt/GDP ratio. 
AT Austria appears to be in a con-
siderably better position than
before to meet the budgetary
costs of an ageing population.
The improved outlook after the 2003 pension reform
needs to be confirmed by actual developments. Firstly,
projections assume a reform-induced strong increase in
participation rates. Secondly, the 10 % cap on benefit
losses compared with the status quo ante renders long-
term budgetary effects rather uncertain. Moreover,
exonerating effects on government finances are unnec-
essarily delayed due to a disproportionately long transi-
tion period for abolishing early retirement until 2017.
This year’s policy conclusions welcome the improve-
ments due to the pension reform. 
PT Risks of imbalances in the long
term cannot be completely
ruled out.
The high deficit and the rising debt/GDP ratio may
undermine the sustainability of public finances in the
longer term, hence the timely achievement of a
budgetary position close to balance is imperative.
Moreover, an early assessment of the effects of the
2001 reform of the general social security pension
regime seems to suggest that its long-term sustaina-
bility has not been improved.
Very similar, even if the efforts to complete the proc-
ess of pension reform and to make the healthcare
sector more efficient are recognised.
SE Sweden should be able to meet
the projected budgetary costs
of an ageing population.
The increase of healthcare expenditure, including
expenditure related to ill health, foreseen in the pro-
jections needs to be addressed as the update notes
that further measures are necessary in order to
achieve the target of half the number of sick days.
Moreover, the medium-term target has to be
reached; failure to do so can cause some budgetary
imbalances in the very long term. 
No.
FI Public finances appear to be on
a sustainable footing to meet
the budgetary costs of ageing
populations.
Public finances benefit from the sustained running of
budget surpluses and a reformed pension system that
is to a large extent pre-funded.
No.
UK There are still, in the light of
the current and projected defi-
cits, some risks of imbalances in
the long term.
A prudent budgetary position kept in the medium
term would help avoid a risk of emerging budget
imbalances in the context of ageing populations.
This year’s policy conclusions put more emphasis on
strength concerns expressed last year since the
medium-term scenario worsened.
Source: Based on the Commission’s assessment of the 2003 updates to stability and convergence programmes and the respective opinions of the Council.51
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This year’s assessment of the long-term sustainability of
public finances confirms the track record of continuous
improvements in the way the sustainability is assessed.
Thus, besides the inclusion of additional age-related
expenditure items and of cyclically adjusted revenues, a
more systematic analysis of qualitative features signifi-
cantly contributed to a higher information value of the
assessment.
Overall, the results show that risks to long-term sustain-
ability are still present in nine countries of which in five
(Belgium, Greece, Italy, Germany and France) the diffi-
culties are more serious, while another four (Portugal,
Spain, the Netherlands and the UK) face some risks due
to the medium-term budgetary development or, as is the
case for Spain and Portugal, due to the uncertainties over
the long-term projections of pension expenditures.
Finally, six countries (Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Aus-
tria, Luxembourg and Sweden) seem relatively well
placed to meet the cost of an ageing society.
Table I.30
The 2003 projections on long-term age-related expenditures compared to the 2002 projections
Results as compared 
to the last year What are the differences between this and last year’s projections?
BE Slightly worse • Higher pension expenditures (1.2 p.p. higher at the end of the period).
• Lower total revenues.
DK Similar • Higher primary expenditure and higher increase in healthcare expenditures 
(1.1 p.p. at the end of the period).
• Higher total revenues (0.4 p.p. over the period).
• Higher initial debt level.
DE Slightly improved • Lower growth of pension expenditures due to the effect of the pension reform
(– 1.9 p.p. at the end of the projection period).
• Higher initial debt level.
EL Similar • Lower increase in total primary expenditures.
• Lower total revenues (according to the programme and cyclical adjustment)
• Slightly lower initial debt level.
ES Improved • Higher total revenues.
• Lower initial debt level.
FR Improved • Gains from the pension reform (app. 1 p.p. per year).
• Significantly higher total revenues.
IE Improved • Lower increase in age-related spending.
• Higher total revenues (0.6 p.p. over the period).
• Lower initial debt.
IT Similar • Lower primary expenditures due to favourable trends in age-related expenditures.
• Lower total revenues.
• Higher initial debt level.
LU Improved • Significantly higher total revenues. 
NL Slightly worse • Lower tax revenues.
• Higher initial debt level.
AT Improved • Lower pension expenditures from the expected impact of the pension reform 
(1.5 p.p. lower at the end of the projection period).
• Slightly lower total revenues.
• Lower initial debt level. 
PT Improved • Lower pension expenditures from the expected impact of the pension reform 
(at least 1 p.p. lower between 2020 and the end of the projection period).
• Significantly higher total revenues (by 0.9 p.p. over the entire period).
SE Slightly worse • Higher total primary expenditure due to higher increases in pension and healthcare expenditures.
• Higher total revenues (0.9 at the start and 1.8 p.p. at the end of the period).
FI Improved • Higher total revenues (2.1 p.p. over the projection period).
UK Slightly worse • Significantly higher increase in age-related expenditures.
• Lower total revenues (0.8 p.p. lower at the end of the period).
• Higher initial debt level.
Source: Commission services.52
Part II
Evolving budgetary surveillance

Summary
After five years of experience with the euro area, an over-
all positive judgement can be given on how economic
governance has worked in EMU, as the results achieved
are well within the expectations at the beginning of the
process of monetary unification. The budgetary frame-
work provided by the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP has
helped to deliver macroeconomic stability and budgetary
positions under control and at prudent levels in most EU
countries. Even if several countries have deficits
approaching or exceeding the 3 %-of-GDP ceiling, and
therefore need to correct them — the multilateral surveil-
lance has played a decisive role in maintaining such defi-
cit levels well below those witnessed in previous eco-
nomic slowdowns, which would seem to explain the
muted reaction from markets to the latest developments.
Economic coordination at EU level has also helped to
improve the sustainability of public finances and enhance
their contribution to growth and employment. While the
EU fiscal framework has broadly delivered, it is natural to
strive for further progress. To deal with the tensions that
have accumulated over time under this framework, the
Commission already made proposals to this end in
November 2002.
In spite of these steps, during 2003 the need for further
and more decisive progress was clearly exposed by test-
ing developments in the implementation of the SGP.
These showed that a reassessment should be made both
of the framework which applies to the conduct of
national fiscal policies to ensure that they are run on a
prudent basis and of the processes underlying the coor-
dination of economic policies in the EU.
By the second half of 2003, the number of countries in an
excessive deficit position increased to three, with France
joining Portugal and Germany in this group. Like the latter
two countries, France received recommendations from the
Council in June as to the measures to be taken to correct
the deficit. In autumn, given that the measures taken by
France and Germany in response to the Council recom-
mendations were proving ineffective, the Commission
moved forward with the excessive deficit procedures in
order to ask them to take more decisive measures in order
to correct the deficit as soon as possible. In doing so, how-
ever, the Commission considered that the changed eco-
nomic conditions required an additional year to be granted
to the two countries in order to correct the excessive defi-
cit situation. The Council, however, could not reach a con-
sensus to endorse the Commission recommendations, and
instead adopted conclusions which suspended the applica-
tion of the Treaty procedure, while extending by one year
the deadline set for Germany and France to correct the
excessive deficit. In practice, this amounted to weakening
the provisions of the SGP intended to have a deterrent
effect on those countries which did not take adequate
measures in compliance with the Treaty and the recom-
mendations of the Council itself.
Following these controversial events, the Commission
announced a three-pronged strategy based on the continua-
tion of budgetary surveillance, the need to seek legal clarity
on the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and
the need to make substantial steps in order to strengthen
economic governance. Accordingly, at the beginning of the
year, the Commission asked the European Court of Justice
to annul the decisions taken by the Council and the conclu-
sions adopted on the same occasions. The case has been
assigned to an accelerated procedure by the Court.
At the same time, the Commission continued to conduct
budgetary surveillance, by assessing the stability and
convergence programmes submitted by the Member
States and prepared the related opinions for the Council.
Subsequently, following the notification of budgetary
data concerning 2003, the Commission proposed to
repeal the decisions taken in 2002 which placed Portugal
in a position of excessive deficit. At the same time it
started the procedures concerning the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, which registered deficits over 3 %
for the first time in 2003. On the basis of the latest Com-
mission forecasts, which indicated that there was a sub-
stantial risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP ceiling, the55
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an ‘early warning’ to Italy, asking it to take measures to
avoid the occurrence of an excessive deficit.
Finally, the developments and decisions over the last few
months suggest that, in order to capitalise further on the
advantages brought about by the euro, there is a need for
more ambition in addressing a number of issues which
have arisen with the implementation of the framework
for economic governance. In particular, this requires that
efforts be pursued to continuously improve the analytical
expertise necessary for the conduct of multilateral sur-
veillance and that the functioning of the framework be
reconsidered in order to identify those elements which
may be reworked in order to improve its effectiveness.
Improving and widening the knowledge of budgetary
developments is crucial in addressing the budgetary chal-
lenges and avoiding unsound or wrong policy conclusions
in the EU context. During the last few years, multilateral
surveillance has increased the attention given to more
structural factors. This calls for temporary changes in
budgetary positions to be clearly identified, in particular
when due to either the implementation of budgetary meas-
ures with only temporary effects or to the economic cycle.
Chapter 3 looks at both these issues. The use of temporary
measures is becoming a regular feature in EU countries.
Changes in the budgetary profile due to measures with
temporary effects make the assessment of budgetary
developments more difficult as they blur the picture of the
‘underlying’ budget trend. But assessing whether and
when budgetary measures have only temporary effects is
difficult. To illustrate the use and budgetary impact of
non-cyclical temporary budget effects, the amount and
type of one-off measures taken by EU-15 countries during
the last few years is presented. Overall, it appears that
temporary measures do have an impact on national budg-
ets. It is therefore important to consider such measures in
the surveillance process. This calls for more transparent
budget measures and a clearer reporting of these measures
by Member States, including in the stability and conver-
gence programmes.
Economic growth and cyclical developments signifi-
cantly affect budgetary developments. In order to better
explain the impact of economic growth on budgets and
clarify the role of the cyclically adjusted budgets (CABs)
for budgetary surveillance under the SGP, this part of the
report reviews the Commission methodology for calcu-
lating CAB figures and its use for monitoring compli-
ance with adjustment requirements specified in cycli-
cally adjusted terms. In particular, one issue is
addressed: it appears that changes in the CABs may not
reflect the effects of discretionary fiscal policy alone, but
also (unexpected) changes in potential growth. The rules
of the SGP are not explicit about whether compliance
with the adjustment requirement is to be intended condi-
tional upon ex ante expectations on growth or uncondi-
tional. If compliance is to be interpreted conditionally,
then the change in CABs should be corrected to take into
account the component of the change attributable to the
difference between actual and expected potential
growth. In the chapter, a methodology to operate such
correction is developed and discussed.
Available data about government liabilities is normally
centred on government debt figures, collected in accord-
ance with the Maastricht definition. However, other liabil-
ities not included in this definition of debt also warrant
surveillance. Chapter 4 is devoted to the role of the so-
called contingent liabilities in budgetary surveillance. The
term ‘contingent liabilities’ refers to those liabilities that
correspond to government obligations which will materi-
alise only in case of the occurrence of particular events.
Being highly uncertain, contingent liabilities are not part
of the definition of government debt used in EU budgetary
surveillance. However, the broad tendency for govern-
ments to step back from providing direct support to eco-
nomic agents and towards playing a more active role in
guaranteeing outcomes means that there needs to be an
increased focus on contingent liabilities. The importance
of this issue in EU budgetary surveillance has increased
with enlargement. The stock of contingent liabilities is in
fact relatively high in new Member States. On a positive
note, it should be noted that these countries, rather differ-
ently from most other Member States, have been disclos-
ing information on contingent liabilities in their pre-acces-
sion economic programmes (PEPs) and the Commission
has taken developments in fiscal risks and contingent lia-
bilities into account in assessing the PEPs. After present-
ing basic definitions and a widely used taxonomy for gov-
ernment liabilities, Chapter 4 illustrates the broad trends in
budgetary risks and surveys the main economic argu-
ments for why such increased risks can be very relevant
for government public finances. Finally, it reviews prac-
tices for increasing disclosure and for monitoring contin-
gent liabilities and discusses the implications for EU
budgetary surveillance. The definition of standards con-
cerning the collection and the reporting of information on
contingent liabilities would be a positive step towards
increasing the knowledge of such liabilities and would
facilitate their surveillance.56
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tive would contribute to progress towards the objective of
higher growth. In this endeavour, the right balance has to
be found between the need to keep the economic govern-
ance framework stable and predictable and to improve the
system on the basis of experience. How the rules and pro-
cesses — upon which budgetary surveillance at EU level is
based — can be improved is the subject of Chapters 5 and
6. Chapter 5 explores the issue of how the rules could be
interpreted in order to attach greater weight to government
debt ratios in the budgetary surveillance process, as the
Commission proposed in November 2002. The ‘2003
report on public finances in EMU’ already addressed the
issue of what could constitute a satisfactory pace of debt
reduction for high-debt countries. This year, Chapter 5
highlights the importance of focusing on debt develop-
ments in order to ensure sound policies over time, reduce
high debt ratios and create margins of flexibility for coun-
tries which run prudent policies. Firstly, it considers why a
prudent debt position should be pursued, concluding that
the Treaty ceiling of 60 % for the debt/GDP ratio is an
important cornerstone for conducting prudent policies.
Secondly, it identifies current developments in EU coun-
tries and the implications over the medium term. Thirdly,
it discusses how fiscal rules can contribute to the achieve-
ment of prudent debt levels and increase flexibility in fiscal
policy. Finally, it explores how objectives for the budget
balance could be defined in a way which considers debt
developments and, is therefore more country-specific.
Clearly, further refinements are necessary on this subject
and a consensus must be found among the institutions
involved in the surveillance of budgetary policies on how
they can take better account of sustainability in the moni-
toring and assessment of budgetary policies.
Chapter 6 explores how economic coordination in
EMU must balance common interest with national
sovereignty. An intense debate has provided a number
of ideas on how to improve the functioning of the pro-
cesses affecting economic coordination and budgetary
surveillance. While some proposals go beyond any
realistic changes to the current framework, some ideas
could be usefully developed. The chapter explores in
some detail the issues of how to improve the budgetary
process by adjusting the budgetary calendar at EU
level and by stimulating better procedures at national
level.
Chapter 7 concludes this extensive part with a wide-
ranging contribution to the debate on how the EU
framework for budgetary surveillance could evolve. In
particular, it includes a number of principles which
could usefully be followed in order to further
strengthen the EU fiscal framework. The chapter
focuses on three main avenues: rendering the BEPGs a
more effective instrument for economic coordination;
rejuvenating the Pact through a number of elements
which should help tackle the issues arising from its
implementation, in particular in the definition of fiscal
policies and in the respect of policy requirements; ren-
dering enforcement more effective, by strengthening
the Community power to monitor national fiscal poli-
cies, and putting in place institutions at national level
appropriate to the task of ensuring sustainable public
finances. These principles are presented with a view to
strengthening the governance of economic policies in
EMU: the anticipated evolution must remain within
the provisions of the Treaty which have demonstrated
their validity and usefulness over time.57
1. Moving towards a clearer 
and more effective framework
1.1. A sound framework which needs 
strengthening
When the project of EMU was launched in the early
1990s (1) it was clear that, for the successful functioning
of EMU, Member States would be responsible for man-
aging national budget deficits at low levels consistent
with a high standard of monetary stability and that an
effective economic policy coordination function was
required. This would have conciliated the need for a
common standard of discipline over deficits and debt
with that for flexible response at the national level to
country-specific shocks. The need for fiscal autonomy
and flexibility was seen to arise from the loss of the mon-
etary and exchange rate instrument for individual coun-
tries. The need for fiscal discipline was seen as vital to
avoid threats to the overall monetary stability.
The Maastricht Treaty and the SGP have defined the budg-
etary framework for the functioning of EMU along these
considerations. The Treaty sets the policy assignment in
EMU for fiscal policy to achieve and maintain sound and
sustainable public finances. While this is to be achieved
through the coordination of fiscal policies, implying a great
degree of autonomy at Member State level, it foresees a
strict procedure for the correction of policies when ‘gross
errors’ may have undesirable implications for EMU.
The economic governance framework built on the SGP
and the Treaty has helped to deliver macroeconomic stabil-
ity in EMU. Budgetary positions are under control and at
prudent levels in most EU countries. Even if several coun-
tries have deficits approaching the 3 % of GDP ceiling, or
are beyond it — and therefore need to correct them
promptly — the multilateral surveillance has played a
decisive role in maintaining such deficit levels well below
those witnessed in previous economic slowdowns.
The EMU framework has also contributed to improving
the sustainability of public finances and enhancing their
contribution to growth and employment. A number of
reforms in the public sector, a renewed attention to effi-
cient allocation of resources and a progressive decrease in
the debt burden in the majority of Member States indicate
that the fiscal policy framework is delivering substantial
results overall, even if some countries are falling behind.
After five years of experience with the SGP and with the
system of economic governance in the euro area, an overall
positive judgement can be given on how economic govern-
ance has worked in EMU, as the results achieved are well
within the expectations at the beginning of the process of
monetary unification. While the EU fiscal framework has
broadly delivered, further enhancement is needed. Atten-
tion is required for those countries where improvement has
been more limited. Progress is required to deal with the
tensions that have accumulated over time under this frame-
work. In particular, the developments and decisions at the
end of 2003 suggest that in order to capitalise further on the
advantages brought about by the euro there is a need for
stronger economic governance: a number of issues with
the implementation of the economic governance frame-
work have arisen and need to be addressed.
Firstly, the processes underlying the coordination of eco-
nomic policies in the EU have exhibited certain flaws. As
a consequence, the EU coordination framework for eco-
nomic policy has been perceived as almost only focusing
on fiscal policy, and in particular on budgetary balances
and fiscal discipline. This reflects the weak link between
the orientations provided on economic policies and on fis-
cal policy (in particular in the BEPGs and the Pact, but also
in other processes). Such a weak link between the two
processes makes it more difficult to look at fiscal policy¥1∂ See European Commission (1990).58
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eboth in terms of fiscal discipline (budgetary balances) and
of the contribution of fiscal policy to growth and employ-
ment (composition of the budget) and to show the benefits
of coordination. In addition, it often appears that the policy
guidelines have a limited influence on national budgets or
on the priorities for the EU budget.
Secondly, the rules which apply to fiscal policy have on
some occasions shown shortcomings. It is for example
apparent that the framework is lacking incentives for
prudent behaviour in good time. In other cases, it was not
stringent enough: as a consequence, some countries have
not reduced their debt level as fast as expected at the start
of EMU, while others have moved back to deficit levels
above those required for adopting the euro. Taking this
experience into account, the case could be made that the
rules could be more articulated in practice so as to be
more stringent when necessary, and more flexible when
possible, by considering the different elements, such as
debt levels, dynamism of the economy, investment
requirements or long-term demographic trends.
These difficulties with the functioning of economic govern-
ance need to be tackled soon, in order to increase the
chances of achieving the objectives the EU set itself in Lis-
bon. This requires an evolution around the essential ele-
ments of the Treaty. The latter defines a clear set-up for eco-
nomic governance based on clear guiding principles, such
as stable prices, sound public finances and monetary condi-
tions and a sustainable balance of payments. It foresees
clear obligations for sustainable public finances, in particu-
lar to avoid excessive deficits. The coordination of eco-
nomic policies and the procedure to induce countries com-
mitting ‘gross errors’ to correct their excessive deficits are
key elements to ensure the smooth functioning of EMU.
These elements of the framework are clearly valid. Any
evolution of the framework should deliver the needed
improvement within the principles and provisions of the
Treaty.
1.2. Developments in the coordination 
of budgetary policies
1.2.1. Evolution in the framework for budgetary 
surveillance …
As explained above, the EU’s framework for fiscal surveil-
lance requires improvements on the basis of the experience
with its implementation. While some important steps need
to be taken at the current juncture, it should be recalled that
refining the current rules is an ongoing process. As an
example, in response to the developments which have
taken place over recent years, and in line with a mandate
from the Barcelona European Council conclusions, the
Commission adopted in November 2002 a communication
on strengthening the coordination of budgetary policies (1).
While identifying a number of shortcomings with the
implementation of the SGP in the first years of EMU, the
communication outlined a number of elements on which
progress was crucial and a strategy based on Member
States reassuming political ownership of the Pact (2).
Many of the Commission’s proposals on strengthening
the coordination of budgetary policies were shared by
the (Ecofin) Council and endorsed by the spring Euro-
pean Council of March 2003. The Council confirmed
that the achievement of a budget position of ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ is in the economic self-interest of
Member States both individually and collectively: in the
short run, it provides room for the automatic stabilisers
to operate freely and cushion the effect of economic
shocks; in the medium-run it creates room for budgetary
manoeuvre to either cut taxes or to increase growth-
enhancing expenditures on items such as investment and
R & D; in the long run, compliance will help Member
States meet the budgetary costs of an ageing population
while securing adequate pensions and access for all to
high quality healthcare. The Council also agreed that
compliance with the ‘close to balance or in surplus’
requirement should be assessed in cyclically adjusted
terms with due account taken of one-off budgetary meas-
ures which only have a transitory impact on budget posi-
tions. For euro-area countries, agreement was reached
that Member States with deficits should achieve an
annual improvement in the cyclically adjusted budget
deficit of at least 0.5 % of GDP until the ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ requirement is reached. It underlined
the need for automatic stabilisers to operate symmetri-
cally over the economic cycle and the particular impor-
tance of avoiding a pro-cyclical loosening of fiscal poli-
cies in good times. The Council also confirmed the
importance of running down government debt at a satis-
factory pace towards the 60 % of GDP reference value
and that the existing provisions of the Treaty (i.e. the
debt criterion of the excessive deficit procedure) can
contribute to achieving this goal.
¥1∂ Communication from the Commission ‘Strengthening the coordination of
budgetary policies’, COM(2002) 668 final of 27 November 2002.
¥2∂ See Part II.2 of European Commission (2003a) for a substantive presenta-
tion of the communication.59
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ary surveillance, and building on the experience of the
first years of EMU, new elements have progressively
been introduced in the surveillance. In particular, more
attention has been given to economic developments both
in assessing budgetary positions and in addressing policy
recommendations (1). Improved knowledge of the proce-
dure deriving from its application has been progressively
coupled with increasingly broader considerations.
Reflecting the need to continue in the learning-by-doing
process, the Commission has been working with the
Council on various issues of particular policy relevance.
Chapters 3 and 4 in this part present some of this work,
which in particular shows how the evolution of surveil-
lance of public finances requires a continuous effort in
order to improve the analysis of budgetary developments
in the European countries.
1.2.2. … accompanied by a mixed implementation
In spite of the progress made in strengthening the
coordination of budgetary policies, its implementation
has not always been consistent with the ambition and the
provisions of the Treaty and the SGP. The policies
implemented by countries in excessive deficit positions
cast on some occasions doubts about the effective will-
ingness and capacity to ensure the correction of the
excessive deficits within the deadlines set. In addition,
the Ecofin Council did not implement the provisions of
the SGP vis-à-vis both France and Germany. Instead of
adopting formal recommendations the Council pre-
sented its position in the form of ‘conclusions’ of the
meeting (see Box II.1). Acting in this way, the Council
aimed at introducing an additional informal step in the
procedure, so as to postpone the approaching of the last
step (i.e. the sanctions).
A more nuanced assessment of experiences in the first
few years of EMU points to more mixed results on the
benefits of peer pressure and enforcement mechanisms.
Peer pressure did appear to work in several cases. Even
in countries that have failed to correct excessive deficit
positions, the Treaty and SGP requirement have
undoubtedly had an impact on budgetary consolidation.
Countries have been forced to address deteriorating
budgetary problems sooner than they otherwise would
have, preventing deficits from reaching even higher lev-
els. Still, the robustness of the framework was tested dur-
ing a period of slow growth in large Member States.
Heightened tensions in the system call for action to re-
establish a consensus on the surveillance and coordina-
tion of fiscal policies. The events of 2003 have high-
lighted not only a different interpretation of the budget-
ary provisions of the Treaty and the SGP between the
Commission and the Council, but also have singled out
different views among Member States as to what are the
consequences of participating in a single currency for
countries with unsound budgetary positions.
1.3. The strategy pursued after the events 
of 25 November
Following the difficulties in the implementation of the
SGP provisions concerning France and Germany, the
Commission announced a three-pronged strategy based
on the continuation of budgetary surveillance, the need
to seek legal clarity on the implementation of the provi-
sions of the Treaty, and on the need to make substantial
steps in order to strengthen economic governance (2).
The three prongs of this strategy are outlined below.
Continuing surveillance
The Commission made it clear that, in spite of the uncer-
tainty on how to implement the procedures arisen after
the November 2003 Ecofin decisions the Commission
manifested its intention to continue to exercise fully its
role in budgetary surveillance in the framework of the
SGP. At the beginning of 2004, therefore, the Commis-
sion carried out the assessment of the latest updates of
the stability and convergence programmes and adopted
recommendations for opinions on these programmes.
The assessments were completed by early March. For
the first time, the Commission assessments were pub-
lished on the day of adoption in order to steer public
debate and enhance transparency. Moreover, the Com-
mission services’ technical documents supporting the
assessments have also been published within a few days
of the adoption of the assessments by the College.
¥1∂ As an example, and as Chapter 2 illustrates more in detail, contrary to the
first recommendation addressed to Portugal, the recommendation under
Article 104(7) to Germany and the successive recommendations under
Article 104(9) to both Germany and France took economic developments
more into account: the adjustment has been defined taking into account
growth prospects, and the effort has been quantified on the basis of the
economic perspective at the moment of finalising the recommendations.
¥2∂ See press release of 13.1.2004: ‘Commission sets out strategy for eco-
nomic policy coordination and surveillance’, available at:  http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/04/
35|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=60
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ary outcomes, the Commission recommended to the
Council to abrogate the excessive deficit position for
Portugal, and launched new procedures vis-à-vis Greece,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Re-establish legal certainty for the future
The second element in the Commission strategy was to
re-establish legal certainty for the future. From the point
of view of the legal and institutional framework, the
Ecofin Council conclusions of 25 November posed prob-
lems. These concerned not only the modalities to be fol-
lowed in the implementation of the procedures, where an
unconventional step had been created by the Council, but
in a wider context the fact that the Council could imple-
ment the Treaty as it wished, rather than following spe-
cific provisions contained therein. The Commission had
already stated in the minutes of the Council meeting that
in its opinion these conclusions were outside the spirit
and the letter of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth
Pact. The Commission subsequently decided to chal-
lenge in the European Court of Justice the legal status
and validity of certain elements of the Council conclu-
sions, on the basis of the following considerations.
According to the Commission, the Council conclu-
sions of 25 November constitute a violation of the con-
trol mechanism laid down in Article 104 EC, Regula-
tion (EC) No 1467/97 and the Stability and Growth
Pact resolution. This mechanism represents a series of
successive steps and stringent deadlines and is
designed to guide the Council in addressing recom-
mendations to the Member State in order to correct the
excessive deficit.
The Council had the possibility to reject the Commission
recommendations. Within the provisions of the Treaty
and the SGP, it can do so in the light of its own evalua-
tion of the objective economic factors, which form the
basis of the decisions to be taken. In that case, it had to
set out clearly and unambiguously why, in the light of
such objective economic factors, there was no need to
adopt the decisions based on the Commission recom-
mendations. This would have required the Council to
Box II.1: The Council vote on the Commission recommendations concerning France and Germany
In the context of the excessive deficit procedure, draft recommendations concerning France and Germany were submitted
by the Commission to the Ecofin Council for adoption. The first two draft recommendations under Article 104(8) of the
Treaty aimed at establishing that France had taken no effective action in response to the Council recommendation under
Article 104(7), or, in the case of Germany, that the action taken was proving inadequate. The second two draft recommen-
dations, made under Article 104(9) of the Treaty, outlined the measures that France and Germany would need to take in
order to remedy the excessive deficit situation while giving an additional year for completing the correction.
The Ecofin decisions were prepared by the meeting of the Eurogroup which preceded the Ecofin on the basis of a compro-
mise identified by the Italian Presidency. The draft conclusions agreed in the Eurogroup were adopted the following day
by the Ecofin, after a formal vote which did not endorse the Commission recommendations. The votes expressed in the
Council, which were made public in accordance with the provisions of the SGP, showed that there were quite divergent
views on how to advance with the procedure. In spite of being the numerical majority, countries in favour of endorsing the
Commission recommendations did not manage to achieve the qualified majority (of two thirds of the votes) required by
the Treaty in this field. The voting on 25 November took place as follows.
The Council first took a vote on the two Commission recommendations for Council decisions under Article 104(8) of the
Treaty concerning France and Germany, respectively. With Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland and Sweden voting in favour, the Presidency concluded that there was not a qualified majority for adopting the
decisions. The Council then took a vote on the two Commission recommendations for Council decisions under Article
104(9) of the Treaty addressed to France and Germany, respectively. The same countries as above voted in favour (with
the exception of Denmark and Sweden, which were excluded from the vote, together with the UK, as only countries which
have adopted the euro can vote on decisions under Article 104(9) of the Treaty), and the Presidency concluded that also in
that case there was not a qualified majority for adopting the decisions. Subsequently, the Council, with Belgium, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and, alternatively, Germany and France voting in favour, adopted specific conclu-
sions regarding France and Germany, respectively.61
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and Germany with the recommendations addressed to
them under Article 104(7). But in the present case con-
cerning the recommendations for France and Germany,
the Council confirmed the Commission’s economic
analysis (1). Consequently, the Council recognised that
additional measures to address the excessive deficit of
the Member States concerned were necessary. In those
circumstances the Council would have been expected to
adopt a recommendation submitted by the Commission,
possibly in an amended version.
The Commission filed its complaint with the Court of
Justice at the end of January, asking the Court to deal
with this case with an accelerated procedure, given the
importance of the matter. The Court accepted the request
of the Commission.
Working on new proposals
The effectiveness of economic governance has suffered
from the developments in 2003. The 25 November
events reinforced the importance of making a further
step forward. In this respect, the experience over the last
five years since the creation of the euro should serve as
guidance for future action. In this endeavour, the right
balance has to be found between, on the one hand, the
need to keep the economic governance framework stable
and predictable and, on the other, to improve the system
on the basis of experience.
Building on its communication of November 2002, the
Commission started considering ways to improve the
framework for economic governance in the Union,
which would build on the existing Treaty and the draft
Constitution text (see Box II.7) but could imply changes
to the SGP regulations.
In order not to prejudge the work of the future Commis-
sion, which will be called to carry through eventual for-
mal proposals, the current Commission, in a first debate
held in February, focused on the main orientations to be
drawn from the experience with the framework.
This part of the report on public finances in EMU repre-
sents a contribution to the debate on how the EU frame-
work for budgetary surveillance could be improved. The
Commission will further elaborate on specific proposals
for any formal changes in the legal provisions which will
deem necessary to strengthen economic governance.
The remainder of this part is structured as follows.
Firstly, it recalls the main issues which have arisen in the
implementation of the SGP since spring 2003, including
an explanation of the SGP provisions which are to be
applied when countries are placed in an excessive deficit
position, and the experience with countries which have
been dealt with within the surveillance mechanisms of
the SGP. Secondly, a number of important elements are
touched upon which concern the analysis of budgetary
positions and liabilities for European countries, includ-
ing the measurement of underlying budgetary positions,
and of risks and contingent liabilities. Thirdly, issues
concerning the rules and processes upon which budget-
ary surveillance at EU level is based are considered.
Finally, suggestions for a further evolution of the EU fis-
cal framework are explored (2).
¥1∂ This was highlighted in its recommendations (points 1 and 4 of the Coun-
cil conclusions).
¥2∂ For an overview of the evolution of the debate the reader can refer to Part II.2
of the previous years’ reports. 62
2. Implementing the Stability 
and Growth Pact
2.1. Introduction
This chapter describes several aspects related to the
implementation of the SGP. Section 2 outlines the
steps in the enforcement mechanisms provided for in
the Treaty and the SGP regulations which have been
activated for the first time and recalls the implemen-
tation of the SGP since spring 2003. Section 3 exam-
ines the developments concerning the Member States
for which action has been taken in the framework of
the excessive deficit procedure and other countries
which have been the object of recommendations by
the Council. Section 4 presents the application of the
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) to the 10 new
Member States which joined the EU on 1 May 2004.
2.2. The implementation of the EDP for 
euro-area countries in excessive deficit
Steps foreseen by the Treaty and the Pact after 
a recommendation under Article 104(7) has been 
addressed
Member States that are in excessive deficit positions
have the obligation to correct it in accordance with the
content of the recommendation addressed to them under
Article 104(7) of the Treaty.
The adoption of a recommendation under Article
104(7) implies an intensification of the surveillance on
the country concerned. Ultimately, this recommenda-
tion (and the others related) will be abrogated with a
Council decision in accordance with Article 104(12).
However, depending on the way the Member State acts,
the EDP could also lead to an even closer surveillance
and to sanctions imposed in order to spur the necessary
budgetary adjustment.
It should be recalled that the recommendations under
Article 104(7) of the Treaty included specific deadlines
(i) for the adoption of effective action and (ii) for the
correction of the excessive deficit. According to Article
3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the first
deadline for the adoption of effective action has to be
within four months at the most from the adoption of the
recommendation under Article 104(7). By contrast, the
correction of the excessive deficit should be completed
in the year following its identification unless there are
special circumstances (1).
After a recommendation under Article 104(7) has been
issued, the next steps in the EDP are governed in par-
ticular by Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1467/97 in conjunction with Article 104(9) of the
Treaty. These provisions are clearly defined. Graph II.1
gives an overview of how, according to the articles
mentioned above, the EDP works in its later stages. It
should be noted that while the focus of surveillance is
on the delivery of results (i.e. actual deficit back below
3 % of GDP), initially surveillance has to focus on the
measures taken by the Member States concerned in
response to the recommendations addressed by the
Council.
In accordance with these provisions, the Commission
has carried out the required surveillance concerning
the countries in ‘excessive deficit positions’. The next
section presents the relevant developments.
¥1∂ The wording ‘year following its identification’ requires an interpretation
of the word ‘identification’. The one adopted is that the ‘identification’ of
an excessive deficit takes place in ‘the year in which the Council has
adopted the decision on the existence of the excessive deficit under Article
104(6) of the Treaty’.63
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country in accordance to Article 104(7)
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spring 2003
Following developments in 2002 and in the early part of
2003, the Council took action against Portugal, Germany
and France (1). These countries were eventually placed
in ‘excessive deficit positions’ and received specific rec-
ommendations in order to correct their excessive deficit.
Setting the deadlines as required by the SGP de facto
implies that Member States can be given a time span of up
to two years for completing the correction of the excessive
deficit, with respect to the year in which the excessive def-
icit has occurred. As has been shown by events though,
such a period has proven not to be sufficient in the case of
Germany and France to achieve the required correction.
In addition to these countries, during the first half of 2004
a number of other countries have been faced with proce-
dures aiming at warning against the risk of an excessive
deficit, or at dealing with their situations showing deficits
above 3 % of GDP. Below is a presentation of the ongoing
procedures concerning the various countries.
Portugal
On 5 November 2002, the Council decided (2) that an
excessive deficit exists in Portugal and recommended to
bring the situation to an end. As required, two deadlines
were set down in this recommendation: (i) a deadline of 31
December 2002 was set for the Portuguese authorities to
take measures to correct the excessive deficit position; (ii)
a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit posi-
tion, which should be completed in the year following its
identification; this is understood as being the end of 2003.
The response of the Portuguese authorities began before
the Council had decided upon the existence of an exces-
sive deficit position. Eventually, the deficit in 2002 fell
to 2.7 % of GDP, an outcome which relied heavily on
one-off measures, especially a tax amnesty.
In spite of this result, against the background of slow
growth and the termination of one-off measures, Portugal
faced a considerable challenge in keeping the nominal def-
icit below the 3 % of GDP reference value also in 2003.
Indeed, during 2003, the impact of the cyclical downturn in
the European economy on Portugal has been sizeable and
accentuated by the ongoing adjustment between domestic
and foreign demand components. In view of the shrinkage
of economic activity, and the revealed high tax elasticities,
a massive shortfall in tax revenue developed in 2003, while
government expenditure, for its part, grew broadly in line
with budgeted targets. Consequently, to avoid breaching
the reference value for the deficit of 3 % of GDP, the Por-
tuguese Government resorted to two one-off operations,
together worth more than 2 % of GDP. Both operations
have been cleared by Eurostat.
The figures reported by the government in March 2004,
and validated by Eurostat, showed that, in spite of adverse
economic circumstances, the deficit was maintained below
3 % of GDP in 2003. Portugal therefore complied with the
terms of the excessive deficit recommendation addressed
to it in 2002, namely, to secure a deficit below 3 % of GDP
in 2002 and 2003. Accordingly, the Commission recom-
mended on 28 April 2004 to the Council to abrogate the
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit position in
Portugal. Nevertheless, according to Commission fore-
casts, the nominal deficit would rebound to 3  % of GDP
in 2004 in the absence of further measures. Following the
release of the forecasts, the Portuguese authorities made
public their intention to carry out additional measures so as
to keep the deficit below 3 % in 2004.
On 11 May 2004, the Council abrogated its decision
taken in 2002 on the existence of an excessive budget,
noting that Portugal had complied with the terms of the
recommendation adopted by the Council with a view to
bringing that deficit situation to an end. In its decision,
the Council noted the efforts made by Portugal to meet
the terms it set — the general government deficit stood
at 2.8 % of GDP in 2003 and was 2.7 % in 2002, com-
pared with 4.4 % in 2001 — whilst highlighting the need
for further vigilance in 2004.
France
On 21 January 2003, the Council adopted a recommen-
dation giving an early warning to France in order to pre-
vent the occurrence of an excessive deficit in 2003. In
the March 2003 reporting of data, however, the French
authorities indicated that the deficit was at 3.1 % of GDP
already in 2002 (3), above the reference value.
¥1∂ For documents concerning these procedures, see the section on fiscal sur-
veillance on the website of the Economic and Financial Affairs DG: http://
europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_
en.htm. See also Part II.2 of European Commission (2003a)
¥2∂ Council Decision 2002/923/EC, OJ L 322/30.
¥3∂ The government deficit for 2002 was revised by Eurostat from 3.0 % of
GDP (as notified by the French authorities) to 3.1 % of GDP. See Press
Release STAT/03/30 of 17.3.2003.65
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Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to Portuguese stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
Graph II.3:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in France
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to French stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
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clusions that although budgetary developments had been
adversely affected by continued weakness in economic
activity, the excess of the general government deficit over
the 3 % of GDP reference value did not result from an unu-
sual event outside the control of the French authorities, nor
was it the result of a severe economic downturn. According
to Commission calculations, the deterioration in the 2002
budgetary position resulted mainly from a worsening in the
cyclically adjusted budgetary position. The breaching of
the 3 % of GDP threshold in 2002 was also rooted in the
reversal of the budgetary consolidation process which had
been taking place since 1999, and was likely not to be tem-
porary. Considering also its forecast for 2003 of a deficit
above 3 % of GDP and that the debt ratio would also
breach the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value, the Com-
mission therefore activated the EDP and on 7 May 2003
recommended to the Council to decide on the existence of
an excessive deficit in France and to address a recommen-
dation to France to put an end to the present excessive def-
icit situation as rapidly as possible and by 2004 at the latest.
The Council decided on 3 June 2003 that an excessive def-
icit existed in France (1), and recommended the French
authorities to put an end to the present excessive deficit
situation as rapidly as possible and by 2004 at the latest,
establishing the deadline of 3 October 2003 for the French
Government to take appropriate measures to this end. The
Council also recommended that the French authorities
achieve a significantly larger improvement in the cycli-
cally adjusted deficit in 2003 than planned, to limit the
increase in the general government debt/GDP ratio in
2003, and to implement measures ensuring that the cycli-
cally adjusted deficit would be reduced in 2004 by 0.5 %
of GDP, or by a larger amount, so as to ensure that the
cumulative improvement in 2003–04 would be enough to
bring the nominal deficit below 3 % in 2004 at the latest.
In response to the Council recommendation, the French
authorities took several measures aimed at improving the
budgetary results for 2003 (2). However, these measures
did not significantly reduce the 2003 cyclically adjusted
general government deficit below the level planned by
the authorities in June, before the Council addressed its
recommendation. In addition, the budgetary plans con-
cerning 2004 were not considered by the Commission
sufficient to ensure that the cumulative improvement in
the cyclically adjusted balance in 2003–04 would bring
the nominal deficit below 3 % in 2004, as recommended
by the Council in June. Indeed, the draft budget pro-
jected the general government deficit to decline from
4.0 % of GDP in 2003 to 3.6 % of GDP in 2004. Accord-
ingly, the Commission recommended to the Council to
decide that France had taken no effective action in
response to the recommendation under Article 104(7).
On this basis, the Commission adopted on 21 October a
recommendation for the Council to request France to
take new measures to reduce the budget deficit and rem-
edy the situation of excessive deficit, beyond those con-
tained in the draft budget for 2004. On account of a
number of elements (see Section 2.3.2), the draft recom-
mendation stipulated that France should:
• achieve in 2004 an improvement in the cyclically
adjusted balance of 1 percentage point of GDP (3);
• in 2005, achieve an adjustment in the cyclically
adjusted deficit of at least 0.5 percentage points of
GDP or by a larger amount so as to ensure that the
general government deficit would be brought below
3 % of GDP;
• allocate any higher-than-expected revenue in 2004
to deficit reduction and, should the recovery in eco-
nomic activity be stronger than expected, the
improvement in the underlying budgetary position
should be accelerated.
The Commission also included in its recommendation a
request for the French authorities to submit a report
announcing the measures or reforms to be implemented
and the time-horizon for their application, followed by
¥1∂ Council Decision 2003/487/EC, OJ L 165/29.
¥2∂ The measures included (i) in September the decision to cancel credits in
the State sector worth EUR 1.4 billion (0.1 % of GDP). However, this can-
cellation was meant to ensure the achievement of the planned expenditure
objective in the State sector, and not to secure a better outcome; (ii) in
July, the decision to cancel the reimbursement of drugs with ‘insufficient
medical service’; (iii) in the same month, a decision, taking effect in Octo-
ber, to increase taxes on tobacco; and (iv) on 1 September, a decision to
slightly increase social contributions for AGS, ‘association pour la gestion
du régime d'assurance des créances des salariés’ (this is a fund in charge of
the payment of wages of workers in companies in bankruptcy). The last
three measures were expected to have a marginal impact on the 2003 gen-
eral government deficit but, for some of them, a larger impact on the 2004
general government deficit was expected. Last but not least, the French
authorities successfully implemented an important pension reform which
was under discussion at the moment that the Council adopted the recom-
mendation according to Article 104(7).
¥3∂ This would have allowed France to catch up in 2004 for the lack of adjust-
ment in 2003 and to set a credible basis for bringing the deficit below 3 % of
GDP in 2005. Given its size, and provided that it was of the right composi-
tion, the additional adjustment compared to current plans was considered not
to be harmful for growth in the short term and, by enhancing the sustainabil-
ity of public finances, to have favourable effects in the longer run.67
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allowing assessing progress made in correcting the
excessive deficit (1).
As explained in Section 1.1, on 25 November 2003 the
Council did not adopt the draft recommendations, but
specific Council conclusions on France. Concerning the
substance, the conclusions postponed the deadline for
bringing the deficit below 3 % of GDP to 2005, as rec-
ommended by the Commission, but were less demand-
ing on the adjustment to be done in 2004, only amount-
ing to 0.8 % of GDP. In the light of the recommendations
given and the commitments by France to implement all
the necessary measures to ensure that the deficit will be
below 3 % of GDP in 2005 at the latest, the Council
decided to hold the procedure for France in abeyance for
the time being and declared that it stood ready to take a
decision under Article 104(9), on the basis of the Com-
mission recommendation, should France fail to act in
accordance with its commitments. The Council noted
that an assessment on the progress made would be based
on a regular reporting by France, in particular in the con-
text of the biannual notifications, and would give due
attention to the prevailing economic conditions and to
the structural reforms being implemented in France with
a view to strengthening growth and ensuring the long-
term sustainability of public finances.
Germany
On 21 January 2003, the Council decided that an exces-
sive deficit existed in Germany (2) and adopted a recom-
mendation with a view to bring the situation to an end.
The latter set a deadline of 21 May 2003 to take meas-
ures to correct the excessive deficit positions and a dead-
line for the correction of the excessive deficit position, to
be completed in the year following its identification; i.e.
the end of 2004. Germany, however, was invited to bring
the deficit below 3 % of GDP already in 2003, as
planned in the updated stability programme, were the
growth conditions projected in the update (GDP growth
of 1 %) to materialise. The Council also recommended
the German authorities to bring the debt ratio to a halt in
2003 and reverse it thereafter.
¥1∂ France was also invited, when drawing up the measures to be taken in
order to comply with these recommendations, to take into account the rec-
ommendations issued by the Council in the framework of the 2003–05
broad economic policy guidelines. The need to curb the dynamics of
spending in the health sector was explicitly included in the guidelines. ¥2∂ Council Decision 2003/89/EC, OJ L 34/16.
Graph II.4:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Germany
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to German stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
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tion in 2003 showed very soon to be an unrealistic objec-
tive, given the deteriorating growth conditions. It soon
proved to be a difficult task also with respect to 2004. In
autumn 2003, the Commission forecast showed that the
deficit for 2003 would be over 4 % of GDP, implying
that, contrary to expectations in spring, neither the nom-
inal nor the cyclically adjusted deficit would be reduced
despite the measures taken by Germany (1). Despite the
budgetary consolidation measures taken in 2003, it also
appeared that Germany would not be able to comply
with the recommendation to bring the deficit below 3 %
in 2004. On 18 November 2003 (2), therefore, the Com-
mission adopted two recommendations for the Council
in relation to the excessive deficit procedure for Ger-
many. The first, under Article 104(8) established that the
action taken by Germany in 2003 was proving inade-
quate and as a result the excessive deficit would persist
also in 2004, in contradiction with what was recom-
mended in January 2003. The second, under Article
104(9), requested Germany to take new measures to
reduce the budget deficit, beyond those already planned.
On account of a number of elements (see Section 2.3.2),
the draft recommendation stipulated that Germany
should:
• put an end to the present excessive deficit situation
as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 2005;
• achieve in 2004 an annual reduction in the cyclically
adjusted balance by 0.8 percentage points of GDP;
• achieve in 2005 a further reduction in the cyclically
adjusted deficit by at least 0.5 percentage points of
GDP or by a larger amount so as to ensure that the
general government deficit is well below 3 % of
GDP; 
• allocate any higher-than-expected revenue to deficit
reduction and, should the recovery in economic
activity be stronger than currently expected, acceler-
ate the reduction in the cyclically adjusted deficit.
In addition, and similarly to what had been done for
France, the Commission included in its recommendation
a request for the German authorities to submit a report
outlining the announced decisions in response to the rec-
ommendations, as well as four implementation reports
over the next two years, in order to assess progress made
by the German Government in correcting the excessive
deficit (3).
As said before, the Commission recommendations con-
cerning Germany and France were discussed and voted
at the same meeting. Concerning the substance, also in
the case of Germany the Council conclusions post-
poned the deadline for bringing the deficit below 3 %
of GDP to 2005, and required a smaller adjustment to
be done in 2004 (0.6 % of GDP) than what was indi-
cated by the Commission. Similarly to France, the
Council decided not to act in the light of the recommen-
dations and the public commitment by Germany to
implement all the necessary measures to ensure that the
deficit will be below 3 % of GDP in 2005 at the latest,
and agreed to hold the procedure for Germany in abey-
ance for the time being. The Council declared that it
stood ready to take a decision under Article 104(9), on
the basis of the Commission recommendation, should
Germany fail to act in accordance with its commit-
ments. The regular reporting by Germany, in particular
in the context of the biannual notifications would pro-
vide the basis for assessing the progress achieved. This
assessment, as for France, would give due attention to
the prevailing economic conditions and to the structural
reforms being implemented in Germany with a view to
strengthening growth and ensuring the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances.
Netherlands
On 28 April 2004 the Commission initiated the exces-
sive deficit procedure for the Netherlands with the
adoption of the report foreseen in Article 104(3) of the
Treaty. According to the latest Commission forecasts,
that took into consideration data reported by the Dutch
authorities on 31 March 2004, the general government
deficit in 2003 reached 3.2 % of GDP in 2003, thus
exceeding the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value, and
increased substantially relative to the 2002 deficit
(1.9 % of GDP).
¥1∂ The forecast also confirmed the German authorities’ publicly expressed
view that the general government deficit was likely to exceed 3 % of GDP
also in 2004.
¥2∂ See ‘Commission proceeds with excessive deficit procedure for Germany’,
Press Release IP/03/1560.
¥3∂ Germany was also invited, when drawing up the measures to be taken in
order to comply with the recommendations, to take into account the rec-
ommendations issued by the Council in the framework of the 2003–05
broad economic policy guidelines. The latter highlighted the need for
structural reforms as the main solution to the growth under-performance of
the German economy.69
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2003 was not the outcome of an unusual event outside the
control of the Dutch authorities, nor was it the result of a
severe economic downturn, which is defined in the Pact as
an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 %. However, it
occurred in a context of strongly negative growth, with real
GDP growth at – 0.7 % in 2003, and a negative output gap
of around 2 % of GDP emerging. This largely explains the
deterioration in the general government balance, which
was further aggravated by a greater-than-expected weak-
ening in receipts and higher-than-expected local govern-
ment deficits while expenditure targets were largely met.
On 16 April 2004, just after the release of the Commis-
sion’s spring forecasts, the Dutch authorities announced
further measures amounting to savings of 0.6 percent-
age points of GDP, intended to keep the deficit below
3 % of GDP. However, the attainment of this objective
depends on the measures yielding the expected results
and on not having second round effects. Hence, there is
a likelihood that the deficit may exceed 3 % of GDP
also in 2004.
On the above considerations on 19 May the Commission
adopted an opinion and recommended to the Council to
decide on the existence of an excessive deficit in the
Netherlands and to make recommendations to the Dutch
authorities with a view to bringing this situation to an
end. According to the Commission, the Dutch Govern-
ment should take action regarding corrective measures
mainly of a structural nature and amounting to about half
a percentage point of GDP. The Commission also invited
the Council to urge the Netherlands to ensure that budg-
etary consolidation towards a position close to balance
or in surplus is sustained after the excessive deficit has
been corrected. To that effect the Dutch authorities
should ensure a reduction in the cyclically adjusted def-
icit by at least 0.5 percentage points of GDP per year.
Greece
On 19 May 2004, following a second revision of fiscal
data notified by the Greek authorities concerning the
outcome for 2003, which showed a deficit above 3 % of
GDP, the Commission adopted a report on the existence
of an excessive deficit in Greece.
After an original notification of data at the beginning of
March 2004, a revision made by the Greek authorities
indicated that the general government deficit in Greece
had reached 3.0 % of GDP. However, such figures were
not validated by Eurostat. At the beginning of May, fol-
Graph II.5:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the Netherlands
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to Dutch stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
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Greek authorities submitted a new notification, which
showed a deficit at 3.2 % of GDP for 2003. Moreover
strong indications emerged that there will be significant
further, and as regards deficits almost certainly upward,
revisions for 2003 and earlier years, when a new notifi-
cation is made in September 2004.
The deterioration in the general government balance in
2003 from a year earlier was the result of a sharp wors-
ening in the balance of the central government, in spite
of a buoyant economy. The general government deficit
of 2003 compares with a target deficit of 0.9 % of GDP
set in the December 2002 updated stability programme.
The significant slippage is attributable, first, to extraor-
dinary factors (expenditure overruns related to the prep-
aration of the Olympic Games and compensation for
weather damages), secondly, to higher than planned pri-
mary spending (social transfers and public sector wages)
and finally to a shortfall of budgetary revenues (VAT
and income taxes).
Given the positive and widening output gap in 2003, the
sharp rise in the cyclically adjusted deficit from 1.7 % of
GDP in 2002 to 3.9 % of GDP in 2003 indicates a pro-
cyclical, expansionary fiscal stance. According to the
Commission’s spring forecasts, based on announced pol-
icies, the general government deficit would remain
above the 3 % reference value in 2004. Moreover, the
high level of government debt and the slow pace of debt
reduction are a cause for concern. The gross government
debt is estimated to decline only slightly to 102.8 % of
GDP in 2004 from 103.0 % of GDP in 2003, thus
remaining widely in excess of the 60 % of GDP Treaty
reference value.
Following the Commission report, the adoption of a
Commission opinion and of the Council decision on the
existence of an excessive deficit and of recommenda-
tions to bring this situation to an end are expected before
the summer recess.
2.3.1. Other procedures
The results of the Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts
also called for the activation of budgetary surveillance
instruments to deal with the occurrence of an excessive
deficit or the risk of it in the United Kingdom and Italy.
The United Kingdom recorded a general government
deficit above 3 % of GDP in the 2003 calendar year and
is forecast to record a deficit above 3 % of GDP for the
2003–04 financial year (which is the basis for budgetary
surveillance for the UK under the Treaty). On 28 April
2004, the Commission therefore adopted a report on the
budgetary situation of the UK under Article 104(3) of the
Treaty. The excess over the 3 % of GDP reference value
in 2003 did not result from an unusual event outside the
control of the United Kingdom authorities, nor from a
severe economic downturn in the sense of the Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the Commis-
sion’s spring 2004 forecast projects the UK deficit to
return to below the reference value in 2004 and 2005.
Hence, the excess over the reference value is likely to be
small and temporary, which gave margins to conclude
that an excessive deficit would not exist in the sense of
the Treaty. The Economic and Financial Committee pre-
pared an opinion on the Commission report confirming
the Commission analysis.
On 28 April 2004, the Commission recommended to the
Council that an early warning be issued to Italy to pre-
vent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. Public
finance developments in Italy have shown a significant
divergence from the objectives set in successive stability
programmes. The Commission forecasts for 2004 a
budget deficit of 3.2 % of GDP compared to a target of
2.2 % of GDP in the 2003 update of the programme and
of 0.6 % of GDP in the 2002 update. The divergence
from the objectives is almost entirely structural. The
cyclically adjusted budget deficit is expected to deterio-
Table II.1
Successive targets for the 2003 general government 
balance and estimated outcome in Greece
Real GDP 
growth (%)
General 
government 
balance 
(% of GDP)
November 2002: 
draft budget for 2003 3.8 – 0.9
December 2002: 
2002 USP (1) 3.8 – 0.9
December 2003: 
2003 USP (1) 4.0 – 1.4
April 2004: Commission 
spring forecasts 4.2 – 3.0
May 2004: Second revised 
EDP notification – 3.2
(1) Updated stability programme.
Source: Commission services.71
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Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to Greek stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
Graph II.7:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the United Kingdom
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to British stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
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forecasts. The budgetary plans of Italy have been recur-
rently based on over-optimistic growth assumptions,
especially as regards the medium-term growth outlook.
The projected interruption of the reduction of the debt,
which at 106 % of GDP is the highest in the euro area, is
a further source of concern. Without extraordinary oper-
ations the debt ratio would have barely decreased in Italy
since 2001.
In view of the above, the Commission proposed to the
Council to recommend the Italian authorities to take
additional measures to ensure that the general govern-
ment deficit does not breach the 3 % of GDP reference
value. A well-devised within-year adjustment, which
could give rise to a positive confidence effect, would be
centred on a sizeable reduction and re-composition of
expenditure, creating room for the intended lowering of
the tax burden, and on an acceleration in the reduction of
the debt/GDP ratio, which together would enhance
potential growth in the long run. Therefore, the Commis-
sion considered it appropriate for Italy to implement
additional measures of a permanent nature of at least
EUR 7 billion (0.5 % of GDP) in 2004 which, based on
the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, would stem the
deterioration of the cyclically adjusted balance in 2004
and would provide a sufficient margin for bringing the
budget below the 3 % of GDP reference value.
At its meeting of 11 May 2004, the Council took note of
the Commission recommendation for the Council to
issue an early warning. It also took note of the Italian
minister’s commitment to ensure that Italy’s deficit does
not exceed 3 % in 2004. It reached a broad consensus in
favour of postponing further consideration of this issue
until its meeting on 5 July, so as to be able to examine the
measures to be announced by the Italian Government.
Following the Council meeting, the Commission took
note that the Council had not been able to reach a deci-
sion on the recommendation for an early warning to be
addressed to Italy. In the view of the Commission the
case for an early warning was fully established. The
Commission noted that its early-warning initiative
already resulted in measures being planned by the Italian
Government to cut public expenditure with effect on the
current year. However, the final size, their specific
impact and the time of their implementation remained
undisclosed. The Commission stated that it will continue
to monitor the budgetary situation in Italy and will assess
measures when they are adopted.
Graph II.8:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Italy
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to Italian stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
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It is possible to summarise some of the major lessons that
can be drawn from the experiences with the EDP in
Stage III of EMU.
While monitoring compliance with the Treaty must
focus on the respect of nominal budgetary aggregates,
the importance of considerations concerning economic
developments has increased in the implementation of the
EU fiscal framework. In the cases of Portugal, Germany
and France the countries faced more difficult economic
circumstances than expected when the recommendations
were addressed. After the first recommendation issued to
Portugal, where no particular reference was made to
growth, in the case of the first recommendation to Ger-
many and subsequently of the recommendations pre-
pared last autumn concerning both Germany and France,
the budgetary adjustment required has been determined
considering past and expected growth. This reflects a
prudent and non-mechanical approach: even if budget-
ary consolidation is not necessarily harmful for growth,
it could not be excluded that a too large effort could
prove economically costly if undertaken in a single year,
in particular given the downward revision in growth
prospects.
The assessment of compliance with the recommenda-
tions presents a number of difficulties which were not
foreseen. Difficulties were encountered in assessing ex
ante the budgetary impact of the measures taken in
response to the Council recommendations. Furthermore,
difficulties have materialised in measuring the fiscal
effort of EDP countries via changes in cyclically
adjusted budget balances between the moment in which
the recommendations are addressed and the moment of
assessment of compliance. In this respect, an important
issue is that of disentangling changes in the CAB due to
discretionary budgetary measures and changes associ-
ated with modified growth conditions (this latter point is
analysed in detail in Section 3.3).
The recent experience with the EDP has shown that
attention should be given not only to the size of budget-
ary adjustment but also to its ‘quality’. The case of Por-
tugal illustrates that an excessive reliance on one-off
measures for ensuring the correction of the excessive
deficit may simply result in postponement of the
moment in which permanent measures have to be taken
to avoid excessive deficits. The Commission recommen-
dations have generally taken into account the aspect of
the quality of the budgetary adjustment, by requiring that
the consolidation measures should secure a lasting
improvement in budget balances and that should be
geared towards a reinforcement of the growth potential
consistent with the BEPGs.
The new steps undertaken in the excessive deficit proce-
dures of the Treaty complemented by the SGP have
proven to be quite complex, not always well defined in the
legal text, and sometimes difficult to comply with in terms
of deadlines. Reflecting this complexity, different inter-
pretations between the Commission and the Council led to
undue tensions in the application of the provisions. In
addition, the deadlines which the SGP requires concern-
ing the measures to be taken by a country have proved to
be quite unrealistic in particular when compared with the
usual delays in the national budgetary processes. In sum,
it appears that in some cases there is an over-specification
of the rules which may usefully be corrected.
Given the relative novelty of the SGP framework, there
is room to improve the current practice in the EDP
implementation. The emergence of new elements to take
into account for a satisfactory implementation of the
EDP, as well as unforeseen difficulties in budgetary sur-
veillance and with the application of the rules, raises the
necessity of an adaptation of the practice followed by the
Commission and the Council within the EDP frame-
work. To be successful the adaptation requires an active
dialogue between the Commission and the Council to
identify timely the issues at stake and define common
ways to tackle them.
The implementation of the EDP has proven more contro-
versial than expected. Part of the problem could be
attributed to difficulties in communication. In this sense,
a lesson to be drawn is that an over-dramatisation could
be counter-productive. Conversely, an effort towards
focusing the debate over factual issues and towards
increased clarity and transparency may help to limit the
risk of misunderstandings.
2.4. The application of the excessive deficit 
procedure to the 10 new Member 
States
2.4.1. Introduction
The EU budgetary surveillance framework will apply to
the new Member States immediately after accession.
This includes, where relevant, the activation of the
excessive deficit procedure.74
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(Continued on the next page)
The intense debate about the economic and procedural aspects of the SGP seems based on a widespread assumption that imposing
a sanction on a Member State in the context of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) would exacerbate the problems faced by
the country concerned, in particular, on the one hand by leading to an increase in the deficit due to the payment of the sanction,
and on the other hand, by leading to an additional tightening stance of fiscal policy, which could be unwarranted if the excessive
deficit is induced, at least in part, by an economic slowdown. This assumption seems to a large extent unjustified. On the latter
aspect, i.e. on the effect of the fiscal stance on the economy, doubts exist whether such additional tightening would weigh nega-
tively on growth (see, for example, Part IV of last year’s report). In addition, both elements linked to the timing and real costs of
the sanctions suggest that the assumption that the sanction makes the budgetary adjustment more difficult is too strong.
Graph II.1 already explained that the possibility of moving to sanctions is foreseen only in case of a severe lack of cooperation
by a Member State, which does not comply with successive recommendations by the Council, or when the actual results for
the deficit show that it has not been brought below 3 % of GDP within the deadline set by the Council. Given the framework
of the Treaty, and the timetable envisaged by the SGP, under the assumption that a country makes its best to comply with the
recommendations but does not manage to deliver a deficit below 3 % of GDP within the set deadline, the imposition of the
first form of sanction, i.e. a deposit, is unlikely to be applied before two years after the first year in which the deficit was above
3 % (hereafter ‘year t’). However, if the country has been complying with the recommendation under Article 104(7) until that
moment, at that stage the Council will only send a notice to the Member State to require further adjustment without imposing
any sanction. At the same time, the Council will be assigning an additional year for the correction, as a new ‘actual’ result
must be available, before any decision to abrogate the excessive deficit procedure, or moving to sanctions on the basis of insuf-
ficient results. In that case of full ‘cooperation by the government’ but inability to deliver the result, the deposit would likely
only be required three years after ‘year t’. If it is assumed that in ‘year t’ the excessive deficit was partly due to an economic
slowdown, it seems likely that in ‘year t+3’ the economic circumstances will have changed with respect to the ‘year t’ (from
historical evidence, there is a high probability that growth comes back to potential within two or three years of a slowdown).
In addition to the fact that such timing makes any sanction unlikely to exacerbate economic circumstances, another element
should be taken into consideration, i.e. that the SGP foresees that the Council should use in the first place the form of a deposit
with the Community (Article 11 of CR 1467/97) among the various forms of sanctions listed in Article 104(11) of the Treaty.
The amount of such deposit, to be made when a country breaches the deficit criterion, is specified in Article 12 of CR
1467/97: ‘the amount of the first deposit shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0.2 % of GDP, and a variable component
equal to one 10th of the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and the reference value
of 3 % of GDP’. The Council may decide in following years to impose an additional deposit, calculated only on the basis of
the variable component expressed above. Any single deposit shall not exceed the upper limit of 0.5 % of GDP.
Given the way the deposit is formulated, the real cost of imposing a sanction in the form of the deposit takes the forms of
having to pay the (opportunity) costs of foregone interest on the non-interest-bearing deposit. Given that the deposit should
be made only for a limited time, the country could borrow the necessary fund at the short end of the market.
Table II.2 shows that even if Member States in excessive deficit were required to deposit the maximum amount foreseen
by the regulation (which would imply deficits at or over 5 % of GDP) the real cost of the deposit in terms of GDP would
be very limited: under an interest rate assumption (e.g. at 4 %), it would be equivalent to at most 0.02 % of GDP.
Table II.2
Cost in % of GDP implied by imposing a deposit as a sanction under the EDP
Deposit in % of GDP
Interest rate 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
2.0 0.0040 0.0050 0.0060 0.0070 0.0080 0.0090 0.0100
2.5 0.0050 0.0063 0.0075 0.0088 0.0100 0.0113 0.0125
3.0 0.0060 0.0075 0.0090 0.0105 0.0120 0.0135 0.0150
3.5 0.0070 0.0088 0.0105 0.0123 0.0140 0.0158 0.0175
4.0 0.0080 0.0100 0.0120 0.0140 0.0160 0.0180 0.020075
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taking into account their status as Member States with
a derogation. Compliance with the budgetary objec-
tives will be closely monitored and encouraged through
the peer pressure instruments foreseen by the Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), although the
sanctions part of the excessive deficit procedure will
not apply.
At a High Level Meeting regrouping all Member States,
including those entering the EU in 2004, the framework
was set on how to integrate the acceding countries into
the EU budgetary surveillance framework. The purpose
of this section is to clarify how this will be done.
2.4.2. The Athens conclusions
At the High Level Meeting in Athens on 28 May 2003,
the following conclusions were agreed with respect to
the excessive deficit procedure and the assessment of the
convergence programmes.
• The acceding countries agree to observe from 2004
onwards the reporting deadlines (before 1 March and
before 1 September) on the bi-annual fiscal notifica-
tions of budgetary data. This early submission will
allow the Commission to initiate the excessive deficit
procedure, where necessary, in May/June 2004.
• The new Member States are invited to submit their
first convergence programmes by 15 May 2004,
which could be an update of the pre-accession eco-
nomic programme submitted in August 2003.
• In line with the code of conduct (1), the new Member
States should submit their updates of the conver-
gence programmes shortly after national govern-
ments have presented their budget proposals to
national parliaments, but not earlier than mid-Octo-
ber and not later than 1 December 2004.
• The code of conduct shall be observed from acces-
sion by the new Member States. They are invited to
pay more systematic attention to the impact of struc-
tural reforms on the medium-term economic sce-
nario and on budgetary implications of structural
reforms. Whenever possible, they should provide
information on cyclically adjusted budgetary posi-
tions. They are also invited to more systematically
include information on the long-term sustainability
of public finance.
2.4.3. Implications of the status of ‘Member State 
with a derogation’ for budgetary surveillance
The new Member States will enter the EU with the status
of Member State with a derogation (2). The new Member
States will be subject to legislative provisions regarding
the EU budgetary surveillance. These stem in particular
from Article 99 and/or Article 104 of the Treaty, supple-
mented by the SGP (3).
The derogation does not exempt the new Member States
from the obligation to avoid excessive deficits, which
applies to all Member States since the start of the third
phase of EMU on 1 January 1999 (4). The derogation
implies that Article 104 does not apply in its entirety to
the new Member States. In particular, according to Arti-
cle 122(3) of the Treaty, Member States with a deroga-
tion, when in a situation of an excessive deficit and fail-
Box II.2 (continued)
Using assumptions which are closer to current circumstances, i.e. deficit remains below 4 % of GDP and the interest rate
paid to raise the funds would be between 2 and 3 % (based on the assumption that countries would issue two-to-four-year
bonds to finance the deposit), shows that the costs are likely to be much smaller, i.e. in the range of 0.004 to 0.009 % of
GDP. Such an amount, which is almost of a purely reputation nature, seems too small to affect significantly any adjustment
in the budget to correct the excessive deficit.
¥1∂ Revised opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee on the content
and format of stability and convergence programmes, endorsed by the
Ecofin Council on 10.7.2001, see Chapter VII.1 of European Commission
(2002a).
¥2∂ Article 4 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the 10 new
Member States and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European
Union is founded specifies that ‘Each of the new Member States shall par-
ticipate in economic and monetary union from the date of accession as a
Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 122 of the
EC Treaty’.
¥3∂ Council Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and No 1467/97, which together
constitute the Stability and Growth Pact.
¥4∂ Articles 104(1) and 116(3) of the Treaty, with the notable exception of the
UK (see protocol on the UK annexed to the Treaty, paragraph 6).76
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under Article 104(7) with a view to bringing that situa-
tion to an end, cannot be submitted to the last two steps
of the excessive deficit procedure, namely the proce-
dures of Article 104(9) and (11). Therefore, the new
Member States cannot be subject to enhanced budgetary
surveillance by the Council (Article 104(9)) nor to sanc-
tions (Article 104(11)) (1).
What are the consequences of this in terms of deadlines
and obligations? In case of non-compliance, the overall
maximum period of 10 months, from the reporting date
of the figures indicating the existence of an excessive
deficit until the decision to impose sanctions, evidently
does not apply to Member States with a derogation, as
the latter stage is not foreseen for these countries (2).
However, the first steps of the procedure and the relative
deadlines apply to all Member States regardless of their
status:
• the Commission prepares the report referred to in
Article 104(3);
• the EFC formulates an opinion on the report (Article
104(4)) within two weeks of its adoption by the
Commission (3);
• the Council decides on the existence of an excessive
deficit (Article 104(6)) within three months of the
reporting dates established in Article 4(2) and (3) of
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, and, at the same time,
makes recommendations to the Member State con-
cerned with a view to correct the excessive deficit
(Article 104(7)) (4);
• in its recommendations under Article 104(7), the
Council establishes a deadline of four months at the
most for effective action to be taken by the Member
State concerned (5). The effective action requested
to the Member State will have to be in line with the
adjustment path to correct the deficit defined in the
recommendation under Article 104(7).
2.4.4. Initiating the excessive deficit procedure 
for the new Member States
According to the fiscal notifications of 1 March 2004,
6 of the 10 NMS, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia, had a general
government deficit above the 3 % of GDP Treaty ref-
erence value in 2003, while Cyprus and Malta
recorded government debt levels above the 60 % of
GDP Treaty reference value. Moreover, on the basis of
the Commission’s spring 2004 forecasts as well as
indicated by the national authorities, the deficits are
also expected to continue to exceed the 3 % of GDP
reference value in all six countries in 2004. In the two
countries which exceeded the debt ratio threshold in
2003 (Cyprus and Malta), the debt ratio is on a rising
trend and is therefore projected to remain above 60 %
of GDP also in 2004.
On the basis of these notifications and the spring 2004
forecasts and in line with the abovementioned provisions
of the EU budgetary surveillance framework, the Com-
mission adopted on 12 May 2004 a report on each of the
six countries as required by Article 104(3) of the Treaty.
The reports found that the excess of the general govern-
ment deficit over the 3 % of GDP reference value did not
result, in the sense of the Stability and Growth Pact, from
an unusual event outside the control of the authorities,
nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn.
Thereafter, the Commission adopted recommendations
within the excessive deficit procedure in time for the
Ecofin Council of 5 July (6).
2.4.5. The deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit and ‘special circumstances’
Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
states that the Council recommendation under Article
104(7) should establish a deadline for the correction of
the excessive deficit and that this correction should be
‘completed in the year following its identification unless
there are special circumstances.’ Without special cir-
cumstances, the new Member States found to be in a sit-
uation of excessive deficit in 2004 would therefore have
to complete the correction in 2005, which may not be
appropriate from an economic point of view.
It appears possible that the economic and budgetary sit-
uation of the new Member States provides arguments for¥1∂ In addition, Member States with a derogation have no voting right on deci-sions provided for under the two paragraphs.
¥2∂ Consistently, Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 only refers to partici-
pating Member States for the application of the overall 10 month deadline. 
¥3∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, Article 3(1).
¥4∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, Article 3(3).
¥5∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, Article 3(4).
¥6∂ For a complete overview of the country-specific budgetary developments
see Part I and Part V.77
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fication of such circumstances will have to be done on a
case-by-case basis, some relevant features may be com-
mon to several new Member States, on which the assess-
ment of the convergence programmes will shed further
light.
For example, an element to consider is the initial level of
the government deficit, which will affect the length and
the size of the implied necessary adjustment. If the initial
deficit level is substantially above the reference value,
the new Member State could be allowed to undertake the
necessary budgetary adjustment in a period appropri-
ately longer than one year. Naturally, it will be necessary
to take into account the reasons behind the excessive def-
icit, past budgetary developments and the convergence
programme, to assess whether the government deficit
has been and is expected to be on a sustained decreasing
path. Moreover, the level of government debt must also
be considered.
If ‘special circumstances’ are present, the Council may
give the Member State concerned a longer period to cor-
rect the excessive deficit than the year following its iden-
tification.
This multi-annual approach would be consistent with the
way the EDP was applied after 1994 to today’s members
of the euro area (1). Every year a recommendation under
Article 104(7) was issued until the country brought the
deficit below 3 % of GDP and the EDP was abrogated.
2.4.6. Monitoring compliance with the 
recommendations under Article 104(7)
If a new Member State is given a multi-annual period for
bringing its deficit to below 3 % of GDP, the period
granted for the correction of the excessive deficit would
be based on its convergence programme. The assessment
by the Commission and the Council should help ensure
that the adjustment adopted by the Member State is cred-
ible and realistic.
This monitoring of the adjustment will involve compar-
ing the adjustment path with the budgetary outcomes
reported in the regular fiscal notifications, taking also
into consideration the regular updates of the conver-
gence programmes. The monitoring could include the
issuance of further Council recommendations under
Article 104(7), which appears to be the only means avail-
able to exercise pressure or control. Given the impossi-
bility of moving to the next step in the EDP, namely a
recommendation under Article 104(9), on account of the
derogation, increased pressure on the Member State con-
cerned would be provided by further Council recommen-
dation under Article 104(7).
In addition to Council recommendations, three other
channels may act as complementary disciplinary mecha-
nisms. Firstly, the authorities of most of the new Mem-
ber States have made their intentions known with respect
to ERM II participation and subsequent euro adoption.
Before adopting the euro, full compliance with the
Maastricht convergence criteria must be achieved.
Therefore, non-compliance with the adjustment path for
fiscal convergence would delay the abrogation of the
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and con-
sequently the adoption of the single currency.
Secondly, market perceptions of the ability and readi-
ness of policy-makers to live up to the commitments
required by participation in a system such as ERM II will
play an important role in ensuring the sustainability of
the mechanism. In this context, compliance with the
budgetary adjustment path as regularly assessed by the
Council will be an important indication of the credibility
of economic policies. Markets may put the exchange rate
under pressure if they detect incompatibilities between a
commitment to a central rate within ERM II and budget-
ary developments in the new Member State concerned.
Thirdly, there is the possibility of suspending Cohesion
Fund funding for the new Member States. Article 6 of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1264/99 amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 on establishing the Cohe-
sion Fund states that ‘no new projects or, in the event of
important projects, no new project stages shall be
financed by the Fund in a Member State in the event of
the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a recom-
mendation from the Commission, finding that the Mem-
ber State in the application of this regulation has not
implemented the programme referred to in Article 2(4)
(i.e. the convergence programme) in such a way as to
avoid an excessive government deficit’. This decision is
abrogated when the Council finds that ‘the Member
State concerned has taken measures to implement that
programme in such a way as to avoid an excessive gov-
ernment deficit’.
¥1∂ The SGP regulations were not in force at that time and thus the deadline
for correcting the deficit was not pre-established as is now the case (see
footnote 9).78
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Member States should therefore set credible and realistic
budgetary targets. Failure to meet these targets could
lead to a series of damaging repercussions for economic
policies of the new Member States and undermine the
planned strategy for the adoption of euro.
2.4.7. New Member States not subject 
to the excessive deficit procedure in 2004
For those new Member States whose actual or planned
deficit is not estimated to exceed the reference value at
the time of accession, there is no reason for initiating the
excessive deficit procedure. Upon accession their budg-
etary positions become the subject of normal multilateral
surveillance as foreseen by the Treaty (Article 99) and
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (‘preventive’ arm
of the Stability and Growth Pact).
Specifically, the required adjustment toward the objective
of a budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus
will be monitored in the framework of the examination of
the convergence programme, which each Member State
with a derogation is obliged to submit and regularly
update. In their assessment of convergence programmes,
the Commission and the Council can be expected to take
into account specific conditions bearing upon the defini-
tion of the appropriate adjustment path much in the same
vein as special circumstances will be taken into account in
defining the appropriate adjustment path for the correction
of excessive deficits, as discussed above.
In line with the provisions of the Pact, in the event of a
‘significant divergence’ from the adjustment path
towards the medium-term objective, the Member State
concerned should receive a recommendation in accord-
ance with Article 99(4) ‘with a view to giving early
warning in order to prevent the occurrence of an exces-
sive deficit’ (Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97). In assessing the case for recommending to
the Council the activation of the early-warning mecha-
nism, the Commission can be expected to be guided by
the general criteria identified by past practice, namely,
(i) the size of the budgetary slippage, that is, the extent
to which the budget position diverges from targets set
down in the stability and convergence programmes; (ii)
the reason for the budgetary slippage, that is, whether the
budgetary slippage reflects a departure of government
policy from the programme or the impact of unforeseen
developments in the economy; and (iii) the risk of an
excessive deficit, that is, in first approximation, the dis-
tance between the projected budgetary outcome and the
3 % of GDP nominal benchmark.79
3. Improving the analysis 
of budgetary developments
3.1. Introduction
A number of elements underlie the effort to strengthen
the understanding of budgetary policies. In particular,
two main issues are developed in this chapter. Firstly,
from the statistical information received, it is important
to identify the size and implication of measures which,
for their nature, have only a temporary impact on the
adjustment of public finance, and therefore, may have to
be dealt with separately in view of a proper assessment
of the soundness of fiscal positions and policies. Sec-
ondly, during the last two years, important advance-
ments have been made in the definition of a common
methodology to calculate output gaps, and hence cycli-
cally adjusted balances (CABs). At the same time, the
fiscal stance (i.e. changes in CABs) has acquired
increased policy relevance, to the point that not only
compliance with the medium-term targets is assessed on
the basis of such an indicator, but also whether the yearly
adjustment towards the target is higher than a given min-
imum (0.5 % of GDP, as set by the Eurogroup in October
2002). The second section of this chapter highlights the
implications of using the common CAB indicator.
3.2. Non-cyclical temporary 
budgetary effects
3.2.1. Introduction
In the assessment of budgetary positions, the issue of iden-
tifying the more permanent budgetary trends from the
short-term transitory influences has been increasingly rec-
ognised. In the budgetary surveillance it is standard proce-
dure to adjust the budget balance with the estimated tem-
porary impact from the cycle by calculating cyclically
adjusted balances. However, to better understand budget-
ary developments and draw the right policy conclusions it
is important to take into account the short-term impact of
other temporary budgetary effects, not directly linked to
the cycle, such as different one-off measures.
In this light, the November 2002 Commission communi-
cation on ‘strengthening economic policy coordination’
proposed that the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ require-
ment of the SGP is defined in underlying terms through-
out the economic cycle, i.e. net of transitory effects and
especially the effects of cyclical fluctuations on budgets.
Beyond cyclical fluctuations, the March 2003 European
Council recognised the potential importance of looking at
additional temporary influences. It concluded that ‘in mak-
ing an assessment (of the improvement of the cyclically
adjusted budgetary position) one-off measures will be con-
sidered on their own merits on a case-by-case basis’.
Also, the recent debate on the Stability and Growth Pact has
increased the focus on sustainability and improvements in
underlying budgetary positions. To this end it is important
to understand how changes in the budget in the short term
relate to the underlying budget trends in the longer term.
Indeed, in the EU context there are two main concerns
related to the analysis of temporary budget effects.
Firstly, in the general surveillance of budgetary develop-
ments, changes in the budgetary profile due to temporary
effects make the assessment of the budgetary profile
more opaque as they blur the picture of the ‘underlying’
budget trend. This is especially relevant when assessing
the fiscal stance and the degree of consolidation.
Secondly, it is important to assess the quality of budget-
ary consolidation measures taken by governments in the
context of the EU budgetary framework.
For countries not yet at close-to-balance or in excessive
deficit, the broad aim is to consolidate in such a way that
the risk of future budgetary problems is reduced. Hence, it80
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being made of one-off operations. On the one hand, one-
off impacts can be well justified by a rationalisation of
national budgetary procedures, implying an initial tempo-
rary change in the timing of specific revenues or outlays.
It can also be due to an unusual event that is unlikely to
reoccur in the future, or, by a sudden economic slowdown.
In the latter case, the use of one-off measures allows keep-
ing the deficit under control while at the same time avoid-
ing a pro-cyclical impact when the slowdown reverses.
Therefore, the recourse to one-off measures is not nega-
tive per se (1), but a persistent use of temporary measures
can delay structural adjustment and undermine the trans-
parency and credibility of the budgetary developments
over the medium term. What definitively should be high-
lighted is the recourse to one-off measures to respect the
EU fiscal rules. This is because one of the main aims of
the EU fiscal rules is to reduce the so-called deficit-bias.
The respect of the 3 % rule or of the medium-term target
of the SGP can be achieved either through structural
adjustments or through temporary measures. While these
measures improve the short-term budgetary position and
help in respecting the EU targets, they do not improve
the longer-term underlying position.
In a numerical rule-based framework, the incentives to aim
for ‘accounting friendly solutions’ rather than more diffi-
cult substantial measures is well recognised. For example,
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) or Kopits and Craig
(1998) argue that the existence of a numerical rule induces
the use of one-off policy measures. Using one-off meas-
ures within the EU rules-based framework allows avoiding
reputation sanctions (endorsed in the early-warning proce-
dure or in the first steps of the excessive deficit procedure)
or pecuniary sanctions, which can ultimately arise if the
excessive deficit is not corrected.
Against this background, below follows a discussion on
the nature of temporary budgetary effects coupled with
some illustrative indications on their quantitative impor-
tance across EU Member States over the last few years.
3.2.2. Temporary budgetary influences
The distinction between temporary and permanent budget
impact is complex. There is not a clear categorisation
which fits with all national budgetary procedures and
practices. One way to classify broadly different transitory
budgetary effects would be to focus on their source.
• A first category would be the cyclical budget
impact. Tax revenues increase in good times and
decrease in bad times. The reverse is true for unem-
ployment-related expenditures. In the EU surveil-
lance, the temporary budgetary impact from the
cycle is assessed by estimating the cyclical compo-
nent and adjusting the budget accordingly (i.e. the
CAB, see Section 3.3).
• A second category is transitory budget effects not
linked to the cycle and outside the control of the cur-
rent government. For example, there could be a
court decision with an important one-off impact or
alternatively the call of a contingent liability agreed
in previous years (see Section 4).
• A third category would be transitory budget effects
resulting directly from a policy initiative. This would
typically be labelled as a ‘one-off measure’. Exam-
ples could be tax amnesties or the sale of real estate
(this category will be further discussed below).
Transitory elements of the budget can also be classified
according to the nature of their impact on the underlying
budget position. For example, some budget measures
have a ‘clean’ one-off dimension in that they only have an
impact on the nominal budget balance the year they occur.
Others may be ‘self-reversing’ in that they basically shift
revenues or expenditures over time. In this case higher
revenues today would come at the expense of lower reve-
nues or higher expenditures tomorrow. On a similar note,
the temporary measure can have, or not have, a permanent
effect on the government net worth depending ultimately
on whether the one-off measure implies a change of the
opposite sign on the government asset side (see Milesi-
Ferretti and Moriyama, 2004). For example, the sale of
real estate improves the budget balance (sale of a real
asset) and the government debt (indirectly to the extent the
revenues substitute for additional borrowing) but does not
change the net debt of government.
In the end, of course, what is regarded as temporary or
not depends on the time frame studied. In the long term
everything is temporary and in the very short term every-
thing is permanent. A large and specific investment may
be regarded as one-off in the very short term but as
normal expenditure if seen in the chain of consecutive
investment decisions over time. What features are the
¥1∂ See European Commission (2003a) for a debate on the pros and cons of
one-off measures.81
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mately a judgement call for the analyst.
Having the considerations above in mind and focusing on
the surveillance in the EU budgetary framework, as a gen-
eral criterion for the purpose of the analysis below, a
measure can be considered as temporary if it implies an
improvement/deterioration of the budget balance that
does not lead to a reliable improvement/deterioration in
the intertemporal budgetary position. To make this defini-
tion more operational, a possible approach could be to
consider as transitory those measures that have a much
greater impact on the budget balance in the short term than
in the long term. This approach does not look at the impact
on the net worth since the focus is on the role of one-off
measures in the current EU framework for budgetary sur-
veillance
A temporary effect will be called a ‘one-off measure’
only if it is based on a policy action such as a law or any
other formal act.
Without the ambition of being fully exhaustive or pre-
senting precise definitions, non-cyclical transitory ele-
ments that can be explicitly taken into account are:
On the expenditure side:
• large individual sales of real assets such as real
estate; the revenues temporarily improve the budget
while in the longer term costs for rents etc. could go
up depending on the nature and use of the building;
• receipts from auctions of publicly owned licenses
(as UMTS receipt). In the accounts, the receipts are
recorded as negative investment expenditure at the
moment the sale takes place;
• ‘unusual events’ as short-term emergency costs
from flooding or earthquake;
• additional expenditures due to specific court rulings;
• temporary legislative changes in the timing of outlays;
• capital injections not recorded as financial transactions.
On the revenue side:
• tax amnesties and tax settlement schemes;
• temporary cuts for social contribution in specific
categories;
• exceptional tax revenues from State-owned compa-
nies;
• lower revenues due to specific court rulings;
• temporary changes in the timing of revenues, which
have an impact on the deficit.
3.2.3. One-off measures in EU-15 countries
With the aim to broadly capture the use and budgetary
impact of non-cyclical temporary budget effects,
Table II.3 shows figures on the budget impact of dif-
ferent classes of government one-off measures (that is,
policy measures taken by government with a tempo-
rary impact) across EU-15 Member States from 2000
up to 2004. The figures are estimated within the Finan-
cial and Economic Affairs DG, and the different meas-
ures taken into account correspond to the list of meas-
ures presented above. The figures for 2004 refer to the
foreseen impact as planned by national governments
(1). Only those measures identified with an impact on
the budget balance of around 0.1 % of GDP or more
have been considered
On this basis, the main categories of one-off measures
recorded during the last five years in EU countries can be
grouped as follows (see Table II.3).
• Sales of real assets. They occur in at least three
countries: Portugal in 2002 and 2004, Italy for four
years in a row (2001–04), and Denmark in 2000. In
Portugal and in Italy they represent a large portion of
their budgetary strategy. In Portugal, it is expected
the deficit will be reduced in 2004 by 0.7 % of GDP,
after a contribution of 0.3 % of GDP in 2002. In
Italy, sales of real assets count for 0.9 percentage
points of GDP in 2002 and a gain of 0.3 % of GDP
in 2004 is still expected. It is worth noting that the
sales of real assets, while contributing to ameliorate
the actual budget balance, do not modify consist-
ently the net worth since the lower debt is accompa-
nied by a lower amount of public assets.
• Sales of licences. This refers largely to UMTS
licences sold mainly in 2000 and 2001 by the
majority of Member States. They had a relevant
impact on the budgetary position, in particular in
Germany (2.5 percentage points of GDP in 2000),
¥1∂ Estimates are either official estimates from national authorities (when
available) or made by Commission services.82
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(1.2 % of GDP in 2000). While they ameliorate
the budget balance and the net worth, they do not
contribute to improve the underlying budget bal-
ance.
• Unusual events. They occurred in Greece and Aus-
tria (environmental damages) and the UK, where
the ‘foot and mouth disease’ cost around 0.3 % of
GDP in 2001. Also the cost of the Iraq War could
possibly be classified as an unusual event for the
UK, which accounts for about 0.1 % of GDP in
2003 and something close to it is expected for
2004. In most cases these events deteriorate the
actual budget balance, leaving unchanged the
underlying budget balance.
• Tax amnesties and tax settlements. Such schemes
can be identified at least in Greece (2004), Ireland
(2000–02), Italy (2002–04) and Portugal (2002).
They led to additional revenues of about 1 % of
GDP in Portugal, allowing it to bring the deficit-
to-GDP ratio below 3 % for that year. In Italy, it
amounts to around 1.5 % of GDP in 2003 and it is
expected to bring benefits also in 2004. It is ques-
tionable to what extent these schemes have a more
lasting impact. On the one hand, tax revenues may
increase as a result of a larger tax basis emerging
after the amnesties. On the other hand, it may also
be that they lead to lower future tax revenues if
expectations are created for future tax amnesties
and agents then decide to avoid paying taxes on a
regular basis waiting for the next amnesty.
Table II.3
Main categories of one-off measures recorded during the last five years in EU countries 
(% of GDP)
Sale of licences Sales of real assets Tax amnesties/
settlements Unusual events Others
BE 0.2 (2001) 0.3 (2004) 1.2 (2003)
0.5 (2004)
DK 0.2 (2001) 0.1 (2004)
DE 2.5 (2000) 0.2 (2004) – 0.1 (2003)
– 0.2 (2004)
– 0.1 (2001)
0.3 (2003)
EL 0.4 (2001) – 0.3 (2002)
– 0.3 (2003)
– 0.3 (2004)
ES 0.1 (2000) 0.3 (2003) 0.1 (2003)
FR 0.1 (2001) 0.1 (2003)
IE 0.2 (2002) 0.2 (2000)
0.2 (2001)
0.2 (2002)
– 0.2 (2001)
– 0.3 (2002)
0.1 (2003)
– 0.6 (2004)
IT 1.2 (2000) 0.2 (2001)
0.9 (2002)
0.2 (2003)
0.5 (2004)
0.1 (2002)
1.5 (2003)
0.5 (2004)
0.4 (2001)
0.5 (2002)
0.5 (2003)
0.1 (2004)
LU 2.0 (2001) 0.3 (2004) – 1.5 (2002)
– 1.0 (2003)
– 0.5 (2004)
NL 0.7 (2000) – 0.3 (2001)
AT 0.4 (2000) – 0.2 (2003)
PT 0.3 (2000) 0.3 (2002)
0.7 (2004)
1.0 (2002) 0.2 (2002)
2.0 (2003)
FI 0.6 (2004)
SE 0.5 (2000)
UK 2.4 (2000) – 0.3 (2001)
– 0.1 (2003)
Source: Commission services.83
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aggregated for each year to give the overall impact. The
first column of the table shows the cyclically adjusted
budget balance (CAB), the second column the aggregate
impact of one-off measures and the third column gives
the structural budget balance (SBB) here defined as the
CAB net of the estimated impact of the one-off meas-
ures.
The ‘structural budget balance’ reported in Table II.4
in some cases gives a different picture of fiscal develop-
ments than looking at the CAB only would do. For
example, in 2003, in Portugal and Italy the structural def-
icit would have been close to 4 % of GDP while the
cyclically adjusted budget balance is substantially
smaller, at 1.8 and 1.9 % of GDP respectively. In Italy in
particular, while the CAB improves between 2002 and
2003, the structural balance deteriorates due to the
higher recourse to one-off measures during last year. The
same holds for Spain: while the CAB improves from a
small deficit to a small surplus between 2002 and 2003,
the structural budget does not show the same magnitude
of improvement.
Overall, it appears that one-off measures are common
and with a non-negligible impact. Temporary effects
have been identified in all countries during the last five
years, although there are important cross-country differ-
ences in the magnitude of the temporary effects and their
frequency. In some cases it can be argued that measures
have been taken with the specific aim directly to keep the
deficit below the 3 % deficit ceiling or in line with the
close-to-balance medium-term target. However, it should
be noted that one-off measures have been taken also in
countries with sound budgetary positions signalling that
they are also a normal feature in budgetary policy. In addi-
tion, in some cases they have also implied a deterioration
of the budget balance in the coming years (1).
This year’s assessment of the stability and convergence
programmes increased the focus on one-off measures.
Both the Commission’s technical assessments and the
Council opinions on the programmes refer to one-off
measures when relevant for budgetary developments.
One-off measures are highlighted in the assessments of
six countries: Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Portu-
gal and Italy. In the former three countries the analysis is
mainly factual and it allows to better understand budget-
ary developments by qualifying the cyclically adjusted
figures which are used to assess compliance with the
medium-term targets.
In particular, temporary measures improved the budget
balance in Ireland for 2003 due to the accounting effects
from advancing the date of payments of capital gains tax
in 2003. Of course, in 2004 the temporary effect will be
the same with the opposite sign. In Greece one-off meas-
ures deteriorated the budgetary position for 2003, as a
consequence of unusual events (bad weather). Also,
additional spending linked to the Olympic Games has a
budget impact but here the temporary aspects can be dis-
cussed as it mainly relates to investment projects (2).
In Belgium the payment by the telecommunication oper-
ator Belgacom to the government in relation to future
pensions blurs the picture of the underlying position. The
receipt improves the nominal budget balance by 1.9 % of
GDP in, while at the same time increasing the implicit
pension debt linked to future pension payments (3).
In the Austrian case, taking the one-off spending related
to the flood disaster in summer 2002 was relevant.
Indeed, in the Commission technical assessment for
Austria on the December 2002 update of the programme,
the cyclically adjusted balance in 2003 was projected to
deteriorate by 0.6 percentage points of GDP, fully
explained by the effects of the flood disaster. Therefore,
in underlying terms, the budget balance was expected to
remain unchanged (4).
The recourse to one-off measures in Italy and Portugal is
of particular concern. In both cases, one-off measures
have been used actively to keep the actual deficit to a
GDP ratio below the 3 % threshold. As underlined in the
Council opinion on Portugal, the Portuguese authorities
relied, for a second year running, on sizeable one-off
measures, amounting in 2003 to 2 percentage points of
GDP. Part of it, (amounting to around 0.7 % of GDP)
results form a lump-sum payment to the government by
the Post Office. In exchange, the government assumes
¥1∂ This is, for example, the case with Luxembourg where a temporary change in
the timing of revenues (an acceleration in the payment of back taxes by pri-
vate corporations) led to a deterioration of the budget in the years 2002–04.
¥2∂ This will continue also in 2004.
¥3∂ Other one-off operations took place with the opposite sign, leading to an
overall improvement of the budget by 1.2 % of GDP. 
¥4∂ However, in the December 2003 update a cyclically adjusted deterioration
of 0.8 % of GDP was estimated, that is, 0.3 percentage points higher than
what was estimated one year earlier. This was the case despite the fact that
there has been a downward revision of the flood-related budgetary impact
by some 0.3 percentage points of GDP. 84
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2 0 0 4the responsibility for paying pensions to a group of
employees. As in the Belgian case, while ameliorating
the current budgetary position the increase of pension
liabilities will deteriorate future budget balances.
For Italy the Council expressed its concern both in last
year and this year’s opinions on the recourse to one-off
measures. Also the broad economic policy guidelines for
the 2003–05 period recommended Italy to substitute
one-off measures with more permanent ones. The Com-
mission assessment raises doubts on the possibility of
replacing those measures with structural budgetary
adjustments as foreseen in the programme, due to the
risk of breaching the 3 % threshold in the future years.
In the case of Portugal, this year’s use of one-off meas-
ures is partly justified by the economic recession, which
did not advocate the recourse to structural fiscal consol-
idation through pro-cyclical policies. The Italian case is
rather different since the growth conditions have been
similar to the rest of Europe both in 2002 and 2003 and
thus the recourse to one-off measures is less justified by
the slowdown.
3.2.4. Conclusions
The discussion above shows that temporary measures
can have a relevant impact on the budget and that it can
be important to take this into account to better assess the
implications of changes in the budget balances. It is dif-
ficult to clearly define what is temporary or not. It will
by nature depend on the situation and the question at
hand. However, such definitional obstacles must not pre-
vent the policy analyst from taking them into account
when necessary to avoid drawing the wrong policy con-
clusions. Additional work will be necessary to analyse
these issues more closely which could help to develop a
reference framework for how to integrate them better in
the standard surveillance ‘tool box’.
In the context of the EU budgetary rules it has been a
worrying tendency for some Member States to imple-
ment measures with only a temporary impact on the
budget with the direct aim to shift the demanded budget-
ary adjustment into the future and postpone necessary
efforts and in this way circumvent the basic intentions of
the budgetary framework. Indeed, this short-term focus
is opposite to the philosophy of the EU fiscal rules,
where instead the main aim is to favour policies which
will ensure sound public finances in the medium and in
the long term. It is therefore important to signal and
clearly identify such measures in the surveillance pro-
cess. This calls for more transparency of budget meas-
ures and a clearer reporting of these measures in the
stability and convergence programmes. This would
improve the knowledge of the national budgetary strate-
gies and contribute to making sure that the risk of biased
policy conclusions by the Council and the Commission
when public finances are scrutinised, is limited.
3.3. The use and interpretation 
of cyclically adjusted balances
3.3.1. Introduction
The use of the CAB in budgetary surveillance has been
expanding over time. Currently, the CAB is used: (i) to
build indicators of discretionary fiscal policy; (ii) to
assess the risk of breaching a specified nominal deficit
threshold; (iii) to gauge the effects of fiscal policy on
aggregate demand; (iv) to measure the sustainability of
fiscal policy.
A comprehensive analysis commissioned by the OECD
at the end of the 1980s thoroughly x-rayed the CAB in
connection with its several uses (1). In spite of the con-
clusion that the CAB is subject to a series of limitations,
especially when applied outside its original function, it
has remained a major reference for fiscal policy analysis
with all major multilateral institutions as well as national
authorities. Like any fiscal indicator, the CAB represents
a compromise between simplicity and precision, the
alternative being a fully-fledged model-based analysis.
The Commission has been using the CAB for the analy-
sis of budgetary developments for a long time; first as an
informal tool, and more recently as an official instrument
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP).
The present chapter reviews the Commission methodol-
ogy for calculating the CAB and discusses the role of the
CAB for budgetary surveillance under the SGP. It also
discusses one controversial issue related to the interpre-
tation of CAB figures that have emerged from recent
experience, namely the use of the CAB to monitor com-
pliance with budgetary adjustment requirements speci-
fied in cyclically adjusted terms under the SGP. The
question relates to the observation that changes in the
CAB may not exclusively reflect the effect of discretion-
¥1∂ See Blanchard (1990), Gramlich, (1990) and Chouraqui et al. (1990).86
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lower than expected potential growth. The rules of the
SGP are not explicit about whether compliance with the
adjustment requirement is to be intended conditional
upon ex ante forecasts on potential growth or uncondi-
tionally. If compliance is to be interpreted conditionally,
then the change in CAB should be corrected to take into
account the component of the change attributable to
actual potential growth different from expected. In the
following sections, a methodology to operate such cor-
rection is developed and illustrative figures are pro-
duced. A comprehensive annex details the main analyti-
cal dimensions of the discussion.
3.3.2. The Commission method 
for estimating the CAB
The Commission method for estimating the CAB is sim-
ilar to that adopted by other institutions involved in
budgetary surveillance. It has evolved over time, reflect-
ing successive analytical developments and agreement
among Member States as to what constitutes best prac-
tice. One of the first official references of the Commis-
sion’s approach of estimating the CAB is in the technical
annex to a European Commission (1982) publication and
discussed in Heller et al. (1986). The approach was
improved later on and outlined in a technical note
attached to a European Commission (1995) publication.
The CAB in any given period  is obtained by subtract-
ing the cyclical component  from the actual budget bal-
ance/GDP ratio, :
(1)
where  is the nominal balance and  is nominal
GDP. The cyclical component  involves two items,
firstly, a measure of the link between the budget and the
cyclical position of the economy. This measure,
denoted by , is referred to as a ‘budgetary sensitivity’
parameter. It measures the level change in the budget
associated with a level change in GDP. The second
item is a measure of the cyclical position of the econ-
omy, the output gap, defined as the percentage differ-
ence between actual  and potential , both
expressed in real terms. A more detailed discussion of
expression (1) is in Annex II.1.
As for the budgetary sensitivity , it is derived from
budgetary elasticities measuring the percentage change
in budgetary items associated with a percentage change
in GDP. The elasticities used by the Commission serv-
ices have been estimated by the OECD (1).
Concerning the calculation of the output gap, the Com-
mission has recently moved from the purely statistical
Hodrick-Prescott filter to a more structural approach,
based on a production function model. The new method
was developed by the EPC output gap working group
(set up in 1999) and adopted by the Ecofin Council of
12 July 2002 (2). A detailed description of the Commis-
sion’s production function methodology is in Denis,
McMorrow and Roeger (2002).
3.3.3. Use of CAB within the framework 
of the Stability and Growth Pact
The Commission services have been applying the CAB
as an instrument for the analysis of budgetary situations
for a long time. Initially used as an informal tool, the
CAB has been gradually integrated in the official proc-
ess of budgetary surveillance under the SGP. In 1998 the
code of conduct on the ‘content and format of stability
and convergence programmes’ endorsed ‘the Commis-
sion’s services cyclical adjustment method as a useful
approach for assessing budgetary developments’ (3). The
role of the CAB was reiterated in the revised code of
conduct in 2001 (4). The definitive ‘investiture’ as a key
instrument of budgetary surveillance under the SGP
occurred in March 2003, when the Ecofin Council
adopted conclusions based on the recommendations con-
tained in the November 2002 Commission communica-
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¥1∂ The budget sensitivity  is given by the difference between the sensitivi-
ties of revenues  and of expenditures : .The sensitiv-
ities of revenues and expenditures are given in turn as the product of the
corresponding elasticities times the share of public revenues and expendi-
tures in GDP:
where and denote, respectively, the elasticities of revenues (R) and
expenditures (G) with respect to output produced by the OECD i.e.
.
The OECD method for estimating and is described in van den
Noord (2000) and OECD (2001). 
¥2∂ Spain, Germany and Austria were granted derogation due to problems
related to the quality of data. For these three countries the reference
method for calculating potential output was the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Based on further work carried out by the EPC output gap working group
and following the draft Council conclusion of 15 March 2004 the produc-
tion function method will be used as a reference method for Germany and
Austria, while in the case of Spain the production function and the
Hodrick-Prescott filter will be used in parallel.
¥3∂ MC/II/482/98-final of 16 September 1998, endorsed by the Council in
October 1998.
¥4∂ EFC/ECFIN/404/01 — REV1 of June 2001, endorsed by the Council in
September 2001.
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cies’ advocating that the achievement and the progress
towards budgetary positions of ‘close-to-balance or in-
surplus’ (CTB) should be assessed in cyclically adjusted
terms (1).
Under current practice within the SGP framework the
CAB is used for several purposes, which are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
3.3.4. Assessing compliance with the CTB position
The SGP requires Member States to reach and sustain a
CTB position which, according to the Council decision
of 7 March 2003, is to be assessed in cyclically adjusted
terms. The monitoring of the CTB requirement is for-
mally made by the Commission services on the occasion
of the assessment of the Member States’ stability and
convergence programmes followed by an additional
review around mid-year taking into account develop-
ments observed since the presentation of the conver-
gence and stability programme (see, for instance, ‘Budg-
etary developments in 2003 and prospects for 2004’,
note to the EFC, ECFIN/279/03). A further appraisal of
the budgetary situation is also done in occasion of the
Commission’s bi-annual forecast exercise.
In the light of the measurement uncertainties involved
with the estimation of potential output and the budgetary
elasticities, CAB figures are generally interpreted with a
sufficient margin of flexibility. As outlined by the Euro-
pean Commission (2001a), a margin of 0.5 % of GDP
below balance can be allowed for when assessing com-
pliance with the CTB requirement. Consequently, a
CAB estimate showing a deficit of 0.5 % is generally
taken to be consistent with the CTB requirement.
A further complication in assessing compliance with the
CTB requirement by means of the CAB stems from tem-
porary budgetary components unrelated to the cycle,
notably the so-called one-off measures. If not factored-
out from the CAB, such components tend to conceal the
‘true’ underlying budgetary position. The problem does
not involve the CAB per se; it is rather the lack of a gen-
erally valid definition of what constitutes a one-off
measure. While the issue was addressed by the Council
decision of 7 March 2003 asking for a case-by-case
assessment, more could be done to achieve a more gen-
eral and comprehensive approach especially in view of
the increasing recourse to one-off measures.
3.3.5. Gauging the risk of breaching the 3 % 
Maastricht deficit threshold
In connection with the preventive arm of the SGP, an
early warning is given if the Council identifies a signifi-
cant divergence of the budgetary position from the
medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards
it (2). Although the SGP does not define the conditions
under which an early warning should be launched, the
Commission has been applying the following three crite-
ria: (i) the size of the budgetary slippage with respect to
the targets set out in stability or convergence pro-
grammes; (ii) the reason for the budgetary slippage, (iii)
the risk of breaching the 3 % deficit threshold.
The second and the third criteria involve the CAB. As
regards the reason for the budgetary slippage the key
question is whether it mainly ensues from the working of
automatic stabilisers or alternatively, whether it is due to
a change in the underlying budgetary position as meas-
ured by the CAB. Concerning the risk of breaching the
3 % deficit threshold, the assessment generally includes
the comparison of the estimated CAB level with the so-
called minimal benchmark (3).
Overall, the experience so far shows that the CAB has
been a useful tool in understanding the risk of breach of
the 3 % ceiling (see Graph II.9).
3.3.6. Monitoring the budgetary adjustment
The report adopted by the Ecofin Council in March
2003, states that the budgetary adjustment towards a
CTB position is to be measured in cyclically adjusted
terms. Concerning the size of the adjustment, the Euro-
group agreed on 7 October 2002 to commit euro-area
countries to a minimum annual reduction of 0.5 % of
GDP. The same requirement was confirmed in the broad
economic policy guidelines for the 2003–05 period. For
Member States with an excessive deficit, the Eurogroup
agreement requires a correction in cyclically adjusted
¥1∂ COM(2002) 668 final of 27 November 2002.
¥2∂ Article 6(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on
‘Strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveil-
lance and coordination of economic policies’.
¥3∂ The minimal benchmark is the level of the CAB which, assuming normal
cyclical fluctuations, ensures that the nominal deficit stays below 3 % of
GDP. See Buti et al. (1998) or European Commission (2002a) for a more
detailed discussion of the concept.88
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eterms of more than 0.5 % of GDP per year, as long as the
nominal budget is in excess of the 3 % ceiling.
Compliance with the adjustment requirement is
assessed by looking at the observed change in the
CAB over time. Although straightforward in theory,
the experience of recent years shows that complica-
tions arise in practice, with Member States claiming
that they adhered to plans, despite a measurable diver-
gence between projected and observed changes in the
CAB. This issue will be examined in detail in a sepa-
rate section below.
3.3.7. Measuring the stance of fiscal policy
The report adopted by the Ecofin Council in March
2003 also underlined that ‘pro-cyclical policies in good
times have been one of the major flaws in the imple-
mentation of the SGP in the past’. Based on this diag-
nosis the report concludes that ‘Member States shall
avoid pro-cyclical policies, especially when growth
conditions are favourable’. Under current practice, the
Commission approximates the demand impulse of fis-
cal policy using the change in the primary CAB. A fall
in the primary CAB is interpreted as a sign of expan-
sionary policy, a rise as an indication of a contraction-
ary fiscal policy. Conclusions about the pro or counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy are drawn by relating the
observed change in the primary CAB with the output
gap, which measure the cyclical condition of the econ-
omy. The analysis generally, synthesised in a single
graph with changes in the primary CAB plotted against
the output gap, is carried out and presented in various
areas of the coordination framework of economic poli-
cies in the EU, most importantly in the context of the
BEPGs and the budgetary surveillance under the SGP.
The main caveats of using the CAB as an indicator of fis-
cal impulse are well known and documented (1). The
basic problem is that changes in the primary CAB may
correctly measure neither the impact nor the final effect
of fiscal policy on aggregate demand (2).
Graph II.9:  Minimal benchmark and nominal budget balance in EU Member States, 2000–03
Source: European Commission, economic forecasts autumn 2003.
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¥1∂ See, for instance, Blanchard (1990) or Mackenzie (1989).
¥2∂ The channels through which fiscal policy produces and impacts on aggre-
gate demand and the magnitude of such impacts are subject to debate (see,
for example, Part III of this report).89
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in cyclically adjusted terms
In principle, monitoring budgetary adjustments defined
in cyclically adjusted terms may appear as a purely
mechanical exercise. However, on several occasions, the
interpretation of the difference between projected and
observed changes in the CAB has been debated. Member
States argued that they had effectively implemented fis-
cal measures according to plans, and hence complied
with the requirement. The Commission by contrast, took
the divergence between planned and observed changes
in the CAB as resulting from fiscal policy measures
inconsistent with agreed plans.
The basic reason at the root of the difficulties in inter-
preting changes in the CAB is that the CAB is expressed
as a percentage of GDP. Consequently, changes in the
CAB can simply result from a difference between
expected and realised potential growth. Annex 2 to this
chapter presents a detailed analytical discussion of the
issue. A simple illustrative example may clarify the
issue. Consider a case in which budgetary plans pre-
sented in period t–1 do not include major discretionary
measures for period t, so that tax rates are left unchanged
and expenditure plans broadly follow potential growth.
If potential growth turns out to be lower than expected,
but expenditure volumes are implemented according to
plans at t–1, the CAB will fall short off the target. Since
revenues are roughly proportional to GDP, the revenue/
GDP ratio will probably not change considerably as a
result of potential growth lower than expected. Con-
versely, the expenditure/GDP ratio will rise, thus leading
to a lower than expected CAB.
The issue illustrated above became progressively more
evident throughout the sustained economic slowdown
experienced over the past several years. When faced
with negative growth surprises, Member States’ fiscal
authorities were faced with the requirement to enact
additional restrictive measures in order to comply with
the targeted correction in the CAB, running this way the
risk of implementing a fiscal policy that was perceived
as being pro-cyclical or in any case not suitable in the
light of weak or negative economic growth. This, cou-
pled with the traditionally long lags in identifying the
growth shortfall and the slowness of the decision-mak-
ing process in fiscal policy put fiscal authorities under
strain. As a consequence, and given that SGP and related
Graph II.10:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions in EU Member States, 2003
Source: European Commission.
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about how the budgetary adjustment in cyclically
adjusted terms should actually be interpreted. More spe-
cifically, the debate focused on whether the adjustment
has to be delivered unconditionally, or, alternatively,
whether the adjustment is to be interpreted as conditional
upon a growth expectation defined as ex ante.
If the requirement of adjusting the budget balance in
cyclically adjusted terms was conditional on growth, the
fiscal correction would correspond to the obligation of
delivering a certain volume of expenditure cuts or reve-
nue increases contingent on a specific assumption about
economic growth. The observed change in the CAB
would then no longer be the appropriate indicator for
monitoring compliance. A correction would be needed.
As an illustration, in the case of the 0.5 percentage point
rule set out in the Eurogroup agreement of 7 October 2002
(and included in the 2003–05 BEPGs), the requirement
of conditional adjustment can be described as:
(2)
where and denote, respectively, the
planned discretionary corrections on the level of reve-
nues and expenditures, i.e. the fiscal effort, while
is the expected level of nominal potential output.
The fiscal effort needs to amount to at least 5 % of
billions of euro to ensure conditional compliance (1).
Note that the adjustment is conditional because the relevant
GDP figure is not that effectively realised at time t, but that
expected for time t and time t– 1.
While carrying out the required adjustment measures by
Member States is easier when adopting a conditional
compliance approach since the size of the fiscal effort is
fixed in advance and invariant with respect to unex-
pected changes in economic growth, the difficulties with
conditional compliance are on the monitoring side. The
basic problem is that the discretionary measures
effectively taken are generally not directly
observable. Moreover, the fiscal effort cannot be
inferred with certainty by looking at the observed change
in the CAB, as the latter will be affected by changes in
the denominator.
It follows from the above arguments that to assess con-
ditional compliance the observed change in the CAB has
to be corrected for the effect of unexpected growth sur-
prises. As shown in Annex 2 a convenient approximation
is given by:
(3)
Equation (3) states that in order to monitor conditional
compliance the observed change in the CAB can be
adjusted by adding a term equal to the ratio of non-cycli-
cal expenditures over potential output at time t-1 times
the forecast error of potential output growth .
It should be noted that taking budgetary corrections to be
conditional on economic growth may give rise to moral
hazard in forecasting GDP since countries may have the
incentive to make over-optimistic growth projections ex
ante in order to blame lower than expected growth ex
post for any slippage compared to plans (2). From equa-
tion (3) it is visible that the introduction of a correction
in the change in CAB to monitor compliance condition-
ally may create an incentive for countries to produce a
positive and high difference between forecast and actual
potential growth: such a difference would translate into
a bigger improvement in the corrected CAB. To prevent
this risk, the assessment of conditional compliance
would have to be anchored to an unbiased forecast of
economic growth. In practice, the part of the anchor
could be played by the Commission’s forecast the accu-
racy of which is documented in Keereman (1999).
The correction presented in equation (3) might be
applied both in the preventive and the dissuasive part of
the SGP. To monitor compliance in practice, it would be
sufficient to compare the value of the corrected change
in the CAB with the required adjustment set out ex ante.
In the case of the ‘0.5 rule’, conditional compliance at
time t requires .
To give an idea of the size of the figures involved,
Table II.5 compares the observed change in the CAB of
Member States between 2003 and 2002 with the corrected
change obtained from applying equation (3). In most of
the cases, the correction improves the observed change
in the CAB, as growth projections for 2003, on which
budgetary plans were built, turned out to be on the high
side. The magnitude of the correction depends crucially
¥1∂ See Annex 2 for further details.
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growth, amounting in some cases to 0.3 percentage
points of GDP. Consequently, applying the correction to
the observed change in the CAB can make a difference.
However, Table II.5 suggests that the correction on the
observed change in the CAB would generally be quite
small. The year 2003 is particularly telling as the differ-
ence between forecasts and actual outturns of real GDP
growth, and hence potential GDP growth, is estimated to
be comparatively large (1).
Evidently, the proposed correction would be applied
symmetrically. It would amplify (compress) any
observed increase (decline) in the CAB in the case of
negative growth surprises, but compress (amplify) the
observed increase (decline) in the CAB when growth
was underestimated. Consequently, when confronted
with a positive growth surprise, conditional compliance
would be more demanding than the unconditional
approach.
3.3.9. Conclusions
The Commission methodology for computing the CAB
has evolved over time, incorporating successive analyti-
cal developments and the definition of best practices
agreed among Member States. In spite of the progress
and the overall positive experience, there is still margin
for improving the Commission methodology. In particu-
lar, the methods for linking output gaps with budgetary
figures could be improved.
CAB figures have generally been effective in assessing
the underlying budgetary position, in evaluating the
achievement of the CTB position as well as in evaluating
the risk of breaching the 3 % Maastricht deficit thresh-
old. In this context, it is important to interpret estimated
CAB figures with a sufficient margin of flexibility, to
account for the inherent uncertainty about potential out-
put.
Table II.5
Correcting the change in CAB for the effects of potential growth forecast errors
 
Ex post change in 
CAB between 2002 
and 2003 (% GDP)
Ratio of non-cyclical 
expenditure 
over potential output 
in 2002 (%)
Difference between 
the 2003 estimate 
for 2003 potential 
growth and 
the Commission 2002 
autumn forecast (%)
Change in CAB 
due to potential 
growth forecast 
error (% GDP)
Change in CAB 
between 2002 
and 2003 corrected 
for the potential 
growth forecast 
error (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (2)/100*(3) (5) = (1)–(4)
BE 0.8 50.5 – 0.3 – 0.2 1.0
DE – 0.1 48.4 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0
EL – 0.7 46.7 0.2 0.1 – 0.8
ES 0.3 39.9 0.1 0.0 0.3
FR – 0.2 54.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.0
IE 0.9 35.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 1.0
IT 0.2 47.5 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.4
NL 0.8 48.0 – 0.6 – 0.3 1.1
AT – 0.5 51.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.4
PT 0.7 46.0 – 0.7 – 0.3 1.0
FI – 1.0 50.4 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.7
DK – 0.1 56.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0
SE – 0.4 58.6 0.0 – 0.0 – 0.4
UK – 1.0 41.2 0.1 – 0.0 – 1.0
Source: Commission forecast.
¥1∂ It has to be stressed that the correction presented in equation (3) and under-
pinning figures in Table II.5 strictly applies to the assessment of changes
in the CAB only. That kind of analysis must not be mixed up with the
assessment of planned vis-à-vis observed levels of the CAB. In that case
the correction is not for the growth surprise, but for the unexpected change
in the level of potential output. The size of the two corrections is generally
very different, with the correction of CAB levels generally much larger.92
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of observed changes in the CAB has proved to be prob-
lematic, as they can result from both fiscal policy
actions and higher or lower than expected growth. The
SGP rules do not specify as to whether compliance
with budgetary adjustment is defined conditionally
upon a given growth forecast or unconditionally. How-
ever, whether compliance is to be interpreted uncondi-
tionally or conditionally matters both for the imple-
mentation of the required adjustment and for its
monitoring. Monitoring the adjustment uncondition-
ally is not problematic, but implementing the adjust-
ment package can be, since countries have to adopt
additional budgetary corrections whenever economic
growth turns out different from expectations, implying
the risk of a fiscal stance that is generally perceived as
pro-cyclical. Conversely, if compliance is taken to be
conditional on a specific growth forecast, monitoring
and assessing fiscal policy is difficult, as observed
changes in CAB are blurred by changes in economic
growth.
The Commission has recently made suggestions, cur-
rently examined by the Economic Financial Committee,
on how to monitor conditional compliance with budget-
ary adjustment requirements. The Commission suggests
that, in monitoring compliance, observed changes in the
CAB have to be corrected to take into account the impact
arising from potential growth which is different than
expected. Moreover, to prevent the possibility of ‘strate-
gic manipulation’, growth forecasts used in defining the
required budgetary adjustment should not be provided
by the concerned countries but by a third party. The fore-
casts produced by the Commission services may serve
the purpose. Finally, the assessment based on the cor-
rected CAB should also be cross-checked by the assess-
ment of the individual fiscal policy measures effectively
taken by Member States.93
4. Budgetary risks and contingent liabilities
4.1. Introduction
It is widely recognised that in the academic and policy
debate budgetary surveillance in the EU should be
increasingly focused on debt (see Chapter 5 in this part
of the report). The notion of government debt considered
in the EU rules-based fiscal framework is defined in the
protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and further defined in sec-
ondary legislation (1). By ‘Maastricht’ debt it is meant
the general government gross debt as: (i) including the
consolidated liabilities of the ESA 95 general govern-
ment sector; (ii) measured at nominal value. It should be
noted here that, in spite of capturing a substantial part of
government liabilities, the ‘Maastricht’ debt, as do most
definitions of government debt used in budgetary sur-
veillance, excludes some categories of government lia-
bilities. Firstly, all kinds of liabilities backed by legal
obligations but which may never lead to an actual gov-
ernment payment (e.g. government guarantees) are not
included. These are generally named contingent liabili-
ties. Secondly, there is no account of future obligations
that are not backed by law but that are very likely to
translate into actual government expenditure (e.g. future
expenditure on healthcare, pensions, etc.). These are
often referred to as implicit liabilities. Although these
types of liabilities are not included in government debt,
they are regularly taken into account in the long run sus-
tainability assessments of stability and convergence pro-
grammes, which include projections for future govern-
ment expenditures (on pensions, health, education, etc.)
not yet grounded in legal commitments (see EPC, 2001).
Focusing budgetary surveillance on government debt is
somehow inevitable, since measuring issues would
become easily unmanageable and even meaningless if
adopting a too comprehensive notion of government lia-
bilities. Moreover, government debt includes liabilities
with a strong degree of certainty and enforcement. How-
ever, types of government liabilities that are not recog-
nised in national accounting such as contingent and
implicit liabilities are receiving increasing attention in the
debate among fiscal experts and national accountants (2).
There are two major reasons for this rising focus on gov-
ernment liabilities other than debt. Firstly, as a result of
ageing populations, government expenditures in pensions
and health are likely to increase considerably in the future.
Most of these future expenditures are not grounded in
legal commitments (hence, are not included in govern-
ment debt), but result from public expectations based on
past patterns of behaviour of government. Secondly, as a
consequence of the shrinking role of government in pro-
viding direct support and a growing role in guaranteeing
outcomes, government finances are becoming increas-
ingly risky. Governments are bearing a growing share of
risk of private pension funds, public companies, infra-
structure projects through the issuance of guarantees and
insurance schemes. Depending on the realisation of par-
ticular future events (e.g. failure of private pension
schemes) government debt may increase substantially, but
present debt is not affected by the piling up of contingent
liabilities such as guarantees and insurances.
The aim of this section is that of addressing the issue of
contingent liabilities in EU budgetary surveillance. The
focus will be on contingent rather than implicit liabilities
since the latter type of liabilities are already taken into
account in the long run sustainability assessments of sta-
bility and convergence programmes. Moreover, the rele-
vance of the issue of contingent liabilities in EU budgetary
¥1∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the appli-
cation of the protocol on the excessive defecit procedure annexed to the
Treaty establishing the European Community.
¥2∂ More comprehensive definitions of debt are suggested in international
standards and are currently under discussion among fiscal experts and
national accountants. In particular, the accounting treatment of liabilities
of uncertain amounts (like clearly defined accrued pension obligations) of
uncertain nature (like guarantees) and pension-related commitments in
general is among the issues that are being discussed with the aim of updat-
ing and further modernising the system of national accounts (SNA) and the
European system of accounts (ESA).94
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contingent liabilities is in fact relatively high in new Mem-
ber States. Consistently, these countries have been dis-
closing information on contingent liabilities in their pre-
accession economic programmes (PEPs) and the Com-
mission services have taken into account developments in
fiscal risks and contingent liabilities in assessing the PEPs.
Although contingent liabilities in EU-15 countries are of a
relatively lower quantitative relevance, there are indica-
tions that it may increase in the future.
After having presented basic definitions and a widely used
taxonomy for government liabilities, broad trends in
budgetary risks are surveyed and the main economic argu-
ments for why such increased risk can be very relevant for
government public finances presented. Finally, practices
for monitoring contingent liabilities are reviewed and
implications for EU budgetary surveillance are discussed.
4.2. A taxonomy of government liabilities
According to the definitions used in national accounting,
liabilities arise for the government only as a result of
obligations backed by law. Moreover, such obligations
cannot depend on the occurrence of any specific event.
Hence, for instance, loans granted to the government by
financial institutions and government bonds issued in
financial markets are clearly liabilities. They fulfil all the
conditions in the definition of liabilities. The obligation
to pay (that is of reimbursing principal and of paying
interest) does not depend on any future event and arose
from a past event (the issuance of a bond or of the loan).
In contrast, contingent liabilities derive from possible
obligations, rather than present obligations (1). Some spe-
cific uncertain event must happen before an obligation for
the government is generated. For instance, the guarantees
granted by governments to the debt of private corporation
bonds issued by enterprise are contingent liabilities, since
the government obligation to pay depends on the non-abil-
ity of the original debtor to honour its own obligations.
The payments that the government has to make as a
result of contingent liabilities are necessarily uncertain
in their amount. This does not mean, however, that non-
contingent liabilities must necessarily involve payments
of a certain magnitude and distributed over time with
certainty. In fact, whenever the uncertainty surrounding
the obligations of the government concerns the timing
and the exact amount of payments and is such that by the
use of the law of large numbers reliable expected values
can be computed (e.g. in the case of clearly defined
accrued pension rights), then these liabilities can be con-
sidered as non-contingent liabilities (2). This is a subtle
but crucial distinction between liabilities and contingent
liabilities. The logic is that the uncertainty falling on the
underlying obligations can be assimilated with the nor-
mal uncertainty characterising economic transactions
(related to death, accident, macroeconomic risk, risk of
renegotiation, etc.). More specifically, liabilities with
uncertain timing and amount are defined as provisions
by national accountants. The difficulty with the inclu-
sion of provisions in national accounting systems is not
a conceptual one like in the case of contingent liabilities
but a practical one, related to the difficulties in obtaining
reliable estimates of their expected amount.
A further concept is that of implicit liabilities. The notion
of implicit liability refers to all cases in which future gov-
ernment obligations are very likely to arise in spite of the
absence of a legal basis. It includes both the cases in which
the government has a potential future obligation as a result
of legitimate expectations generated by past practice (e.g.
paying pensions to the beneficiaries of pay-as-you-go
schemes) and the cases in which government obligations
are related to the pressure of interest groups (e.g. bailing-
out of public or private corporations that are ‘too big to
fail’). Most implicit liabilities are contingent, i.e. depend
upon the occurrence of uncertain future events (e.g. gov-
ernment intervention in the case of natural disaster).
Liabilities of a certain nature and a certain amount are the
only type recognised in integrated national accounting sys-
tems like the system of national accounts (SNA) and the
¥1∂ According to the definition provided by the International Federation of
Accountants (see IFAC, 2002), contingent liabilities are defined as ‘possi-
ble obligations that arise from past events and whose existence will be
confirmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncer-
tain future events not wholly within the control of the entity’.
¥2∂ The IMF government finance manual treats clearly defined accrued
unfunded pension schemes operated by employers differently from the
SNA and the ESA since they give rise to liabilities recorded in the employ-
ers’ balance sheets. Hence, government liabilities according to the IMF
government finance statistics manual should also include clearly defined
accrued pension rights of government employees. Among the most rele-
vant cases of provisions there is the stock of clearly defined accrued pen-
sion rights. The logic beyond this treatment is that since the uncertainty for
the government surrounds only the exact amount of the payments to be
made, but not whether or not payments at all for clearly defined accrued
pension rights will be made, these should be considered as provisions and
not as contingent liabilities Moreover, since the degree of contingency is
quite limited, clearly defined accrued pension obligations can be recorded
as present obligations, i.e. (non-contingent) liabilities.95
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the inclusion of provisions in national accounts is rather a
practical one related to a reliable estimation of amounts
than a logical one, with contingent liabilities and implicit
liabilities a logical issue emerges in including them in gov-
ernment balance sheets since actual obligations may never
occur. However, the above difficulties do not exclude the
usefulness of reporting information on such government
obligations in supplementary notes to the budget (1).
After having exposed the definitions of different types of
government liabilities and their treatment in national
accounting, it is useful to summarise the different notions
of government liabilities encountered by means of a tax-
onomy that takes into account both the degree of certainty
of government obligations and the existence of a legal
basis for such obligations. Table II.6 presents a scheme for
classifying government liabilities as proposed in Polack-
ova Brixi and Mody (2002) (2). In this scheme, different
types of current and future obligations falling on the gov-
ernment are classified according to the certainty of their
future existence or the presence of a legal basis. If govern-
ment obligations arise only when certain specific contin-
gencies are realised, then the corresponding liabilities are
contingent liabilities. If government obligations have a
legal basis (are backed by law or contracts) then the corre-
sponding liabilities are said to be explicit, if they are
instead generated by legitimate expectations in the public
related by a past pattern of government behaviour or by
pressure by interest groups the corresponding liabilities
are said to be implicit. Hence, liabilities may be of four
types: non-contingent explicit, non-contingent implicit,
contingent explicit, contingent implicit (3).
The use of the taxonomy proposed in Table II.6 is that of
providing a simple framework for classifying govern-
ment liabilities according to their degree of certainty and
government commitment. This helps in identifying the
risks on the liability side of government balance sheets.
The typical categories of liabilities falling under the
identified four definitions are reported in the table. The
list of liability categories reported in the table aims at
being comprehensive but should not be taken as exhaus-
tive and is made for illustrative purposes.
Non-contingent explicit liabilities are those normally
entering national accounts and considered in standard
fiscal analysis. So, ‘Maastricht debt’ is among the liabil-
ities included in the first quadrant of Table II.6. Though
not included normally in government debt and govern-
ment balance sheets, provisions also fall in the first
quadrant of Table II.6, since the obligations are backed
by law and the uncertainty does not concern the exist-
ence of an obligation but the amount and timing of pay-
ments. Among the most relevant type of provisions there
are legally backed obligations of uncertain amount and
timing like clearly defined accrued pension rights.
Among the liabilities backed by law (explicit) but con-
tingent, the typical category is that of government guar-
antees and insurance schemes. Government guarantees
serve the purpose of covering risky activities carried out
by specific types of agents or for specific types of activ-
ities. Common examples of government guarantees are
those issued on the debt of specific sub-national levels of
government (e.g. municipalities), public corporations or
private firms entering relations with the government
(including through PPPs for the realisation of public pur-
pose investment projects). Such guarantees are normally
issued on an individual basis to the beneficiaries through
contracts (4). Other guarantees on debt can be ‘umbrella’
guarantees covering all the eligible entities borrowing
for a specific purpose (e.g. housing, education, etc.). A
different category of government obligations which
depend upon the occurrence of particular contingencies
is that of insurance schemes provided directly by the
government. In this case, the risk borne by the govern-
ment is not necessarily related to the liabilities of partic-
ular entities (as in the case of guarantees) and may con-
cern a wide set of events. The case of government
insurance of private pension schemes is of increasing
¥1∂ The IFAC handbook of international public sector accounting pronounce-
ments defines standards on which information should be provided on con-
tingent liabilities in notes to the government financial statements. Similar
recommendations about the disclosure of information on government con-
tingent and implicit liabilities in supplementary notes are contained in the
IMF manual on fiscal transparency.
¥2∂ This scheme is also known as ‘fiscal risk matrix’. In the terminology used
in Polackova Brixi and Schick (2002) non-contingent liabilities are
referred to as ‘direct’ liabilities.
¥3∂ It is to be remarked that the definitions used in the taxonomy proposed in
Table II.6 are not exactly the same as those used in standard national
accounting terminology. In particular, since the government liabilities nor-
mally taken into account in national accounting are backed by law and
independent of the realisation of particular events, there is no further spec-
ification in national accounting terminology that these liabilities are non-
contingent and explicit. Hence, the government liabilities systematically
recorded in integrated systems of national accounts like the SNA and ESA
all belong to the first quadrant of Table II.6. Furthermore, Table II.6 does
not distinguish between liabilities related to obligations whose amount and
timing is certain and those related to provisions, while such a distinction is
crucial in national accounting. Hence, all provisions are included in the
first quadrant of Table II.6 even if most of them are not recorded as gov-
ernment liabilities in national accounts.
¥4∂ Public financial support granted to companies may constitute State aid and
should be granted in compliance with Articles 87/88 of the Treaty.96
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such insurance schemes is to reduce the risk of private
pension subscribers concerning the return on their pen-
sion contributions.
Among the implicit (non-contingent) liabilities of
greater relevance there are those related to welfare pro-
visions by government, e.g. future pension and health-
care expenditures. Although there is no legal commit-
ment to provide such services in the future, there are
expectations grounded in past government behaviour
that the government will provide such services. Similar
considerations apply to government expenditures that
occur on a regular basis, such as those for maintenance
and refurbishment of the public capital stock. Note that
the categories of obligations considered under the head-
ing of implicit and non-contingent should be character-
ised by a limited degree of uncertainty, concerning at
most their timing and magnitude but not their own occur-
rence in the future.
The list of obligations potentially falling under the head-
ing of implicit contingent liabilities is very long and an
exhaustive description is beyond the scope of the present
treatment. In fact, all possible future obligations trig-
gered by uncertain events and grounded in expectations
by the public or pressure by interest groups should be
included. Among the most relevant from a quantitative
viewpoint are all the cases of government bail-out of
public and private corporations. In the recent past, gov-
ernment expenses associated with the bail-out of banks
and other financial intermediaries have been particularly
relevant in middle income countries, but notable cases
have also manifested in advanced economies, including
EU countries. Other categories include government
expenses related to environmental damage, disaster
relief and military financing in the case of war.
A final remark concerns government obligations related
to pensions. These are often referred to as implicit liabil-
ities. Although a substantial amount of pension obliga-
tions fall in fact in these categories (Quadrant III in
Table II.6, i.e. non-contingent, implicit liabilities) espe-
cially in the case in which pension systems are of the
pay-as-you-go type, pension obligations can be found in
all categories (all the quadrants of the matrix in
Table II.6). Government obligations corresponding to
clearly defined accrued pension rights should be assimi-
lated to provisions (uncertain amount and timing but cer-
tain obligation, backed by law) and belong to Quadrant
1, although one should not underestimate the degree to
which even pension in payment can be changed through
legislation (notably through the indexation of benefits).
Explicit guarantees issued to private pension funds or
Table II.6
A taxonomy for government liabilities
Non-contingent liabilities (the existence of 
government obligations does not depend 
upon particular events)
Contingent liabilities (the existence of 
obligations depends upon the realisation of 
particular events)
Explicit 
(government obligations have legal basis)
I
• government debt
• government expenditures as stated in 
budget law
• provisions (e.g. clearly defined accrued 
pension rights not backed by a fund)
II
• government individual guarantees 
on the debt issued by public and private 
entities
• government umbrella guarantees
(e.g. on household mortgages, etc.)
• government insurance schemes (on bank 
deposits, on returns from private pension 
funds, etc.)
Implicit (government obligations do not have 
a legal basis and arise as a consequence of 
expectations created by past practice or 
pressures by interest groups)
III
• future welfare payments (pension 
payments related with pension rights which 
have not matured yet, future healthcare 
payments, etc.)
• future government expenditures related to 
recurrent operations (e.g. capital stock 
refurbishment, etc.)
IV
• bail-out of defaulting public sector or 
private entities (public corporations, banks 
or other private financial institutions, 
pension and social security funds, etc.)
• disaster relief
• environmental damage
• military financing
Source: Commission services.97
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schemes are explicit, contingent liabilities. Whenever
the bail-out of pension funds does not follow legally
backed obligations (as in the case of insurance schemes
issued by the government) but is the result of public
expectations and pressures on the government, then the
related obligations are both implicit and contingent
(Quadrant IV). It is worth noting that pension reforms
may alter the distribution of government pension obliga-
tions across the quadrants in Table II.6. For instance,
reforms that reduce the extent of future pay-as-you-go
pension obligations and increase the role of mandatory
private pension schemes will reduce the size of the pen-
sion liability stock in Quadrant III (non-contingent,
implicit pay-as-you-go obligations) and most probably
increase that found in Quadrants II and IV (since govern-
ment will explicitly or implicitly guarantee minimum
pension benefits to the beneficiaries of mandatory pri-
vate pension schemes).
4.3. Sources of budgetary risk
4.3.1. Broad trends
Government finances are increasingly exposed to risk in
many countries. Increased risk on governments is the
result of two separate and simultaneous tendencies.
On the one hand, there is a quite generalised trend for
governments to step back from the direct finance and
operation of activities (e.g. providing public infrastruc-
ture or healthcare) to a more indirect regulatory role
(e.g. setting standards for health services, regulating
public utilities, etc.). To a certain extent, the changing
role of government coincides with a move away from
financing services and towards guaranteeing outcomes,
with the consequence of containing (other things being
equal) the average level of expenditures increasing at the
same time their riskiness.
On the other hand, overall economic risk is increasing in
many countries as a result of long-term structural tenden-
cies in demography, environment, and technology (1).
Ageing populations will increase expenditures related to
pensions and health. Rising contingent liabilities are also
associated with environment-related concerns. Some of
them are quite well documented, because they are linked
to legal or contractual obligations. For instance, govern-
ment guarantees are normally issued against the risks
associated with the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants. Other risks are less documented. Typical
examples are risks related to climate change. This is a
source of increased risk for government since govern-
ment finances will be probably called with increasing
frequency to compensate the citizen groups hit by natu-
ral disasters (2). Developments in technology and institu-
tional change are at the basis of possible increased eco-
nomic risk associated with greater capital mobility
(‘globalisation’). Advances in information and telecom-
munication technologies have increased the speed at
which financial capital moves in search of the highest
returns and made productive capital more footloose,
increasing both the magnitude and volatility of FDI
flows. Parallel to this tendency, in the past few decades
institutional barriers to capital mobility have reduced in
most countries, both advanced and emerging economies.
Increased capital mobility in the past decade has often
coincided with greater volatility of capital flows and
with increased risk of speculative attacks, currency cri-
ses and sudden current account reversals. Capital flights
have coincided with banking crises in most emerging
economies and in some instances also in advanced
economies (3). Once bank failures set in, governments
seldom have any other option but bailing out the banks
under distress to avoid the failure of bank creditors and
the spreading of a confidence crisis.
Ranking the relevance of the different possible sources
of budgetary risk is not an easy task due to scarcity of
data. Moreover, results are likely to be very country-
specific (4). Available data on the fiscal cost of bailing
out the financial sector indicate that such costs could be
extremely high, up to a substantial share of GDP (5). The
costs to government to refund banks and bail-out credi-
tors have been highest in Latin America and Asian
emerging markets and often occurred in the aftermath of
capital flights and currency crises (ranging up to 50 % of
GDP in the case of the Indonesian banking crisis of 1997
and 55 % in the banking crisis of Argentina in 1980).
Costs, however, have also been severe in some advanced
and transition countries (above 10 GDP percentage
¥1∂ See e.g. Heller (2003) for an overview of the factors underlying increasing
risks on government finances in various country groups.
¥2∂ Of course, the magnitude of such risks will also depend upon the extent to
which governments are engaged in environmental prevention policy.
¥3∂ For instance, the banking crises of Finland and Sweden in 1991.
¥4∂ For instance, natural accidents related to global warming have so far been
a cause of fiscal distress especially in developing countries found in tropi-
cal areas, while risks related to ageing populations are more likely to
become relevant in advanced countries.
¥5∂ See, e.g. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000).98
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and the Czech Republic).
4.3.2. Sources of budgetary risks in EU countries
Overall, budgetary risks are probably the highest in
emerging countries (Asian and Latin American espe-
cially). These countries are indeed structurally more vul-
nerable to banking crises that are, in quantitative terms,
the most relevant source of budgetary risks. However,
budgetary risks in EU countries should not be neglected
either. In most Member States risks to public finances
are likely to increase in the future as a consequence of
ageing populations. Increased budgetary risks may also
come from the issuance of guarantees to the debt of pub-
lic corporations (as a form of ‘hidden subsidy’) and to
that of corporations involved in the construction, opera-
tion, and maintenance on public purpose infrastructures
in the framework of public–private partnerships.
Most new Member States are subject to substantial and
peculiar budgetary risks. In the early 1990s, CEECs had
to face the challenge of transition to a market economy.
To that purpose, it was necessary to carry out liberalisa-
tion, restructure and privatise the economy, and build the
necessary institutions to make effective the working of a
market economy. This transition process entailed a sig-
nificant increase in overall economic risks. Firms previ-
ously operating under a regime of regulated prices had to
start competing in the market system; formerly State-
owned enterprises changed ownership and started being
run according to business models; entrepreneurs had to
abandon old activities and enter into new businesses.
Part of this increase in economic risks was shared by
governments in the form of guarantees or other forms of
explicit or implicit insurance. A transfer of risk to gov-
ernments during the transition process was probably nec-
essary to induce private capitals to engage in risky entre-
preneurial activities. However, the web of guarantees
and implicit insurances issued by governments to corpo-
rations, financial institutions and sub-national govern-
ments increased without sufficient monitoring in some
countries. Quite often, guarantees were not provided by
governments directly, but were issues by guarantee
funds. Sometimes, the debt issued by these guarantee
funds was not consolidated into government debt (1).
Most of these ‘extra-budgetary’ guarantee funds were set
up to deal with the restructuring of State-owned enter-
prises and their privatisation. After privatisation, these
guarantee funds often carried over the obligations of the
privatised enterprises through the issuance of guarantees
(e.g. environmental funds to cover future environmental
liabilities of the privatised enterprise). Since the debt
assumptions of privatised entities by government do not
affect budget balances according to most national
accounting systems, privatisation in transition countries
often entailed two types of fiscal flows not recorded in
budget balances (see Box II.3), on the one hand, privati-
sation receipts, accruing to governments after the sales
of corporate shares, and on the other hand, the payments
related to the realisation of events triggering the call of
guarantees provided by governments to various stake-
holders of privatised entities. While the first type of flow
is certain, reduces debt and occurs just after privatisa-
tion, the second type of flows are uncertain, distributed
in time and increase government debt.
The magnitude and length of the period during which the
State has been involved in extra-budgetary fiscal inter-
ventions differs across the countries. While in some
countries (e.g. the Czech Republic), the fiscal costs of
adjustment were postponed through a web of guarantees
issued by extra-budgetary funds, others opted for con-
taining the piling-up of contingent liabilities and for
adopting a transparent monitoring of such types of liabil-
ities (e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Hungary) (2). In these
countries, the operations of guarantee funds were con-
solidated into government accounts and progress was
made to keep track of the magnitude of their contingent
liabilities in supplementary budgetary documents.
An indirect way to measure the extra-budgetary costs asso-
ciated with government contingent liabilities has been pro-
posed by Kharas and Mishra (2001). It simply consists of
the difference between budget balances and the change in
government debt. Such a difference (named ‘hidden defi-
cits’) is interpreted as an approximation of the fiscal flows
associated with government liabilities (some of them con-
tingent) not reported in budgets. Since these ‘hidden defi-
cits’ can be the result of factors different from extra-budg-
etary activities, Table II.7 reports a decomposition of the
change in debt ratios for CEEC Member States between
1999 and 2002 which allows for the better isolatation of the
component related to extra-budgetary activities. To that
purpose, the change in the debt ratio associated with the
stock-flow adjustment is further decomposed into a com-
¥1∂ See, for instance, Allan and Parry (2003). ¥2∂ See, for instance, Polackova Brixi, Schick and Zlaoui (2002). 99
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properly consisting in extra-budgetary activities. Since
CEEC privatisation proceeds during the investigated
period have been a substantial source of extra-budgetary
flows, privatisation proceeds are further deducted from the
part of stock-flow adjustment associated with extra-budg-
etary activities. The final figure is quite a close approxima-
tion of fiscal flows not reported in budgets and not related
to privatisation activities. As argued before, a relevant
share of such extra-budgetary flows is likely to be related
to the provision of guarantees by government to various
stakeholders of privatised entities.
Figures turn out to be quite large. On average, during the
investigated period, as a result of extra-budgetary flows
other than privatisation receipts, the debt increased by
more than 1 and 1.5 GDP percentage points per year,
respectively, in Lithuania and Poland, by 2 GDP points in
the Czech Republic, and 4 GDP points in Poland (1). Given
the fact that the bulk of privatisation in CEECs has already
occurred, extra-budgetary flows related with privatisation
proceeds are likely to become of a smaller magnitude in the
future. This also means that the stock of contingent liabili-
ties will most probably start growing at a slower rate or will
begin to fall in most new Member States. However, the
existing stock of guarantees and implicit insurances issued
by CEEC governments will still be a source of extra-budg-
etary flows and debt increase for years. An appropriate
measurement of this stock of implicit guarantees is the only
way for evaluating the magnitude and riskiness of the asso-
ciated future payments.
According to the last round of pre-accession economic
programmes (PEPs) submitted by new Member States in
2003, the main source of risk remains to be the existence
of a wide range of State guarantees. In some countries,
the PEPs report the expected value of the stock of the lia-
bilities associated with guarantees. The amount of guar-
antees seems to be relatively high in Malta (22 % of
GDP) and somewhat lower in Cyprus and the Czech
Republic (around 10 and 13 % of GDP, respectively),
Slovenia (6.6 % of GDP) and Hungary (5.4 % of GDP).
¥1∂ Such ‘top-down’ estimates of extra-budgetary fiscal flows related to con-
tingent liabilities seem broadly consistent with existing ‘bottom-up’ esti-
mates in some CEECs. Polackova Brixi, Schick and Zlaoui (2002) for
instance report that the government disbursements related to guarantees in
the Czech Republic amounted to 1, 3.1, and 1.5 GDP percentage points in,
respectively, 1996, 1997, 1998.
Table II.7
Average annual contribution of various factors to change in debt/output ratio, 
CEEC new Member States (1999–2002)
Change 
in debt ratio Of which:
Snowball 
effect
Primary 
deficit
Stock-flow 
adjustment Of which:
Exchange rate 
effect
Extra-
budgetary 
flows
Of which:
Privatisation 
revenues
Other extra-
budgetary 
flows
CZ 2.95 0.08 3.9 – 1.02 0.03 – 1.05 – 3.18 2.13
EE – 0.08 – 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.28 – 0.25 n.a. n.a.
HU – 2.7 – 1.43 – 2.03 0.75 2.7 – 1.95 n.a. n.a.
LV 1.13 – 0.08 2.2 – 1 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.63 – 0.48
LT 1.45 0.75 1.15 – 0.46 – 0.38 – 0.08 – 1.1 1.05
PL 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.35 0.43 0.88 – 0.45 – 2.03 1.58
SK 3.93 0.35 4.68 – 1.1 0.7 – 1.8 – 5.85 4.02
SI 0.78 – 0.7 0.3 1.17 1.3 – 0.13 – 0.13 – 0.03
Source: Commission services.100
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finances
Government finances are subject to increasing risk in
many countries. Although there may be reasons that jus-
tify such a tendency, there are also reasons for concern.
Missing markets for insurance justify the provision of
explicit or implicit insurance by governments for some
type of risks. A typical case is that of natural catastrophes.
Such events may entail very high losses coupled with lim-
ited possibilities of diversification of individual risks.
Under these conditions, actuarially fair insurance premia
may be too high to permit the development of an insur-
ance market. The only possible provision of insurance
may come from the government, which has the possibility
of covering losses through taxation and to spread the bur-
den of natural accidents more. A different case is that of
economic ‘systemic’ risk. The typical example is that of
bank runs and financial crises. Bank failures may involve
considerable externalities since the initial failure of a lim-
ited number of banks may induce a ‘domino effect’
whereby a large number of creditors may fail as well and
trigger a confidence crisis. The consequence will be a
credit crunch and a possibly considerable and persistent
reduction in economic activity. Asymmetric information
is at the root of the market failures characterising the
financial system that justify government intervention as a
lender of last resort. A final relevant case to be mentioned
is insurance provision by government to the returns of
mandatory-funded pension schemes. Government inter-
vention in such a case is justified not only for equity pur-
poses (avoiding excessively diverse outcomes in terms of
actual pension income for scheme beneficiaries) but also
for efficiency purposes, since a less risky pension income
permits a more efficient distribution of disposable income
between consumption and savings.
In spite of the existence of a sound rationale for govern-
ments providing explicit or implicit insurance to the pri-
vate sector, social costs may nevertheless be substantial
when such an insurance role by government is exercised
in the presence of pervasive problems of information
asymmetries in markets or when government action is
biased towards short-term horizons. Asymmetric infor-
mation in markets may give rise to a moral hazard prob-
lem whereby the provision of government explicit or
implicit guarantees leads financial institutions or private
firms to undertake excessively risky activities (1). Para-
doxically, due to moral hazard, an active role of the gov-
ernment to reduce systemic economic risks through
guarantees may end up raising aggregate economic risks.
A second issue with the provision of government guar-
antees and insurance is related to government action ori-
ented towards short-term goals. By guaranteeing a mini-
mum level of economic returns, governments can
provide hidden subsidies to public or private corpora-
tions, even when such firms are not viable on the market
without the presence of government guarantees. A simi-
lar case arises when the government guarantees the debt
issued by corporations, since this reduces the effective
cost of capital borne by these firms. In such cases, the
undertaking of risk by the government reduces economic
efficiency since its motivation is that of delaying the
inevitable adjustment costs associated with corpora-
tions’ failure and restructuring rather than that of
addressing market failures. Governments acting over a
short-term horizon may also easily understate the
amount of risk they are putting on public finances
through the use of explicit and implicit guarantees and
the future consequences this may have. The main reason
is that proper accounting of government guarantees in
budget documents is generally missing. In contrast to
commercial accounting practices which require firms to
include committed uncertain obligations in their balance
sheets, relatively few governments disclose enough
information on guarantees in their books to make possi-
ble a proper assessment of their impact on public
finances. This lack of proper information on government
contingent liabilities, coupled with short-term incentives
for governments to issue implicit and explicit guarantees
as a substitute of explicit transfers and subsidies, may
lead to the build-up of excessive risks on public
finances (2). An appropriate monitoring of the budgetary
risks associated with the presence of contingent liabili-
ties and a shift of the focus of budgetary surveillance
towards a longer term perspective is a key requirement
to prevent the possibility that shocks to the economy or
the financial sector reverberate in some countries into
public finance distress.
¥1∂ For instance, there are documented cases showing that pension funds, once
government insurance schemes were introduced, started investing in
shares rather than in less risky financial assets like bonds.
¥2∂ Through the issuance of government guarantees, the overall risk in the
economy is translated on public finances and magnified. From the view-
point of their financial characteristics, guarantees can be assimilated to put
options issued by governments. In fact, guarantees could be priced as
options and sold to financial institutions and corporations. It is well-known
from option theory that the price of options tend to vary more than propor-
tionally with variations of the vale of the underlying asset (e.g. the value of
corporate debt in the case of guarantees issued to private firms’ debt). A
wider use of option theory instruments has been recently suggested in pub-
lic debate as a means to measure the accumulation of government risk
(Draghi, Giavazzi and Merton (2004)).101
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budgetary risks
4.5.1. Monitoring and measuring contingent liabilities
Most national accounting systems do not recognise gov-
ernment contingent liabilities. As a result of government
explicit or implicit guarantees and insurances, debts and
deficits are affected only at the moment in which the
events that trigger actual payments by government are
realised. Such payments will increase deficit and,
depending on the specific transactions involved, they
may also increase debt. Box II.3 describes the account-
ing treatment of government guarantees to the debt
issued by other entities.
Although the mere presence of guarantees does not alter
the magnitude of government debt, most national
accounting manuals recommend the disclosure of infor-
mation concerning guarantees and other types of contin-
gent liabilities in supplementary documents to the
budget. Supplementary information on contingent liabil-
ities is also recommended by the IMF code on fiscal
transparency. Finally, documentation attached to the
budget may be requested by national parliaments that
have to approve the budgetary law. Disclosed informa-
tion on contingent liabilities may range from short state-
ments describing the major characteristics of existing
government guarantee and insurance schemes to detailed
reports possibly including estimates of their economic
impact on public finances.
Concerning the evaluation of the impact of contingent
liabilities on government finances, a first approach is to
assess the expected value of government payments asso-
ciated with the existing guarantees, insurances, and other
programmes of government support. Although the esti-
mation of the expected value of contingent liabilities is
only a first approach to measure their economic impact
on public finances, computations may nevertheless be
quite demanding. What is needed for such an assessment
is not only the likely amount that will be paid by govern-
ment in case of the realisation of uncertain events, but
also an estimate of the probability of the occurrence of
such events (1). The estimation of the probability of cer-
tain events is quite problematic (e.g. debt default of cor-
porations) and the information reported will be inevita-
bly indicative. However, regular updating estimated
probabilities as new information becomes available
could improve considerably the quality of the estimation
of the expected value of contingent liabilities.
The expected value of contingent liabilities conveys rel-
evant information to assess the extent to which the gov-
ernment is providing ‘hidden’ subsidies to private or
public entities via the issuance of guarantees or the set-
up of insurance schemes. Such a measure, however, is of
limited use in evaluating the amount of risk borne by the
government. What is missing with the use of the
expected value is an assessment of the magnitude of the
payments that government might have to effectuate in
very adverse circumstances. Such an evaluation can be
of great use, especially if governments have limited
capacity of borrowing. The expected value of, say, guar-
antees to the financial sector may not be particularly
high. However, in case of a very severe banking crisis,
the fiscal costs to government may be extremely large, so
large to possibly imply a debt crisis.
Ideally, one would like to measure the risk impact of
contingent liabilities by computing the whole probability
distribution of the monetary value of the obligations trig-
gered by such liabilities. A more practical approach,
largely followed in the banking sector and increasingly
used also in fiscal analysis is that of evaluating the so-
called ‘value at risk’ of such liabilities. This consists of
estimating the highest government cost whose probabil-
ity of realisation is not lower than a given, pre-deter-
mined threshold (2).
Apart from the disclosure of information on contingent
liabilities and the assessment of their impact on govern-
ment finances, a more comprehensive approach to the
assessment of fiscal risk is possible. Consistent with the
taxonomy presented in Table II.6, a fully-fledged analy-
sis of fiscal risks should consider in fact whole balance
sheets of government and the covariance of the items of
both the liability and the asset side. Following this
approach, the net worth of the government (as measured
by the difference between a comprehensive definition of
government assets and liabilities, including assets and
¥1∂ For instance, in the case of a guarantee by the government to the debt
issues by a particular corporation, the expected cost of such a guarantee is
given by the probability of the corporation defaulting on debt times the
value of the outstanding debt at the time of default.
¥2∂ Even more sophisticated techniques of evaluation for government guaran-
tees come from option theory. The idea behind this approach is that govern-
ment guarantees play the same economic role as financial put options so
that, if appropriately priced by financial markets, their value should be
recorded as that of options with corresponding characteristics among gov-
ernment liabilities and among the assets of the beneficiaries of the guarantee.102
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stochastic variables (e.g. interest rates, exchange rates,
real growth rates, etc.) which affect both government
assets and liabilities and the way they vary together (1).
Monitoring contingent liabilities is a necessary first step
towards the containment of an excessive accumulation
of such types of liabilities. Several precautionary meas-
ures can be taken in this respect.
A reduction in the rate of growth of contingent liabili-
ties can be achieved through the imposition of caps to
the number of guarantees or to the volume of guaran-
teed debt issued by government and governmental bod-
ies in the framework of medium-term budgetary plans.
This was, for instance, the route followed by Hungary
during the years of transition to contain the growth of
guarantees associated with privatisation (Polackova
Brixi, Schick and Zlaoui, 2002) and by the Czech and
the Slovak Republics (Allan and Parry, 2003).
A different approach is that of avoiding the piling up of
an excessive stock of government guarantees by mak-
ing the granting of guarantees conditional upon the
payment of fees by the entities benefiting from
guarantees (2). The working of this solution crucially
depends on the criterion chosen for setting the magni-
tude of these fees.
As long as the fees reflect the volume of the guaran-
teed liabilities (e.g. the debt of a corporation, the
present value of the pension benefits to be paid by a
private pension fund, etc.) and their riskiness, the
introduction of mandatory fees entail a trade-off for
the beneficiaries between the up-front cost of the fee
and the insurance provided by the guarantee against
adverse events. Some government counterparts may be
willing to pay the fee to be entitled to guarantees, oth-
ers may not. The result will be a lower amount of con-
tingent liabilities accumulated by government in the
medium/long run (3).
Finally, an alternative method to contain the risk associ-
ated with government liabilities is that of designing
guarantees in such a way as to limit the risk to govern-
ment. For instance, in the case of government guarantees
provided to the financial sector, conditions could be
added specifying the maximum amount of payments that
government is ready to make in case of default of finan-
cial institutions (4).
In this context, the consequent decrease in government
contingent liabilities would be not only desirable from
the point of view of government finances, but would also
be consistent with the reduction of the overall amount of
State aid, and the reorientation to horizontal objectives,
in accordance with the Lisbon strategy.
4.5.2. Dealing with budgetary risks 
in the EU fiscal framework
The existing practice of EU Member States concerning
the monitoring of contingent liabilities and containing
budgetary risks varies widely. Some EU Member
States simply disclose information on guarantees and
other insurance schemes in supplementary documents
to the budget countries. Other countries have instead
developed more sophisticated practices to achieve and
adequately monitor contingent liabilities. In the Neth-
erlands, for instance, contingent liabilities have been
incorporated in the cash-based budgets. In some new
Member States, notably in Hungary, detailed informa-
tion on the expected cost of each guarantee scheme is
reported in the documents attached to the budget.
Moreover, in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia the volume of guarantees issued is limited by law.
In Sweden, the issuance of guarantees by government
is subject to the payment of mandatory fees by the ben-
eficiaries.
¥1∂ Though more comprehensive and rigorous, since such an approach
requires collecting and processing a large amount of information which is
not always available to governments, its use is so far rather limited. See,
e.g. Barnhill and Kopits (2003) for an application to Ecuador.
¥2∂ This is the practice followed by the EIB and the European Commission, which
issue guarantees conditional upon the payment of fees by the beneficiaries.
¥3∂ The presence of mandatory fees does not mean that an effective transfer of
risk to government through the issuance of guarantees would not occur. If
the cost of the fees reflects the expected value of the guarantees without
incorporating any risk premium, the risk of the underlying liabilities will
be effectively transferred onto governments. Under these conditions, a
form of subsidising will still take place. However, the subsidy will not
coincide with the full value of the guarantee as in the absence of manda-
tory fees, but only to the risk premium that would be required by markets
for the issuance of a guarantee of the type provided by the government. Of
course, governments may also set guarantee fees in such a way as to
exclude any subsidy component. To that purpose, they could set the same
fees that would be set by private operators offering contracts with condi-
tions yielding similar financial outcomes (e.g. put options).
¥4∂ In addition to measures to contain the accumulation of contingent liabili-
ties, government may take action to reduce the overall amount of risk on
the finances. One possibility is that of establishing reserves against com-
mitments yielding uncertain outcomes for government finances. An alter-
native approach to reducing overall risks to government finances is
through hedging, for instance via financial derivatives exhibiting a nega-
tive correlation with the net resource flows accruing to government. 103
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Many governments give guarantees for liabilities issued by other entities, notably public enterprises or private enterprises
involved in some government-related project. Governments may also guarantee liabilities of other governments, for example
in relation to projects of common interest. A guarantee will improve the credit rating of the liability and therefore improve
borrowing conditions (for example by reducing interest costs). Therefore, from the perspective of the original debtor, the
credit guarantees are similar to subsidies for interest relief. However, in some cases, a government guarantee is the only way
ailing companies, including non-viable public enterprises, can obtain financing from private capital markets. In the case of
companies operating in heavily regulated industries, guarantees are also given to protect companies from major changes in
government regulations — for example price controls — which could affect their economic viability. From the government
perspective, a guarantee does not lead to any cash payment when it is given — in some cases, the government may even
receive some fees or commissions — but might lead to disbursement in future, were the guarantee to be called.
The most typical guarantee involves a legal commitment to take on a liability, paying the debt service and reimbursing the
outstanding principal, if the original debtor fails to meet its obligations relating to this or (possibly) other liabilities. How-
ever, in some cases, the guarantee can be limited to the interest, to the principal or to a share of the principal. There are
many other types of guarantee instruments, for example where the guarantor does not have an obligation to formally take
over a debt, but commits to open a credit line to an entity if the latter is unable to meet its financial obligations.
Guarantees are contingent liabilities. This means that they are conditional obligations which will become present obliga-
tions if the original debtor was unable to meet its obligations and the government had to take over the debt. As a general
rule, contingent liabilities are not recognised in the ESA 95 or SNA systems of national accounts (1). There are two reasons
for this. The first, more pragmatic, reason is that most guarantees are never called. In most cases, the original debtor will
be able to satisfactorily meet its obligations without assistance. Therefore, to record a guarantee as government debt, as a
conventional liability, would be detrimental to the comparability and meaningfulness of debt statistics. The second reason
is more technical. In an integrated accounting system, such as the ESA 95 or SNA, each financial liability has a correspond-
ing financial asset and each liability should be recorded in the accounts of one, and no more than one, unit. If guarantees
were recorded as liabilities in the accounts of the guarantor, they would have to be deleted from the original debtor’s bal-
ance sheet (or an asset would have to be imputed in the balance sheet of the original debtor). This would be detrimental for
the usefulness and analytical interest of the accounts of the respective sectors.
Under the ESA 95, the assumption by a government of debts of other units — even when there is no explicit guarantee — is
recorded as a capital transfer from government to the defaulting unit. This can be seen as if the government gave a gift to the
original debtor to allow the latter to discharge its liabilities. Capital transfers are government expenditure and therefore increase
the government deficit. At the same time the assumption of the debt by the government increases its own debt. In principle no
actual call of the guarantee is needed to register a capital transfer and the respective increase in the deficit and debt. It is suffi-
cient that there is enough evidence that the primary debtor is unable to fulfil its obligations and the government will have to step
in. In practice, given the difficulty in obtaining such evidence, capital transfers are recorded when the government has formally
taken over the liability or starts behaving as if it is now the primary debtor, for example by paying coupons or instalments.
There is one major exception to this accounting rule. When debt assumptions take place during a privatisation or a liqui-
dation, the debt assumption is recorded without any direct impact on the government deficit. In these cases, the assumption
of liabilities by government leads to an increase in government debt, but no capital transfer is recorded and the deficit does
not change. The rationale for these exceptions is that the assumption of liabilities in these contexts will increase the pro-
ceeds from privatisation or liquidation. The privatisation and liquidation proceeds are recorded as financial transactions
(‘below the line’), without any direct impact on the government deficit, and it would not make sense that the operations
that are directly linked to privatisation or liquidation — increase the proceeds of privatisation and liquidation — would
adversely affect the government deficit (2).
(1) The ESA 95 and SNA record contingent liabilities when these liabilities are tradable and have a market value. State guarantees are very rarely tradable.
(2) There is also a second, more technical and rarer, exception, when the unit that is relieved from the liability is a government-owned quasi-corporation. Quasi-
corporations are units that do not have the legal status of corporations, but whose economic behaviour is similar to that of corporations. These units often cannot
issue liabilities on their own and, when they can, statisticians always impute their net worth — the difference between liabilities and assets — in the accounts of
the owner. Therefore, when governments assume debts from one of their quasi-corporations, they are, in fact, already recorded as government debts.104
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budgetary surveillance has been reflected especially in
the preparation and assessment of the PEPs. Former
acceding countries have been reporting information on
the main sources of fiscal risk and in some cases have
provided quantitative assessments. A number of coun-
tries, in the framework of their PEPs, have quantified,
for instance, the expected value of the cost of the out-
standing guarantees. Table II.8 provides an overview of
the information on State guarantees and other sources
of fiscal risks provided in the 2003 PEPs. The Commis-
sion services, in assessing the PEPs submitted annually
by former acceding countries, have been taking into
account the magnitude of fiscal risks in such countries
and the progress made in monitoring and containing
such risks.
Given the possible future increase in the amount of
government guarantees (for instance in the framework
of pension reforms or infrastructure financing) and
other sources of fiscal risk among EU countries, a bet-
ter account of contingent liabilities may become
needed in EU budgetary surveillance. In this perspec-
tive, given the wide differences in the current practices
followed by Member States, a first step will be the def-
inition of standards concerning the collection and
reporting of information on various types of contingent
liabilities.
Table II.8
Fiscal risks in the new Member States end-2002 as reported in the PEPs of 2003
Fiscal risks
Cyprus • State guarantees (10 % of GDP).
Czech Republic • State guarantees (12.2 % of GDP).
Estonia (1) • total explicit (0.04 % of GDP): student loans, business bankruptcies, court settlements, guarantees given by Kredex;
• total implicit (0.01 % of GDP): local government liabilities, environmental and natural damages;
• total (0.05 % of GDP).
Hungary • State guarantees (5.4 % of GDP).
Latvia • State guarantees — government guaranteed loans (1.2 % of GDP);
• planned issuance in 2003: Latvian Mortgage and Land Bank (SME development) student and study crediting and 
Skulte port reconstruction (total: 0.8 % of GDP).
Lithuania • low level of private deposit insurance (total amount of insured deposits — 21.4 %);
• restitution of real estate ownership rights (2.9 % of GDP);
• debt of State-owned enterprises to banks (1.4 % of GDP);
• restitution of rouble savings (4 % of GDP);
• debt and defaults on loans on-lent by the government to enterprises which will be privatised (once privatised, the 
State may face the problem of recovery of the on-lent funds — 6.3 % of GDP);
• decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (7 % of GDP);
• State guarantees and municipal budget arrears (0.3 % of GDP).
Malta • State guarantees (22 % of GDP — 90 % of it to public entities);
• proceeds from privatisation.
Poland • State guarantees (total anticipated payments up to 2024; 1.5 % of GDP);
• reprivatisation (compensation for the real estate appropriations by the State Treasury in years 1944–62 to former 
owners — potential value 5.6 % of GDP);
• potential liabilities arising from restructuring of industries (coal mining, railway).
Slovakia • State guarantees (12.6 % GDP);
• legal disputes between the state and the CSOB bank;
• legal disputes regarding bills of the Slovak gas company SPP;
• already reported in government debt: debt of Slovenska konsolidacna — 2.6 % of GDP; debt of social insurance funds 
— 0.3 % of GDP; debts of territorial self-governing units — 1.4 % of GDP, State guarantees — principal of 6.1 % of GDP.
Slovenia • State guarantees (6.6 % of GDP);
• total debt of public sector entities (11.1 % of GDP).
(1) Realisation of contingent liabilities in 2002. Total expected realised contingent liabilities in 2003 and 2004 are estimated at 0.03 % of GDP and 0.02 % of GDP
respectively.
NB: Fiscal risks related to ageing populations and the characteristics of government debt (e.g. maturity, currency denomination) are not included in the table.
Source: Commission services.105
5. Increasing the focus on debt and economic 
developments
5.1. Introduction
Government debt matters. Both its level and dynamics
are sources of concern, for at least three reasons. Firstly,
a high debt level leads to budget inflexibility, and in par-
ticular it reduces the room for devoting additional
resources to growth-enhancing public expenditures or to
reduce employment-unfriendly taxes. Secondly, high
and increasing debt positions can lead to rising interest
rates in order to allow governments to attract private sav-
ings, crowding out private investment (1). Thirdly, a
growing debt can ultimately undermine price and/or
financial stability. In the context of a monetary union,
the abovementioned effects are likely to influence eco-
nomic developments across the whole area.
To avoid the risks or negative effects arising from high
debt levels, there is general agreement that it is important
to pursue and achieve prudent policies over time. Within
the debate on the implementation and functioning of the
Stability and Growth Pact, increasing attention has
accordingly been placed during the last two years on bet-
ter including debt developments in the assessment of
budgetary positions. In November 2002, the European
Commission put forward a set of proposals to improve
the implementation of the SGP (2). Among other propos-
als, the Commission suggested that ‘greater weight must
be attached to government debt ratios in the budgetary
surveillance process. The debt criterion of the excessive
deficit procedure, which requires debt levels above 60 %
of GDP to approach the reference value at a ‘satisfactory
pace’, should be made operational’. In addition, the
Commission proposed that ‘a small deviation from the
‘close to balance or in surplus requirement of a longer
term nature could be envisaged for Member States where
debt levels are well below the 60 % of GDP reference
value, and when public finances are on a sustainable
footing’.
After several months of debate upon the Commission
proposals, the Ecofin Council in March 2003 concluded
that ‘the pace of decline in government debt plays an
important role in budgetary surveillance, especially in
highly indebted countries. In conformity with the Treaty
provisions, the excessive deficit procedure should con-
tribute to ensuring a satisfactory pace of debt reduction’.
The Council recognised the need to increase the focus on
debt although did not decide on specific steps on how to
operationalise the debt criterion (3).
Although the debt requirement of the Maastricht Treaty
has never been enforced so far (4), following the institu-
tional developments indicated above, some progress in
considering debt development in the monitoring of pub-
lic finances has been made. Steps have been taken to
upgrade the assessment of long-term sustainability (see
Part I of this report) and additional pressure to very high-
debt countries to increase the rate of reduction has been
exercised. In addition, even if no formal position has
been taken by the Council on whether small deviations
from the medium-term objective are acceptable in cases
of low debt, in practice, the discussions on budgetary
positions in the context of the assessment of the last sta-
bility and convergence programmes have highlighted
that this approach is somehow taken into consideration.
After the problems encountered in the implementation of
the SGP in 2003, in particular after the decisions of the
Ecofin Council of 25 November 2003, it appeared clear
¥1∂ See Part III for an analysis of the effects of fiscal discipline on growth.
¥2∂ European Commission (2002a).
¥3∂ For a debate on how the debt criterion can be made operational, see Euro-
pean Commission (2003a).
¥4∂ As pointed out, for example, by Alesina and Perotti (2004).106
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c ethat the credibility of the framework had been seriously
dented. The proposals made by the Commission in 2002
had been made on an unchanged legislation basis, to avoid
any discussion on redesigning the provisions of the SGP
which would have affected the credibility of the surveil-
lance process. At the end of 2003, however, it became
clear that the moment had arrived for openly accepting the
possibility of changing the SGP: this could possibly
increase the support for the fiscal framework, as it could
lead to improve its functioning, increase its effectiveness
in ensuring fiscal discipline, and reinforce its contribution
to growth oriented policies within the Lisbon strategy.
The Commission therefore announced its intention to
make proposals to strengthen economic governance.
Among the building blocks of the ongoing discussion on
how the fiscal framework can be reinforced in an
enlarged Union, the Commission announced the need for
taking debt levels and their developments more into
consideration (1). While there is a growing awareness of
the need to tackle the problematic issues, the reasons
why it is important to rapidly achieve prudent levels
below the 60 % of GDP ceiling set by the Treaty are not
extensively discussed. In view of the elements described
above, the remainder of this chapter explores the follow-
ing aspects. Firstly, it considers the reasons why a pru-
dent debt position should be pursued, independently of
the Treaty ceiling of 60 % for the debt/GDP ratio, con-
cluding that the latter is a relevant indicator for conduct-
ing prudent policies. Secondly, it identifies current
developments in EU-15 countries, and the implications
over the medium term. Thirdly, it discusses how fiscal
rules can contribute to achieve prudent debt levels and
increase flexibility in fiscal policy. Finally, it explores
how the current rules could be improved to define objec-
tives for the budget balance which consider debt devel-
opments and, accordingly, are more country-specific.
5.2. A prudent reference value for the debt
The 60 % reference value of the Maastricht Treaty is often
criticised for being an arbitrary number and for being
restrictive as it does not necessarily represent a ‘maximum
level of debt’ beyond which countries face difficulties in
issuing new debt (Blanchard, 1984). In addition, there is no
evidence that it represents the ‘optimal’ debt level which
ensures the most growth-enhancing use of resources.
However, it should be recalled that an ‘optimal’ or a ‘max-
imum’ level of debt cannot be clearly identified. This pre-
supposes precise knowledge of the effects of government
debt which is not available (2). In policy terms, even if these
levels could be defined, they are likely to change over time
reflecting the evolution in the economy. Given that the
change in the stock of debt takes time, once reached, the
level previously considered ‘optimal’, may no longer be so.
Therefore, it appears that, given the current state of the art,
policy action should focus on maintaining ‘prudent’ levels
of debt, in order to reduce risks and negative effects aris-
ing from high debt levels. However, even the definition of
‘prudent’ levels of debt is an open issue. For example, it is
argued that ‘a moderate debt level is desirable, but moder-
ate cannot be precisely pinned down. We simply have to
rely on good judgement’ (Wyplosz, 1999).
There are several indications on what can constitute a
prudent debt level. In order to assess whether a position
is prudent or not, a number of factors can be considered,
such as the volatility of the economic conditions and the
capacity of the public finances to adapt to mutated cir-
cumstance, either through higher taxes or lower expend-
iture. Below it is argued that these factors are more likely
to play a significant role when debt levels are high.
The fact that higher debt levels can lead to risks arising from
changes in the economic circumstances can be shown by
looking at the simple framework of the so-called ‘sustaina-
bility area’. Graph II.11 shows, under different economic
conditions, the ‘sustainability area’ (the area above the
depicted continuous lines) (3), which indicates those posi-
tions where the debt/GDP ratio remains stable or decreases,
for a given primary surplus. At this point, it can be already
noted that being within the sustainability area in a specific
point in time is not a sufficient condition for medium-term
sustainability. If the economy moves to a new steady state
with less favourable economic conditions, any debt level
¥1∂ In a speech at the European Parliament at the beginning of December
2003, Commissioner Solbes recalled this strategy and the intention to build
upon the November 2002 Commission communication and thus to put
more emphasis on sustainability and indebtedness. The speech is available
at: http://europa.eu.int:8082/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.getfile=
gf&doc=speech/03/590|0|aged&lg=en&type=pdf. The strategy was for-
malised by the Commission on 13 January 2004, see the press release of
the commission available at: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?
p_action.getfile=gf&doc=ip/04/35|0|rapid&lg=en&type=pdf
¥2∂ Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004) believe that general equilibrium
models would be needed to capture all the effects of fiscal policies and
public debt.
¥3∂ The ‘sustainability area’ is defined by the following inequality:
, where s is the primary surplus, i is the interest rate, y is the
growth rate and b is government debt as a percentage of GDP.
s i y–( )b≥107
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level of debt: the higher the level of the debt, the higher its
vulnerability. This can be seen with an example based on
Graph II.11, where two stylised countries have the same
primary surplus (2.5 % of GDP), the same interest rate
growth differential (2) but two different debt/GDP ratios:
country A has a debt/GDP ratio equal to 60 % while coun-
try B has a ratio of 100 %. Given these conditions, both
economies are into the sustainability area and the debt/GDP
ratio decreases. However, a change in the economic condi-
tions is likely to take place, as in practice it is normal that
economic conditions fluctuate over time. If for instance,
they deteriorate, so that the interest rate growth differential
increases up to 3, the relative position of the two countries
would change: country A would remain in the sustainability
area while country B would find itself in a position which
requires a change in the primary surplus. Therefore, without
an increase in the primary surplus to 3 % of GDP, country
B would see its debt level increasing continuously, and at an
increasing speed. Thus, while a given debt level can be con-
sidered to be stable at a given point in time, this may not
always be the case at all times (in particular if changes in
economic circumstances of a permanent nature take place).
The risk that such changes in the economic conditions may
determine the insurgence of unsustainable developments
increases with the level of debt.
This analysis illustrates several aspects linked to the vul-
nerability of public finances. Firstly, the sustainability area
tends to become smaller the higher the interest rate growth
differential. Secondly, the risk of becoming unsustainable
when the economic environment changes increases with
the level of the debt/GDP ratio (1). In addition, an endo-
geneity between debt level and the interest rate growth dif-
ferential cannot be excluded, so that the higher the debt, the
higher are interest rates and the lower is real growth. This
reinforces the probability that higher debt levels risk
putting the country in an unsustainable position.
Clearly, given a specific economic condition, sustainabil-
ity is guaranteed at any debt/GDP ratio, whenever the pri-
mary surplus is high enough. However, the other side of
the coin is that the primary surplus required to stabilise the
debt level increases with the level of debt, under given eco-
nomic circumstances. But the capacity of a government to
adapt the primary surplus to changed economic conditions
(and/or increasing debt levels) is not without costs (2). In
particular in European countries the capacity to increase
taxation from current levels or to rapidly and permanently
compress public spending, if significant unbalances arise,
appears limited. Finally, the analysis assumed that primary
surpluses are fully within the control of governments.
However, if primary surpluses are volatile, reflecting fac-
tors outside government control, this may increase the risk
that a country could find itself in an unsustainable position:
significant changes in the primary surplus not arising from
policy decisions may have to be corrected by the govern-
ment promptly, and especially at high debt level, to avoid
unfavourable developments (3).
The analysis above shows that maintaining low debt lev-
els reduces the vulnerability of public finances to eco-
nomic developments (4). Although arbitrary, the threshold
set by the Maastricht Treaty for debt levels below 60 % of
GDP seems consistent with sound budgetary policy, as it
is well below levels which could be perceived as leading
to default for indebted countries. Being below such a
threshold would give a reasonable margin for fiscal policy
to avoid unsustainable debt development if economic con-
ditions change. By doing so, it reduces the risk of having
to implement drastic policy changes, which could be eco-
nomically costly and politically difficult. The analysis of
government response to unfavourable debt developments
shows that it is often belated, as the market incentives only
appear at a very late stage, when high debts have been
accumulated, and therefore it has to be strong in order to
place the country back onto a sustainable path (5). In addi-
tion, as argued in Part I, rapidly moving to and remaining
at levels below 60 % of GDP will be a helpful contribution
to tackle the budgetary pressures arising from the ageing
of populations.
¥1∂ If a country with a high debt moves from a sustainable to an unsustainable
position, the transmission effect on its debt is higher than for a low debt
country: the impact on interest payments creates a snowball effect on debt/
GDP ratios which is more difficult to correct than for a small debt country. 
¥2∂ As argued by Blanchard (1984), there is an upper limit of the debt/GDP
ratio, above which there is not additional political consensus to increase
the primary surplus further. Thus, when this upper bound is reached, the
government has to run a drastic policy change, which is costly in terms of
consensus. As an illustrative example, Mongelli (1996) computed maxi-
mum levels of primary surpluses which government of European countries
would be able to impose.
¥3∂ This may happen, for example, reflecting changes in the price of and/or
demand for one particular material or product whose sales produce signifi-
cant government revenues This issue, however, is mainly relevant for
emerging markets (see IMF (2003)).
¥4∂ In addition, Part III of this report suggests that prudent fiscal policies can
have positive effects on growth.
¥5∂ The IMF (2003) identifies maximum sustainable debt levels for industrial-
ised countries and shows that their governments on average started a seri-
ous response to debt level only when it reached about 80 % of GDP. Other
studies, e.g. by Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004), highlight the limited
and belated role of financial markets and credit ratings in inducing govern-
ment reactions to unsustainable debt developments.108
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two important issues. Firstly, the analysis of debt
developments cannot take place over too short a hori-
zon, as current economic circumstances are not neces-
sarily close to a steady-state condition in the short
term. Secondly, the analysis over a long-term horizon
is affected by the hypothesis made on the future devel-
opment of economic conditions, which are likely to
vary from the current position, and as argued in Part
III, may even be influenced significantly by fiscal pol-
icy itself.
For these reasons, Blanchard et al. (1990) suggested that
sustainability should be assessed over one-, five- and 40-
year periods ahead to capture short-, medium- and long-
term implications of current deficit and debt positions
and their interrelation with economic variables. Along
these lines, the European Commission assesses debt
developments on a yearly basis (when making forecasts
and implementing the EDP), in a medium-term perspec-
tive (in the assessment of stability programmes) and over
the long term, (when assessing the long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances) (1).
5.3. An assessment of debt developments
Having in mind that achieving prudent debt levels and
ensuring the respect of the debt ceiling set by the Treaty
is crucial to avoid fiscal risks and increase the contribu-
tion of public finances to growth and employment, it is
relevant to assess whether the policies run by EU-15
countries are consistent with achieving and maintaining
prudent debt positions, given economic conditions.
Firstly, this requires having a look at the determinants of
past developments in high-debt countries. Secondly, by
projecting past debt developments into the future, it
assessed how long it takes for very high-debt countries
to reach debt levels below 60 % of GDP. Thirdly, debt
prospects for the EU-15 countries are analysed, taking
into account the volatility and trends in debt develop-
ments over recent years. The analysis is conducted on a
medium-term horizon: this reduces the influence of the
volatility of economic circumstances on debt develop-
ments. It should also allow stock-flow operations to
compensate over time, which would make debt develop-
ments depending to an almost exclusive extent on defi-
cits and economic conditions.
Table II.9 explores ex post the debt dynamic in those
EU-15 countries with debt levels in 2003 above 60 % of
Graph II.11:  The sustainability area
Source: European Commission.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Primary surplus
Debt/GDP ratio
(i-y) = 1
(i-y) = 2
(i-y) = 3
(i-y) = 4
¥1∂ See Part I of this report for the three different types of analysis.109
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Italy). It compares them with the targets planned in the
stability programmes submitted four years ago, when the
year 2003 was covered for the first time. In practice, the
table assesses the reasons behind the different outcomes
in terms of debt/GDP ratio. The reasons for slippages are
grouped into three broad factors: the primary balance,
the economic environment (which includes interest pay-
ments, GDP deflator and real economic growth) and the
stock-flow adjustments.
The first result emerging from Table II.9 is that the debt/
GDP ratio is currently higher than planned in all high-
debt countries, except Belgium. The difference is partic-
ularly remarkable for Greece (more than 10 percentage
points of GDP), Germany, Italy (about 6 percentage
points) and France (1).
The primary balance in particular has had a strong
negative impact on debt development in these four
countries. In absence of slippages in the primary bal-
ance, the debt/GDP ratio would have been below 60 %
in Germany and France, close to 100 % in Italy and
well below it in Greece. Conversely, the primary bal-
ance has been more favourable than planned in Aus-
tria and Belgium, limiting the slippage in debt due to
lower real GDP growth.
A second general feature resulting from the decomposi-
tion provided in Table II.9 is that real growth turned out
to be worse than projected in late 1999, reducing the con-
tribution to debt reduction with respect to plans in all
cases. Cumulated over the period, real growth contrib-
uted less than expected in particular in Belgium and
Italy. However, the debt dynamics are driven by nominal
growth, which results form the evolution of both real
GDP growth and GDP deflator. If the GDP deflator turns
out to be higher than estimated, the impact of (nominal)
growth on debt is stronger than planned, for a given real
GDP growth. This is particularly the case in Greece,
where the GDP deflator contributed by almost 6 percent-
age points of GDP more than initially expected in amel-
iorating debt developments. The GDP deflator had a
more favourable impact on debt trends also in Italy,
where it almost completely offset the worse than
expected real growth conditions (cumulative over the
¥1∂ Slippages from planned trends are greater than what appears for France due
to a revision in the debt/GDP ratio figures for the year 1999. This can be
read from the difference between the actual debt/GDP ratio for 1999 and the
one included in the updated programme (submitted in January 2000, see last
line in Table II.9). According to the French 2000 updated programme, the
debt/GDP ratio in 1999 should have been 1.8 percentage points of GDP
higher than what it has instead been. It means that the difference between the
planned debt reduction (in points of GDP) and the actual one is 7.4 percent-
age points of GDP, resulting from adding up the contribution of stock-flow
adjustments, the external environment and the primary balance.
Table II.9
Difference in the 2003 debt/GDP ratio between planned data in the 2000 updated stability 
programmes and actual data 
(% of GDP)
 AT BE DE EL (1) FR IT
Debt ratio (actual) 65.0 100.5 64.2 103.0 63.0 106.2
Debt ratio (as planned in USP 1999) 61.2 101.2 58.0 90.5 57.7 100.0
Difference 3.8 – 0.7 6.2 12.5 5.3 6.2
Contribution to change:
Primary balance – 2.7 – 1.2 6.2 9.1 4.3 4.3
Economic environment: 0.0 – 0.3 3.6 – 0.8 1.8 1.6
Interest payments – 0.2 – 1.1 – 0.6 3.2 0.5 1.2
GDP deflator (2) – 1.8 – 2.8 1.4 – 5.8 – 0.6 – 4.7
GDP growth (real) 2.1 3.6 2.8 1.8 2.0 5.1
Stock-flow adjustment 3.9 0.8 – 3.8 3.6 1.0 – 0.5
Difference due to starting position in 1999 2.6 – 0.1 0.2 0.6 – 1.8 0.8
(1) Figures for Greece concern USP 2001 (December 2000).
(2) Figures replaced by the HCPI (harmonised consumer price inflation) for Austria.
NB: A ‘minus’ indicates a positive contribution (a faster than expected debt reduction), a ‘plus’ indicates the opposite.
Source: European Commission.110
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responsible for only half a percentage point of GDP to
the different-than-planned debt development). Finally, a
mixed contribution results from interest payments devel-
opments. In general this has been close to what was pro-
jected, except for Greece due to the slower debt reduc-
tion and probably to higher interest rates on government
debt than originally expected. Overall, the economic
environment (measured as the sum of the contribution of
interest payments, growth and GDP deflator to debt
reduction) had a relatively minor impact (although gen-
erally negative) on debt developments during the last
few years than generally perceived, with the sole excep-
tion of Germany, where a combination of lower than
expected real growth and inflation led to unfavourable
debt developments.
A final factor to be considered in the analysis is the stock-
flow adjustments (resulting from privatisation receipts or
the impact of exchange rate changes on foreign denomi-
nated debt). As shown in Table II.9, stock-flows had a
negative cumulative effect on debt dynamics in all coun-
tries but Germany and Italy. While in Austria and Greece
they have contributed more than planned to increase the
debt ratio, in Germany, stock-flows have contributed by
almost 4 percentage points of GDP to bring the debt down
more than planned in the 2000 updated programme (1).     
On the basis of past developments, Graph II.12 shows
the projected debt/GDP ratios in the three very high-debt
countries (Belgium, Greece and Italy). This reflects the
assumption that the debt reduction in future will con-
tinue as in the recent past (2). The graph is a simple
projection in the future of average past behaviours and
therefore assumes that economic growth, interest rates,
inflation remain on average as in past years, while it does
not include additional assumptions on age-related
expenditure (3).
Since the rate of reduction has been positive on average
during the last six years, convergence towards 60 %
results in all three countries, although the speed differs
widely across countries. Projecting the current rate of
reduction over time implies that Belgium will bring its
debt/GDP ratio below 60 % within the next 20 years,
Italy would need around 30 years while Greece will not
converge to 60 % before the end of the century. This
clearly means that in Greece and, partly, in Italy the
current average rate of reduction will not bring debt
below 60 % of GDP before the impact of ageing fully
takes place.
In a wider perspective, it is possible to look at debt
prospects in all EU-15 Member States, on the basis of
recent developments. Focusing the analysis on overall
deficit levels, nominal GDP growth and initial debt
levels, current situations in Member States can be pre-
sented using the 60 % of GDP ceiling as a benchmark.
Four cases can be identified on this basis, where coun-
tries have:
(i) an initial debt/GDP ratio above 60 % and increasing;
(ii) an initial debt/GDP ratio above 60 % and decreasing;
(iii) an initial debt/GDP ratio below 60 % and increasing;
(iv) an initial debt/GDP ratio below 60 % and decreasing.
Graph II.13 places countries in four quadrants, which
reflect the four cases depicted above. Accordingly,
quadrant (i) shows countries where measures have to
be taken rapidly to be consistent with current eco-
nomic circumstances. A judgement on the four coun-
tries in quadrant (ii) depends on the speed of reduction,
as that implies how quickly the country will move to
below 60 % of GDP. Case (iii) signals that despite a
good performance in the past, economic conditions
and the current deficit imply increasing debt levels.
Quadrant (iv) shows countries pursuing prudent poli-
cies given the economic environment (4).
Graph II.13 also shows that a large number of EU
countries have debt levels below 60 % and reducing.
¥1∂ This shows that the difference between planned figures and actual ones is
bigger than in other countries. However, it does not mean that overall
stock-flow operations have been higher in Germany than in the other coun-
tries. Stock-flows deteriorated debt developments by around 25 percentage
points of GDP in Greece between 1999 and 2003.
¥2∂ This is based on the average rate of reduction over 1998–2003. The six-
year period is likely to cover a whole economic cycle so that it could be
considered a ‘structural’ rate of reduction, i.e. the one the country can
achieve in normal economic conditions. A six-year average means undue
weight is not given to unusual stock-flow operations. Positive and negative
adjustments should compensate each other in this length of time, with the
sum of these operations resulting in the ‘structural’ impact of stock-flows
on the debt dynamic.
¥3∂ For the latter analysis, see the assessment of long-term sustainability
included in Part I of this report.
¥4∂ The case of Hungary should be considered carefully: although the debt
position in 2003 is lower than in 1998, debt is recently on an upward path
after the minimum of 53.5 % of GDP reached in 2001. This mainly reflects
substantial deficits recorded in 2002 and 2003 and reinforces the impor-
tance of looking at both debt and deficit developments when assessing
budgetary positions.111
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even negative debt levels. This aspect has been
remarked by observers (e.g. Bishop, 2003) as a critical
aspect of the implementation of the EU fiscal rules, in
Box II.4: Stock-flow adjustments in Greece
The high debt/GDP ratio in Greece is declining albeit at a slow pace, despite the improvement of the primary balance since
the second stage of EMU, strong growth and the prevailing low interest rates in particular since adoption of the euro. The
slow decline in the debt ratio seems due to large stock-flow adjustments: the residual change in government debt not result-
ing from the surplus/deficit or the effect on the ratio of the evolution of nominal GDP. In Greece these adjustments have
been consistently positive in recent years, i.e. they have had the effect of raising the debt compared with what would have
resulted only from the effects of the surplus/deficit and change in nominal GDP. In the case of Greece, the stock-flow
adjustment includes: the variation in the valuation of debt denominated in foreign currencies as a result of exchange rate
movements; debt assumptions by the State on behalf of third parties; military borrowing; the acquisitions of financial
assets, such as capital injections to public enterprises; a number of financial operations related to debt management such
as the securitisation of future receipts, privatisation certificates, share-convertible bonds and exchangeable bonds; and pri-
vatisation proceeds.
The stock-flow adjustment which peaked at 6.8 % of GDP in 2001 was still high in 2002, standing at 4.2 % of GDP,
before being reduced to 3 % of GDP in 2003. These large autonomous increases in the stock of debt, which from 1999
to 2003 amounted to a cumulative 25 % of GDP, reduced the beneficial impact on the debt ratio of the high primary
surplus, the snowball effect during periods of low interest rates and strong nominal GDP growth, and of sizeable pri-
vatisation receipts.
The very high level of spending on military equipment in Greece is one of the most important components of the stock-
flow adjustment. In 2003 military borrowing reached 1.4 % of GDP as compared to 2.3 % in 2002 (1). Before the intro-
duction of the euro, the relatively high external debt was exposed to the fluctuations of the exchange rate with serious
implications in periods of national currency depreciation. Sizeable debt assumptions and capital injections to public
enterprises also contributed significantly in increasing the stock of debt. In 2002, Eurostat requested that the securitisa-
tion proceeds and the share convertible and exchangeable bonds, until then fully omitted from government accounts,
should be included in the stock of debt, resulting in a significant upward revision of the debt ratio to 107 % of GDP in
2001 and to 104.7 % in 2002. Nonetheless, the treatment of debt-creating financial operations according to 2002 Euro-
stat guidelines led to a reduction in the stock-flow adjustment and improved the transparency and credibility of the gov-
ernment accounts. In addition, in the period 2001–03, privatisation proceeds used to pay-off government debt amounted
to a cumulative 6 % of GDP. 
In recent years the Greek authorities have taken measures to restructure the debt and to improve its dynamics. Some of
these measures might contribute to limit the stock-flow adjustments, which continue to be high.
• Following the introduction of the euro and as a result of currency swap operations carried out during the last three years,
the share of non-euro currency denominated debt declined from 5.5 % in 2001 to 2.1 % in 2003; the sensitivity of debt
to exchange rate movements was thereby reduced significantly.
• The establishment of a liquid market for government securities, through the issuance of large liquid benchmarks traded
both in the domestic secondary market and abroad, contributed to a narrowing in the spread of the Greek Government
bonds vis-à-vis the euro area. In addition, the lengthening of the weighted maturity of debt and the smoothing of its matu-
rity structure contributed to the better management of the government debt.
(1) The stock flow effect of military expenditure in Greece results from the fact that it affects the deficits only once military equipment has
been delivered by producers and enters into service. Until that moment the purchase is only recorded in the debt.112
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medium-term objective of close to balance or in sur-
plus. Giudice and Montanino (2003) point out that, on
the basis of average conditions in 1998–2002, debt
would disappear only in Luxembourg, the Scandina-
vian countries, the UK and Ireland, as the debt/GDP
ratio would be below 15 % of GDP (or even below 0)
within 15 years at most (1).
Graph II.12:  The rate of debt reduction in very high-debt countries
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.13:  Debt levels and trends in the EU
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¥1∂ However, their computations do not take the effects of ageing populations
into account.113
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2 0 0 4While Graph II.13 presents average debt developments
over recent years, Table II.10 points out that there is vol-
atility in the financial position of the EU-15 countries. It
indicates in column (1) the average distance of current
deficit from the deficit level which would stabilise the
debt ratio (1), in column (2) the volatility of such a mar-
gin and in column (3) how this distance has changed
between 2003 and 1998. Column (4) indicates current
debt levels.
As shown in the first column of the table, all countries
except France, Germany and Portugal have had on aver-
age a budget balance which allowed a debt reduction
under prevailing economic conditions. However, the dis-
tance of the actual balance from a debt stabilising value
has changed considerably on a yearly basis, as column (2)
shows: the greater the value, the greater its volatility. In
some cases the standard deviation is even higher than the
average distance of the actual deficit from a stabilising
position, showing how a country can easily move from a
sustainable to an unsustainable position due to deterio-
rated economic environment or changes in budget bal-
ances.
The third column shows how the margin has changed
between 2003 and 1998. It appears that all countries save
Spain have smaller margins now which results from
either the deterioration of the economic environment or
the loosening of budgetary policy.
This analysis shows how medium-term debt sustainabil-
ity is not only a concern for very high-debt countries. In
addition, available information shows a high probability
of increasing pressure on the budget in a no-policy
change scenario as the result of demographic pressure.
Pursuing a policy of debt reduction over the medium
term would avoid dramatic policy shifts at a later stage,
which could be politically hard to implement and could
have an important impact on growth, at least in the short
term. Therefore, it seems important to reach once again
budget positions which ensure that debt ratios converge
rapidly towards prudent values.
5.4. Strengthening economic surveillance 
by jointly assessing deficit and debt 
developments
The previous analysis has shown that additional focus on
debt levels and developments is needed to better qualify
medium-term budgetary positions. A given deficit level
could be perfectly sustainable for a country, while it
could lead to explosive debt developments in others.
This reflects the specific economic circumstances of
each country, but to a very large extent their level of gov-
ernment debt. In particular, the analysis highlighted that
¥1∂ The equation , where  is the deficit to GDP ratio, shows
that when the sum of budget balance and the nominal growth rate times the
debt/GDP ratio is equal to zero, the debt/GDP ratio is stabilised. If it is
greater than zero, the country concerned is within the sustainable zone, or
‘over sustainable’ in the medium term, while for negative values the coun-
try is out of the sustainability zone.
yb d 0=– d
Table II.10
Index of medium-term debt stability
Average 
1998–2003 (1)
Standard 
deviation (2)
Diff. 
2003–1998 (3)
Debt level
in 2003 (4)
BE 3.8 1.3 – 1.2 100.5
DE – 0.8 2.3 – 3.4 64.2
EL 6.4 0.7 – 0.2 103.0
ES 3.2 0.9 1.9 50.8
FR – 0.3 1.6 – 3.0 63.0
IE 6.7 4.2 – 10.5 32.0
IT 2.3 1.5 – 1.2 106.2
LU 3.9 2.7 – 4.2 4.9
NL 2.7 2.9 – 4.9 54.8
AT 0.9 0.9 0.0 65.0
PT 0.2 1.1 – 3.0 59.4
FI 6.1 2.7 – 2.3 45.3
EUR-12 1.1 1.6 – 1.8 70.4
CZ – 5.2 4.3 – 10.2 37.6
DK 4.0 1.4 – 0.9 45.0
EE 0.6 2.0 3.1 5.8
CY 0.5 1.8 – 1.2 72.2
LV – 1.1 1.7 – 0.6 15.6
LT – 1.5 2.3 0.9 21.9
HU 1.8 2.8 – 4.0 59.0
MT – 4.3 1.9 1.1 72.0
PL 0.5 2.8 – 6.6 45.4
SI – 3.6 3.0 0.4 27.1
SK – 2.6 2.5 1.3 42.8
SE 4.5 2.4 – 3.0 51.9
UK 2.4 2.5 – 3.9 39.9
EU-25 1.5 2.4 – 3.6 63.2
p.m. EU-15 1.5 2.4 – 3.5 64.0
NB: Column (1) indicates the sum of budget balance and nominal growth rate
times the level of debt/GDP ratio. A positive value indicates that, under the
given economic conditions, on average the actual budget balance has led to
declining debt levels.
Source: Commission services.114
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tries need higher primary surpluses to stabilise their debt.
It also pointed out that high-debt countries are more vul-
nerable in their budgetary position: if economic circum-
stances become unfavourable the sustainability of public
finances in those countries risks being jeopardised unless
drastic policy changes are taken. At the same time, it
appears that for some countries the current combination
of budget balances and debt levels implies that prudent
debt levels will be easily maintained, even if a small
deterioration in the budget balance would occur.
In sum, the analysis shows that current combinations of
budget balances and debt positions are very different
across EU countries, that debt developments should be
more clearly taken into account in the multilateral budg-
etary assessment, and that this should lead to more coun-
try-specific assessments.
In addition, the analysis revealed that considering deficit
levels in isolation from other factors affecting debt
dynamics can lead to misleading interpretation as to
whether current policies imply risks to sustainability. It
has been noted in the previous section that the recent
evolution of debt levels is to a significant extent
explained by other factors than the overall budget bal-
ance (or the primary surplus). Ideally, all the other main
factors affecting debt dynamics (real growth, interest
rates and inflation rates, the so-called economic environ-
ment) should be considered in the application of the fis-
cal framework for economic surveillance. At the same
time, the inclusion of more elements in the analysis nat-
urally leads to a wider country diversification. This
would be a positive development at this stage of eco-
nomic surveillance in EMU, where in an EU of 25 Mem-
ber States it cannot be expected that a common rule leads
to uniform consequences on different countries. The
common rules should recognise such differences, and
accordingly imply different policies.
Although looking at the factors behind the debt dynam-
ics would complicate the framework, it would improve
its economic rationale. As argued by Buiter and Grafe
(2002), the appropriate operational expression of the
concept of sustainable and stabilising policies ought to
depend on certain key structural economic features of
the economy. Building flexibility and strengthening
credibility in the rules seems to require above all an
extension of the focus of surveillance. Indeed, the expe-
rience of the first years of EMU has shown that surveil-
lance based on monitoring exclusively and the respect of
the nominal deficit ceiling of 3 % is not sufficient to
cater for the complexity of the European economies (1).
In addition, it has been noted that the SGP suffers from the
notion that a simple deficit rule could provide a rich
enough environment to deal with many of the biases of fis-
cal policy: it turned out that the reality is much more com-
plex (Fatàs and Mihov, 2003). Accordingly, it appears to
some observers that the narrow interpretation of the rules
of the SGP, by being too simplistic (in this exclusive focus
on deficits) and not fitted to take national differences into
consideration, is over-restrictive in some cases while too
lenient in others. As a consequence, Buiter and Grafe
(2002) (2) think that the strict enforcement of the SGP as
it is interpreted now would cause serious problems for EU
members whose initial conditions are different from aver-
age and whose medium-term growth rates and inflation
rates may differ significantly from average.
Among the various characteristics of an optimal numer-
ical rule, credibility and flexibility play a relevant role.
However, flexible need not mean opportunistic, while
credible need not mean rigid and inflexible. In this con-
text, it cannot be excluded that the EMU fiscal frame-
work, especially since the adoption of the SGP, may
have erred to the side of rigidity, without necessarily
being more credible. The lack of considerations about
debt levels and developments, as well as the strict
enforcement of procedures only in relation to deficit
positions have led to criticisms concerning the lack of
clear economic rational (see, among others, Melitz, 2002
and Pisany-Ferry, 2002), and the mechanistic approach
(HM Treasury, 2004).
One of the features of the SGP is indeed that it defined
narrowly the procedures to be applied for not respecting
the deficit ceiling set in the Treaty, while barely any refer-
ence is made in the SGP to debt developments. In particu-
¥1∂ A deficit below 3 % of GDP is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
reducing debt ratios. See European Commission (2003a) and Giudice and
Montanino (2003) for an account of recent experiences in EMU and the
implications of only focusing on the deficit rule.
¥2∂ According to Buiter and Grafe (2002), the Pact is apt to lead to errors of
commission as well as to errors of omission, by signalling the need for
action when there is no danger, and by omitting alerting for real risks. The
authors challenge the medium-term target of close to balance or in surplus
as non-economically-based, and criticise it for preventing countries from
borrowing when they want to build up public sector capital, for lacking
any incentive for fiscal restraints in view of the impact of ageing popula-
tions, for preventing essential but temporary expenditures which may help
the transition towards the steady state, and for their asymmetric behaviour.
Buiter and Grafe also consider that currently in the SGP there is insuffi-
cient flexibility but scope for opportunistic, politically motivated manipu-
lation of the framework and the process.115
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by relating them expressly to the deficit-to-GDP ratio:
first, among the three ‘escape clauses’ foreseen in Article
104(2) (1) the only one which has been developed in detail
is the one concerning the deficit-to-GDP ratio (Article 2 of
CR 1467/97); secondly, the specification of sanctions
mentioned in Article 104(11) has been spelled out in detail
only as concerns sanctions to be applied in the case of pro-
tracted excessive deficit positions resulting from non-
compliance with the criterion relating to the deficit ratio
(Article 12 of CR 1467/97). This has led to a short-term
bias in the procedure which has somehow left the surveil-
lance of debt developments in a secondary place.
As recalled above, the European Commission (2002a)
already expressed the importance of improving the inter-
pretation of the fiscal rules, in order to take debt devel-
opments and country-specific circumstances more into
account. Since then, the debate concentrates on how
numerical rules should be interpreted or even changed
for mainly two reasons: firstly, strengthening the pres-
sure on high-debt countries to rapidly reduce their debt
towards more prudent levels; secondly, giving more
flexibility to low-debt countries to enact policies which
could enhance growth in the medium term, or to stabilise
the economy during slowdowns. In particular, the debate
has focused on:
• how to apply the Maastricht criteria in order to foster
debt reduction;
• how to avoid submitting countries to procedures and
recommendations, when they do not present risks of
unsustainable developments;
• how to set medium-term targets which are ambitious
enough to bring debt ratios towards prudent levels
without making them over-restrictive;
• how to determine the adjustment path towards pru-
dent budgetary positions, given the consideration
expressed above.
For some observers, stronger focus on the analysis of
debt developments would imply that in the context of the
multilateral budgetary surveillance the only variable to
be monitored should be debt levels. However, the analy-
sis of the previous sections clearly suggest that the sur-
veillance on the sustainability of the government finan-
cial positions of Member States cannot refrain from
taking account of overall deficit positions, as they are an
important, generally the main, determinant of debt
developments. Therefore, any increase in attention
placed on debt developments should not be at the cost of
less attention on deficit developments. Deficit levels
remain the primary indicator and the only one directly
controllable by governments in the short term: therefore
they cannot be excluded from the monitoring and sur-
veillance of budgetary policies.
In trying to achieve the objectives presented above, it
should thus be stressed that the Treaty approach does not
need any change as to how the surveillance should be
conducted. In addition, the SGP concept of establishing
medium-term objectives seems valid in order to provide
directions to Member States on which policies should be
pursued, and to the EU institutions on how to conduct
surveillance.
Within these boundaries for the current fiscal frame-
work, there are three specific instances where interpreta-
tion of the numerical rules may take place to take the ele-
ments indicated above into consideration:
• in assessing the respect of the reference values
which prompt corrective action;
• in determining the medium-term objective which
should reflect the conduct of prudent policies;
• in setting the pace of adjustment, either when the
deficit ceiling is breached or in order to achieve the
medium-term objective.
Clearly, the three aspects are strictly interrelated. Pro-
vided that there is agreement that ‘gross errors’ in
national fiscal policies must be avoided and promptly
corrected at EU level, an approach which defines pru-
dent policies cannot be inconsistent with ceilings which
allow the identification of ‘gross errors’. Ultimately, the
speed of adjustment to correct ‘gross errors’ and achieve
the medium-term objectives must be based on the same
economic rationale underlying the other two concepts.
¥1∂ The term ‘escape clauses’ is commonly used to refer to those cases in
which, in spite of the reference values of the deficit and debt being
exceeded, the criteria for assessing compliance with budgetary discipline
are considered satisfied. These cases are respectively, for the deficit/GDP
ratio, ‘either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and
reached a level that comes close to the reference value, or, alternatively,
the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and
the ration remains close to the reference value’; for the debt/GDP ratio, if
‘the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value
at a satisfactory pace’.116
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considered in the numerical rules?
There are several ways to consider the various budgetary
and macroeconomic variables in the assessment of budg-
etary positions, and to make them consistent with Treaty
requirements on debt and deficit. In the course of the last
years, the academic and political debate has produced a
number of ideas on how the joint assessment of budget-
ary positions and debt developments could be carried out
in practice. Clearly, the thinking on this issue is only
beginning, and needs to be pursued further. Therefore, it
is stressed here that the ideas reported for illustrative
purposes in the next section do not represent in any case
specific proposals for strengthening surveillance.
Without formalising the link between debt and deficit,
the European Commission (2002a and 2003a) proposed
to apply the debt criterion, in addition to the one on the
deficit, by setting the satisfactory pace of debt reduction
mentioned by the Treaty (1). Accordingly, by conducting
the surveillance jointly on the two criteria, and taking
action when one of the two is not respected, a significant
degree of country differentiation would be introduced:
the higher the debt/GDP ratio, the higher would be the
implied debt reduction required to respect the debt crite-
rion. At the same time, flexibility for low-debt countries
would be provided. The Commission suggested that the
medium-term objective could be somewhat relaxed for
countries having debt levels well below 60 % of GDP,
and presenting no problems in terms of sustainability.
Therefore, the Commission proposals aimed at widening
the focus from fiscal deficits to also include debt levels,
allowing for a substantial degree of country differentiation.
Other ideas discussed in the literature, also based on the
objective of giving sustainability a greater place in the
assessment of budgetary positions, rely less on the
Treaty framework. Without necessarily providing more
economic rationale than the current rules, as the Com-
mission would like to implement them, they either widen
the focus from fiscal deficits to include also debt levels,
or sometimes shift altogether the surveillance only on
debt levels. Below are briefly reviewed some ideas cir-
culated on how the objective of increasing the focus on
medium-term sustainability could be made operational.
Most of the ideas that have been put forward responded
to the only objective of providing more room for low-
debt countries. By contrast, no specific suggestions have
been provided on how to make sure that the rules ensure
a fast reduction of debt levels in high-debt countries, nor
on how the adjustment towards sound budget positions
should be done.
Therefore, most proposals address only one of the many
concerns, and accordingly they usually tend to raise the
deficit ceiling, if debt levels are maintained below 60 %.
In practice, this would imply that in some cases a low-
debt country raising its deficit above 3 % may not incur
into procedures aiming at the prompt correction of such
deficit.
For the sake of illustration, hereafter are some examples
of ideas which could pursue the limited objective of rais-
ing the deficit ceiling for low-debt countries. It should be
clear, however, that this is not in conformity with the
Treaty and does not represent a viable way ahead. Most
of the proposals provide a diversification across coun-
tries through deficit ceilings based on debt levels. As a
general intuition, the lower the debt/GDP ratio below the
60 % of GDP ceiling, the higher should be the maximum
allowed deficit. An advantage in such an approach could
be that it could create incentives to run down debt during
good times, in order to achieve more room of manoeuvre
in bad times.
According to one approach which would group countries
in ranges reflecting their debt levels (2), only those coun-
tries with a debt/GDP ratio above 55 % should maintain
the 3 % ceiling, while other countries would be allowed to
run a higher deficit (up to 5 % of GDP for countries with
a debt/GDP ratio below 25 %). In applying this approach,
under normal economic circumstances a country with a
starting debt/GDP ratio equal to 25 % could run excessive
deficits (higher than 3 %) for about 15 years before
approaching the 60 % reference value for the debt. The
deficit ceiling would get closer to 3 % as debt approaches
60 % of GDP. This rule is appealing for its simplicity, but
the discretionary groupings may create jumps and lead to
incentives to creative accounting for countries at the edge
of the groups. Alternatively, deficit ceilings could be
defined with a specific formula, linking deficit and debt
which would avoid discontinuity (3).
¥1∂ See also Giudice and Montanino (2003).
¥2∂ See Calmfors and Corsetti (2003).
¥3∂ A formula suggested by Fiorito (2002) is 
where d is the maximum allowed deficit to GDP ratio, b is the current
debt/GDP ratio and x is the ‘degree of incentive’ the rule would put for-
ward in order to create motivation to run down debt. Clearly, the greater x,
the greater the spread of country-specific ceilings.
d 0.03 x* b 0.6–( )–=117
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ceiling altogether, and placing stronger focus on debt lev-
els and long-term sustainability. As, for instance, sug-
gested by Pisani-Ferry (2002), Member States could opt
for a ‘sustainability pact’ and be exempted from the SGP
numerical rules if they fulfil the following conditions:
• publish a comprehensive balance sheet of the public
sector, that would allow an assessment of the poten-
tial future impact of off-balance sheet liabilities;
• maintain the debt ratio (Maastricht definition) below
50 % of GDP;
• set a five-year target for the government debt, taking
into account implicit liabilities, which would be the
benchmark for assessing their budgetary policies.
Countries choosing to opt for the ‘sustainability pact’
and complying with these conditions would automati-
cally be exempted from the Treaty procedure for exces-
sive deficits. In practice, those who follow the sustaina-
bility pact can run a deficit higher than 3 % of GDP.
Besides the fact that the primary variable for controlling
budgetary developments would be excluded altogether
from the surveillance, compared with the approaches
previous presented, the sustainability pact requires a
higher degree of judgement, since it would be based on
future budgetary and macroeconomic developments (1).
As argued above, while there is a need to increase the focus
of surveillance on debt developments and sustainability,
the ideas mentioned above increase the risks of fiscal indis-
cipline, as they revise substantially or abandon altogether
the deficit ceiling. Besides the fact that following such
ideas would mean changing the protocol of the Treaty,
which is politically highly unlikely, the economic argu-
ments used to support these ideas are considering only part
of the complex of needs which must be tackled in the sur-
veillance of 25 countries. In sum, the risks for fiscal indis-
cipline arising from such a revision of the deficit ceilings
seems too high for considering this route further (2).
A more promising avenue seems to be one which consid-
ers the Treaty ceilings as reference values for the analysis
of fiscal positions, and an accurate judgement is given as
to the reasons why the developments in these variables
have led to a non-respect of the Treaty values. The focus
of the revision of the numerical rules should be elsewhere.
While leaving the main provisions unchanged, the various
concerns expressed above could be addressed by redefin-
ing the medium-term objective enshrined in the SGP: the
‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ objective in order to con-
sider each country’s debt level and developments. Mem-
ber States whose debt and implicit liabilities are low
would be able to run higher deficits (3).
In defining the medium-term objective, a number of pos-
sibilities exist. Here too, groupings of countries can be
defined according to their debt level: in practice, the
medium-term objective would be more stringent (close to
zero or in surplus) the higher the debt level. A debt reduc-
tion policy would eventually lead to a less stringent
medium-term objective but without compromising the
3 % deficit reference value. Such a link could also be
expressed with various formulas, although the economic
complexity is hard to reflect in a smart rule. If it is
assumed that a prudent policy would be running a
medium-term deficit of 0.5 % of GDP over the cycle,
when the debt/GDP ratio is equal to the reference value of
60 %, variations around such an objective could be
allowed according to other levels of debt. For countries
with higher (lower) debt levels a more (less) demanding
objective could be set, where such a variation would be
determined by an ‘incentive’ (4). As an example,
Table II.11 shows different medium-term objectives
under a range of ‘incentives’: for a very low-debt country,
the medium-term objective could vary between 0.8 % of
GDP to 1.7 % of GDP, while a high-debt country could be
required to be in balance or run a surplus, depending on
how the ‘incentive’ is set. Clearly, the higher the ‘incen-
tive’ set, the greater would be the spread across medium-
term objectives. Also, over time, the development of debt
levels would imply a change in the medium-term objec-
tive. In any event, the redefinition of the medium-term
objective should imply that the latter would have to
remain well below the 3 % reference value. Nevertheless,
it seems evident that the possibility that a low-debt coun-¥1∂ The higher degree of judgement is in line with proposals in Wyplosz (1999).
¥2∂ Besides these proposals aiming at linking debt and deficit levels, by mak-
ing the admissible deficit function of debt levels, other proposals have
been advanced to propose linking admissible deficits (the deficit ceiling)
to other elements than the debt. Among them, are the proposals of exclud-
ing capital expenditure from the computation of the deficit, which de facto
links deficits to public investment. See, for example, Blanchard and Gia-
vazzi, (2002). As argued later in this section, it may be possible to concili-
ate the needs for increased investment and for fiscal discipline by
redefining the medium-term objective. 
¥3∂ For instance, the European Commission (2002a) suggested that for coun-
tries with debt ratios well below 60 % of GDP, the medium-term objective
may be relaxed for temporary or more permanent deviations. 
¥4∂ The formula used could be similar to the one expressed in footnote 3,
p. 117 by replacing the number 0.03 by 0.005 and considering the letter d
as the medium-term objective and not the deficit ceiling.118
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turns increases.
A few limitations, however, are still not addressed:
firstly, the central medium-term objective, i.e. in this
example 0.5 % for a country with a debt level of 60 %, is
still set arbitrarily; secondly, the main economic factors
indicated in the previous sections and which affect debt
developments would not be taken into account explic-
itly. Therefore, over time, the debt ratio may develop
unfavourably and the rule may not be sufficient to pre-
vent such evolution. At the same time, the analysis could
include other factors which over time may induce a bet-
ter evolution of the economic factors (for example public
investment, assuming that they positively affect growth).
On the latter aspect, the issue of supporting public
investment could be addressed through the redefinition
of the medium-term objective, for example by allowing
countries to target over the medium term a balance or
surplus for the deficit excluding net capital expenditure,
while the 3 % ceiling could still apply to overall deficits.
In this fashion, the difficulties in implementing the rules
for the respect of the deficit ceiling would be reduced, as
accounting issues would not arise with respect to the 3 %
of GDP ceiling (1). At the same time, excluding net cap-
ital expenditure in the assessment of the medium-term
targets makes economic sense and, not being such a large
amount, it should not put fiscal discipline and the respect
of the 3 % of GDP ceiling at risk.
Some authors have extended the analysis further, at the
cost of adding complexity, by including considerations
about the impact of real growth, interest rates and infla-
tion on debt dynamics in a mechanistic approach.
Though such formulas do provide a useful analytical tool
for the assessment of sound budgetary policy, their com-
plexity limits their practical use.
Reflecting the various elements mentioned so far,
Buiter and Grafe (2002) propose a ‘permanent balance
rule’, which takes into account both the structural and
temporary situation of an economy (2). According to
this ‘rule’, and given the current nominal GDP growth,
a deficit is implied which should be considered the
objective to be followed over time. This would in prin-
ciple maintain the debt ratio stable, but the rule does not
specify around which level. Variations of current pub-
lic spending, of government capital income and of the
inflation-and-real-growth-corrected current interest bill
from their permanent values should be accepted, so that
the deficit ceiling should be adjusted accordingly (3).
Implicitly, such a rule has relevance for the use of the
Treaty reference value for the deficit, as it does not
exclude that, on occasions where temporary deviations
from the permanent balance rule would be high, the
deficit be left to go well above 3 %.
Among the difficulties with this approach, the most
important is certainly its general complexity and diffi-
culty to compute, given that most variables are not
observable. In addition, the issues of recognition of
whether current deviation are temporary or permanent,
and of the irreversibility of spending decisions should
not be underestimated. Assuming that a temporary devi-
Table II.11
Incentives and medium-term objectives
Degree 
of incentive Debt to GDP ratio
Medium-term 
objective
1 %
30 – 0.8
60 – 0.5
100 – 0.5
2 %
30 – 1.1
60 – 0.5
100 0.3
3 %
30 – 1.4
60 – 0.5
100 0.7
4 %
30 – 1.7
60 – 0.5
100 1.1
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Resulting from the perverse incentive which the rules provide in recording
current expenditure under capital accumulation, and in the computation of
the ‘net’ investment, which is not observable.
¥2∂ The rule is based on the idea of ‘tax smoothing’, so that taxes would remain
at a constant share of GDP, no lower than the lowest share of GDP which
would ensure government solvency now and in future — intended as a non-
exploding (net) debt level. This implies that current (and permanent) taxes
are no less than permanent public spending, minus permanent government
capital income, plus the inflation-and-real-growth-corrected permanent
interest cost of the public debt, all expressed as a share of GDP. Permanent
public spending can be thought as the average expected future value of the
share of public spending to GDP, which given the discounting factor does
not necessarily mean this is the steady-state value (see Buiter, 2003).
¥3∂ Buiter and Grafe (2002) propose the following formula:
 where def-
icit is represented with d and debt with b. Permanent values are shown
with a p superscript, with g meaning current government spending, 
government capital income, r is the real rate of interest, n is the real GDP
growth rate, and is the rate of inflation.
d n π+( )b g gp κp κ r rp–( ) n np–( )b–[ ]+–+–+≤
κ
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conceived to remain temporary, the political economy
factor could not exclude the irreversibility of decisions
taken. Therefore, if a ‘temporary’ programme becomes
over time ‘permanent’, a deficit higher than what could
have been allowed would have been maintained for a
number of years. At that moment, in order to bring the
debt down to its initial level, taxes may have to be
increased. Therefore, the rule may not be efficient.
Finally, no specific position is taken to which should be
the debt level which is to be pursued, which does not
address aspects of the effects of the debt level on eco-
nomic factors.
A less ambitious approach could be one setting a deficit on
the basis of observed economic variables in the past few
years, and of a specified debt target for the long run. Taking
into account the Maastricht ceiling as a reasonable value to
define sustainable policies, such a debt target implied by
current policies should aim at providing comfortable room
below the 60 % ceiling (1). For example a prudent target
could be in the range of 40 % of GDP (2). This approach
could use past data (3), and by adapting yearly, would pro-
gressively indicate which seems the most appropriate defi-
cit in order to achieve over time the debt target. A faster
nominal growth rate would imply setting more demanding
objectives for countries with high debt levels.
Both this and the previous approach consider inflation in
the computation of the appropriate medium-term objec-
tive. Indeed, it should be noted that high inflation is a
problem which needs to be tackled by countries, both
because it creates spillovers in the euro area, and because
it reduces the relative competitiveness of the higher-infla-
tion country with respect to its counterparts in the cur-
rency area (4). While this is a problem which needs to be
tackled in the context of the wider conduct of economic
policies (and therefore at EU level should be addressed by
the BEPGs), it cannot be denied that in a sustainability per-
spective it plays a role. The role is particularly relevant in
case of very fast disinflation processes, where the reduc-
tion in inflation is likely to result in a worse debt develop-
ment. Requiring an adjustment of fiscal policies to com-
pensate the more unfavourable debt developments may be
inappropriate. In particular the last approach, by progres-
sively adapting to the mutated economic condition (5),
would avoid asking for an immediate but sizeable correc-
tion. Rather, it would require a progressive adjustment
towards the new steady-state, an adjustment which would
become stronger in periods of higher nominal growth.
Finally, a combination of the approaches indicated above
could be used to determine the speed of the adjustment to be
required from a country when it has either not yet achieved
the medium-term objective, or worse, breached the 3 %
deficit ceiling. The last approach already includes a self-
adjusting mechanism dictating the appropriate speed of cor-
rection. Other approaches could be used that determine the
adjustment as a function of the debt/GDP ratio, or the cur-
rent (and expected) economic growth, or a combination of
the two. Of course, even more factors could be taken into
account, such as the need to build up the infrastructure of
the economy. These types of consideration may have to be
made when determining the adjustment path of those EU
Member States which have just entered in the Union and
have a deficit well above 3 % of GDP.
This brief and illustrative presentation on how current
rules could be implemented to increase the focus on debt
developments is clearly non-exhaustive and should not
be seen as revealing a preference by the Commission for
any specific reform. Rather, it has been made to illustrate
the many possibilities which exist to widen the scope of
the surveillance of countries’ budgetary positions. It also
serves to point out that any choice on the approach to be
taken inevitably requires striking a balance between the
need for simplicity and the need for economic rationale,
which may in turn mean increasing complexity in the
implementation of the rules.
As another example of issues which would need to be
addressed for determining the country-specific objec-
tives (or the speed of adjustment towards them or to
below the 3 % deficit ceiling) is whether it is more
¥1∂ A formula which could be instrumental to achieve such an objective could
be the following: , where the medium-
term objective for the deficit should be smaller than the nominal GDP
times the debt level, plus an adjustment factor requiring convergence over
time of the debt/GDP ratio towards the value x.
¥2∂ This is consistent with the notion already used by the European Commission
(2002a) that a small deviation of a more permanent nature from a balanced
budget could be allowed for countries well below 60 %. It could also be noted
that the UK have set a target of 40 % of GDP for their net debt/GDP ratio.
¥3∂ Namely, moving averages of observed nominal GDP growth over a
number of years (a period of at least five years would allow for smooth
cyclical fluctuations), and the last debt/GDP ratio.
¥4∂ Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004) discuss the existence of long price
and wage adjustment cycles with periods of overheating and overcooling
and large differences in nominal growth over a sustained period. These
cycles have an important impact on the pace of debt reduction and the per-
ception of sustainability. 
d n π+( )b n π+( ) b x–
b
-----------  +≤
¥5∂ It could be noted that this applies also in the case of an economic slow-
down, which implies a partial reduction of growth potential.120
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State, or rather ranges, or make some groupings of coun-
tries. Clearly, as country-specificity would require that
each country is treated with a common and unique
approach, while recognising its structural and even tem-
porary specificities, computational problems would
make it inadvisable to define ‘point’ estimates for the
medium-term objective. Establishing ranges for setting
medium-term policy seems a more cautious approach. In
all cases, care should be taken to avoid too mechanical
an approach in the implementation of the rules. The
recent experience suggests that, in order to reinforce the
credibility of the framework, it will be essential to regain
space for judgement which the original interpretation of
the pact somewhat hampered.
5.6. Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the analysis of debt levels
and developments, which is becoming central in the EU
fiscal framework. Low debt levels reduce vulnerability
and contribute to a growth-enhancing environment.
From a multilateral point of view, it is evident that ensur-
ing budgetary positions which remain sustainable in the
long term is essential. The progress made in the last dec-
ade is an example of how simple numerical rules with
adequate incentives can be instrumental in moving out-
side dangerous waters and towards prudent positions.
While the rules set in the Treaty for monitoring and
ensuring that public finances are sound and sustainable
have made, and are making, an important contribution to
ensure the proper functioning of the currency union, it is
clear that more can be done to tackle those issues which
initially appeared of a secondary importance. Now, in
particular, it is clear that those countries which have
made all the required efforts to pursue sound public
finances should be rewarded with more flexibility than
initially allowed by the SGP. At the same time, other
countries have not persevered with the adjustment car-
ried out with the objective of entering the single currency
area. For these reasons, the framework should be
improved to rapidly achieve prudent debt positions.
In this context, both the deficit and the debt criteria of the
Treaty are complementary and appear prudent indicators
which signal the presence of ‘gross errors’ in the conduct
of a Member States’ fiscal policy. Accordingly, there
seems to be no necessity to reconsider the reference val-
ues. Both criteria should be used, as countries which
respect the deficit criterion may enjoy economic condi-
tions which do not ensure a rapid convergence of the debt/
GDP ratio to below 60 % of GDP. Therefore, the debt cri-
terion should be used to put pressure on those countries to
adapt their budgetary positions in order to achieve a satis-
factory pace of reduction with respect to the debt ceiling.
At the same time, it is evident that the concept of a
medium-term objective for the budgetary balance intro-
duced by the SGP is a central element of the surveillance
of the fiscal framework. It helps government to create a
clear strategy over the medium and long term and over
their electoral mandate, which can set clearly the expecta-
tions of agents and be supportive of sometimes difficult but
necessary choices. Setting an appropriate objective in view
of the medium-to-long-term debt developments is crucial,
given that increasingly information is available about very
long-term trends, and that current responses through budg-
etary choices affect only gradually these trends.
While the recent experiences would suggest rebalancing
the current fiscal framework, this demands careful
examination and in particular a delicate balance between
a simple approach and an economically more appropri-
ate but more complicated approach. Several possibilities
could be envisaged on how to take the various consider-
ations into account in the definition of the medium-term
objective. In the previous section a number of ideas have
been mentioned as a contribution to the debate which
needs to take place among the institutions of the EU and
the Member States on how the rules should be inter-
preted so as to provide more incentives and stronger
pressure in steering the conduct of national budgetary
policies. These ideas do not represent any formal pro-
posal by the Commission. Rather, they have been used to
illustrate the difficulty of conciliating different needs
existing in the complex reality of the EU with the sim-
plest possible rule (or its interpretation). Nevertheless,
they indicate that at this stage, more country-specific
issues should be taken into account, and any assessment
of budgetary positions and developments should reflect
a judgement on how they are likely to affect the sustain-
ability of public finances, but also the functioning of the
economy and of the single currency area in the short to
medium term.
In sum, rejuvenating the interpretation of the numerical
rules could at this stage be useful: this would provide the
basis for a better assessment of budgetary and economic
developments and would help to better deal with the
major concerns which the conduct of budgetary and eco-
nomic policies must tackle in the coming years.121
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(Continued on the next page)
There is no agreed definition on what constitutes a sustainable debt position. Debt sustainability can be a short- to
medium-term concept, or used to define a long-term condition. What is long term is however not strictly defined: it
could be either a precise number of years or an infinite horizon. In addition debt sustainability is not a synonym of ‘opti-
mal’ debt. The former refers to a condition which can be afforded by policy-makers while the latter defines a condition
in which the debt ratio is growth-maximising. A sustainable debt is also not a synonym of a ‘prudent’ debt. A ‘prudent’
position is one where the debt is in general more than sustainable but it allows to avoid shift from sustainable to unsus-
tainable positions when the economic environment changes.
The economic literature considers that if the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, the accumulation of debt can lead to
unsustainable position. The Ricardian equivalence suggests that taxation has no impact on the aggregate demand. To
finance its spending, a government has two options: raise taxes or borrow funds. Borrowing implies debt servicing. Since
any deficit has to be repaid later, taxpayers will increase their savings in prevision of the future tax bill, smoothing the
effect of tax over time. Nevertheless, this theoretical view has little empirical corroboration and, for this equivalence to
hold, a large number of restrictive requirements have to be fulfilled, and modern economies do not.
When a general government deficit arises, a government can finance it through inflation, monetisation or debt. As debt
and the interest rates are measured in nominal terms, generating inflation depreciates the real value of debt and interest
payments (1). Secondly, money creation produces some benefits from seignoriage. Seignoriage refers to the right of
printing money which generates revenue as there is a difference between the face value of a banknote and the cost of
issuing and distributing it. Moreover, those new issued banknotes can also be used to pay interest. The third option is
issuing debt (2) but it does not hold forever and in any event, it depends ultimately whether the level and the trend of
debt is sustainable.
Borrowing from A to pay B is known as Ponzi finance. It can be defined as
(1)
where dt+1 is the debt level in period t+1, dt is the debt level in period t and i is the real interest rate. The value of the
debt carried into the next period (dt+1 – dt) is, at least, as large as the value of the cost of servicing the debt carried into
the current period (idt). In practice, Ponzi finance implies that interest payments on debt are financed through additional
debt. Blanchard (1984) argues that this can be run for a while but, as debt becomes greater and greater, the risk of debt
unsustainability arises. Thus, there is a ‘maximum level of debt which the government can sell before repudiating it’
(Blanchard, 1984; p. 6).
While there is a general agreement on this principle, so that government cannot always borrow over time to pay the cost
of servicing the debt, debt sustainability has been defined in a number of ways. Broadly speaking, the economic theory
defines sustainability in two main alternative ways.
The first interpretation of sustainability refers to the ‘obligation to achieve budget balance on average over a number of
years’ (Wyplosz, 2002a). As already known, the implementation of a fiscal policy will generate disturbances in the budget
balance but, to be called sustainable, those increases in taxes or reductions in expenditure may not cause social or political
upheaval (Collignon and Mundschenk, 1999). Hence, it will be called sustainable a policy stance whose continuation in
time does not violate the budget constraint (Frenkel and Razin, 1996).
(1) The interest amount is computed as a certain percentage of the nominal amount of the debt. Thus, if the inflation rate is positive, the real value of the interest
amount is lower than the due nominal value of it.
(2) Countries of the EMU do not have many options to finance their deficit but to issue more debt.
dt 1+ dt– idt≥122
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In other words, it means that the intertemporal budget constraint has to be satisfied (3). Defining R
s
 as government’s reve-
nue and E
s
 as government’s expenditures in year s, r as the real discount rate and D as the initial stock of debt, the inter-
temporal budget constraint can be formalised as
(2)
The present discounted value (PDV) of all the government’s future revenue must be equal to the PDV of all its future
spending and today’s outstanding debt. This solvency condition expressed by the intertemporal budget constraint allows
the existence of government debt in a sustainable fiscal policy. Moreover, as the PDV of all the government’s future rev-
enue is larger than the PDV of all its future spending, debt must not necessarily be ever fully paid off. Nevertheless, the
level of government debt has clearly an impact on the sustainability of a fiscal policy, as a higher debt level generates higher
servicing costs, increasing government’s future spending and requiring higher future revenue to cover this double increase
in the right-hand part of the condition. The main problem of this condition is that it is not binding: with an infinite horizon,
a government can always anticipate a bright future for its revenue in order to legitimise its outstanding debt and its current
spending.
The second interpretation considers debt sustainability as ‘a given reduction of the debt/GDP ratio over a given hori-
zon’ (Wyplosz, 2002a). In the same way, Blanchard et al. (1990) defines a sustainable fiscal policy as a ‘policy such
that the ratio of debt/GNP eventually converges back to its initial level’(4). The Maastricht Treaty also refers to this
interpretation of debt sustainability as it declares a budgetary situation unsustainable ‘whether the ratio of government
debt/GDP exceeds a reference value (60 % of GDP), unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value at a satisfactory pace’ (Article 104). This interpretation of debt sustainability as the convergence of
the debt/GDP ratio to a reference value in the long term is the one used within the Commission as in the different parts
of the present report.
The main justification to this interpretation is that government with a high debt level will be less flexible to respond to the
occurrence of adverse shocks since the costs of servicing that debt restrict its means of intervention through fiscal policy.
The following will illustrate this.
Considering a limited period model and defining dt as the debt/GDP ratio for period t and St+1 as the primary surplus for
period t+1, i as the real interest rate and y as the real growth rate of the economy, the budget constraint can also be formal-
ised as follows
(3)
According to this interpretation of the sustainability concept, the budgetary policy of a government must achieve a
reduction of the debt/GDP ratio for a certain period (5). Thus, with a stable level of debt, in a no Ponzi scheme (6), the
primary surplus must be greater than the service of the debt in order to reduce it. This condition can be expressed as
(4)
(3) This condition is known as the government’s solvency condition.
(4) The justification of the initial level of the debt/GNP ratio as the conversion point is discussed in Blanchard et al. (1990).
(5) For instance, it could be considered that a period corresponds to an elective period for a government.
(6) The government cannot sell debt to finance its debt-servicing.
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This static condition is known as the weak short-term condition (7). Obviously, if the real interest rate is larger than the real
growth rate of GDP, the government should ensure a positive surplus to guarantee a sufficient diminution of the debt/GDP
ratio towards the reference value. It can also be observed that this condition will be hard to hold with high levels of debt/
GDP ratio since, politically and socially speaking, it is problematic to extract large primary surplus from the population (8).
In this weak condition, the interest rate and the economic growth rate are determined exogenously without taking into
account the impact of a high debt level on both of them. Moreover, this condition does not provide a clear definition of the
appropriate reference value for the debt/GDP ratio above which debt will be declared unsustainable as mentioned in the
Maastricht Treaty.
Based on the weak short-term condition, Collignon and Mundschenk (1999) propose a strong sustainability condition. This
condition sets endogenously the interest rate as a positive function of debt (9) and assesses, for a specific economy, the max-
imum primary surplus extractable from the population and the speed at which fiscal policy responds to a shock (10). Those
estimations lead to the evaluation of the maximum level of sustainable debt, which can be defined as the reference value
for that economy. However, the strong sustainable condition is specific to each model considered, implying that no general
definition of sustainability, applicable to all countries, can be derived.
(7) A medium-term sustainability index can also be constructed to balance short-term variation over time (see Collignon and Mundschenk, 1999).
(8) So far, it has been assumed that the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate of the economy. Without this condition, the sustainability discussion would
be very different. Indeed, if (r–y) was negative, the economy would be dynamically inefficient as the government no longer needs to run primary surpluses
to achieve sustainability. It is easily seen from equation (4) that surpluses of the primary balance would generate a stable reduction of the debt/GDP ratio, at
rate (r–y). According to Blanchard et al. (1990), ‘in such a case, a government should (…) probably issue more debt until the pressure on interest rates made
them at least equal to the growth rate’.
(9) High debt level will, other things being equal, generate a loss of confidence in a country fiscal management which will raise the risk premium and thus, the
interest rate paid by the government.
(10) Estimates for the EMU countries can be found in Bagnai (2004).124
6. Integrating the budgetary processes
6.1. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty establishes two guiding principles
with regard to the conduct of budgetary policies in the
EU. Firstly, Member States have recognised budgetary
policies (and indeed all economic policies) as a matter of
common concern, and agreed to coordinate them with a
view to achieving, inter alia, sustainable, non-inflation-
ary growth (1). Secondly, by stating that budgetary poli-
cies should be coordinated (as opposed to harmonised,
federalised, or otherwise centralised) the Treaty pre-
serves Member States’ fundamental right to formulate
their own expenditure and taxation decisions, providing
that excessive budget deficits are avoided (2).
By increasing economic interdependence between par-
ticipating Member States, EMU intensifies the effects
that the policies implemented in one country have on
economic policies of other countries. Such increased
interdependence increases the benefits of coordination
of Member States’ economic policies.
Coordination in EMU has to be balanced with the basic
fact that, by and large, nation States remain the centre of
political accountability on economic policies. In addi-
tion, the EMU set-up must balance common interest with
national sovereignty. Binding checks on national poli-
cies are justified when they may create a serious risk for
the stability of EMU. In this perspective of shared com-
petences, the role of the EU can be qualified as of a
‘supervisor’ (Sapir et al., 2003).
From the point of view of sound public finances, this
institutional configuration has two important implica-
tions. On the one hand, the Treaty preserves Member
States’ sovereignty in relation to budgetary policy. On
the other hand, it means that for coordination to be suc-
cessful, the EU’s budgetary goals must be embedded in
the machinery of domestic policy-making.
The number of countries that experienced excessive def-
icit positions in the past few years, and the difficulties in
the coordination and surveillance processes, have high-
lighted the need for improvement on this aspect.
A number of proposals have been made by academics in
the last years, regarding possible changes in the budget-
ary process and monitoring at both EU and national
level. Among them can be mentioned proposals such as
by Begg et al. (2002) to delegate monitoring of technical
issue to an independent body (3). Fatas et al. (2003), and
von Hagen (2002) name such a body, called to monitor
the sustainability of Member States’ finances, the ‘Euro-
pean Sustainability Council’. Along similar lines, HM
Treasury (2004) suggest the establishment of an inter-
governmental fiscal surveillance committee to conduct
analysis and surveillance of national fiscal policies. At
the opposite side of the spectrum are proposals which
aim at reinforcing the role of current institutions, in par-
ticular of the Commission, in order to increase its ability
to monitor and give recommendations on the evolution
of Member States’ public finances. Other proposals aim
at altering the numerical rules in conjunction with
changes in the surveillance procedures (e.g. Pisani-
Ferry (2002). Wren-Lewis (2003)) suggests that coun-
tries should be allowed to establish and follow their own
national procedures, which, if they are sufficient to
ensure long-term sustainability and are respected, would
imply that the countries are exempted from the SGP.
More proposals are made concerning the establishment
of independent bodies at national level which should
increase monitoring and enforcement of sound policies.
While some proposals go beyond any realistic changes
to the current framework, similar ideas could be devel-
¥1∂ Article 98 and Article 99(1) TEU.
¥2∂ Article 99 TEU. 
¥3∂ The authors mention, for example, the issue of calculating cyclically
adjusted budgets, which they suggest could be computed by the ECB.125
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4oped in order to improve the functioning of the processes
affecting economic coordination and budgetary surveil-
lance. The issues of improving the budgetary process by
revisiting the budgetary calendar at EU level and by
stimulating better procedures at national level are
explored below in some detail.
6.2. Moving to a proper EU semester
The right balance between the limits to supra-national
coordination and the objective of governance in EMU
can be found by focusing the fiscal rules on avoiding
negative spillovers to protect monetary policy and on
ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability, while other EU
processes should give guidance on issues where national
sovereignty has a large role.
Within this approach, economic coordination and budget-
ary surveillance in EMU take the form of guidelines
(BEPGs), common assessments (i.e. of the stability and
convergence programmes) and binding rules (the SGP).
The events and experience of recent years suggest that a
new balance between these forms of coordination needs to
be found. In this context, the recent debate and events sug-
gest that there is a need to shift the focus of coordination
to a wider perspective than just fiscal discipline within the
Pact. While the SGP focuses on the need to avoid ‘gross
errors’, and therefore looks at developments in the bal-
ances, the BEPGs cover quality aspects of the budget.
Increasing the coherence between these processes and inte-
grating them better at the national and European level
seems an important step to strengthen economic govern-
ance in EMU. In particular it appears that the SGP and the
BEPGs, the two key EU instruments for economic policy
coordination, could usefully add more value to the conduct
of national policies and the definition of budgets.
This objective could be achieved by a better articulation
between the stability programmes and the BEPGs, and the
national budgetary processes. In particular, a more effi-
cient contribution of the European process to the conduct
of national policies could be created by revisiting the
European processes to bring them more in line with the
national one. While the BEPGs process has been stream-
lined recently, and has now a more settled timetable, the
one concerning the preventive part of the SGP has not
fully achieved the purpose for which it has been created.
Indeed, the preventive part of the Pact, based on the sub-
mission and analysis of the stability and convergence
programmes, has seen its effectiveness reduced by the ex
post approach on which the assessment of the pro-
grammes is still based. It should be recalled that, when
the SGP entered in force, it required the submission of
the programmes at the beginning of the year. This
implied that the content of the early programmes mainly
illustrated the budget just approved, and only loosely
reflected the guidelines adopted with the BEPGs almost
a year before. More recently, the revision of the time-
table established with the code of conduct (1) has
advanced the submission to before 1 December of each
year. This has made it possible to assess the programmes
at an earlier stage. However, the Council opinions on the
programmes are currently adopted in the early months of
the year, which is evidently too late for the budget just
adopted, but also too early for the forthcoming one.
In order to increase the value which both the SGP and the
BEPGs can provide to national authorities in setting up
their budgets, a possible route ahead could be to trans-
form the stability and convergence programmes into a
real ex ante process and shift their submission and adop-
tion to just before the summer. This would mainly imply
reorganising the timetable for the submission and assess-
ment of the stability and convergence programmes,
while the timetable of the BEPGs would not be changed.
The rationale of such a shift would be that it could
increase the focus on the medium term by reorienting the
content of the programme on strategic planning, ensure
an interaction between European and national levels
before a draft budget for the following year is prepared,
provide the possibility to involve national parliaments at
an early stage, and strengthen the assessment of imple-
mentation at the end of the year on the budget just
approved. In brief, this would increase the Member
States’ ownership of EU policy coordination, making it
easier to factor common orientations into domestic pol-
icy-making, by allowing for a proper EU semester in the
definition of guidelines and recommendations which can
be taken into account by national authorities.
The modalities which could be applied could be the fol-
lowing. The submission of the stability programmes by
the Member States could be advanced to before the sum-
mer, say as early as (end) May. This would allow gov-
ernments to take into account the main content of the
¥1∂ Code of conduct on the format and content of the stability and conver-
gence programmes, adopted in July 2001 (see Part VII.1 of European
Commission (2002a)).126
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It would also allow governments to base their medium-
term planning on the Commission forecasts released in
spring, which would avoid non-marginal problems so far
experienced with the degree of optimism of economic
assumptions underlying national programmes. Possibly,
governments could consult national parliaments before
submitting the national stability programmes (1). In prac-
tice, this step could be envisaged as the national transpo-
sition into a national perspective of the multiannual
guidelines provided in the BEPGs, focused in particular
on the budgetary aspects. Clearly, given such a time-
table, the programmes (with this new style) would not
include detailed information about the forthcoming
budget, but would rather be a more strategic document
over the medium- to long-term budgetary policy (cover-
ing the main aggregates). Subsequently, the Ecofin
would deliver its opinion on the programmes by the end
of July. In that way, the BEPGs and the opinions on the
programmes would provide the framework for the prep-
aration of national budgets by governments and for its
final adoption by the parliament.
Finally, the process of assessment of the implementation
of the BEPGs could conclude the annual cycle. The
(eventually single) reports prepared by Member States
by the autumn would include information on the forth-
coming budget (currently included in the programmes),
and would deal, among the various aspects treated in the
BEPGs, also with the budgetary features of the actions
addressed in the BEPGs/EGs. The Commission and the
Council would take all the elements of the yearly cycle
into consideration when assessing the degree of imple-
mentation of the BEPGs.
In sum, a coherent cycle could be achieved by reorgan-
ising the timetable of the SGP, increasing the effective-
ness, democratic legitimacy and national ownership of
the process. Clearly this involves administrative changes
in the Member States. At the same time, however, it
implies a rationalisation of resources, as they could be
more efficiently coordinated, used in a more integrated
manner, and focused in the respective phases of the year
on the various aspects of the process of defining guide-
lines, transposing them into budgetary strategies, adopt-
ing them into the budget, and assessing their degree of
implementation.
6.3. Strengthening the national budgetary 
surveillance and performance
It has been said above that, for coordination to be suc-
cessful, the EU’s budgetary goals must be embedded in
the machinery of domestic policy-making. This point is
particularly salient in relation to domestic budgetary
institutions. Recent studies in the political economy tra-
dition have found that institutions which shape the for-
mation and implementation of national budgets are a sig-
nificant determinant of fiscal outcomes, and hence of
Member State’s capacity for compliance with the EU’s
budgetary rules (2). The Treaty duly recognises this fact
when it calls on Member States to ‘ensure that national
procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet
their obligations’ (3).
The link between domestic budgetary institutions and
compliance with the EU’s budgetary rules has important
implications for ongoing efforts to strengthen budgetary
coordination in the EU. It implies, in particular, that what-
ever steps are taken to improve the transparency, enforce-
ability, flexibility and adequacy of the EU’s budgetary
rules, it is equally important to ensure that domestic budg-
etary institutions contribute towards sound public
finances. In considering which budgetary institutions have
a closer ‘fit’ to the aims of budgetary coordination, it is
convenient to distinguish between the dissuasive and per-
suasive elements of current arrangements.
The dissuasive elements of budgetary coordination cen-
tre on the use of peer pressure as a sanction mechanism.
In so far as current arrangements rely to only a limited
extent on hard law obligations or the threat of financial
penalties, a principal deterrent against non-compliance
with the EU’s budgetary rules comes in the form of non-
binding recommendations for corrective action by the
Council of Ministers. Since it is not straightforward to
induce Member States to comply with their legal obliga-
tions (i.e. to follow the recommendation), peer pressure
is also used, in the form of naming, shaming, and blam-
ing to promote awareness about unsound domestic eco-
¥1∂ In European Commission (2001a), Section II.2.3, it is shown that whereas
governments interact directly with national parliaments in the annual
budgetary process, they operate with a large degree of autonomy when
deciding the medium-term targets and commitments in their stability pro-
grammes. Amato (2002) suggests that the Italian experience of adopting a
DPEF (Documento di Programmezione Economic a e Finanziaria), a
multi-annual strategic plan, presented and endorsed by the parliament, and
which precedes and constraints the draft financial law, could be usefully
extended to the European level.
¥2∂ Hallerberg (2004).
¥3∂ Article 3, TEC Protocol 20. The excessive deficit procedure.127
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stimulate appropriate action. The effectiveness of peer
pressure will depend on a number of factors (1). Firstly,
the obligation which peer pressure enforces must be well
defined so as to minimise the opportunity for counter-
claim on the part of errant Member States. Secondly, the
Council of Ministers must exercise peer pressure in an
impartial and consistent manner so as to eliminate
doubts about its credibility. Thirdly, peer pressure must
generate a ‘diminution (for the errant Member State) of
credibility with peers, and the possibility of censure by
political elites, the media and public opinion within the
State’ (1). If the first two elements point towards the need
for greater transparency and credibility at the EU level,
then the third implies that accountability mechanisms at
the Member State level must be strengthened to ensure
that Council recommendations reach the right audience.
Recent studies of budgetary coordination have focused on
two ways in which domestic institutions might increase
the effectiveness of peer pressure. One strand of the liter-
ature focuses on the need to create independent agencies
to monitor Member States’ budgetary policies. One such
suggestion calls for the creation of a Fiscal Policy
Committee (FPC), comprised of independent experts
appointed on a non-renewable basis, to assess, and pub-
licly comment upon, the sustainability of Member States’
budgetary positions (2). Another strand of the literature
focuses on the role of national parliaments in the coordi-
nation process. Existing evidence suggests that the interest
of national parliaments in budgetary coordination has thus
far been fairly muted (3). The implication is that a closer
involvement of national parliaments in the coordination
process could help to bolster accountability mechanisms
at the Member State level and thus increase the effective-
ness of peer pressure as a sanction mechanism (4).
The persuasive elements of budgetary coordination in the
EU attempt to build consensus between Member States
over the aims of economic policies. From the point of view
of domestic budgetary institutions, successful budgetary
coordination will depend not just on the pursuit of agree-
ment at the EU level, but also on whether the agreement is
compatible with the process of budgetary formation and
implementation at the Member State level. Recent studies
have emphasised a number of steps that could be taken to
strengthen the contribution of budgetary institutions in this
regard. Firstly, budgetary institutions should be more com-
patible with the underlying electoral system. Budgetary
institutions which delegate powers to a strong finance min-
ister appear better suited to an electoral regime in which sin-
gle party majority governments are the norm, while budget-
ary contracts will generally work better in an electoral
regime in which coalition governments between ideologi-
cally distinct political parties are more common (5). Sec-
ondly, the more transparent and enforceable domestic
budgetary institutions are, the more they will constrain pub-
lic finances, and hence the more they will boost compliance
with the EU’s budgetary rules (6). Finally, budgetary insti-
tutions which embed fiscal policy in a robust medium-term
framework will make it easier for Member States to comply
with the EU’s budgetary rules. For example, the deficiency
of such mechanisms in Portugal during the first three years
of EMU can partially explain why its budgetary estimates
proved to be so misleading from the point of view of com-
pliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (7). 
In conclusion, well-formed budgetary institutions at the
Member State level are a complement to budgetary rules at
the EU level. It follows that attempts to strengthen budget-
ary coordination in the EU level will benefit from some
degree of reform to national budgetary institutions. The
involvement and role of the various institutions vary
according to the focus of budgetary coordination. For the
dissuasive elements of the EU’s macroeconomic frame-
work, stronger domestic institutions would be beneficial to
amplify the resonance of Council recommendations for
corrective action addressed to errant Member States. This
should have the effect of increasing domestic opposition
against profligate fiscal policies, thus reinforcing the effec-
tiveness of peer pressure as a sanction mechanism. With
regard to the persuasive elements of budgetary coordina-
tion, stronger domestic institutions would ensure that the
EU’s budgetary goals are embedded in the formulation and
implementation stages of national budgets.
In sum, national budgetary institutions could become more
integrated with and beneficial to the overall system of eco-
nomic coordination and budgetary surveillance in the EU,
if they would ensure consistency with their own political
structure (i.e. well suited to the underlying electoral
regime), transparency and internal enforceability and by
focusing better on medium-term planning.
¥1∂ Hodson and Maher (2004).
¥2∂ Wyplosz (2002b).
¥3∂ European Commission (2001a).
¥4∂ Meyer (2004).
¥5∂ Hallerberg (2004).
¥6∂ European Commission (2003a).
¥7∂ Hodson (2004).128
7. Conclusions
7.1. Orientations on how to strengthen 
economic governance
The previous chapters of this part of the report highlight
the strengths and weaknesses of the current EU fiscal
framework and explore ideas for possible improvements.
While the framework worked reasonably well in avoid-
ing excessive deficits and not repeating past errors in the
conduct of budgetary policies, it encountered difficulties
in its implementation, both in its preventive and dissua-
sive components.
The Commission stressed at the beginning of the year the
need to strengthen economic governance. In this endeav-
our, the right balance has to be found between the need
to keep the economic governance framework stable and
predictable and to improve the system on the basis of
experience. Making the EMU macroeconomic frame-
work more effective would contribute to progress
towards the Lisbon objectives of sustainable growth, full
employment, social cohesion and competitiveness. It
should not, and need not, compromise the degree of sta-
bility achieved.
The key elements agreed by the Commission to be
addressed in order to strengthen economic governance
are: ‘(i) the need to better combine discipline with eco-
nomic growth considerations by placing fiscal policy
within the broader context of general economic policy
surveillance; (ii) the need to focus more on the sustaina-
bility of the Member States’ public finances; (iii) the
need to improve implementation by enhancing the com-
mon interest in the area of economic policy’ (1).
This report provides analytical insight on how these
three elements can be approached. It reviews ideas and
suggestions but it does not reach any firm conclusions at
this stage. It has been argued that both better implemen-
tation of the existing tools and specific refinements of
the legislative framework can help in strengthening eco-
nomic governance. This does not mean changes in the
Treaty but rather a better application of the Treaty itself
through an enhanced coordination of the available policy
instruments and an improvement in some specific parts
of the Stability and Growth Pact.
7.2. Possible improvements
The analysis in Part IV below shows that there is in par-
ticular scope to improve the balance between the broad
economic policy guidelines and the Stability and Growth
Pact as instruments to coordinate economic policy since
both deal with budgetary surveillance. There is also
room to combine stricter discipline and enforcement
with more flexibility in the conduct of national budget-
ary policies. The previous chapters and the recent litera-
ture on EU fiscal rules stress the importance of, among
other things: (i) putting more emphasis on government
debt and sustainability; (ii) being particularly strict at the
time when the economy is booming and thereby apply-
ing more symmetry in budgetary surveillance over the
economic cycle; (iii) making more allowance for country-
specific differences without putting at risk the equal
treatment principle; and (iv) reconsidering how the
budgetary adjustment path should be set and enforce-
ment could be enhanced. Increasing awareness about
budgetary evolution among institutional actors and the
public opinion is likely to enhance the common interest
in economic policies.
In developing these reform ideas, one might consider the
following.
7.2.1. Improving the available tools
Part II.3 shows how the assessment of yearly budget
positions is affected by transitory elements such as the
impact of the economic cycle and the recourse to one-off
measures. Improvements in the available tools to judge
the underlying budgetary position will allow the Com-¥1∂ See Press Release No IP/04/35 of 13.1.2004.129
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better understand the fiscal strategy put forward by the
governments and give appropriate recommendations.
Along the same lines of improvements of existing tools,
better information on structural reforms and their impact
on long-term growth and public finances, on accumu-
lated assets to afford future pension payments, on
implicit liabilities in the field of pensions, healthcare and
education, and on contingent liabilities can increase the
knowledge on future budgetary trends and enhance the
focus on long-term sustainability of public finances.
7.2.2. More effective broad economic policy 
guidelines
The arrangements concluded in the context of streamlin-
ing and the Commission proposals on strengthening eco-
nomic governance submitted to the Convention and dis-
cussed in the IGC (see Box II.7) would go some way in
addressing the identified shortcomings. However, fur-
ther measures could be envisaged. In particular, as
addressed in Part II.6, it would be worth exploring how
to bring the budgetary policy coordination calendar more
into line with the general policy coordination cycle
agreed in the context of streamlining. This would fit with
the idea of having an EU semester in which policy guid-
ance would be formulated and issued followed by a
national semester during which Member States would
follow up. This would also allow to place fiscal policy
into a broader context than just the disciplinary one
through a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of
budgetary developments and their relation with inflation,
cyclical conditions, long-term sustainability and the
overall objective of enhancing the growth potential.
The Commission and the Council have repeatedly under-
lined the need to focus more on the sustainability of the
Member States’ public finances and of being particularly
strict at the time when the economy is booming and
thereby applying more symmetry in budgetary surveil-
lance over the economic cycle. In this respect the idea
has been raised of a more active use of recommendations
under Article 99(4) should be made to guide fiscal poli-
cies in times when the Pact is not constraining, but
equally in other policy areas. In November 2002, the
Commission also put forward the idea of a better organ-
isation of the information flow from Member States to
the Community level and on the need that the BEPGs be
better linked with the Community’s policy agenda and
that more consideration should be given to the contribu-
tion of Community policies to the overall economic per-
formance. In particular, the Commission communication
on the multiannual financial framework (1) states that, as
a number of the commonly agreed recommendations in
the BEPGs have budgetary implications, a closer look is
required to the implications for EU or national budgets
(or a combination of both).
7.2.3. Rejuvenating the Pact
Based on various possibilities explored by the Commis-
sion, input from academics, and the experience of the
last years with the implementation of the common fiscal
rules which has been summarised in the previous chap-
ters of this part, the objective of increasing flexibility
while strengthening prevention and enforcement may
require a revision of the Stability and Growth Pact. In
this regard, the Treaty provisions, including the protocol
continue to provide the necessary strong backbone of the
fiscal framework.
Aspects to be considered, some of which have been dis-
cussed in the preceding chapters, could be the following:
• Allowing for country-specific circumstances by
redefining the medium-term objectives of ‘close
to balance or in surplus’. As discussed in Part II.5,
medium-term objectives could be of a small deficit
for countries with low debt ratios and/or high poten-
tial growth rates. This would approximate the flexi-
bility of a ‘golden rule’ by focusing on long-term
sustainability, while avoiding its major drawbacks.
By contrast, for countries with high debt levels,
large future pension liabilities and/or low potential
growth rates, the medium-term target should be
more ambitious, possibly a surplus.
• Placing more focus on debt and sustainability in
the surveillance of budgetary positions. Both the
3 and 60 % of GDP values would be used for assess-
ing whether a country is in an excessive deficit (see
also European Commission, 2003). A Commission
report should always be produced in cases of non-
compliance with either of the reference values of
60 and 3 % of GDP for respectively the debt and the
deficit. The Pact can help in clarifying these con-
cepts and how the two reference values would be
assessed in the budgetary surveillance process.
¥1∂ European Commission (2004), ‘Building our common future: Policy chal-
lenges and budgetary means of the Enlarged Union’, COM(2004) 101
final, 10.2.2004.130
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opments to foster both a prudent and symmetric-over-
the-cycle behaviour and surpluses in good times.
Early warnings and recommendations could be issued
in case of unsustainable developments, even if the
deficit-to-GDP ratio is still well below 3 %.
• Catering for protracted slowdowns and ensuring
consistency with the medium-term objectives for
example by redefining the clause on ‘exceptional
circumstances’ concerning the application of the
deficit criterion.
• Allowing for country-specific elements in the
enforcement of the correction of excessive defi-
cits. On the basis of the analysis developed in Part
II.5 and the literature reviewed in this part of the
report, this could be pursued along two lines:
(i) Setting appropriate deadlines for correcting the
excessive deficit, taking into account country-spe-
cific debt and growth conditions. A slower adjust-
ment may be required from countries with low debt
levels and/or experiencing slow growth.
(ii) Reconsidering the deadlines for moving within the
EDP. The analysis in Part II.3 on monitoring budg-
etary adjustments as well as the recent experience
lead to the consideration of the possibility to revise
the deadlines set in the first recommendation for the
correction of the excessive deficit. Also the modali-
ties for application of the sanctions and their amount
could be revised.
Some of the abovementioned elements may imply
changes in the implementation, or a better specification
which can be achieved through a revision of the code of
conduct. Others may require changes in the Pact regula-
tions. 
7.2.4. More effective enforcement
In order to work properly any coordination mechanism
needs to be embedded in strong institutions. This is
because coordination, however well devised, will always
contain a considerable element of judgement.
A more flexible and articulated interpretation of the
notions of ‘close to balance’ and a more discretionary
application of the procedure would need to be bolstered
by stronger authority of the institutions involved. Other-
wise the reform risks becoming a simple watering down
of the existing rules.
As argued in Part II.6, economic policy coordination in
EMU implies a shared authority between institutions at
the Community and the national level. Strengthening
economic coordination therefore requires addressing
issues at both levels.
At Community level, the authority and the instruments
entrusted respectively to the Commission and to the
Council need to be clarified and possibly reviewed. The
Commission is best placed to assess developments and
determine policy recommendations. Authority can be
clarified through a better articulation and differentiation
of roles in the application of the SGP. As regards instru-
ments, the changes agreed in the European Constitution
are a first important step (see Box II.7). Namely, they
will allow the Commission to issue ‘early-warning’ rec-
ommendations directly to Member States in case of sig-
nificant deviations from the medium-term budgetary
objective, and to address proposals rather than recom-
mendation to launch the EDP.
More in general, however, the Community power to
effectively monitor the application of the fiscal rules by
Member States needs to be strengthened, especially con-
cerning the preventive element of the framework. This
need not involve changes in legislation, but would
require significantly greater cooperation on the part of
the Member States and increased Commission, including
the verification of national budgetary projections.
At national level, it is important that Member States
ensure that institutions are appropriate to the task of
securing sustainable public finances. Although this man-
date is explicitly included in the protocol on the exces-
sive deficit procedure, little consideration has been given
so far to its implementation. Improving budgetary proce-
dures and favouring the dialogue among all actors con-
cerned would strengthen the institutions for effective
economic policy coordination. As pointed out in
Part II.6, a more relevant role could be played by
national counterparts for the monitoring function ful-
filled by the Commission at EU level.131
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In the debate on the need to reform the EU fiscal rules, several other approaches have been suggested. They have merits and
disadvantages and it is beyond the scope of the box to discuss them in detail. Their main features are briefly outlined below.
• Moving back to the excessive deficit procedure as foreseen by the Treaty. This would mean abrogating Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97, i.e. the dissuasive part of the Pact. This could help to reduce automaticity and time constraints for the
correction of an excessive deficit that has been perceived as too restrictive by some. However, this approach would pro-
vide too much room for interpretation of the Treaty. It would also reduce excessively the weight of the dissuasive pro-
visions of the Pact, and therefore such an approach would be perceived as a substantial weakening of the rules. It would
also require stronger institutions to use their increased discretion in a credible and consistent way. Finally, the preventive
part of surveillance, which has shown its limits over the last years, would not be touched.
• Continue to refine the interpretation of the SGP to mainly strengthen prevention. Such an approach would redefine
some concepts used in the application of the SGP, in particular the specification of the ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’
requirement, or the role of debt in the EDP. This approach would attempt to (re)interpret the preventive part of the SGP
(CR 1466/97) through at most a revision of the ‘code of conduct’, a text simply endorsed by the Ecofin, which gives an
interpretation to a few issues of the SGP. However, such an approach may be perceived as a ‘non-change’ by observers,
in particular when confronted with the Commission communication of November 2002. In addition, it would not solve
certain issues set in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 which have shown their limits, i.e. the ‘clause on exceptional circum-
stances’ for not placing a country in an excessive deficit position, the speed of adjustment required in case of excessive
deficit, and the working of the latter part of the procedure concerning the enforcement of correction or of sanctions.
• Changing the nature of the 3 % ceiling to look exclusively at sustainability. Shifting the focus more from the deficit
rule to surveillance of sustainability may imply that the 3 % of GDP value would no longer be the exclusive and hard anchor
of the system as has hitherto been the case. This approach would imply that countries with deficit/debt ratios above the ref-
erence values would not be placed in an ‘excessive deficit position’ if such budgetary developments did not threaten sus-
tainability. This may include the case of countries with debt/GDP ratios above 60 % but which are nevertheless reduced at
a satisfactory pace, or of deficits which, although being above 3 % of GDP, are considered not dangerous for sustainability.
In such circumstances the Commission would not move forward with the procedure after the adoption of its report. Never-
theless, by moving radically away from the current approach, this may be seen as too lax by some, particularly because the
discretion in establishing whether ratios above the reference values can be accepted as ‘non-excessive’ may be used arbi-
trarily by the Council. In addition, the annual fiscal deficit is the main operational variable for governments and parliaments.
Finally, the ECB considers changes in the fiscal stance when deciding a monetary policy action.
• A golden rule. A golden rule means excluding capital expenditure from the computation of the deficit. Its rationale is that
the cost of public investment should be borne by future generations who will benefit from it. Therefore capital expenditure
should be financed through debt and not by taxes paid by the current generation. While its rationale is appealing, there are
several shortcomings with the golden rule. Firstly, depending on the specific design of the golden rule, it could entail main-
taining high deficit for long periods. Secondly, it may create distortions in the allocative process, where physical infrastruc-
ture could be preferred to other forms of capital or current spending which may have also beneficial effects over the long
run. In case a wider spectrum of ‘productive’ expenditures is deducted from the computation of deficits and the application
of the golden rule, an issue would arise concerning the choice of which expenditure categories should be granted special
budgetary treatment and which not (e.g. public investment and R & D? Public investment and R & D and education? Public
investment and R & D and education and health?). Moreover, the rule advocated is based on gross investment, while the
relevant variable to be considered when looking at intergenerational equity should be net public investment, which is just
a small fraction of the total. Finally, a sudden introduction of the golden rule may lead to contentious accounting problems,
as there would be significant incentives to record current expenditure as capital spending. The golden rule becomes less
attractive at the EU level, in particular given the diversity of country circumstances and that compliance checks and enforce-
ment would be much harder. In addition, to implement it, it would be necessary to change either the protocol or the system
of national accounts (ESA). Conversely, the alternative possibility to maintain small deficits in some countries and in par-
ticular circumstances, namely when sustainability is not jeopardised, would mean that some expenditure with economic
benefits differed in time may be carried out, in practice catering for the economic rationale of the golden rule without entail-
ing all its risks.132
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The draft Constitution prepared by the Convention on the Future of Europe primarily focused on the European Union’s
powers and competences, its institutional architecture, and the simplification of its legal instruments and decision-making
procedures. The existing Treaty provisions relating to the different EU policy areas (e.g. agriculture, transport, environ-
ment, etc.) largely remained unchanged. In the area of economic governance, however, the draft Constitution introduced a
number of important amendments. The intergovernmental conference (IGC), which was formally opened on 4 October 2003,
introduced some further changes to the Convention’s draft. On 18 June 2004, it adopted the text of the Constitution, which
will need to be ratified by all 25 Member States. A summary of the main changes in the area of economic governance is
presented below. 
Both the Convention and the IGC took some steps towards reinforcing the decision-making powers of the Member States
belonging to the euro area in view of their need for closer policy coordination and in order to allow them to be more fully
in charge of their economic destiny. This approach builds on existing practice in the current Treaty, as the representatives
of participating Member States in the Council are the only ones to vote on certain matters of relevance to the euro area (cf.
Article 104.9 or 122.5 EC). The draft Constitution extends this approach to the adoption of the parts of the broad economic
policy guidelines which concern the euro area generally. In addition, the draft Constitution contains a new Article III-88
allowing for the adoption of specific measures to strengthen the coordination of the budgetary discipline of these Member
States as well as for its surveillance. Finally, the draft Constitution prepared by the Convention recognises the important
role of the (informal) Eurogroup, which is mentioned in Article III-89. A separate protocol has been added describing the
tasks and composition of the Eurogroup. The IGC went a considerable step further in reinforcing the decision-making
autonomy of the euro-area Member States. It agreed that both the surveillance recommendations (under Article III-71.4
which corresponds to the current Article 99.4 EC) addressed to euro-area Member States (including stability programmes
and early warnings) as well as measures related to excessive deficits concerning euro-area countries (under Article III-76,
paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 11, which replace the corresponding provisions of Article 104 EC), will henceforth be decided only
by the euro-area representatives in the Ecofin Council. It also decided to amend the procedure for abrogating the derogation
concerning Member States not yet participating in the single currency (‘pre-in’). While the decision will still be taken by
the ‘full’ Council, it will be conditional upon the adoption (on the basis of a Commission proposal) of a prior recommen-
dation by a majority of the Council’s euro-area representatives.
The Convention also sought to strengthen the framework for multilateral economic surveillance, notably by reinforcing the
Commission’s powers. The Convention allowed the Commission to address a ‘direct’ warning to a Member State under
Article III-71.4 in case its ‘economic policies are not consistent with the broad guidelines or that they risk jeopardising the
proper functioning of economic and monetary union’. This broadly defined instrument, which allows for rapid and auto-
nomous action by the Commission, not only applies in the context of the BEPGs but also in the area of budgetary surveil-
lance. The possibility for the Council to make a recommendation to the Member State concerned, on a recommendation
from the Commission, remains in place. Under the constitutional rules, such Council recommendations will however be
adopted without taking into account the vote of the Member State concerned, thereby reducing the latter’s capacity to block
the adoption of the recommendation. Both changes have been accepted by the IGC.
The Convention moreover introduced a number of changes in the excessive deficit procedure (Article III-76). First of all,
the Council’s decisions on whether an excessive deficit exists will be based on a proposal (as opposed to a recommenda-
tion) from the Commission. The Convention proposed to apply the same procedure to the adoption of the recommendation
addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period, but was
not backed up in this by the IGC, which decided to cross out this amendment on the grounds that this change would overly
strengthen the Commission’s hand in the process. Indeed, any amendment introduced by the Council that appears unac-
ceptable to the Commission would then require unanimous Council approval. The IGC however conceded that its recom-
mendations to the Member State concerned should be adopted ‘without undue delay’. As a third new element, the
Convention agreed (and the IGC endorsed) that the Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit will hence-
forth be taken without taking into account the vote of the representative of the Member State concerned. Finally, the con-
ference decided to adopt a declaration on the Stability and Growth Pact.133
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The Commission considers that many changes introduced by the Convention and the IGC go in the right direction. It how-
ever regrets that some of its key proposals were not taken up. For example, it had proposed to establish a genuine Ecofin
Council for the euro area, in which only euro-area ministers would be represented. The substitution of Commission rec-
ommendations by genuine proposals, notably for the draft BEPGs and associated surveillance (Article III-71), constitutes
another important element which was not incorporated in the Constitution. Finally, the Constitution still fails to ensure the
proper external representation of the euro area, despite the fact that all parties involved recognise that the current situation
is unsatisfactory.134
Annex II.1. The Commission methodology 
for cyclical adjustment
In Section 3.3.2 the CAB is defined as
where  stands for the nominal budget balance to GDP
ratio,  is the budgetary sensitivity,  is real GDP and
 is real potential GDP, and  denotes the cyclical
component of the budget. In the Commission approach
the budgetary sensitivity parameters  represents a mar-
ginal change in the level of the budget balance bb with
respect to a change in the level of GDP Y i.e.
. Consequently, the CAB approximates the
budget balance net of cyclical components expressed in
percentage points of actual GDP:
where  is the deflator of GDP,  real GDP, and 
real potential GDP (1).
By contrast, an alternative method for the cyclical adjust-
ment applied by several institutions other than the Com-
mission captures the impact of the cycle on the budget to
GDP ratio. Denoting by CAB’ such alternative method to
carry out the cyclical adjustment in a linearised form, one
has CAB’ = . The budgetary sensitivity to be
used when computing CAB’ is , where
,  represent rela-
tive changes in the revenue and expenditure to GDP ratio
with respect to a relative change in GDP. In fact, this
yields
Note that this is the budget to GDP ratio that would pre-
vail if the economy was operating at its potential, i.e. the
underlying budgetary position relevant for assessing the
compliance with the close to balance or in surplus
requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact.
For small output gaps the CAB and CAB’ are very close.
This can be seen by considering the relation between 
and :
which reveals that:
(i) As the tax elasticity  is close to zero for most mem-
ber countries the contribution of revenues to  is almost
nil, i.e. the revenue-to-GDP ratio hardly changes as GDP
changes. Conversely, the expenditure elasticity  is
close to –G/Y; i.e. the expenditure to GDP ratio falls as
GDP rises;
(ii) the difference between  and  increases with the
budget balance.
¥1∂ The output gap is derived from actual and potential GDP both expressed in
constant prices. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that the GDP deflator is the
same for both realisations of GDP. 
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Annex II.2. Changes in the CAB as a measure 
of budgetary adjustment
Traditionally, changes in the CAB are used as an indica-
tor of discretionary fiscal policy. This annex shows that
this reading needs to be qualified in the presence of
higher or lower than expected growth coupled with
budgetary inertia or adherence to plans in the execution
of the budget.
The budget and the CAB ex ante
The budget for the year t is generally drafted in advance
in year t-1 based on projections for economic growth and
price inflation. The following link between budgetary
aggregates and economic activity is assumed in the plan-
ning phase of the budget:
• Revenues: Any variation in economic growth will
automatically translate into a corresponding varia-
tion in governments’ receipts as, under unchanged
fiscal policy, tax bases should bear a stable relation-
ship with the level of economic activity. For the sake
of simplicity taxes are assumed to be proportional to
GDP.
• Expenditure: Fiscal policy-makers are assumed to
increase non-cyclical expenditure in line with pro-
jected potential GDP growth (1).
• Discretionary measures: Fiscal authorities plan dis-
cretionary corrections the size of which may depend
of fiscal objectives.
As a result of the above the planned non-cyclical
expenditure to potential output ratio expected for year t
is: 
where  the planned discretionary component in non-
cyclical expenditure in period t. and  are
expected potential output growth and expected inflation
respectively. The ratio is conditional on the expected
level of actual GDP , as potential output is
extracted from observed real GDP. Non-cyclical
expenditure is obtained as
Since the tax system is assumed to be proportional, the
tax to GDP ratio will remain constant except for discre-
tionary measures (2). Thus, the expected change in the
CAB in year t with respect to year t–1 is
¥1∂ In contrast to the revenue side of the budget, there is no evident or stable
link between non-cyclical expenditure and the level of economic activity.
A wide range of alternative relationships could be used. However, the
assumption of proportionality with respect to potential output has a rela-
tively long tradition in the economic literature and is referred to as neutral
fiscal policy. It can be found in Heller et al. (1986) and more recently von
Halleberg et al. (2001), von Hagen (2002) and Buti and van den Noord
(2003). It essentially implies that under unchanged fiscal policy expendi-
ture is set to keep the size of government constant over the cycle.
¥2∂ The assumption of proportionality is made for the sake of simplicity. If the
tax system is regressive or progressive economic growth also affects the
revenue side of the budget and hence the CAB:
where is the degree of progressivity or regressivity of the tax system.
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equal to the discretionary fiscal policy intervention
.
The budget and the CAB ex post
The ratio of non-cyclical expenditure to potential GDP
in year t results from the implementation of expenditure
plans, discretionary fiscal policy corrections and actual
economic growth. Assuming that expenditure plans are
implemented as planned we have
The actual ratio is conditional on real GDP in year t. In
contrast to the ex ante case, it is not expected real GDP
but the actual level observed ex post. Hence, if actual real
GDP in year t differs from the forecast, it will also affect
potential output and the output gap compared to what
was expected ex ante. Both the denominator and the
nominator of the ratio are affected.
In addition, lower or higher than expected growth not
only affects potential output in year t, it also impacts on
potential output of previous years as potential output is
either estimated as a kind of moving average of the
actual output series or involves a moving average of a
component of actual output (the Solow residual in the
case of the production function approach used by the
Commission). Consequently, assuming again that the tax
system is proportional, the observed change in the CAB
in year t with respect to year t–1 is
The observed change in the CAB will exclusively reflect
discretionary fiscal policy interventions only if non-cycli-
cal expenditure follows potential output growth. How-
ever, given that expenditure plans are fixed in advance
based on economic projections, inertia in the budgetary
processes or adherence to plans will lead to a departure
from the projected change in the CAB ex ante. This effect
may be called passive fiscal policy. In particular, if growth
is overestimated a full
implementation of expenditure plans results into a deteri-
oration of the CAB, even in the absence of discretionary
fiscal policy measures. There is empirical evidence that
forecast errors on potential output are significant in
explaining the CAB (1).
Denoting the degree with which spending plans are
adjusted to unexpected changes in potential output by λ
we can distinguish between two extreme cases:
— λ = 0 signals full inertia or adherence to budgetary
plans in volume terms,
— λ = 1 stands for no inertia or full adjustment,
The change in the CAB can be written as
The change in the CAB can be taken to be equal to the
effect of discretionary fiscal policy only if we assume:
Perfect foresight on the side of fiscal policy-makers,
implying that potential output and inflation turn out to be
exactly as foreseen when setting the budgetary plan. In
such a case, inertia would not even come into play; or
No inertia in the implementation phase of the budget
with fiscal policy-makers ‘being on call’ i.e. adjusting
non-cyclical expenditure plans with respect to higher or
lower than expected economic growth.
Taking into account relatively long recognition lags, the
complexity and slowness of budgetary processes and the
political economy of political inaction, a viable working
hypothesis over the short term, for instance one year, is
to assume full inertia or full adherence to spending plans
i.e. to assume that spending is not adjusted for unex-
pected short- or windfalls of growth.
The difference between ex ante and ex post
The effect of lower than expected growth and passive
fiscal policy also plays a role in explaining the difference
between plans and actual results. Specifically, planned
changes in the CAB and actual outturns will generally
differ even if expenditure plans and discretionary fiscal
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2 0 0 4policy measures are fully implemented. Simplifying the
notation and assuming again that the tax system is
roughly proportional, the difference between ex ante and
ex post changes in the CAB can be written as:
ex post ex ante
where  is the discretionary fiscal policy intervention
. Rearranging the difference between ex post
and ex ante yields.
Hence, if expenditure plans and discretionary fiscal pol-
icy measures are fully implemented in volume terms, the
difference between ex ante and ex post is a function of
• the effect of the revision of growth on the output gap
and, in turn, on the discretionary component of the
budget (first term). A revision in the output gap entails
that budgetary items, which ex ante were thought to be
cyclical, turn out to be structural or vice versa. Empir-
ically, this term will tend to be fairly negligible;
• the effect of the revision of growth on the level of
potential output and, via the assumption of adherence
to plans, on the size of the discretionary correction
expressed in percent of potential GDP (second term);
• the effect of the revision of growth on the level of
potential output and, in turn, on the non-cyclical
expenditure to potential GDP ratio (third term).
Numerically, this term clearly dominates as the non-
cyclical expenditure to potential GDP ratio is gener-
ally around 0.4–0.6, whereas discretionary correc-
tions tend to be comparatively small.
Monitoring conditional compliance
Recapitulating, the practical problem of monitoring the
budgetary adjustments in cyclically adjusted terms is
that the observed difference between the planned and the
actual change in the CAB will generally include compo-
nents not attributable to discretionary fiscal policy. They
rather refer to revisions in real GDP which in turn affect
the estimates of potential output and the output gap.
To adjust for this overlay of causes one has to gauge the
effect of higher or lower than expected growth on the
CAB so as to isolate the policy component. A practical
approximation of the total growth effect in year t given
by the equation shown above is
i.e. the ratio of cyclically adjusted expenditure multi-
plied by the revision in potential output growth. The
approximation essentially ignores the first two elements
of the total growth effect which, as mentioned above,
will tend to be numerically small in practice. To ensure
coherence with the cyclical adjustment described in
equation (1) the focus is on revisions in real potential
output growth. Prices are not to be affected by the revi-
sion. In this connection one needs to bear in mind that in
some cases inflation projections presented in stability
and convergence programmes are target values rather
than forecast, serving as a benchmark for expected infla-
tion in the national wage bargaining process.
The above approximation was derived on the assumption
that taxes are proportional to GDP. Based on the tax elas-
ticities calculated by the OECD, this assumption would
seem to be acceptable for most Member States (see Van
den Noord, 2000). However, some countries appear to
have a non-negligible element of regressivity in their tax
system, notably France, Austria, and Portugal implying
that a revision of potential output also affects the CAB
through changes in the revenue ratio. In practice, this
does not pose a problem. The effect can be captured by
adding a term to the above approximation (1).
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Part III
The benefits of fiscal discipline 

Summary
Budget deficits are increasing in major advanced econo-
mies. During the past three years, the fiscal surplus in the
United States has turned into a deficit and started deterio-
rating rapidly. In Japan, the already high budget deficit
widened further from 2001 onwards. In the EU, the aver-
age budgetary position has also deteriorated in the last few
years: the almost balanced budgetary position recorded in
2000 turned into a deficit above 2.5 GDP points in 2003.
The recent record on EU budget balances is largely the
result of lower than expected growth in the largest Mem-
ber States. Nevertheless, there are reasons for concern. Is
the deterioration in the budgetary position of many EU
countries a temporary phenomenon or a sign of perma-
nent loss of fiscal discipline? The question is of the
utmost relevance for at least two reasons. The first rea-
son is the current situation of institutional uncertainty.
After the Ecofin Council decision of 25 November 2003
not to proceed further with the excessive deficit proce-
dure for France and Germany, uncertainty has increased
concerning the future of the EU rules-based framework
for fiscal discipline. However, it is crucial that the EU
rules-based fiscal framework should function effectively
in order to shape market expectations concerning the
future behaviour of fiscal authorities. Actual develop-
ments in financial markets that in turn affect the cost of
capital and growth potential largely depend upon such
expectations. The second reason is that the relatively
high debt/GDP ratios coupled with rapidly ageing popu-
lations that characterise most EU countries could make
the postponement of budgetary discipline very costly.
The aim of this part is to reassess the case for fiscal dis-
cipline in the EU. The objective is to highlight the main
channels through which protracted deficits affect income
prospects and to assess empirically the relevance of such
channels for EU countries. A counter-factual simulation
analysis on the issue is also provided. The following
question is raised: what developments in economic
activity would have prevailed in EMU in absence of fis-
cal discipline?
According to prevailing economic theory, budget defi-
cits may stimulate demand in the short run. However,
when deficits are protracted, they will reduce future
income prospects by reducing national savings. The
reduction in public savings associated with budget defi-
cits is in fact likely not to be fully compensated by an
increase in private savings (as predicted by the so-called
‘Ricardian equivalence’ theorem). As long as national
savings are reduced, either a reduction in private invest-
ment follows (investment crowding-out), or a worsening
of the current account occurs, or both. Irrespective of
whether the reduction in national savings is reflected in
lower investment or in worsened current account bal-
ances, a reduction in future income is inevitable. Lower
investment reduces future potential output; a less posi-
tive, or more negative, current account balance, corre-
sponds to a lower stock of net foreign financial assets,
and therefore to a lower net stream of interest payments
from abroad. The real issue is not so much whether a loss
of fiscal discipline will translate into lower future
incomes but how much and through which channels. The
first chapter of this part of the report highlights all the
main channels through which budget deficits may affect
income prospects. Apart from reducing national savings,
thereby reducing investment and current account bal-
ances, protracted deficits may affect potential growth
indirectly, via other channels. High and persistent defi-
cits lead to the accumulation of debt and this in turn may
raise the pressures by governments on central banks to
produce inflation as a short-cut for debt reduction. High-
inflation environments, in turn, may discourage invest-
ment and be conducive to low growth potential. High
debts can also lead to higher interest rates via increased
credit risk premia. Therefore, persistently high deficits
may depress investment not only directly, by reducing
national savings, but also indirectly, via higher risk
premia. Credit risk premia reflect expectations of default
on debt. Persistent and high deficits may also lower
expectations concerning the sustainability of current
account imbalances, triggering capital flights and cur-
rency crises. Finally, persistent deficits may reduce141
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in the tax burden, which may in turn reduce capital accu-
mulation. The second chapter of this part of the report
assesses the effects of protracted budget deficits, focus-
ing on their impact on investment and current account
balances.
Budget deficits crowd out private investment via higher
interest rates. A good understanding of the impact of fis-
cal aggregates on interest rates is crucial to assessing this
link empirically. Although the issue is quite contentious
and there is a relatively wide range of magnitude for the
existing estimates, most of the analyses on the subject
report significant effects of budget deficits on interest
rates. Econometric analysis carried out in this part of the
report shows that, on average, in euro-area countries, one
additional point of (expected) deficit is associated with
an increase in the interest rate spread between long and
short-term government bonds of 15–20 basis points.
Correlation analysis shows a robust negative relation
(current and past) between budget deficits and private
investment shares, which is consistent with the finding
that deficits raise interest rates.
Concerning the link between budget deficits and current
accounts in EU countries, although correlation analysis
indicates, as expected, a negative relation on average,
this relation is quite weak and influenced by country-
specific factors. However, this does not mean that con-
siderations related to the current account balance and the
external equilibrium of countries are not relevant for
budgetary policy. Current account imbalances within the
euro area have been increasing. Protracted large budget
deficits in countries with strongly negative current
account balances may be a cause of delay in the external
adjustment. As for the new Member States, most of them
have in recent years been recording relatively large
budget deficits coupled with wide current account defi-
cits. Keeping budget deficits under control will be a key
condition for maintaining stable currencies within
ERMII as a necessary step towards joining EMU.
It is commonly perceived that the EU fiscal framework
provided by the Treaty and the SGP has strongly influ-
enced budgetary policies in EU countries, not only in the
run-up to EMU, but also after the introduction of the sin-
gle currency. However, agreement is missing on the
quantitative impact of the presence of the EU fiscal
framework exerted on budget balances in EU countries.
This part of the report proposes a counter-factual analy-
sis of what economic developments would have taken
place in the euro area in its absence. To that end, counter-
factual budget balances after 1994 (corresponding to
Stage II of EMU) in the absence of the EU fiscal frame-
work have been estimated econometrically, and simula-
tions with European Commission QUEST II model have
been performed to assess what implications such coun-
terfactual budget balances would have had for growth.
The following main points emerge from the analysis:
• in the absence of the EU fiscal framework, primary
budget deficits for the euro area would have been
higher by almost 0.9 GDP percentage points per
year over the 1994–2003 period. This would have
led to a sizeable build-up of euro-area government
debt, which would have been about 8 GDP percent-
age points higher by 2003;
• model simulations ignoring the link between
increased debt and risk premia on interest rates indi-
cate that the short-run gains from an absence of fis-
cal discipline would not have exceeded half a
percent of GDP and would have faded away quickly;
• simulations taking into account the impact of debt
on risk premia suggest that the gains from an
absence of fiscal discipline over the last decade
would have been even smaller in the short run, and
would have become negative in the medium term.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the budgetary conver-
gence in the 1990s implied a reduction in growth of lim-
ited magnitude and duration but laid the basis for better
growth prospects. In the absence of the fiscal discipline
induced by the EU fiscal framework, private investment
crowding-out would have further reduced potential
growth compared with current figures.142
1. Introduction
The aim of this part of the report is that of refocusing the
debate on the benefits of fiscal discipline, building on the
positive experience of the EU-15 countries that managed
to reduce budget deficits and bring government debts
under control on the road to EMU. In the European case,
the introduction of numerical rules for fiscal discipline
was followed by an actual improvement if budgets bal-
ance in most countries. What would have happened in
the absence of such rules? Would the current growth per-
formance of EU economies be more or less satisfactory?
Answering the above questions would help to reassess
the need and the relevance for an EU-wide framework
for fiscal policy.
In Chapter 2 the main channels are reviewed through
which budget balances and government debts affect the
economic variables on which crucially depends coun-
tries’ income prospects, like interest rates, current
account balances and the structure of taxation and
expenditure. The chapter is introduced by an overview
on long-term developments and recent trends in budget
balances in advanced economies. Afterwards, the major
channels through which permanent deficits affect
income prospects are highlighted, referring both to theo-
retical findings and existing empirical analysis. Particu-
lar attention is given to the link between budget deficits
and interest rates, given the relevance for channelling
crowding-out effects. The methodology employed in
existing empirical analysis, exploring this link, is illus-
trated and the results surveyed.
In Chapter 3 the analysis focuses on the link between
budget deficits, investment, current account balances
and growth in EU countries. Original analysis concern-
ing the impact of budget deficits on interest rates in euro-
area countries is provided. A discussion on the major
issues raised by the links between budget deficits and
current accounts in euro-area countries and new Member
States follows. The chapter ends with simulation analy-
sis aimed at assessing what would have happened to EU
growth in the absence of a rules-based fiscal framework
introduced with Maastricht and enshrined in the SGP.143
2. What do budget deficits do?
2.1. Budget deficits in advanced countries: 
Long-run developments 
and recent trends
The past behaviour of deficits and debts in advanced coun-
tries shows that persistent departures from the balance
between government revenues and expenditures have been
rather uncommon. In the past, advanced countries have ran
persistent deficits and accumulating government debt in
correspondence of periods of particular distress in public
finances. Consistent with the tax-smoothing principle, high
and sustained deficits characterised war periods. The cost
of financing war needs have been spread across genera-
tions by means of deficit spending, in order to avoid a con-
centration of the tax burden on the generations having to
live with the economic distress of wars. Table III.1 reports
average values for deficits and debts over selected histo-
rical periods in the United States, Japan and the three major
European economies. The data show that deficits in bel-
ligerent countries were higher than historical averages dur-
ing the two world wars. Government debt increased dra-
matically starting from the First World War, and the stock
of debt peaked at the end of the Second World War. After
the Second World War, debt was brought down by a con-
comitance of improved budget balances and high growth
in nominal GDP.
Except for the periods in which the economies were
engaged in wars, government budgets in the past have been
relatively low (the deficit of the central government aver-
aged 0.9 GDP points during the whole 1881–1913 gold
standard period and 3.2 GDP points over the 1947–95 post-
war period in G7 countries) and debt levels have been stable
beyond fairly low levels (47.8 in the gold standard period
and 45.2 in the post-war period) (1). The picture changes
starting from the 1970s, where sustained deficits were
registered in most advanced countries and debts started ris-
ing. Such a tendency was not related to exceptional public
finance needs as during war periods, but was a result of an
increased role of the government in providing public goods
and social security and in redistributing income, coupled
with decelerating growth rates in most advanced countries.
The tendency towards increased deficits and debts has
been reversed for most advanced countries during the
1990s. Graph III.1 reports budgetary developments in the
United States, EU-15 and Japan starting from 1995. The
high debt/GDP ratios of the 1980s required a correction,
which was brought about by fiscal consolidations episodes
in many advanced countries (2). Some EU countries started
their consolidation already in the 1980s, others undertook
budgetary adjustment policies in the mid-1990s, to fulfil
the fiscal discipline requirements for adopting the single
currency. In this landscape, a notable exception is Japan,
which responded to economic depression with a broadly
expansionary fiscal stance throughout the 1990s.
The picture changed again after 2001. The fiscal surplus in
the United States rapidly transformed into a deficit and
started deteriorating rapidly, as a result of reduced growth
and actively expansionary fiscal policies. In the EU, the
average budgetary position also deteriorated, but less mark-
edly than in the United States and to a lesser extent as a
result of an expansionary fiscal stance. In 2002 the budget
deficit in Germany and Portugal exceeded the Maastricht
3 % ceiling, followed by France in 2003. After the Ecofin
Council decision of 25 November 2003 not to proceed fur-
ther with the excessive deficit procedure for France and
Germany, uncertainty has increased concerning the future
of the EU rules-based framework for fiscal discipline.
A question arises. Is the recent deterioration in advanced
countries’ budgetary position temporary or is it a sign of
lost fiscal discipline and the start of a journey into what
Ball and Mankiw (1995) refer to as an ‘uncharted terri-
¥1∂ Bordo and Jonung (1998).
¥2∂ See, e.g. IMF (1996, 2001) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) for an over-
view of the fiscal consolidation experiences of advanced countries in the
1980s and 1990s.144
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rialise in absence of major war shocks?
It is probably too early to judge whether the current dete-
rioration in budget balances taking place across the
major advanced economies is a temporary phenomenon
or is a sign of an enduring loss of fiscal discipline.
Among the elements that can induce optimism, in the
late 1990s there has been a broad tendency across
advanced economies towards consolidation based on
expenditure cuts rather than on tax increases, which are
more likely to have durable impact on debt
developments (1). This was often accompanied by
reforms in public sector management to improve the pri-
oritisation and control of public spending (see Part IV of
this report). Other elements may instead induce pessi-
mism. The improvement in budget balances achieved in
the late 1990s in the United States and, to a lesser extent,
in the EU, was partly due to higher than expected reve-
nues associated with an exceptionally well-sustained
period of economic growth. In the case of a large number
of EU countries, the improvements in budget balances
were the result of falling costs of debt ensuing from the
reduction in risk premia on interest rates that accompa-
nied the process of monetary unification. Similar reduc-
tions in interest rates cannot be expected in the future.
Analogously, the positive impact on the budget balance
of several EU countries due to one-off measures under-
taken in the recent past are not likely to be repeated on
the same scale in future years. However, the most worri-
some tendency for future years is probably the pressure
that the fiscal positions of many advanced countries will
receive from the increase in ageing-related expenditures
like pensions and healthcare.
Understanding whether the recent budgetary deteriora-
tion in advanced countries is the beginning of a new
phase of protracted deficits or the result of contingent
events is of the utmost relevance, especially in the case
Table III.1
Deficits and debts in advanced countries in historical perspective 
(average value of ratios over GDP over selected periods)
Gold standard 
(1881–1913)
First World 
War (1914–19)
Inter-war 
(1920–38)
Second World 
War (1939–46)
Bretton Woods 
(1947–71)
Floating 
exchange rate, 
high inflation 
(1973–82)
Floating 
exchange rate, 
low inflation 
(1983–95)
Deficit (central government) 
United States – 0.2 5.1 1.0 15.2 0.6 3.1 5.5
UK – 0.3 24.1 0.6 20.2 1.8 5.1 3.2
Germany 0.5 23.5 2.7 45.3 1.0 2.0 2.7
France 0.9 33.1 5.4 n.a. 2.8 2.1 3.3
Japan 3.3 1.3 5.0 41.1 1.9 6.4 4.2
G7 mean 0.9 18.1 2.7 27.2 2.0 4.9 5.3
 
Debt (central government)
United States 7.6 10.0 29.4 73.6 60.9 33.5 10.2
UK 38.5 72.9 162.2 161.7 125.8 45.1 41.8
Germany 6.8 56.8 16.2 146.3 8.2 13.1 24.9
France 96.6 135.2 118.2 n.a. 25.0 11.2 n.a.
Japan 38.9 44.2 57.4 145.8 16.4 26.1 56.7
G7 mean 47.8 69.1 78.4 122.8 48.7 31.6 52.4
NB: The budget deficit is defined as the change in end-of-year government debt.
Source: Bordo and Jonung (1998).
¥1∂ Details on these tendencies for advanced countries are reported in IMF
(2001). See also European Commission (2002a, 2003) for evidence on EU
countries. Among the studies showing that consolidations based on expendi-
ture cuts are more likely to have a durable impact on debt levels than consol-
idations based on tax increases see, e.g. Alesina and Ardagna (1998).145
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played by the EU fiscal framework in shaping market
expectations concerning the future behaviour of fiscal
authorities. Actual development in financial markets and
the functioning itself of the monetary union largely
depend upon such expectations. The second reason is
that the relatively high debt/GDP ratios coupled with
rapidly ageing populations that characterise most EU
countries could make the postponement of budgetary
discipline very costly.
In the light of the developments summarised above, the
objective of this part of the report is to reassess the case
for budgetary discipline in the EU. What are the impli-
cations of protracted deficits for national income?
Through which channels can budget deficits affect the
growth potential and international income flows?
These are the basic questions that this part of the report
aims to address. The focus will be on the long-run
impact of permanent deficits on national income,
abstracting from the effect of deficits on output stabili-
sation and income distribution. This section illustrates
the main channels through which budget deficits may
affect income and reviews the main findings from
available empirical evidence. The next section explores
the empirical relevance of these channels for the case of
EU countries.
2.2. The impact of permanent budget 
deficits: Predictions from alternative 
views
From a long-run perspective, budget deficits can affect
national income prospects (i.e. the income accruing to
national production factors) either by having an impact on
the level and rate of change of domestic potential output
or by affecting income flows between national and foreign
citizens. Potential output in turn depends upon the effi-
ciency in resource allocation (e.g. the extent of distortions
associated with public intervention) and the accumulation
of production factors and knowledge. Other things being
equal, higher potential output corresponds to increased
national income. Income flows between national and for-
eign citizens mainly depend on the stock of net foreign
assets, i.e. the difference between the stock of assets held
abroad by national citizens and the stock of assets owned
by foreigners at home. The stock of net foreign assets
decreases whenever a country, in a given year, is a net bor-
rower from the rest of the world, i.e. when it exhibits a
negative current account balance.
The role of budget deficits in the determination of
national income can be understood by looking at
national accounting identities. From the equality of the
value of aggregate final output supplied and demanded,
Graph III.1:  Recent developments in budget deficits in advanced economies (% GDP)
Source: 2002 and 2003 updates to French stability programmes and spring 2004 Commission forecasts.
– 12.00
– 10.00
– 8.00
– 6.00
– 4.00
– 2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
US Japan EU-15146
P a r t  I I I
T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  f i s c a l  d i s c i p l i n eand given the definition of the components of aggregate
demand and that of the determinants and uses of dispos-
able income, it follows that
(1)
i.e. the sum of aggregate private savings (S) and the
budget surplus (i.e. the negative of the budget deficit, BD)
must equal the sum of domestic private investment (I) and
the current account balance (CA) (1). The above relation is
an identity, i.e. it is always verified. It states that aggregate
national savings can either finance domestic private
investment (I) or investment abroad, increasing net for-
eign lending (which occurs whenever the current account
improves) (2). Both private investment, I, and the current
account balance, CA, contribute to national income pros-
pects. Identity (1) is silent on which variables adjust to
restore the equality after the occurrence of shocks that
may perturb it, notably fiscal policy shocks that affect the
budget balance. Any deterioration in the budgetary posi-
tion will necessarily imply either an increase in aggregate
private savings, or a reduction in investment, or a reduc-
tion in the current account balance, or a combination of all
the above effects. Which variable will adjust depends
upon assumptions concerning how the economy works,
mainly on the consumption and investment behaviour of
agents. Different theories have been developed putting
emphasis on alternative aspects of consumption and
investment and generating alternative predictions con-
cerning the long-run impact of budget deficits.
The Keynesian view
Keynesian macroeconomics is mainly suited for short-
term analysis, but implications for the long-run relation
between budget deficits and national income can be
inferred (3). One of the basic tenets of Keynesian
macroeconomics is the idea that (e.g. as a result of liquid-
ity constraints) aggregate consumption is determined by
current disposable income. This is sufficient for policies
that directly affect aggregate demand (such as budgetary
policies) to have additional effects on income via
increased consumption spending (multiplier effect). Any
policy-induced increase in aggregate income will there-
fore also be associated with higher private savings since
only a fraction of the additional income will be consumed.
Budget deficits in Keynesian macroeconomics are there-
fore expected to have a relevant short-term impact on the
level of economic activity and are seen as a relevant tool
for macroeconomic stabilisation.
Under the typical assumptions underlying Keynesian
models (underemployment of production factors, high
aggregate demand multipliers, low sensitivity of invest-
ment on interest rates) budget deficits are not expected to
affect in a relevant way aggregate investment or the cur-
rent account. After an increase in budget deficits, the
equality in (1) will be restored mainly via increased pri-
vate savings (so that national savings remain broadly
unchanged), which is made possible by an increased
level of economic activity. The implication from Keyne-
sian theory is that, in spite of relevant short-run effects of
budget deficits, the long-term impact on national income
is expected to be small.
The Keynesian view of budget deficits can be appropri-
ate for temporary deficits, not for permanent deficits.
When the government runs persistent deficits, the stock
of government bonds raises over time. The prediction of
Keynesian models is that the additional savings needed
to absorb the rising supply of bonds will come from addi-
tional aggregate demand. However, this means that
aggregate output needs to grow continuously as a result
of demand injections irrespective of the determinants of
potential output (supply of factors, technology). The
major limitation of traditional Keynesian analysis is the
neglect of the role of time and expectations, a gap that
has been filled by more recent developments in macro-
economic theory.
Ricardian equivalence
The developments in macroeconomic thinking occurred
since the late 1970s have put emphasis on the forward-
looking behaviour of agents and on the requirement of
agents’ rationality in forming their expectations (4). The
¥1∂ The definition of income implicit in (1) is GNP. In EU national accounting
it is common to use GDP as a measure of national income. The use of GDP
would require substituting the current account with net exports in expres-
sion (1), which excludes net returns on national production factors and uni-
lateral transfers. Note also that investment in expression (1) excludes
government investment. An alternative way of writing (1) would be to add
government investment, IG to both sides of the identity, obtaining the fol-
lowing expression: S – CBD = IG + CA, where CBD denotes current rather
than overall budget deficit. 
¥2∂ Strictly speaking, national savings are given by S-CBD, i.e. private savings
net of the current government deficit.
¥3∂ While in short-run analysis the actual level of economic activity can differ
from the potential (or full-employment) level, in the long run deviations of
current output from potential average out. Temporary policy-induced dis-
crepancies between actual and potential output can be rationalised on the
ground of incomplete nominal adjustment coupled with real rigidities (in the
Keynesian tradition) or imperfect information and surprise policy shocks (in
the tradition of new classical economics). See, e.g. Romer (1996).
S BD– I CA+=
¥4∂ See Barro (1974).147
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budget deficits is that, since consumers base their deci-
sions on permanent income (i.e. on the whole stream of
expected future incomes) how the government decides to
finance a given amount of expenditure will be irrelevant
for agents’ consumption choices and aggregate income (1).
It follows from agents’ forward-looking behaviour that
financing public expenditure through deficits (and the
consequent accumulation of debt) or taxes will not affect
permanent income and therefore consumption, since all
debt will have to be paid in the future by means of higher
taxes. Such prediction, briefly discussed by David
Ricardo in his ‘Principles of political economy’, is com-
monly known as the ‘Ricardian equivalence theorem’. It
states that the financing policy chosen by the govern-
ment will not affect consumption, so that any change in
public savings will be matched by a change of opposite
sign and equivalent magnitude in private savings.
Ricardian equivalence has the very strong implication
that budget deficits will be neutral on the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium both in the short and the long run.
Since national savings are unchanged after a change in
budget deficits, there will be no impact either on invest-
ment or on the current account. The only impact will be
on disposable income, without any effect on the aggre-
gate level of economic activity.
The very strong result on the neutrality of budget bal-
ances descending from Ricardian equivalence relies on a
set of strong assumptions, that have been criticised on
several grounds both theoretically and empirically (2).
The assumption that agents will fully take into account
additional future taxes associated with debt repayment in
computing their permanent income requires households
to be characterised by a strong bequest motive. More-
over, the hypothesis that households’ consumption
depends on permanent rather than on current income
necessitates a very efficient working of credit markets,
since consumption needs may be in excess of current
income for some individuals.
The emerging consensus
In a sense, while the basic limitation of Keynesian mod-
els is that of referring to a too short time horizon (with
agents that base their decisions entirely on current vari-
ables), that of models producing Ricardian equivalence
is that of evaluating agents’ behaviour over an extremely
long time horizon. There is growing consensus that the
relevant time-frame to evaluate the impact of budget def-
icits is most probably in between (3). From such an inter-
mediate perspective, agents are assumed to take into
account expected future events in their consumption and
investment decisions, but the weight put on variables
distant in the future is much smaller than that given to
current variables. Overlapping generations’ models with
finitely-lived forward-looking agents have been devel-
oped exhibiting features that permit to analyse the long-
run effects of permanent deficits without relying on
extreme assumptions at the basis of Ricardian
equivalence (4). This category of models has sometimes
been referred to as ‘neoclassical’ models for the analysis
of budget deficits (e.g. Bernheim, 1987). ‘Neo-classical’
models are at the basis of most of the applied macroeco-
nomic models used for policy analysis in academia and
policy institutions. The basic result which is common to
such models is that a permanent increase in budget defi-
cits will not be fully compensated by an equivalent
increase in private savings. The ensuing reduction in
national savings will necessarily be followed by either a
reduction in domestic investment or a reduction in net
foreign assets, i.e. worsened national income prospects.
The reason why national savings fall as a result of a per-
manent increase in budget deficits is related with the
behaviour of consumption in ‘neo-classical’ overlapping
generations models. Since deficits shift disposable
income from the future to the present and since agents
put a higher weight on current income in taking con-
sumption decisions, consumption will not remain
unchanged as predicted by the Ricardian equivalence
theorem but will generally increase (5). Empirical evi-
dence on advanced economies shows that government
¥1∂ Formally, while in the Keynesian framework S = YD – C(YD), where YD = Y – T
denotes disposable income (income net of taxes and transfers, T) and
C(YD) denotes that consumption is a function of disposable income,
according to the expectations view S = S = YD – C(YP), where YP is perma-
nent income. Since deficits leave unchanged permanent income in the
Ricardian view, it follows that a change in the budget deficit generated by
a change in T will impact on private savings by the same amount as the
impact on disposable income, while it will in general affect also C (and
then Y) according to the Keynesian view.
¥2∂ For a survey on the debate on Ricardian equivalence see, e.g. Bernheim
(1987), Seater (1993) or Ricciuti (2003).
¥3∂ This is the framework considered to be relevant in recent advanced macro-
economics textbooks (e.g. Azariadis (1993), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998)).
¥4∂ Among the first contributions in this field see, e.g. Diamond (1965). Blan-
chard (1985) develops an analytical framework where agents are forward
looking but characterised by a constant probability of death in which
Ricardian equivalence does not hold. See also Tirole (1986) and Weil
(1987) for theoretical contributions on the subject. 
¥5∂ Recent literature has also considered a ‘non-Keynesian’ view according to
which in the presence of distortionary taxation and high debt levels budget
consolidations may actually increase agents’ expected disposable income
and then provoke an increase in consumption. See, e.g. Giudice, Turrini
and in’t Veld (2003) for a discussion of non-Keynesian effects of budget-
ary consolidations in EU countries.148
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private savings (1).
2.3. The long-term impact of permanent 
deficits: The channels at work
In the following, the main channels through which
budget deficits affect national income prospects are
illustrated, taking care of distinguishing between the
direct impact of budget deficits on capital accumula-
tion and net factor rewards from the indirect effects
arising through induced changes in the perspective
stream of revenues and expenditures and on the risk
perceived by markets.
2.3.1. Debt, interest rates and private investment 
crowding-out
The first reason for why persistent budget deficits may
affect potential output is the reduction in capital accu-
mulation caused by the building-up of government
debt. Potential output depends upon the supply of pro-
duction factors and technology. How the supply of cap-
ital changes over time depends on investment, which in
turn depends on savings. Persistent deficits reduce
national savings and raise over time the stock of gov-
ernment bonds. Such new issues of debt can be
absorbed by the public only if yielding higher real
returns. The growth in government bonds’ real returns
shifts savings away from productive capital (firms’
stocks) into financial assets, thus depressing invest-
ment. It follows that a permanent increase in budget
deficits translates into a lower steady-state per capita
capital stock and then into reduced per capita potential
output (2).
The magnitude of the effect of deficits on interest rates
crucially depends upon two factors: the sensitivity of
private savings to interest rates and the degree of inter-
national capital mobility. The weaker the response of
private savings to changes in interest rates, the higher
the increase in the interest rate required to equate the
supply and the demand of bonds. Other things being
equal, when private savings are relatively insensitive
to interest rates, general government deficits will have
a strong effect on interest rates and then on productive
investment (3). As for the role of international capital
mobility, as capital becomes increasingly mobile
across national boundaries, domestic interest rates are
increasingly determined by foreign interest rates and
by exchange rate expectations. The higher the degree
of capital mobility, the lower the impact of budget def-
icits on interest rates: the increased supply of govern-
ment bonds associated with the realisation of deficits
will mainly be allocated abroad, with no need of a
change in interest rate to induce a sufficient increase in
domestic private savings.
Concerning the dynamics of adjustment in interest rates to
budget deficits, agents’ expectations play a crucial role.
Since agents participating in financial markets take their
decisions from a forward-looking perspective, what is rel-
evant for the relation between budget deficits and interest
rates is not the current but rather the future budget deficits
expected by markets. At unchanged current deficits, fac-
tors that may affect expectations concerning future budget
deficits (including the introduction of laws aimed at pro-
moting budgetary discipline) will have an impact on
expected interest rates. Via arbitrage, expectations on
future interest rates will translate into immediate changes
in the terms’ structure of interest rates. The emergence of
factors that induce expectations of higher deficits in the
future will entail an immediate steepening of the yield
curve, since the value of long-term interest rates tend to
reflect that of average future short-term rates (4). If expec-
tations on budget deficits turn out to be correct, interest
rates across the whole term structure (both short- and
long-term) will rise over time (5).
A final remark concerns the impact of budget deficits on
economic activity via changed rates of capital accumula-
tion. As stressed by endogenous growth theory, a reduc-
tion in the rate of investment may impact not only the
level of potential output (and its growth on the transition
path) but also its rate of growth at the steady state. The
reason is that new capital goods may embody a higher
level of technology, being therefore more productive. A
higher rate of investment would therefore be associated
¥1∂ See, among others, Bernheim (1987), Seater (1993), Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1999).
¥2∂ The theoretical result that permanent deficits should lead to reduced capi-
tal accumulation is a robust one. The major requirement for its validity is
the absence of Ricardian equivalence.
¥3∂ The impact of interest rates on consumption (and then on savings) savings
is a priori ambiguous, since while substitution effects are negative, income
effects are generally positive (being households’ net creditors on aggre-
gate). Consistently, empirical evidence shows a relatively small impact of
interest rates on savings, both in advanced economies (Bosworth, 1993)
and developing countries (Giovannini, 1985).
¥4∂ Campbell (1995) provides a survey on the theory and the empirics of the
expectation view for the term structure of interest rates.
¥5∂ See, e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989), pp. 132–134, for a formal charac-
terisation of the dynamic response of interest rates to budget deficits.149
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of growth in total factor productivity (1).
It follows from the above arguments that the crowding
out of productive investment by permanent government
deficits can be a sufficient condition for debt unsustain-
ability. On the one hand, deficits reduce the rate of
investment, which in turn leads to lower transition or
steady-state growth. On the other hand, the increase in
real interest rates caused by high permanent deficits
raises the cost of government debt (2).
Concerning empirical evidence, a large body of work
has been carried out in the past few decades to esti-
mate the impact of budget deficits on interest rates (3).
Most of the existing work focuses on the United
States, but a number of studies on European countries
and other OECD countries are also available. Several
different methodologies have been employed to test
the impact of deficits on interest rates (see Box III.1).
In spite of recognised difficulties in estimating the
effect of deficits on interest rates, there is increasing
consensus on a causal relationship between govern-
ments’ fiscal positions and interest rates (see
Table III.2). A significant impact of budget balances
on interest rates is found especially in those analyses
that employ measures of expected rather than actual
budget deficits as explanatory variables. Concerning
the magnitude of the estimated impact, most of the
studies indicate that a 1 GDP point of additional defi-
cit increases long-term nominal interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds by between 20 and 100 basis points
and long-term real interest rates by between 15 and
80 basis points.
2.3.2. Current account deficits and decumulation 
of net foreign assets
Allowing for the economy to be open internationally, the
adjustment in response to budget deficits may come
from the current account side. Going back to the
accounting identity (1), the adjustment may fall on the
current account CA rather than on investment I. When
this is the case, the loss in income prospects is not asso-
ciated with a reduction in domestic potential output but
rather with an income transfer between national and
foreign citizens to pay back foreign debt. A reduction in
the current account balance corresponds in fact to a
deterioration in the stock of net foreign assets held by
residents (4).
Under which conditions are deficits more likely to
induce a worsening of the current account, rather than
a slowdown in capital accumulation? In general, the
response of the current account will depend upon the
degree of international capital mobility and the
exchange rate regime (5). With flexible exchange rates,
permanent budgetary expansions will normally entail
an incipient increase in interest rates, thus triggering
capital inflows. The inflow of capital will in turn lead
to the appreciation of the currency and then to a dete-
rioration in the current account (CA falls) (6). Con-
versely, with fixed exchange rates, crowding-out of
fiscal expansions via the current account will be lim-
ited, since monetary expansions are required to offset
the impact of budgetary policies on interest rates, in
order to avoid the currency appreciation. In the long
run, however, a deterioration in the current account
will occur due to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate associated with an increase in the domestic price
level and a consequent loss of competitiveness. This
form of external adjustment via the real exchange rate
following budgetary expansions takes place also in the
euro area. Expansionary budget policies will normally
raise output temporarily above potential, thereby
putting pressure on prices: the associated loss in ‘com-
petitiveness’ will result in a deterioration in the current
account.
As for empirical evidence, it has been shown by Feld-
stein and Horioka (1980) that there is a very close
relation between domestic investment and domestic
savings across countries. This finding, known as the
¥1∂ Although permanent effects of investment on growth via ‘endogenous
growth’ channels is much emphasised both in theoretical work and in the
policy debate, estimating empirically the magnitude of these effects is sub-
ject to major difficulties (see, e.g. Temple, 1999).
¥2∂ It is shown in Chalk (2000) that debt unsustainability may arise from
investment crowding out generated by primary deficit levels that leads
over time to real interest rates in excess of growth.
¥3∂ See, e.g. Gale and Orszag (2003) and Brook (2003) for surveys.
¥4∂ This is easily understood in the case of a current account deficit (CA < 0).
The excess of the value of imports over exports must be financed by an
increase of liabilities (or reduction of assets) with respect to the rest of the
world. Foreign residents will then hold in their portfolios a higher stock of
domestic assets, i.e. of claims on the returns from the stock of domestic cap-
ital and national citizens will hold a lower stock of claims on foreign assets.
¥5∂ The ‘workhorse’ model to evaluate the short-run impact of budget deficits
in open economies remains the Mudell-Fleming model, eventually re-
adapted to account for covered or uncovered interest rate parity (see, e.g.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998)).
¥6∂ In the extreme case of ‘perfect’ capital mobility, crowding-out via the cur-
rent account will be complete: any changes in the budget balance will be
matched by an equivalent change in the current account balance (‘twin
deficits’ case) and there will not be impact on aggregate income.150
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(Continued on the next page)
Estimating the impact of budget deficits on interest rates involves a number of difficulties. A first difficulty is related to
the modelling strategy of the relationship between government fiscal positions and interest rates. Of course, budget deficits
are not the only factor affecting interest rate developments. How to account for the remaining explanatory factors? One
way is that of analysing this relationship by means of simulations via applied, multi-equation macro models. Such models
embed a rich amount of relations among macroeconomic variables, and take into account a wide range of interactions and
feedback. The resulting estimates of the impact of budget deficits on interest rates depend on the model assumptions (e.g.
the modelling of private consumption determination or that of international capital markets) and the values for relevant
model parameters (normally based on existing empirical work). Applied macro models are useful in analysing the impact
of budget deficits on the whole economy but are less suited to provide an assessment of the particular relation between
government fiscal positions and interest rates. The reason is that results can be quite sensitive to the features of the model
and to the chosen value for model parameters (1).
A more direct approach is that of econometric estimation. Following this approach measures of budget balances are used
as explanatory factors in regressions (normally time-series regressions for single countries, but also panel regressions com-
prising several countries) where interest rate dependent variables appear. Also when following this route there is the issue
of choosing a theoretical framework of reference for the specification of the empirical model for interest rate determination.
Most of the existing analyses in this vein have estimated reduced-form specifications of equilibrium models. In some stud-
ies the specification of the equations tested is derived from static equilibrium models in which the interest rate on govern-
ment bonds adjusts in order to maintain equality between the supply and demand of bonds (‘loanable fund models’). This
is the approach followed for instance in Thomas and Abderrezak (1988) or Cebula (1998, 1999, 2000). The typical addi-
tional explanatory variables employed in such specifications are short-term interest rates (determined by monetary policy
and therefore taken as exogenous), inflation or money growth (which increases, ceteris paribus, nominal interest rates) and
capital inflows (which tend to raise the demand for bonds). Econometric tests have also been provided for alternative spe-
cifications grounded on intertemporal models of saving behaviour (e.g. Laubach, 2003).
A second issue in estimating the link between budget deficits and interest rates concerns the detection of causal relation-
ships rather than correlations with alternative possible interpretations. As one can imagine channels through which budget
deficits affect interest rates, one can also envisage the possibility of reverse causation, running from interest rates to deficits
(explained by increased public expenditure in interest payments). In order to tackle the issue of causality, fully-fledged
dynamic specifications have been developed in estimating empirically the link between budget deficits and interest rates
(via ECM model estimations, co-integration analysis or VAR estimations). Examples are found in Plosser (1982, 1987),
Evans (1987a, 1987b), Orr, Edey and Kennedy (1995), Cheng (1998), Cebula (1999), Ewing and Yanochik (1999).
A further estimation issue concerns the role of expectations. If agents participating in financial markets are forward-look-
ing, what matters for the determination of interest rates are the expected, rather than the current budget deficits. To the
extent that agents are rational so they incorporate in their expectations and actions all the information concerning future
deficits that is publicly available, what should be relevant to understand changes in interest rates are only those changes in
budgetary prospects that are unexpected. The VAR approach (pioneered by Plosser (1982, 1987) and followed subse-
quently in Evans (1987a, 1987b)) can isolate the impact on interest rates of the unexpected component of changes in fiscal
variables. The limitation with the use of VAR is that the estimation of expected fiscal variables are extrapolations from
past data and do not account for new available information not included in past observations. To overcome this limitation
of VARs in modelling agents’ expectations, a number of studies have included official forecasts on budget balances
as explanatory factors, with the aim of capturing in this way better measures of agents’ expectations. In the US case,
(1) See Gale and Orszag (2003) for a survey on results concerning the relation between budget deficits and interest rates in the United States obtained from
applied macro-model simulations. Results tend to vary quite widely across different models.151
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’ goes against the wide-
spread view that international capital markets are
highly integrated. In a fully integrated international
capital market, the link between savings and domestic
investment would be weak, since residents of each
country would hold an internationally diversified
portfolio of activities (i.e. would finance not only
domestic investment but also investment abroad).
Consistently, cross-country evidence on the determi-
nants of the current account is not strongly supportive
of the ‘twin deficit’ view that government budget
imbalances will translate into corresponding imbal-
ances in the current account (e.g. Lane and Perotti,
1998; Chinn and Prasad, 2000). Subsequent research
(e.g. Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991) has shown that
the strength of the link between domestic savings and
domestic investment has somewhat declined in more
recent years. Recent evidence reported by Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2002) points to a possible gradual dis-
appearance of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle among
EMU countries, which have been exhibiting growing
current account imbalances in recent times and a
weakening of the link between domestic investment
and savings.
Box III.1 (continued)
the medium-term (five years) budget forecasts of the CBO have normally been used. Analogous medium-term budget pro-
jections are generally not available for European and other countries. Shorter term forecasts have then been used for coun-
tries other than the United States. An alternative approach, followed for instance in Bovenberg (1988) is that of using actual
forward values for cyclically adjusted budget balances as proxies of expected deficits.
In order to disentangle expected from unexpected changes in budget figures, a series of papers have analysed the relation
between news on the budgets printed in the press or new data announcements by budgetary institutions and the day-to-day
change in government bond interest rates (Wachtel and Young, 1987; Thorbecke, 1993; Elmendorf, 1996).
Some recent analyses use measures of expected deficits to measure their impact on expected future interest rates (Laubach,
2003) or the term structure of interest rates (e.g. Reinhart and Sack, 2000; Lindé, 2001; Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002).
The idea beyond using the terms structure of interest rates (i.e. the difference between long- and short-term rates) rather
than interest rate levels is that expectations of higher deficits in the future result in higher future interest rates and therefore
in an immediate steepening of the yield curve. Using as dependent variable the difference between long- and short-term
interest rates permits the capture of this effect without the need of modelling the determinants of interest rate levels.
Finally, it must be mentioned that an indirect assessment on the impact of budget deficits on interest rates comes from the
studies that use debt levels as explanatory variable. In interpreting the implications for the effect of deficits arising from
these studies it is crucial the extent to which deficits are assumed to be permanent. While the effect of purely temporary
deficits would be close to equivalent changes in debt, the effect of permanent deficits on steady-state debt would be con-
siderably stronger.
As for results, a number of regularities seem to merge from existing studies. Firstly, analyses using data up to the early
1980s (e.g. Plosser, 1982, 1997; Evans, 1987a, 1987b) tend to yield (for the US case) insignificant effects of budget deficits
on interest rates. The explanation for such evidence may be rooted on a possible non-linear relation between the stock of
debt and interest rates as found, for instance in Conway and Orr (2002) or in O’Donovan, Orr and Rae (1996). The stock
of US debt was lower in the 1970s and early 1980s, and this may explain a reduced impact of deficits on interest rates for
that period. Secondly, the interest rate impact of deficits on interest rates is stronger for the United States than for other
countries. This regularity is probably related to the fact that the US is a relatively big economy with a relatively low weight
of international capital in deficit financing. Secondly, analyses using short-term interest rates as dependent variables are
more likely to report weak or insignificant results. A possible reason is that short-term interest rates are affected in a hardly
predictable way by monetary policy considerations. Thirdly, studies employing official budgetary projections or news and
announcements on budget data, rather than current deficits or VAR expectations, generally find a significant impact of
budgets on interest rates. This can be interpreted as a test of the better empirical performance of models emphasising the
forward-looking behaviour of economic agents and a confirmation of the greater informational content of budgetary pro-
jections compared with VAR innovations. Finally, the estimated impact of debt on interest rates is in general smaller than
that of deficits. This result appears clear in those studies using alternatively deficits and debts as explanatory variables for
interest rates (e.g. Laubach, 2003).152
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The impact of government deficits on interest rates: Survey of existing studies
Study Data Interest rate dependent 
variable (1)
Fiscal position 
explanatory variable Results 
Actual deficits used as explanatory variable
Plosser (1982) US, 1954–78, quarterly Interest rates 
on short-term bonds 
(bills) at various 
maturities
VAR innovations 
in government debt 
holdings by the private 
sector and the Federal 
Reserve
Changes in debt holdings do not affect 
interest rates, while public expenditures 
increase them
Plosser (1987) US, 1967–85, monthly Interest rates for bills 
and bonds at various 
maturities
VAR innovations in 
government debt 
holdings by the private 
sector and the Federal 
Reserve 
Insignificant impact of debt growth rates 
on interest rate variables
Evans (1987a) US, 1908, 1984, 
monthly 
Nominal and real 
interest yields for bonds 
with different maturities 
VAR innovations 
in budget balances are 
used as proxies 
for unexpected changes 
in fiscal policy
Insignificant or negative impact 
of unexpected changes in budget 
balances on interest rates.
Evans (1987b) G7 countries except Italy, 
1974–85, annual
Interest rates 
on short-term bonds 
Changes in the budget 
balance
Insignificant or negative impact 
of unexpected budget balance changes 
on interest rates
Elmendorf (1993) US, 1971–87, quarterly Change in interest rates 
for bonds with different 
maturities 
Change in DRI budget 
balance projections 
for current and next 
fiscal years 
Significant impact of changes in budget 
projections on interest rate changes: 
about 40 basis points per 1 % GDP deficit 
for long-term bonds and 20 basis points 
for short-term bonds
Orr, Edey and 
Kennedy (1995)
17 OECD countries, 
1981–94, quarterly
Real interest rate on 10-
year bonds
Budget balance Budget balances have a significant 
long-run impact on interest rates 
of 15 basis points per each GDP point 
of deficit
Knot and de Haan 
(1995)
DE, FR, IT, NL and UK, 
1960–89 annual
Cross-country average 
interest rate on 10-year 
bonds
Budget balance and CAB Significant impact of deficit measures 
on interest rates. 1 additional GDP 
point of deficits raises interest rates 
in the range of 40–60 basis points
Vamvoukas (1997) Greece, 1950–93, annual Interest rates on 1-year 
bonds 
Budget balance Budget deficits have a significant impact 
on interest rates. The ECM impact 
multiplier implies that 1 GDP point 
of additional deficit increases interest 
rates by about 20 basis points
Cebula (1998) US, 1963–95, annual Active and passive 
interest rates on bank 
deposits
Budget balance Budget deficits increase the cost of 
deposits for banks (between 20 
and 60 basis points) but not prime 
rates on deposits
Cheng (1998) Japan, 1955–93, annual Interest rates on short 
and long-term bonds
Budget balance Budget balances are not co-integrated 
with long-term interest rates 
Giannaros and 
Kolluri (1989)
Canada, FR, UK, DE, 
1965–85, quarterly
Real interest rate on 
short-term bonds
Budget balance Insignificant impact of budget balance 
on interest rates 
Cebula (1999) UK, 1972–91, quarterly Interest rates on 20-year 
bonds
Budget balance Budget deficits and long-term interest 
rates are cointegrated
Ewing and Yanochik 
(1999)
Italy, 1977–91, quarterly Interest rate spread 
between long and short-
term bonds 
Budget balance Budget balances Granger-cause interest 
rate spreads but not vice-versa
Cebula (2000) US, 1973–95, annual Ex post real interest 
rates for bonds of 
various maturities
Budget balance Significant impact of budget deficits on 
ex post real interest rates. 1 GDP point 
of additional deficit increases ex post real 
interest rates by 86 basis points
(Continued on the next page)153
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Study Data Interest rate dependent 
variable (1)
Fiscal position 
explanatory variable Results 
Lindé (2001) Sweden, 1982–96, 
monthly and quarterly
Spread of domestic 
over foreign interest 
rate for both 3-month, 
5-year and 10-year 
bonds
Budget balance Significant impact of deficits on interest 
rate spread over foreign bonds. 
1 additional GDP point of expected deficit 
raises spreads on average by 20 basis 
points
Darrat (2002) Greece, 1950–93, annual Interest rates 
on 1-year bonds
Budget balance Budget balances do not Granger interest 
rates but interest rates do cause budget 
deficits
Cebula (2003) Germany, 1975–90, 
quarterly 
Interest rates on bonds 
with maturity higher 
than 3 years
Budget balance Budget balances and long-term interest 
rates are cointegrated
Faini (2004) 11 euro-area countries, 
1979–2002
Real interest rates 
on 10 government 
bonds
Primary cyclically 
adjusted budget 
balances
1 additional GDP point of expected deficit 
raises the euro-area interest rate level by 
35 basis points and the spread between 
domestic and euro-area interest rates 
by 5 basis points. 
Expected deficits used as explanatory variable
Bovenberg (1988) US, 1961–85, annual and 
semi-annual
Interest rates on 10- and 
3-year bonds 
Proxy for expected 
deficit: average value 
of the CAB 5 years 
ahead
Statistically significant impact of expected 
deficits long-term interest rates. 
An additional GDP point of expected 
deficit raises interest rates by about 
100 basis points
Thomas and 
Abderrezak (1988)
US, 1970–86, quarterly Interest rates 
on 10-year government 
bonds
Two proxies 
for expected deficits: 
current CAB, average 
CAB recorded 3 years 
ahead
Statistically significant impact of expected 
deficits on interest rates. 1 additional GDP 
point of expected deficit raises interest 
rates by 94 basis points 
Reinhart and Sack 
(2000)
19 OECD, G7 countries; 
1981–2000, annual
Interest rate spreads (10-
year minus 3-month)
OECD 1 year ahead 
budget balance 
projections 
Significant impact of expected deficits on 
the interest spread. For OECD 1 GDP point 
of additional deficit raises spreads 
by 9 basis points on average, 
for G7 by 12 basis points
Canzoneri, Cumby 
and Diba (2002)
US, 1984–2002, semi-
annual 
Interest rate spreads 
(10-year or 5-year minus 
3-month)
Ex post real interest rate 
realised after 5 years
Budget balances CBO 
budget balance 
projections 5 
and 10 years ahead
Significant impact of expected deficits 
on interest rates. 1 additional GDP point 
of expected deficit raises on average 
expected nominal and real interest rates 
by 40–60 basis points. The impact 
of actual budget balances is of a similar 
magnitude 1 GDP point of deficit raises 
the ex post real interest rate 
by 45 basis points
Laubach (2003) US, 1976–2003, annual; 
1985–2003, semi-annual 
Expected future nominal 
and real 10-year bond 
yields
OMB and CBO 5-year 
ahead projections on 
budget balances 
Significant impact of expected deficits 
on interest rates. 1 additional GDP point 
of expected deficit raises on average 
expected nominal and real interest rates 
by about 20 basis points
Event studies: news concerning future deficits used as explanatory variable
Watchel 
and Young (1987)
US, news on deficits and 
daily data on interest 
rates in the 1982–86 
period
Interest rates on bonds 
at various maturities
OMB and CBO 
announcements on 
deficit projections
Statistically significant impact of news on 
higher deficits on day-after interest rates. 
USD 1 billion of additional announced 
deficit increases on average interest rates 
by about 0.2–0.3 basis points
(Continued on the next page)154
P a r t  I I I
T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  f i s c a l  d i s c i p l i n eTable III.2 (continued)
Study Data Interest rate dependent 
variable (1)
Fiscal position 
explanatory variable Results 
Thorbecke (1993) US, news on deficits
and daily data 
on interest rates 
in the 1979–89 period 
Interest rates on bonds 
at various maturities
OMB and CBO 
announcements on 
deficit projections
Statistically significant impact of news 
on higher deficits on day-after interest 
rates, insignificant impact of news on 
government purchases. USD 1 billion of 
additional announced deficit increases on 
average interest rates by about 0.3 basis 
points. News on higher expected deficit also 
significantly raise the day-after US dollar 
exchange rate
Quigley 
and Porter–
Hudak (1994)
US, deficits news 
appeared between 1979 
and 1989, daily data on 
interest rates
Interest rates on 3-
month bills
Deficit projections 
appeared in the Wall 
Street Journal 
Significant impact of news on deficits on 
day-after interest rates. On average, a 1 % 
GDP announced increase in deficit raises 
short-term interest rates by 0.52 basis 
points over 1 day
Kitchen (1996) US, news on deficits and 
daily data on interest 
rates in the 1981–94 
period
Interest rates on US and 
UK bonds at various 
maturities
OMB and CBO 
announcements on 
deficit projections
News on 1 additional GDP point of 
deficit increase day-after US interest rates 
by about 4 basis points. There is also a 
statistically significant effect 
on UK interest rates on long-term bonds
Elmendorf (1996) US, news on budget laws 
and data on interest 
rates in 1985 and 1990
Interest rates on 7-year 
bonds
News appeared in the 
New York Times and 
Wall Street on Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law 
(1985) and Budget 
Enforcement Act (1990)
Statistically significant relation between 
news pointing to stricter budget laws and 
interest rate reductions
Knot 
and De Haan (1999)
Germany, deficit 
announcements 
between 1987 and 1993, 
daily data for interest 
rates
Long- and short-term 
interest rates
Announcements on 
budget balance 
projections from Ministry 
of Finance, the 
Bundesbank and the 
Council of Economic 
Advisers
Significant impact of deficits news 
on day-after interest rates 
on long-term bonds (up to 0.27 basis 
points per 1 % GDP additional deficit). 
No significant impact of expenditure news
Debt measures used as explanatory variable
Helbling 
and Wescott (1995)
Eight advanced 
economies, 1963–90, 
annual
Country-level and 
aggregate measures of 
real short- and long-
term interest rates
World gross government 
debt
1 additional GDP point of debt raises 
interest rates by 10–20 basis points
Ford 
and Laxton (1995)
Nine advanced 
economies, 1977–93, 
annual
Country-level and 
aggregate measures 
of real interest rates 
at 1-year maturity
World net government 
debt
1 additional GDP point of debt raises 
interest rates by 10–20 basis points at 
world level, by 15–50 basis points at 
country level
Chalk 
and Tanzi (2002)
EUR-11 + UK, 1970–98, 
annual
Real long-term interest 
rates
Gross debt In a panel including EUR-11 countries and 
the UK, 1 additional GDP point of debt 
raises real interest rates by 6 basis points 
over the 1970–98 period and by 1 basis 
point over the 1980–98 period
Laubach (2003) US, 1976–2003, annual; 
1985–2003, semi-annual 
Expected future nominal 
and real 10-year bond 
yields
OMB and CBO 5-year 
ahead projections 
on net government debt 
1 additional GDP point of expected 
debt raises on average expected nominal 
and real interest rates by about
5 basis points
Chinn 
and Frankel (2003)
Seven EU countries, 
1988–2002, quarterly
Real interest rate 
on 10-year government 
bonds
Net government debt 1 additional GDP point of debt raises 
EU real interest rates by 7–12 basis points 
on average per year
(1) Nominal rates if not otherwise indicated.155
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is relevant to assess the extent to which reduced national
savings due to budget deficits can be compensated by
foreign borrowing but is probably not crucial to under-
stand what will be the cost of deficits in terms of fore-
gone future national income. As long as the return on the
funds borrowed from abroad does not differ much from
the cost of borrowing, the income loss associated with
reduced domestic investment (lower I) will not differ
much from that associated with higher net foreign debt
(lower CA) (1).
2.3.3. Debt monetisation and inflation
Persistent deficits are a main cause for rising govern-
ment debt stock. Since the real cost of debt repayment
for the government can, at least temporarily, be reduced
by means of inflation surprises, in the presence of high
debt levels government pressures to create inflation are
stronger. A link between deficits, debt and inflation may
emerge also when central banks are independent by stat-
ute from the government, to the extent that the incentives
to reduce the real cost of debt through inflation may
translate into pressures of the government on monetary
authorities.
In the past decade, economic theory has placed the focus
of the analysis of the structural determinants of inflation
on the behaviour characterising fiscal and monetary
authorities. The idea at the grounds of the ‘fiscal theory
of the price level’ is that the level of prices and inflation
rates cannot be seen as the result of decisions taken
by monetary authorities only and that the behaviour of
fiscal authorities necessarily matters as well (see
Box III.2). In particular, monetary authorities with a
strong anti-inflationary commitment will not be suffi-
cient to prevent structural inflation if fiscal policy is not
conducted in such a way to avoid persistent excessive
deficits. The reason is that when fiscal authorities are not
committed to fiscal discipline, debt will accumulate up
to the point in which default occurs or in which debt sus-
tainability is achieved through a reduction in its real
value obtained via an increase in the price level. This
increase in the price level will not necessarily be caused
by expansionary monetary policies but may result from
real factors, i.e. increased aggregate demand resulting
from government deficits.
In spite of the fact that the lack of fiscal discipline does
not currently seem to be a major cause of inflation in the
EU (see Box III.2 for a review of available empirical evi-
dence on the fiscal theory of the price level) it cannot be
excluded that inflationary tendencies may show up in the
future if debt remains high and the increase in age-
related expenditures is not matched by an increase in
government revenues or cuts in other types of expendi-
ture.
Concerning the empirical relation between budget defi-
cits and inflation, Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (2002) and
Catão and Terrones (2003) show that while for devel-
oped countries the relation seems a weak one, it is a sig-
nificant one for developing countries.
As for the effects of inflation on economies’ growth
potential, there is widespread agreement that high and
volatile inflation reduces both potential output and
growth by weakening price signals, thus worsening
resource allocation (2). Cross-country empirical evi-
dence exists showing a negative relation between the
level and the volatility of inflation and growth (3).
2.3.4. Deficits, budgetary policies, and resource 
allocation
Persistent deficits may have also relevant indirect effects
on economies’ income prospects, via induced changes in
budgetary policies. There are two main arguments which
point to a possible negative impact on efficiency and
growth through this channel (4).
The first argument states that since persistent deficits shift
the tax burden to the future, income prospects may be
reduced due to a perspective increase in the degree of dis-
tortions introduced by taxation in the economy. High def-
icits cannot be sustained indefinitely: a moment will come
when, in order to stabilise and pay back the accumulated
debt revenues, taxes will have to rise and expenditures
fall. As long as part of the needed consolidation is
achieved by means of an increased tax burden, this will
aggravate the distortions introduced in resource allocation
in product and factor markets. A reduction in the level of
¥1∂ See Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) on this point.
¥2∂ See, e.g. Romer (1996) for a review of the arguments pointing to a nega-
tive impact of inflation on resource allocation. Among the papers demon-
strating a negative effect of inflation on the incentives to accumulate
productive capital see Stockman (1981).
¥3∂ Grier and Tullock (1989) find that the standard deviation of inflation is
negatively related to growth in a cross-country growth regression.
¥4∂ These arguments are reported as in Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and
have a long-standing tradition in public finance analysis.156
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ory that increased taxation may reduce the incentive to
undertake capital investments or investments in human
capital and R & D (e.g. Barro, 1990). This would in turn
translate into a reduced per capita capital stock and a
lower rate of total factor productivity growth. Easterly and
Rebelo (1993) find empirically in a cross-country growth
regression including both advanced and developing coun-
Box III.2: The fiscal theory of the price level
The link between monetary and fiscal policy in determining structural inflation tendencies has been initially emphasised
by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in the framework of their ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetics’. The idea behind the Sargent
and Wallace (1981) contribution is that since the respect of the government intertemporal budget constraint must hold as
an identity for any possible trajectory of primary budget balances, the way in which this constraint will be respected ulti-
mately depends upon the behaviour of monetary and fiscal authorities.
When the government can sell debt both to the public and to monetary authorities (which correspondingly issue new money
base) the respect of the government intertemporal budget constraint requires that the present value of future real primary
balances and real money base creation must equal the real value of the outstanding stock of debt. Formally, this means that
at any time t the following equality must hold
(2)
where  is the nominal stock of debt,  is the level of prices,  is the creation of money base,  is the discount rate
(which depends upon real interest rates and the growth rate of the economy) and  and  are, respectively, real govern-
ment revenues and primary expenditures.
From expression (2) it can be seen that if monetary authorities can credibly commit towards price stability (i.e. a low rate
of money supply growth), then fiscal authorities will anticipate that a persistent imbalance between nominal revenues and
expenditures cannot be fully offset by higher money base creation. The main policy implication from the analysis of Sar-
gent and Wallace (1981) is that credible anti-inflationary targets for monetary authorities can be sufficient to induce the
perception of a ‘hard budget constraint’ by fiscal authorities, which will need to run a sequence of primary surpluses to pay
back the accumulated debt.
The analysis of the links between inflation and the behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities in the fiscal theory of the
price level (developed in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994)) also focuses on the governments’ intertem-
poral budget constraint but departs from the view of Sargent and Wallace (1981) in a crucial respect. According to the fiscal
theory of the price level it is not necessary that (at least) one policy authority behave in such a way to guarantee the respect
of the government intertemporal budget constraint. Even when both monetary and fiscal authorities act independently and
stick to their own behavioural rules, the respect of the government budget constraint will be guaranteed by an adjustment
in the price level induced by market forces. When the behaviour of fiscal authorities is oriented towards fiscal discipline
(i.e. when primary balances tend to increase as the stock of debt increases) government solvency will hold for any trajectory
of prices consistent with the behavioural rule of monetary authorities. In this case a ‘monetary dominance’ regime will real-
ise. If instead primary balances do not tend to adjust against increasing debt, then government solvency can only apply if
the level of prices  ‘jumps’ in such a way to reduce the real value of the debt stock (‘fiscal dominance’ regime). Here
comes the main difference of the fiscal theory of the price level compared with the unpleasant arithmetics of Sargent and
Wallace (1981). The respect of the government budget constraint is not guaranteed by an increase in the rate of money base
supply by monetary authorities but by a change in the price level due to increased aggregate demand generated by the def-
icit policy of fiscal authorities. The policy implication of the fiscal theory of the price level is that the independence of
monetary authorities may not be sufficient to guarantee a non-inflationary policy environment: rules that induce sufficient
fiscal discipline may also be required.
In recent times there have been several attempts to test empirically the fiscal theory of the price level. Canzoneri, Cumby
and Diba (2001) show that in Europe and the United States the need of government solvency is not a significant determi-
nant of the level of prices.
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2 0 0 4tries that higher taxation contributes negatively and signif-
icantly to per capita output growth. Similar results are
obtained by Kneller, Bleamey and Gemmell (1999) for
OECD countries and by Romero de Avila and Strauch
(2003) for a sample limited to EU countries (1).
The second argument states that poor fiscal discipline
affects the quality of the budget process. When addi-
tional government expenditures need not be matched by
increased revenues the higher the probability that inap-
propriate or poorly conceived expenditure programmes
will be approved.
Under these conditions, the incentive of the different
departments of the public administration to carry out
efficiently their tasks will also be reduced. The lack of
fiscal discipline resulting in persistent deficits may
therefore be accompanied by a reduction in the level of
efficiency of public expenditure. Again, this would
translate into lower potential output and possibly into
lower rates of total factor productivity growth.
2.3.5. Debt accumulation, credit risk 
and confidence crises
A final channel through which persistent deficits may affect
national income prospects is the increase in the perceived
risk on government bonds and the higher vulnerability to a
crisis of confidence of international financial markets.
Risk premia on government bonds tend to increase with
debt/GDP ratios. As pointed out previously (Section
2.3.1) high debts tend to increase interest rates and to
depress growth, thus increasing the probability of diver-
gent debt dynamics. Moreover, when the conditions for
explosive debt dynamics are realised, the growth rate of
the debt/GDP ratio will be higher the higher the initial
debt ratio. It follows that in the presence of high debt ratios
the risk of unstable debt dynamics is higher and that a
stronger response by fiscal authorities is needed to stabi-
lise the debt/GDP ratio. Once the debt/GDP ratio starts
exhibiting divergent dynamics, policy-makers are funda-
mentally left with two alternatives: carrying out timely
and effective fiscal consolidations or defaulting on debt.
Since successful fiscal consolidations may be politically
costly to implement, markets tend to attach a higher prob-
ability of default to government bonds when debt/GDP
ratios are high. Hence, persistent deficits which lead to
debt accumulation tend to increase interest rates and then
to displace investment not only via reduced national sav-
ings as previously described. An additional reason for
increased government bond interest rates is related to the
necessity of compensating the increased default risk per-
ceived by investors when debt levels become excessively
high. Anecdotal evidence, including for the EU countries,
suggests that financial markets may evaluate the risk on
government bonds also on a forward-looking perspective,
giving attention not only to the level of the stock of the
accumulated debt but also to the budgetary policies that
countries are likely to put in place in the future. Hence, not
only the history of past deficits are relevant in determining
risk premia on government bonds, but also expectations
on future deficits may matter.
A series of studies have attempted to estimate the impact
of debt on credit risk premia. Bayoumi, Goldstein, and
Woglom (1995) analyse credit risk determinants of US
municipal bonds. The measure of credit risk used is the
difference between yields on 20-year general obligation
bonds of 39 US states and that of New Jersey. Debt ratio
differences have a significant, large and non-linear effect
on yield spreads. A similar approach has been applied in
Bernoth, Von Hagen and Schuknecht (2003) who analyse
differences between bond yields on government bonds of
different EU countries and comparable bonds issued by
Germany in the same currency over the period 1991–
2002. Their findings are that an additional GDP point of
debt raises yield spreads significantly but by much less
than found for the case of US municipal bonds (by a bit
more than 1 basis point) (2). In Alesina et al. (1992) the
difference between government and private sector bonds
denominated in the same currency is used as a proxy of
credit risk premia and employed as dependent variable in
regression analysis on a panel of 12 OECD countries over
the period 1974–89. The study estimates an average
impact of 1.6 basis points of each additional GDP point of
debt when limiting the sample to high-debt countries (3).
The proxy used in Alesina et al. (1992) to measure credit
risk has the main limitation of not being able to check for
changes in private risk. A further limitation is that differ-
ences in liquidity risk are also not taken into account. In
subsequent studies this issue has been addressed by meas-
uring as a proxy of credit risk the difference between the
¥1∂ It is to be remarked, however, that the impact of fiscal variables in growth
regressions is not always significant. Levine and Renelt (1992) in their
robust assessment of explanatory factors of growth, include fiscal vari-
ables among the set of non-robust regressors.
¥2∂ Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004) also find a high and significant impact
of changes in the debt/GDP ratio, and overall and primary deficits on interest
rate spreads with Germany in a regression across euro-area countries.
¥3∂ A similar result is found in Caselli, Giovannini and Lane (1998).158
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swaps (with same maturity and denominated in the same
currency). Since there is no principal at risk in swap
contracts, such a measure can check for differences in pri-
vate risk. Adopting such measure for credit risk, Lemmen
and Goodhart (1999) estimate an impact of 1.5 basis point
for each additional GDP point in a panel of EU countries.
Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) disentangle the
credit risk component from the liquidity premia compo-
nent in interest rate swaps and find that debt ratios are not
significant in explaining interest rate swap spreads in most
EU countries, with the exception of Spain, Italy and Aus-
tria, where debt has been found to be a significant and
quantitatively relevant explanatory factor.
A related argument, put forward recently in the debate on
deficits in advanced countries, is the possibility that
persistent deficits may lead to a crisis of confidence in
international financial markets and then to sudden and
massive capital outflows (1). Currency crises have
accompanied foreign debt crises of several developing
countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Abrupt and
massive capital flights generated by self-fulfilling
expectations of exchange rate devaluation were common
to the experience of these countries. Currency crises
were the result of worsened expectations concerning
official foreign reserves and the current account, often
triggered by persistent deficits against the background of
high risk of default on government debt. The experience
of developing countries is an imperfect guide to under-
standing the consequences of high and persistent deficits
and large debts in advanced countries. This is only partly
related to the fact that wealthy countries are less likely to
default on their debt (2). A crucial difference is instead
that in the case of default in developing countries, a large
share of government debt was held by foreign investors,
so that the expectation of defaulting was also justifiable
in the presence of debt levels which were not extremely
high (3). However, what can be inferred from the experi-
ence of the developing countries are the effects that con-
fidence crises may exert on the economy (4). Anecdotal
evidence on international financial crises shows that
shifts in investor confidence can be sudden and hard to
predict, with the timing driven by the interaction
between the occurrence of news on the state of the econ-
omy (e.g. concerning growth prospects or policy devel-
opments) and the dynamics of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions. The massive and abrupt decline in the demand of
an economy’s financial assets leads to sudden and poten-
tially very strong increases in interest rates, which would
in turn aggravate debt sustainability problems. Restric-
tive fiscal policies would then be required to stabilise
debt and restore investor confidence. This would aggra-
vate the negative impact on aggregate demand associ-
ated with depressed productive investment. On top of
that, there is the risk that a confidence crisis may trigger
a widespread financial crisis, with the hike in interest
rates causing firms’ bankruptcies which would in turn
generates distress in the banking system. In sum, the
consequences of generalised confidence crises may eas-
ily go well beyond a temporary increase in the cost of
capital. The economy may have to go through a pro-
longed period of instability with stagnating demand and
reduced investment rates.
The above arguments, when applied to the case of
advanced economies like those of the EU countries, are
necessarily speculative. At present, the eventuality of a
large-scale confidence crisis in EU countries is a remote
one. However, this does not mean that this argument in
favour of fiscal discipline is to be dismissed altogether (5).
High and persistent budget deficits tend to worsen the cur-
rent account balance, to the accumulation of foreign liabil-
ities, and to an increased probability of a ‘sudden stop’, i.e.
to abrupt and massive capital outflows which force a fast
correction in the current account (6). Although the argu-
ment of fiscal discipline to limit the risk of currency crises
does not apply to euro-area countries, it may be of some
relevance for new Member States. In spite of current low
debt levels and relatively high growth rates, new Member¥1∂ For instance, Rubin, Orszag and Sinai (2004) argue that a possible conse-
quence of persistent budget deficits in the United States may be an
increase in the risk of ‘financial disarray’.
¥2∂ There have been cases indeed of wealthy States and counties in the United
States defaulting or being close to default. Ball and Mankiw (1995), for
instance, reports that Orange county in California went through a debt cri-
sis in the 1990s when a proposal for a tax increase to honour the debt was
turned down by voters.
¥3∂ When government debt is held by foreigners, defaulting on debt does not
have direct consequences on national citizens’ income, thus making this
eventuality less costly in political terms. It must also be added that in the
case of developing countries’ debt crises interest rate levels (and then the
cost of servicing the debt) were in general much higher compared with that
registered by most advanced countries in recent times while the possibility
of collecting revenues was more limited.
¥4∂ It should be remembered that EU countries also have experienced currency
crises associated with speculative attacks in the past, markedly in 1992 and
1993, when the ERM had to be suspended and revised. 
¥5∂ As pointed out by Ball and Mankiw (1995), ‘despite the vagueness of fears
about hard landings, these fears may be the most important reason for seeking
to reduce budget deficits … if policy-makers are prudent, they will not take
the chance of learning what hard landings in G-7 countries are really like’.
¥6∂ See Edwards (2004) for recent cross-country evidence on the characteris-
tics and determinants of ‘sudden stops’ in current account deficits. The
paper shows that the probability of a ‘sudden stop’ increases with the stock
of cumulated foreign liabilities and the size of the current account deficit.159
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by foreigners, ‘rigid’ public expenditure and more limited
possibilities to increase revenue (see, e.g. European Com-
mission, 2002a). If deficit levels for acceding countries
will remain persistently high, this may increase the risk of
speculative attacks and currency crises during the period in
which their currencies will join ERM II as a necessary step
towards the adoption of the single currency.160
3. The benefits from fiscal discipline 
in the EU
3.1. Introduction
After having illustrated the main channels through which
persistent budget deficits affect long-term income pros-
pects, in this section the empirical relevance of those
channels is addressed with reference to EU countries.
The analysis will focus especially on the channel linking
budget deficits to income prospects via private invest-
ment. Moreover, due to lack of data, the analysis will
only partially cover the new Member States. The plan of
the analysis is as follows. Correlations of budget deficits
with relevant macroeconomic variables both across
countries and over time are first computed and com-
mented. Subsequently, the relation between budget bal-
ances and interest rates is analysed restricting the focus
to euro-area countries. Afterwards, issues concerning the
link between countries’ fiscal positions and their current
account balance are discussed distinguishing separately
issues for euro-area countries and the new Member
States. Finally, an analysis is provided concerning the
size of the economic benefits to euro-area countries gen-
erated by the introduction of the EU fiscal framework.
To that purpose, an appropriate counterfactual is con-
structed which allows to assess what level of economic
activity would have prevailed in absence of EU-wide
rules aimed at guaranteeing fiscal discipline.
3.2. Budget balances, investment, 
current accounts and growth:
A cursory look at EU data
Budget balances may impact on income prospects by
having an effect on private investment or on the current
account balance. Prima facie evidence concerning the
link between budget balances and these variables can be
gauged by simply looking at time correlations.
Table III.3 reports contemporaneous correlation coeffi-
cients (relating variables measured at the same point in
time) between budget balances, private investment and
the current account balance (all expressed as a share of
GDP), separately for each EU country. Due to short
time-series, correlations have not been calculated for
new Member States. To check for the presence of possi-
ble structural breaks in the investigated relations
occurred in the past few decades, contemporaneous cor-
relation coefficients have been computed both for the
whole period 1970–2003 and restricted to years after
1990. Moreover, to account for the possibility of reverse
causation (e.g. investment affecting the budget balance
rather than vice versa) correlations have also been com-
puted between budget balances and the average invest-
ment and current account balances registered in the sub-
sequent five years. (1)
Results show that budget balances are generally posi-
tively correlated with both private investment and the
current account as could be expected. As far as the rela-
tion between budget balances and private investment is
concerned, simultaneous correlations appear to be posi-
tive for almost all countries and fairly stable over time.
However, this result should not be interpreted as evi-
dence of a causal relationship running from budget bal-
ances to private investment shares. Reverse causation
(running from investment to budget balances) or co-
movements associated with the impact of third variables
on both budget balances and investment shares are also
possible. 
¥1∂ Taking a five-year average can better capture relations that may manifest
with possibly long and unpredictable lags, like those we are dealing with
between budget balances on the one hand and investment and the current
account balance on the other. The data span considered for computing cor-
relations between budget balances and five years ahead averages of invest-
ment and current account is the whole period 1970–2003. Of course, the
most recent budget balance data used to compute correlations are those of
1998, since five years ahead data for private investment and the current
account balance are needed.161
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since looking at correlations between current budget bal-
ances and subsequent investment a positive relation
appears in all countries.
Turning to the relation between budget balances and the
current account, contemporaneous correlation coeffi-
cients also turn out to be positive on average. However,
such relation is weak and not present in all countries.
Contemporaneous coefficient correlations are also quite
fragile with respect to the data sample used. When look-
ing at the correlation between current budget balances
and subsequent current account balances, the relation
remains weak. A minority of countries exhibits a nega-
tive rather than a positive link between deficits and the
subsequent current account balance. Overall, this evi-
dence is broadly consistent with the expectation that
budget deficits lead to a deterioration in the current
account balance. However, additional country-specific
factors (which are not accounted for in bivariate analysis
like that reported in Table III.3) seem to contribute sig-
nificantly to shape the relation between budget balances
and the current account.
Time correlations as those presented in Table III.3 do
not permit to distinguish satisfactorily between short-
term relations and relations of a longer-term nature
that occur over the cycle. In particular, it is hard to
disentangle to what extent the positive relation
between budget balances and investment shares is
related to cyclical co-movements and to what extent it
is instead the outcome of a longer-term relation link-
ing deficits to debt levels and debt to investment rates.
Looking at the cross-country variation in average val-
ues over time may help to identify the existence of
long-run structural relations. Graph III.2 reports a
scatter plot relating average budget balances and debt
levels over the 1970–2003 period. The negative rela-
tion identified is consistent with the expectation that,
other things being equal, protracted budget deficits
contribute to the build up of debt. Graph III.3 reports
the cross-country scatter plot between debt ratios and
the share of private investment. The plot describes a
negative relation, broadly confirming the hypothesis
that debt crowds out private investment via increased
interest rates (1).
Table III.3
Budget balances, private investment and the current account — correlation analysis
Budget balance/private investment Budget balance/current account
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1990–2003
Correlation with 
the average private 
investment 
in the subsequent 
five years, 1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1990–2003
Correlation with 
the average current 
account 
in the subsequent 
five years, 1970–2003
BE 0.67 – 0.06 0.77 0.64 0.49 0.18
DK 0.83 0.76 0.41 – 0.16 – 0.10 0.05
DE 0.47 0.33 0.07 0.16 – 0.26 0.24
EL 0.46 0.28 0.83 0.23 0.44 0.32
ES 0.90 0.91 0.71 – 0.34 – 0.26 – 0.19
FR 0.82 0.48 0.86 – 0.22 – 0.06 – 0.46
IE – 0.22 0.90 0.02 0.78 0.53 0.57
IT – 0.07 – 0.13 0.43 0.26 0.13 0.05
NL 0.41 0.31 0.08 0.03 0.22 – 0.36
AT 0.69 0.64 0.26 0.18 0.46 0.08
PT 0.21 0.50 0.39 0.15 – 0.42 – 0.04
FI 0.72 0.57 0.69 – 0.37 0.22 0.73
SE 0.62 0.62 0.36 – 0.15 0.12 – 0.57
UK 0.44 0.70 0.09 – 0.20 – 0.45 – 0.34
Simple average 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.07 0.07 0.02
¥1∂ However, such negative relation appears weak, due to the pooling of coun-
tries at different stages of development, exhibiting investment rates either
much higher (Portugal) or lower (Sweden, UK) than average. 162
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caused by budget deficits translated into lower potential
growth in EU countries? A first approach to tackle this
question is to look at time correlations between budget
balances and trend GDP growth. Table III.4 reports con-
temporaneous correlation coefficients separately for the
1970–2003 and the 1990–2003 periods. It also reports
the correlation of budget balances with the average trend
GDP growth rate in the subsequent 5 years (1970–2003
period). Moreover, in order to account for the impact of
the cycle on countries’ fiscal positions, the same correla-
tions are computed using the cyclically adjusted budget
balance.
Looking at contemporaneous time correlations between
budget balances trend growth a positive relation emerges
on average. However, the relation between budget bal-
ances and potential growth does not seem to be very
robust over time. The average correlation coefficient
drops from 0.48 to 0.18 when the sample is restricted to
the years after 1990 and the correlation turns from posi-
tive to negative for a series of countries. It is also worth-
while recalling that such a positive relation may go in
either direction, either from budget balances to trend
growth or vice versa. An impact of growth on budget
balances may come from the automatic reaction of cycli-
cal budgetary components or from the reaction of fiscal
authorities to cyclical conditions (assuming that they
pursue an output stabilisation objective). The positive
link identified may also simply be the result of a co-
movement of the two variables associated with some
third factor.
Looking at contemporaneous time correlations between
cyclically adjusted budget balances and trend growth can
help to understand to what extent the relation between
budget balances and growth is driven by movements in
cyclical components in the budget. Such correlations are
also positive and with a magnitude close to that for the
correlations between budget balances and trend growth.
This evidence cannot be used to infer causation but
broadly supports the view that either (i) fiscal policies
have in general been counter-cyclical, or (ii) budget def-
icits impacted negatively potential growth. A further
check on point (ii) of the above statement is obtained by
looking at the correlation between budget balances and
subsequent potential growth. This permits to exclude
reverse causation issues. The data suggest that both
budget balances and cyclically adjusted budget balances
are negatively correlated with subsequent potential
growth and that this positive correlation is quite strong
(about 0.4, i.e. each additional point of deficit is associ-
ated with a reduction in subsequent growth by
0.4 points) and present in almost all countries.        
Graph III.2:  Budget balances and debt levels, cross-country correlation
Source: Commission services.
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Source: Commission services.
Table III.4
Budget balances and trend real GDP growth — correlation analysis
Budget balance/trend GDP growth Cyclically adjusted budget balance/trend GDP growth
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1990–2003
Correlation with
the average 
trend growth 
in the subsequent 
five years, 1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1970–2003
Contemporaneous 
correlation, 
1990–2003
Correlation with 
the average 
trend growth 
in the subsequent 
five years, 1970–2003 
BE 0.22 – 0.77 0.45 0.13 – 0.79 0.4
DK 0.62 0.58 0.2 0.67 0.4 0.29
DE 0.04 – 0.09 0.46 – 0.21 – 0.49 0.63
EL 0.79 0.96 0.55 0.74 0.96 0.53
ES 0.56 0.9 0.1 0.48 0.87 0.22
FR 0.75 0.94 0.72 0.73 0.82 0.73
IE 0.89 0.79 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.9
IT – 0.13 – 0.79 0.38 – 0.14 – 0.83 0.35
NL 0.36 – 0.39 0.02 0.27 – 0.32 0.0
AT 0.58 – 0.58 0.76 0.53 – 0.68 0.78
PT 0.53 – 0.73 0.67 0.48 – 0.77 0.68
FI 0.54 0.57 0.14 0.59 0.63 0.32
SE 0.43 0.49 – 0.25 0.45 0.50 – 0.22
UK 0.47 0.67 – 0.04 0.44 0.67 0.11
Simple average 0.48 0.18 0.36 0.43 0.13 0.41
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budget deficits tend to be associated with lower invest-
ment rates, lower current account balances and weaker
trend GDP growth. Such relations also hold when
excluding reverse causation by using subsequent values
for investment, current account, and trend growth. While
the positive link between budget balances and current
accounts appears to be rather weak and driven to a large
extent by country-specific factors, the link between
budget balances and private investment shares is fairly
strong and robust, as is the link between budget balances
and subsequent trend growth. In spite of the fact that
such bivariate relations do not account for other possible
factors other than budget balances that may have helped
to shape developments in private investment, current
accounts or trend growth, they are consistent with the
expectation that persistent budget deficits may compro-
mise income prospects via investment crowding out.
3.3. Do budget deficits increase interest 
rates in the euro area?
The previous section has highlighted a quite strong and
robust positive correlation between budget balances
and private investment. Such positive relations are con-
sistent with the view that budget deficits, by reducing
national savings, lead to an increase in interest rates, an
increase in the user cost of capital and a consequent
reduction in private investment. As illustrated in Sec-
tion 2.3.1, the relation between deficits and interest
rates is crucial to assess a possible causal relation
between deficits and investment. Consistently, abun-
dant empirical work has been produced to test the rele-
vance of such a link in advanced economies. The aim
of the present section is that of investigating empiri-
cally the link between deficits and interest rates in
EMU countries. The analysis is limited to EMU coun-
tries to restrict the focus on countries characterised by
analogous exchange rate arrangements.
Long-term real interest rates are among the major deter-
minants of the cost of capital. In EU countries, the over-
all level of long-term interest rates depends in turn
largely on the rates paid on government bonds, which
have a high weight (more than 50 % of the total) on the
overall stock of long-term bonds issued (1). The current
level of nominal interest rates on 10-year government
bonds in euro-area countries is about half the rate for cor-
responding bonds that have been prevailing over the
1970s and the 1980s. Tables III.5 reports statistics on
annual data on nominal and interest rates on 10 govern-
ment bonds for euro-area countries over the past dec-
ades. Data for the 1990s are reported separately for the
different periods corresponding to the different phases of
EMU (Stage I, 1990–93; Stage II, 1994–98; Stage III,
1999 on). Distinguishing the evidence for the 1990s
between different sub-periods is necessary since that
decade was characterised by relevant changes in the
institutional and policy environment that explained
largely the behaviour of interest rates. Concerning the
criterion used to obtain average values across countries,
Table III.5 reports data both for simple and GDP-
weighted averages. Standard deviations are reported dis-
tinguishing between the cross-country component and
the variation over time, within each country.
Table III.5 shows that between the 1970s and the 1980s
average nominal long-term interest rates have been ris-
ing, while they have been falling throughout all the
1990s. Most of the movement in nominal interest rates
are explained by developments in the inflation rate.
Inflation rose on average during the 1970s, until the sec-
ond oil shock in the early 1980s. After that, the average
inflation rate in the euro area started falling, interrupted
by a period of rising inflation in the late 1980s and early
1990s. The disinflation which occurred in euro-area
countries starting from Stage II of EMU was partly a
result of macroeconomic policies directed at containing
inflation differentials to respect the Maastricht inflation
criterion, requiring inflation rates not higher than half a
point that of the average three best performing countries.
As illustrated in Graph III.4, nominal interest rates on
long-term government bonds of EMU countries con-
verged over the past decade towards the benchmark Ger-
man bond rates, and the convergence path was more
marked for the rates paid on bonds issued by countries
with a past history of higher inflation, like Greece, Italy
and Portugal.
Changes in real interest rates were also quite
considerable (2). During the 1970s, real interest rates on
long-term government bonds were very low or even neg-
ative in several EMU countries, as a result of high infla-
tion, restrictions on international capital movements and
administrative controls imposing the purchase of mini-
¥1∂ For further data and information see, e.g. European Commission (2001b).
¥2∂ The measure of real interest rates reported in Table III.5 consists of the dif-
ference between nominal rates and the realised yearly inflation rate.165
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2 0 0 4mum quantities of bonds to the banking system. Real
interest rates rose throughout the second half of the 1970s
and all the 1980s as a result of the elimination of most
administrative controls on capital and credit markets and
a generalised reduction in aggregate savings, aggravated
by rising government deficits in most EMU countries.
Throughout the 1990s, average real interest rates have been
on average falling. At the end of the decade the average
interest rate paid on 10-year government bonds in EMU
countries was about half that prevailing at the beginning of
the decade. Several factors contributed to this decline in real
interest rates and then in the cost of capital. During Stage I
of EMU remaining controls on intra-EU capital movements
were removed. This translated into a compression of the
interest rate spreads with respect to the German benchmark
rate (reflected in a falling standard deviation of interest rates
across countries, as reported in Table III.5).
Starting with Stage II of EMU falling real interest rates on
government bonds are attributable to both falling credit
risk and exchange rate risk premia. The fall in credit risk
in the mid-1990s corresponded to an upward revision in
debt rating by the major rating agencies for several coun-
tries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Finland, see, e.g. Dhan-
tine, Giavazzi and Von Thadden (2000)) (1). The reduc-
tion in exchange rate risk materialised already in the mid-
1990s as a result of the credibility of the respect of the
Maastricht criteria for inflation and for the exchange rate,
requiring currencies to remain within the ERM for two
consecutive years before the adoption of the euro. Reduc-
tion in exchange risk premia translated into considerable
reduction in interest rate spreads especially for countries
characterised by a structural tendency towards higher
inflation and repeated exchange rate devaluations like
Italy. By 1998, all exchange rate risk on EMU countries’
government bonds virtually disappeared. After the intro-
duction of the single currency, however, in spite of the
absence of exchange rate risk premia, cross-country real
interest rate differentials persisted, mainly explained by
differences in credit and liquidity risk.
The behaviour of public finances was relevant in several
respects in explaining developments in long-term inter-
est rates and therefore in the cost of capital in euro-area
countries. A first reason is that, as stressed previously,
government deficits contribute to the determination of
national savings and then to the determination of prevail-
ing real interest rates. While the 1980s were character-
ised by rising real interest rates, high deficits and grow-
ing government debts, in the 1990s the behaviour of such
variables reversed, with real interest rates falling, budget
balances improving and debt falling in most euro-area
countries. Secondly, public finances mattered also for
the dynamics of nominal long-term rates since actual and
perspective deficits and debts were key in conveying
expectations concerning inflation.
Thirdly, public finances were relevant in the determina-
tion of credit and exchange risk. Credit risk was directly
¥1∂ Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) show that in the second half of the
1990s the reduction in the interest rate spread of 10-year government
bonds with respect to the German benchmark rate is explained almost
entirely by falling credit risk for Italy and Spain.
Table III.5
Nominal interest rates on 10-year government bonds, EUR-12
1970–79 1980–89 1990–93 1994–98 1999–2002
Nominal interest rates
Simple average 9.5 12.1 10.2 7.7 5.1
GDP weighted average 6.6 8.8 7.6 5.6 3.2
Standard deviation across countries 1.9 3.7 4.5 2.4 0.2
Standard deviation within countries 1.4 2.2 1.2 2 0.3
Real interest rates
Simple average – 0.3 4 5.5 4.5 2.5
GDP weighted average 0.4 3.4 3.8 3.8 2
Standard deviation across countries 2.6 2.8 1.7 0.5 1.2
Standard deviation within countries 2.7 2 1.5 1.5 0.8
Source: Commission services.166
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by changed attitudes towards budget balances by fiscal
authorities (1). As for exchange rate risk, the state of
public finances was crucial in shaping the expectations
concerning the adoption of the single currency by some
countries, and the consequent disappearance of
exchange rate risk.
The relation between the euro-area (GDP-weighted)
average 10-year government bonds and the average
budget balance since 1990 is illustrated in Graph III.6.
The left-hand axis reports quarterly data for nominal
interest rates, the right-hand axis reports annual data for
the budget balance as a share of GDP. Interest rates show
a falling trend overall in the period; the upward sloping
pattern between 1994 and 1995 and 1999 and 2000 is
mainly explained by the contractionary stance of the US
monetary policy as a response to the over-heating of the
cycle. Conversely, the trend in the budget balance over
the whole period is broadly increasing. The opposite
behaviour of interest rates and budget balances is clearly
visible during the run-up to Maastricht, i.e. between
Stage II and Stage III of EMU. This relation between
EMU-wide averages captures tendencies that were
present in most countries, although with different inten-
sity. While the opposite pattern in interest rates and
budget balances is very clear throughout the whole
period in the case of Italy, the evidence is much weaker
for Germany.   2
As illustrated in Section 2.3.1 and in Box III.1, effi-
cient financial markets are likely to react to expected
rather than actual deficits. Expectation of higher future
deficits will consistently translate into expectations of
increasing interest rates. According to the expectation
theory, the term structure of interest rates would in
turn follow a steepening of the yield curve, i.e. an
increase in the spread between the returns on long- and
short-term bonds (2).   
¥1∂ See, e.g. Dhantine, Giavazzi and Von Thadden (2000), Codogno, Favero
and Missale (2003), Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004).
¥2∂ On the yield curve and the expectation theory of interest rates see, e.g.
Campbell (1995) and Rendu de Lindt and Stolin (2003). 
Graph III.4:  Convergence of long-term interest rates in the 1990s (10-year government bonds, 
euro-area countries)
Source: Commission services.
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Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002), the impact of fiscal
discipline on interest rates in EMU is assessed quantita-
tively by analysing the relation between expected defi-
cits and the term structure of government bond interest
rates (see Box III.3).
Alternative measures have been used for expected defi-
cits. The analysis focuses on the impact of these meas-
ures of expected deficits on the difference between the
interest rates on 10-year government bonds and 3-month
bills. The data cover EUR-11 countries for the 1990–
2002 period. The empirical analysis shows that expected
deficits have a statistically significant impact on interest
rates. Moreover, results appear to be fairly robust both
with respect to the measure of expected deficit used and
the specification of the empirical equation estimated.
The analysis shows that one additional GDP point of def-
icit raises long-term interest rates by about 15–20 basis
points. The estimated impact is consistent with that
reported in existing recent studies (see Table III.2).   
3.4. Budget balances and current 
accounts in euro-area countries 
and new Member States
The reduction in national savings resulting from govern-
ment deficits may translate into current account deficits
rather than into reduced investment. The extent to which
a reduction in national savings will fall on the current
account depends on a number of factors, primarily on the
degree of capital mobility. As for the consequences of
current account imbalances, they imply a reduction in
national income prospects due to the necessity of paying
back the accumulated external debt. Additional conse-
quences may arise if large current account imbalances
are recorded in countries that keep fixed a parity for their
exchange rate with a foreign currency or basket of cur-
rencies. If current accounts are perceived as unsustain-
able by markets, capital outflows and speculative attacks
may result, which may force countries to abandon the
chosen parity.
Graph III.5:  Long-term interest rates (left-hand axis) and budget balances (right-hand axis), 
euro-area average
Source: Commission services.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
199
0Q0
1
199
0Q0
3
199
1Q0
1
199
1Q0
3
199
2Q0
1
199
2Q0
3
199
3Q0
1
199
3Q0
3
199
4Q0
1
199
4Q0
3
199
5Q0
1
199
5Q0
3
199
6Q0
1
199
6Q0
3
199
7Q0
1
199
7Q0
3
199
8Q0
1
199
8Q0
3
199
9Q0
1
199
9Q0
3
200
0Q0
1
200
0Q0
3
200
1Q0
1
200
1Q0
3
200
2Q0
1
200
2Q0
3
200
3Q0
1
200
3Q0
3
– 4.5
– 4
– 3.5
– 3
– 2.5
– 2
– 1.5
– 1
– 0.5
0
0.5
Euro-zone general government 
net lending, % GDP (right axis)
Euro-zone nominal interest rates 
on 10 year bonds (left axis)
Start of EMU Stage II
Start of EMU Stage III168
P a r t  I I I
T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  f i s c a l  d i s c i p l i n eBox III.3: Assessing the impact of budget deficits on interest rates in the euro area
(Continued on the next page)
To assess the impact of budget deficits on interest rates, econometric analysis is carried out on a panel of euro-area coun-
tries. The methodology followed is akin to that in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) on the US case. The dependent var-
iable employed is the interest rate spread between long- and short-term bonds (i.e. between 10-year government bonds and
3-month bills). This approach permits the assessment of the impact of expected budget outcomes on financial asset returns
without modelling the determinants of interest rate levels. In particular, this approach permits the implementation of empir-
ical analysis on long-term interest rate developments without having to employ measures of long-term expected inflation
as explanatory variables, which inevitably imply a degree of arbitrariness.
The hypothesis is that an expectation of higher government deficits in the future induces an expectation of lower aggregate
savings and increased interest rates. Arbitrage in bond markets will equate returns on long-term bonds with average
expected future returns on short-term bonds. This will translate in turn into a steepening of the yield curve, i.e. an imme-
diate increase in the spread between long- and short-run interest rates.
Several measures of budget balances are used as explanatory factors. A first measure simply consists of the current budget
balance (as a share of GDP). Such a measure implicitly assumes static expectations by agents (i.e. that current values of
the budget balance satisfactorily proxy future expected values). A more direct measure of agents’ expectations employed
is the one year ahead budget balance forecast produced by the European Commission (1). A third measure used, aimed at
capturing agents’ expectations of budget balances over a longer time frame, is the simple average of the values recorded
in the cyclically adjusted budget balance over a time horizon of three years. This is the same approach followed for instance
in Bovenberg (1988) and Thomas and Abderrezak (1988) and is used given the absence of regularly produced medium-
term budgetary forecasts for EMU countries. The assumption underlying the forward actual value of the cyclically adjusted
budget balance is that agents’ expectations on the economic cycle over the medium run are unbiased (so that a null output
gap is expected), like those on cyclically adjusted budget balances.
The data-set comprises yearly data on all euro-area countries (except Luxembourg) for the 1990–2002 period. The selected
time period has been chosen in such a way to restrict the analysis to sufficiently homogenous observations keeping at the
same time a sufficiently large sample to carry out statistical inference. Including observations prior to 1990 would have
meant analysing in the same panel time periods characterised by controls on international capital movements and heavier
internal financial regulations. Excluding observations contained in the selected panel (e.g. data before the introduction of
the single currency) would have compromised the statistical significance of results.
In order to account for a possible impact of the different institutional regimes included in the sample on the term structure
of interest rates in the sample, two dummy variables have been included. One dummy takes value 1 for all the years fol-
lowing Stage II of EMU (i.e. all years from 1994 on) and the purpose of it is to capture the impact on interest rate expec-
tations associated with the start of the convergence process. The other dummy employed takes value 1 for all the years
following Stage III of EMU (i.e. all years from 1998 on) and the reason for its inclusion is to account for the effect of the
introduction of the single currency.
Since the expectations on interest rates are to a large extent driven by the perception of economic agents on cyclical devel-
opments (see, e.g. Rendu de Lindt and Stolin, 2003), the output gap is also included as a further explanatory factor for the
interest spread. To the extent that a low value of the current output gap is associated with expectations of a forthcoming
upturn in the cycle, while high output gaps tend to be associated with expectations of downturns, the regression coefficient
of the output gap is expected to be negative.
(1) Time-series data on Commission budget forecasts up to 1997 are available in Keereman (1999).169
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Table III.6
The relation between interest rate and government budget balances (EUR-11, 1990–2002)
Specifications
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget balance – 0.21***
(– 3.59)
– 0.16**
(– 2.44)
One year ahead budget balance 
forecast
– 0.16**
(– 2.02)
– 0.1
(– 1.26)
Three years ahead CAB – 0.2**
(– 2.09)
– 0.19**
(– 2.03)
Output gap – 0.11
(– 1.6)
– 0.165**
(– 2.34)
– 0.17***
(– 3.21)
EMU Stage II dummy 2.82***
(8.28)
2.78***
(7.45)
3.23***
(9.54)
2.74***
(7.99)
2.55***
(6.7)
3.02***
(9.12)
EMU Stage III dummy 0.82**
(2.76)
0.62**
(2.02)
– 0.01
(– 0.06)
0.94***
(3.10)
0.89***
(2.79)
0.5
(1.66)
Constant term – 1.48***
(– 5.62)
– 1.33***
(– 4.46)
– 1.87***
(– 4.89)
– 1.38***
(– 5.2)
– 1.13***
(– 3.93)
– 1.78***
(– 4.97)
Number of observations 123 121 107 123 121 107
R square within groups 0.42 0.37 0.57 0.43 0.39 0.59
Estimated error auto-regression 
coefficient
0.38 0.38 0.5 0.39 0.41 0.2
F statistic 26.31 21.51 42 20.39 17 34.25
NB: Dependent variable: difference between yearly average nominal interest rates between 10-year government notes and three-month bills. Estimation method: within-
panel regression correcting for error order one serial correlation.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at, respectively, 1, 5, and 10 % level.
Empirical estimates are produced using within-group panel regressions correcting for (first order) error autocorrelation by
means of a Cohrane-Orcutt procedure (1). Results are shown in Table III.6. Results for six different specifications are
reported. Regressions using each of the three alternative measures for expected deficits are performed with and without the
inclusion of the output gap as an additional explanatory factor.
Results show that the chosen specifications explain around 40 % of the within-group variance in interest rate spreads. The
negative coefficient for the constant term indicates that prior to the start of Stage II of EMU the slope of the yield curve in
EMU countries was on average negative, mainly reflecting a contractionary current stance of monetary policy and strong
deflationary expectations. The positive sign for the included dummy variables shows that starting from the early 1990s, inter-
est rate spreads over longer maturities turned positive. The output gap has the expected negative relationship with interest rate
spreads and is generally significant when included in the regression specifications. A non-significant coefficient is reported
in the specification using the current budget balance, possibly as a result of a multi-collinearity problem.
Budget balance measures enter all specifications with the expected sign and are almost always significant. Results show
that the impact of expected budget deficits is fairly robust and its magnitude does not depend crucially either on the meas-
ure chosen for expected deficits or on the particular specification of the estimated equation. The impact of an additional
1 GDP point of deficit increases the interest spread between long-term and short-term bonds by about 15–20 basis points.
Overall, the estimates are in line with those obtained in analogous recent analyses (see Table III.6).
(1) The estimation procedure is the same as in Canzoneri, Cumba and Diba (2002). In their case, the analysis is referred to the US, so that the corresponding
panel structure is a degenerate one with a single panel.170
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link between budget balances and the current account sepa-
rately for EMU countries and for the new Member States.
The overall current account balance for the euro-area
aggregate has remained fairly stable and of a relatively
low magnitude over the past decades (see Table III.7).
However, over time a tendency towards widening imbal-
ances at country level has emerged. This can be gauged
by looking at the simple average of the absolute value
of the current account imbalance across euro-area
countries (1). As reported in Table III.7, the average bal-
ance of the current account in euro-area countries has
been increasing over the 1970s and slightly fell during
the 1980s. Starting from the early 1990s an increase in
the average absolute values for current account balances
took place at an accelerated pace. Larger imbalances in
the current account registered at country level showed up
in an increased cross-country dispersion in current
account balances, as measured by the standard deviation
of such values.
Widening current account imbalances within the euro area
are consistent with increasing capital market integration
within the area. The removal of persisting formal barriers
to capital movements in 1990, financial deregulation and
innovation, and advancements in IT contributed to weaken
the link between national savings and domestic investment
among EU countries and within the euro area in
particular (2). Increasingly, savings are directed towards
the investment opportunities yielding the highest returns,
being those domestic or foreign. Increased capital mobility
corresponds to better conditions for external borrowing for
low per capita income, capital-scarce countries and
improved investment opportunities abroad for high per
capita income countries. The former will find it convenient
to borrow at lower cost from capital-abundant countries;
the latter will profit from investment opportunities opening
in capital scarce countries, characterised by higher
expected growth rates in their catching-up process. In this
way, a mutually convenient form of ‘inter-temporal’ trade
takes place, through which low income countries borrow
from their future income possibilities. Graph III.6 shows
average current account balances across euro-area coun-
tries distinguishing different sub-periods: the 1970s, the
1980s, and the different EMU phases in the 1990s. The
cross-country pattern is broadly consistent with the expec-
tation that high per capita income countries should exhibit
current account surpluses, while low income countries
should run deficits. Across the period considered, Greece,
Spain, and Portugal have been on average running deficits,
while Germany and the Benelux countries have been run-
ning surpluses. Over the 1990s, Ireland managed to turn
positive the large deficits accumulated in the previous dec-
ades, while the balance of the current account turned more
negative for Greece and Portugal. The largest imbalances
in current accounts are also observed in small Member
States. This is not only due to the fact that small countries
are relatively more open. The risks of over-heating (or
over-cooling) are in fact higher for small members of mon-
etary unions, given that the monetary stance of the union is
likely to be rather independent of their cyclical position.
The increased size and dispersion in current account
imbalances within the euro area is a sign of effective cap-
ital market integration. Such developments are likely to
bring about the beneficial effects of increased inter-tem-
poral trade. However, large and persistent current
account imbalances may pose a problem of adjustment,
especially if growth prospects turn out to be weaker than
¥1∂ The use of absolute values (so that negative balances are turned into posi-
tive) in constructing cross-country averages avoid offsetting large positive
current account balances in some countries being offset by large negative
balances in some other countries.
¥2∂ Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) reports evidence from panel data analysis
pointing to a decline over time in the regression coefficient between
domestic investment and national savings. Such a decline is present at
OECD level, stronger within the group of EU countries, even stronger
among euro-area countries. 
Table III.7
Current account balances in euro-area countries (EUR-11)
1970–79 1980–89 1990–93 1994–98 1998–2003
Euro-area aggregate (% of GDP) 0.26 – 0.12 – 0.35 0.63 0.52
Simple average of absolute value of euro-area countries’ 
current account balance (% of GDP)
1.44 2.12 1.76 2.77 3.28
Cross-country standard deviation of current account balances 2.08 2.47 2.19 3.27 4.43
Source: Commission services.171
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they deplete the stock of their net foreign assets. The
repayment of net foreign debt will require running cur-
rent account surpluses in the future. Depending on the
degree of wage and price flexibility, current account sur-
pluses can be obtained in two ways. Under flexible
prices, the current account can turn positive by means of
a reduction in the domestic price levels to improve
export competitiveness (i.e. to induce a depreciation of
the real exchange rate). This will entail in turn an
improvement in the trade balance (1). If prices are rigid
downward, current account surpluses require a compres-
sion in countries’ absorption (i.e. the sum of public and
private consumption and investment).
Budget balances play a major role in the adjustment
process. Avoiding an excessively expansionary fiscal
stance is a major requirement to prevent overheating of
the economy, contain inflationary pressures and facili-
tate the adjustment in terms of trade. Moreover, keeping
a balanced fiscal stance helps to maintain government
deficits low, and this directly contributes to reduce
domestic absorption, thus freeing resources to finance
current account surpluses.
The tendency towards an increasing size and dispersion
in current account imbalances within the euro area has
implications for the budgetary policy conduct of Mem-
ber States. An additional warning against the use of dis-
cretionary expansionary fiscal policies emerges espe-
cially for small countries with structural tendencies
towards current account deficit positions. For such coun-
tries, avoiding high and persistent budget deficits would
be important to prevent the risk of having to incur into
strongly contractionary budgetary policies in the future
to ease the external adjustment (2).
The current account positions of the new Member States
can be a matter of more urgent concern. In recent years,
all new Member States have recorded sizeable current
account deficits. Graph III.7 reports the average value
over the period 1999–2003, computed on the data avail-
able in the AMECO database. As remarked in the case of
low-income euro-area countries, the current account def-
icits in new Member States are the result of capital mar-
ket integration with the rest of the EU. Starting from the
mid-1990s, large capital flows moved from overall
Europe to the countries of new accession. A substantial
share of these capital flows has consisted of foreign
¥1∂ Under this type of adjustment, perspective consumption possibilities will
be reduced by the deterioration in the terms of trade which normally
accompanies the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
¥2∂ See also Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004) for analysis and discus-
sion of the role of budgetary policy in the adjustment process for small
euro-area countries.
Graph III.6:  Current account balances in euro-area countries, % of GDP, averages 
over selected periods
Source: Commission services.
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acquisitions of existing, formerly publicly-owned, pro-
ductive assets. Over the same period, new Member
States have been characterised by deficits in government
budgets of considerable magnitude, exceeding 5 % of
GDP in some cases (Graph III.7).
The link between fiscal positions and current accounts
for new Member States should be evaluated differently
compared with euro-area countries. At present, the coun-
tries of new accession adopt different exchange rate
regimes (from free float to currency board) but in per-
spective, as a requirement for adopting the euro, the cur-
rencies of the new Member States will have to partici-
pate in ERM II for at least two years (1). During this
period, the stability of the currencies will be a crucial
factor to qualify for the subsequent stages of monetary
integration. Currency stability will mainly depend upon
expectations concerning the sustainability of current
accounts and future fiscal behaviour (2). Capital account
perspectives are a primary factor for current account sus-
tainability. Capital inflows to new Member States may
continue to be large and even increase on the road to the
adoption of the euro.
However, the volatility of the capital account, and with
that the risk of sudden capital flights, may increase for
several reasons (3).
A first reason is that foreign direct investment flows to
the new Member States may not remain at the relatively
high levels recorded in the recent past. This would imply
a re-composition of capital inflows towards more vola-
tile portfolio investments.
A second reason is that capital movements will become
more sensitive to changes in expectations concerning the
timing of euro adoption. The expected date of adoption
will shape the expectations on the returns on investments
directed to the new Member States, thereby having an
impact on the actual capital flows to these countries.
Concerning fiscal behaviour, the budgetary policies that
will be adopted by the new Member States in the coming
years will contribute to shape market expectations
concerning future developments in deficits and debt in
¥1∂ New Member States do not have the possibility of opting-out, i.e. their par-
ticipation in the Union also implies the adoption of the euro at some stage.
¥2∂ On this point see also European Commission (2002a, 2002b). 
¥3∂ See, e.g. Begg et al. (2003), Kontolemis (2003), and Schadler et al. (2004)
for a discussion of the topic.
Graph III.7:  Budget balances and current account balances in the new Member States 
(% of GDP, average over data available in the AMECO database for the 1999–2003 period)
Source: Commission services.
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evant factor for the perceived long-term sustainability of
current accounts. Moreover, since countries of new
accession will have to respect the Maastricht deficit cri-
terion to qualify for the single currency, expectations on
the new Member States’ fiscal policies will also contri-
bute to determine expectations on the timing of euro
adoption. Finally, avoiding an excessively expansionary
fiscal stance would help to prevent the possibility of
overheating and the emergence of bubbles in housing
and equity markets. For the above reasons, prudent
budgetary policies will be a key factor for the stability of
the currencies of the new Member States within ERM II.
3.5. The economic effects of the EU fiscal 
framework
The preceding sections have shown evidence consistent
with the view that in the past few decades budget deficits
in EU countries may have crowded out private invest-
ment via debt accumulation and increased interest rates.
This section aims at assessing to what extent the EU
rules-based fiscal framework for fiscal discipline
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact
induced public finance consolidations resulting in a con-
traction in output via Keynesian multipliers and to what
extent it instead contributed to growth by limiting the
crowding out effect associated with high and persistent
deficits. There are two major difficulties with such an
analysis. Firstly, there is the necessity of disposing of
counterfactual information on what would have been the
level of budget balances in the absence of the EU rules
for fiscal discipline. In particular, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish to what extent the reduction in budget deficits
that occurred in the second half of the 1990s in many EU
countries was the effect of the requirements of fiscal dis-
cipline in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP and to what
extent it was instead a response to high debt levels that
would have occurred in any case. Secondly, a general
equilibrium analytical setting is required to analyse the
impact of such counterfactual budget balances on aggre-
gate demand components, debt and interest rates. Taking
into account the above analytical requirements, the strat-
egy performed the analysis as follows. In a first step, ‘fis-
cal rules’ are estimated, describing the reaction of fiscal
authorities (in terms of chosen levels of budget balances)
to major macroeconomic variables, such as the cyclical
position (which presupposes that fiscal authorities pur-
sue a cycle stabilisation motive) and the level of debt
(debt stabilisation motive). Such fiscal rules are esti-
mated for two different sub-periods: before and after the
start of Stage II of EMU. It is shown that the reaction of
fiscal authorities in the two sub-periods changes quite
significantly, with a greater weight put on the debt stabi-
lisation motive after the start of Stage II of EMU. The
estimated change in the parameters for the fiscal rules
(summarising the behaviour of fiscal authorities) is inter-
preted as resulting from the introduction of the EU fiscal
framework. Counterfactual budget balances in absence
of the Treaty and SGP provisions are obtained from pre-
dictions using the fiscal rules for the period before EMU
Stage II. In the second step of the analysis, such counter-
factual levels of budget balances are used to simulate by
means of the European Commission QUEST II model
which would have been the performance in terms of
aggregate output in absence of the EU fiscal framework.
In order to work on a sample of countries which is suffi-
ciently homogenous from the viewpoint of the working
of the major macroeconomic relations (among which are
those relating to monetary policies and exchange rates)
only euro-area countries are considered for the analysis.
3.5.1. How did the introduction of the EU fiscal 
framework modify the behaviour of budget 
balances?
The empirical estimation of fiscal rules summarising the
behaviour of fiscal authorities has become common prac-
tice in the applied analysis of budgetary policies (1). The
aim is that of identifying a limited set of macroeconomic
determinants that explain developments in budget balances.
Most of the proposed fiscal rules assume that budget bal-
ances depend on the cyclical conditions of the economy and
on debt levels. The idea is that fiscal authorities are moti-
vated by an objective of output stabilisation (so that chosen
budget balances should respond positively to expected out-
put gaps) and by debt stabilisation motive (so that a positive
response of budget balances to the existing stock of debt is
expected) (2). As for the budget measures employed in the
empirical estimation of fiscal rules, use is generally made of
budget balances net of interest payments, given that this
budget item is not directly under the control of fiscal author-
ities. In some analyses (e.g. Gali and Perotti, 2003) the
dependent variable employed in estimating fiscal rules is
the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Using such a meas-
ure of countries’ fiscal position presupposes that fiscal
authorities decide about the level of the budget anticipating
¥1∂ See, e.g. Von Hagen, Hugues-Hallet and Strauch (2001), Ballabriga and
Mongay (2002), Melitz (2002), Gali and Perotti (2003).
¥2∂ Formally, most of the fiscal rules estimated in existing work can be derived
as the outcome of a problem in which fiscal authorities choose budget bal-
ances in such a way to minimise a loss function which increases with the
output gap and the distance of the actual debt level from target.174
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nues and expenditures and permits the analysis of the mac-
roeconomic determinants of ‘discretionary’ fiscal policy.
Concerning the explanatory variables that have been
included in existing empirical work on fiscal rules, the out-
put gap is generally used as a measure for the cycle, while
the lagged debt/GDP ratio is normally used to capture the
debt stabilisation motive of fiscal authorities. The lagged
dependent variable (e.g. the primary budget balance) is
quite often included in the empirical specification to allow
for a role of inertia in budgetary policy.
Table III.8 reports the results for panel data estimation of
fiscal rules across EUR-11 countries. Annual data for the
period 1987–2003 are taken from the AMECO database.
The specification chosen follows that in Gali and Perotti
(2003). Two alternative dependent variables have been
considered: the primary balance and the primary cycli-
cally adjusted budget balance. The explanatory variables
included are the output gap, the 1-year lagged debt/GDP
ratio and the lagged dependent variable (1). To account
for endogeneity issues (i.e. the fact that not only the out-
put gap affects budget variables but also that budgetary
policy has an impact on the cycle) the output gap has
been instrumented with its own 1-year lag and the US
lagged output gap (2). The chosen specification has been
estimated separately for the sub-sample 1970–93 (before
the EU fiscal framework) and the 1994–2003 sub-period
(after the introduction of the EU fiscal framework).
Several results of interest emerge from the estimation of
fiscal rules. A first finding is that while before the intro-
duction of the EU fiscal framework budget measures
(both primary budget balances and primary cyclically
adjusted budget balances) were not significantly affected
by the output gap, after Stage II of EMU the output gap
has a significantly positive impact of primary balances,
while the coefficient for the primary cyclically budget
balance remains non-significant but turns from negative
to positive. This finding disconfirms the view that the
introduction of the EU fiscal framework has resulted in
a less counter-cyclical stance for fiscal policy in EU
countries (3). A second major result is that both primary
and primary cyclically adjusted budget balances react
positively to debt levels. The regression coefficient for
the lagged debt/GDP ratio is positive and significant in
both sub-periods irrespective of the budget measure used
as dependent variable. This supports the view that fiscal
authorities pursue debt stabilisation objectives when
deciding about budgetary policy. Moreover, it is worth
noting that the magnitude of the coefficient of the debt
variable increases after the introduction of the EU fiscal
framework, meaning that such a debt stabilisation objec-
tive has become more relevant after Stage II of EMU (4).
Finally, results show that the degree of inertia in budget
balances has diminished after the introduction of the EU
fiscal framework. The regression coefficient for the
lagged dependent variable drops from about 0.7 to
about 0.45 after Stage II of EMU.
In summary, the estimated fiscal rules indicate that the
introduction of the EU fiscal framework resulted in an
enhanced debt stabilisation motive for fiscal authorities
and a reduced degree of inertia in budgetary policy. As
for the reaction of budgets to cyclical conditions, there is
no evidence that it became more pro-cyclical. Overall,
the results from panel data estimation reported in
Table III.8 suggest that the introduction of the EU fiscal
framework led to an improvement in budget balances.
Primary budget balances (both nominal and cyclically
adjusted) became in fact more sensitive to debt levels
and easier to adjust over time (5).
3.5.2. Which impact did the EU fiscal framework 
have on economic activity?
The estimation of fiscal rules as reported in Table III.8
allows for the construction of counterfactual budget bal-
ance values in absence of the EU fiscal framework. In
other words, they can obtain an estimation of which
¥1∂ The results reported in Table III.8 refer to output gap data obtained as the
percentage difference between actual and trend (HP-filtered) output. Esti-
mates have also been performed using potential output computed through
the European Commission production function approach (see, Denis,
McMorrow and Roeger (2002)) and very similar results have been
obtained.
¥2∂ More generally, the use of the lagged dependent variable in panel data
analysis raises an issue of inconsistency of estimates, generally addressed
by relying on GMM estimators. However, given the purpose of the present
analysis (understanding how fiscal rules changed after the introduction of
the EU fiscal framework) and the relatively small sample used this issue of
inconsistency is likely to be of small relevance.
¥3∂ The same result is obtained in Gali and Perotti (2003).
¥4∂ This result does not depend on the chosen year for splitting the sample.
Similar estimates are obtained adopting 1992 as the first year of the work-
ing of the new regime characterised by the EU fiscal framework (as in Gali
and Perotti (2003)). Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004) analyse the
robustness of the coefficient on debt on regression specifications analo-
gous to those reported in Table III.8 and find that for most EU countries
the change in the debt coefficient is the highest in the mid-1990s. The
choice of the sample length for the period preceding the introduction of the
EU fiscal framework may instead affect the result, as indicated by the
smaller change in the debt coefficient in Gali and Perotti (2003) who do
not include data for the 1970s. 
¥5∂ The reduction in the degree of inertia of budget balances after the introduc-
tion of the EU fiscal framework is captured by the reduction in the value of
the regression coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.175
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absence of the EU fiscal framework but allowing fiscal
authorities to follow their output and debt stabilisation
motives. Disposing of such counterfactual values for
budget balances is a necessary first step to assess the
impact of the EU fiscal framework on economic activity.
The computation of counterfactual budget balances
requires using the fiscal rules estimated before the intro-
duction of the EU fiscal framework to predict values for
the budget balances for the following period. Results
show that in the 1994–2003 period, primary budget bal-
ances for the euro-area aggregate would have been
higher by 0.88 GDP points on average in absence of the
EU fiscal framework (1). Though such figures have to be
taken cautiously (mainly due to the limited degrees of
freedom available for estimating predicted budget bal-
ances) they can serve as a benchmark for further quanti-
tative analysis. The computed difference between coun-
terfactual and actual values for primary budget balances
for the euro area have been used as shocks to the Euro-
pean Commission QUEST II model to simulate which
consequences the absence of the rules for fiscal disci-
pline of the Maastricht Treaty and SGP would have had
on euro-area economies (2).
To focus the simulation analysis on the effects of the size
budget deficits rather than on those of the composition of
budgetary adjustment, such shocks to budget balances
have been equally split between revenues and expendi-
tures in the QUEST II model (3).
Three cases are considered. In the first case, the credit risk
premium on government bonds is assumed not to react to
deficits and debt. In the latter two cases, risk premia are
assumed to increase with the level of government debt.
Based on existing empirical work on the relation between
debt and interest rates (surveyed in Table III.2) and, more
directly, on the relation between debt and risk premia (sur-
veyed in Section 2.3.5), in the second case risk premia are
assumed to increase by 1 basis point for each additional
GDP point of government debt, while in the third case
considered the risk premia are assumed to increase by
2 basis points for each GDP point of debt.
Table III.9 reports simulation results for the case in
which risk premia are assumed not to react to debt. The
fiscal loosening implied by the shock applied to primary
budget balances amounts to an ex post increase in the
deficit to GDP ratios of about 1 GDP point on average
for the euro-area aggregate. The simulated fiscal relaxa-
tion leads to a build-up of government debt over time; by
2003 the debt/GDP ratio is almost 8 GDP points higher
compared with baseline.
Results indicate that the simulated fiscal loosening
boosts output via increased aggregate demand (posi-
tive fiscal multipliers). However, the positive output
effects of such fiscal expansion are relatively small
and tend to vanish over time (4). The small value of the
fiscal multiplier is associated with forward-looking
behaviour by private agents, which tend to save part of
the increased disposable income in anticipation of
higher future tax liabilities (5). The fact that the GDP
expansion falls over time is related with the crowding-
out of investment.
The simulated persistent increase in budget deficits leads
to an accumulation of government debt, to higher long-
term interest rates and to a reduction in private invest-
ment that becomes stronger over the years (6).
¥1∂ Such predictions have been obtained after estimating fiscal rules as in
Table III.8 separately for each country. To construct the counterfactual pri-
mary budget balance for a given country in the 1994–2003 period
( ) the vector of the estimated coefficients for the 1970–93
period ( ), the vector of explanatory variables and the esti-
mated regression residuals for the 1994–2003 period (respectively,
 and ) has been used as follows:
,
where “’” denotes vector transposition.
¥2∂ See Roeger and in’t Veld (1997) for a description of the features of the
QUEST II model.
¥3∂ More precisely, the shock to primary budget balances is equally split
between taxes and expenditures. Shocks to taxes are in turn equally
divided among three tax rates (labour income tax, corporate profit tax and
value added taxes) and expenditures equally divided between transfers to
households and government consumption. The shocks are applied to the
value of fiscal variables for the period 1994–2010. 
b^t 1994 2003[ , ]∈
α1970 1993–
Xt 1994 2003[ , ]∈ εt 1994 2003[ , ]∈
b^t 1994 2003[ , ]∈ α1970 1993–
,
Xt 1994 2003[ , ]∈ εt 1994 2003[ , ]∈+=
¥4∂ An ex ante increase in the deficit of almost 0.9 GDP points leads at most to
increased output by 0.3 points. This implies a value of the fiscal multiplier
much smaller than predicted by standard Keynesian theory (higher than
unity). A further reason for the relatively small GDP impact is related to
the crowding-out of the fiscal expansion via the trade balance. The fiscal
expansion is accompanied in fact by a jump appreciation of the exchange
rate, followed by a gradual depreciation in the following years. The loss in
competitiveness leads to a worsening of the trade balance.
¥5∂ The simulated fiscal shock destabilises debt. However, a solution for the
inter-temporal equilibrium in the model requires debt to be stable in the
long run, which is achieved by a delayed increase in tax rates. Due to
agents’ forward-looking behaviour and rational expectations such future
increases in tax liabilities are anticipated.
¥6∂ Nominal short-term interest rates are determined by a monetary policy rule
which targets expected inflation and the output gap and assumes no change
in the equilibrium real interest rate. Long-term interest rates are obtained
from the arbitrage condition across the term structure. The fiscal expansion
simulated here has a small positive effect on inflation and output and inter-
est rates rise. 176
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incorporate an additional risk premium effect of
1 basis point per 1 percentage point increase in gov-
ernment debt (1). This is probably on the low side of
the range of estimates found in the literature, so that
an alternative scenario with a risk premium of 2 basis
points for a 1 percentage point increase in the debt/
GDP ratio is also reported (Table III.9 c). Simulation
results when risk premia are assumed to react to debt
levels are markedly different from those in the case
where the risk premium is assumed to be independent
of debt. The positive GDP effects of increased deficits
are now short-lived and turn negative after a few years
of the simulated regime of increased persistent defi-
cits. The main reason is that the impact of debt accu-
mulation on risk premium leads to a bigger increase in
interest rates, to a smaller positive impact on con-
sumption and to a stronger degree of crowding out of
private investment (2). When the risk premium is
assumed to increase by 2 basis points for a 1 percent-
age point increase in the debt/GDP (Table III.9 c), ris-
ing interest rates offset the direct increase in aggre-
gate demand associated with increased deficits
already in the short run.
Summarising, the simulations performed with European
Commission QUEST model suggest that the introduc-
tion of the EU fiscal framework (modelled as an increase
in primary balances by 0.88 GDP points in the euro area)
may have had a negative impact on aggregate demand
and output for some years. However, such negative
impact on aggregate demand is likely to have been quite
moderate (entailing a reduction in output by at most half
a percentage point). Moreover, current and future growth
prospects are rather likely to have benefited from the EU
rules-based framework for fiscal discipline. The simula-
tions show that in the absence of such a framework the
Table III.8
The EU fiscal framework and budgetary behaviour (EUR-11)
Dependent variable
Primary budget balance Primary cyclically adjusted budget balance 
1970–93 1994–2003 1970–93 1994–2003
Output gap – 0.066
(– 1)
0.363***
(– 3.93)
– 0.086
(– 1.5)
0.097
(1.39)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.027***
(4.5)
0.085***
(5.03)
0.03***
(5.4)
0.067***
(4.04)
Lagged dependent variable 0.74***
(14.9)
0.47***
(6.31)
0.69***
(15.46)
0.45***
(5.78)
Constant term – 1.37***
(– 4.3)
– 4.85***
(– 3.95)
– 1.5***
(– 5)
– 3.51***
(– 2.99)
Number of observations 238 110 238 110
R square within groups 0.57 0.63 0.62 0.47
Wald Chi square 319.4 875.61 371.76 916.5
NB: Estimation method: instrumental variables fixed effects panel regression. The output gap variable is instrumented using its own lag and the lagged US output gap.
All variables are expressed as a percentage of trend output.
Z statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at, respectively, 1, 5, and 10 % level.
¥1∂ In this simulation a risk premium is added to the uncovered interest parity
condition in the model, which relates expected exchange rate changes to
interest rate differentials. The risk premium is a function of the differences
in the debt/GDP ratio from that in the baseline. Note also that the assumed
change in the risk premium refers to ex ante variables, and that the ex post
effect on interest rates is determined also by the central bank’s response to
the output gap and inflation gap.
¥2∂ The negative impact of higher interest rates on consumption expenditure is
due to stronger discounting to future income flows and the consequent
reduction in consumers’ permanent income. It should be noted that in such
a case the increased risk premium leads to a capital flight, a depreciation
rather than an appreciation of the euro-dollar exchange rate and therefore
to an improvement rather than a worsening of the trade balance. 177
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increased by about 8 GDP points over the period 1994–
2003. This would have implied upward pressure on
interest rates, crowding-out of private investment and
reduced long-term growth prospects. The simulations
show that what may appear a relatively small impact of
increased debt on interest rate risk premia (1 to 2 basis
points for each additional percentage point in the debt/
GDP ratio, as found in empirical evidence) can instead
matter quite considerably for the impact of persistent
deficits on growth. When risk premia are assumed to be
affected by debt, simulations show that the absence of
fiscal discipline would have had a negative impact on
economic activity already in the medium run.
Of course, such results are also suggestive of what a loss
of fiscal discipline in the future may imply. Increased
permanent deficits may have a positive impact on aggre-
gate demand, but this effect will probably be small and
short-lived. Over the medium run, private investment
crowding-out will become the major driver, and poten-
tial growth will suffer.
Table III.9
Counterfactual simulation of ‘no fiscal discipline’ (euro-area aggregate)
(a) No impact of deficit and debt on government bond interest rate risk premia
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2010
GDP (% difference from baseline) 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 – 0.1
Consumption (% difference from baseline) 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62
Investment (% difference from baseline) – 0.9 –1 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.9 – 2 – 3.2
Long-term interest rate 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 – 0.2
Deficit/GDP 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.89 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.9 0.94
Debt/GDP 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.25 1.16 2.03 2.88 3.69 4.49 5.26 6.07 6.9 7.61 12.1
(b) Risk premium on government bond interest rate rises by 1 basis point for each GDP point of debt
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2010
GDP (% difference from baseline) 0.2 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.04 0 – 0 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3
Consumption (% difference from baseline) 0.36 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.3 0.38
Investment (% difference from baseline) – 1.6 – 2 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 4.1
Long-term interest rate 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.2 – 0.1
Deficit/GDP 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.92 1 1 1.01 0.98 0.96 1.04 1.02 0.99 0.96 1.01
Debt/GDP 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.3 1.25 2.2 3.1 3.94 4.79 5.57 6.4 7.26 7.99 12.6
(c) Risk premium on government bond interest rate rises by 2 basis points for each GDP point of debt
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2010
GDP (% difference from baseline) 0.15 0.08 0 – 0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5
Consumption (% difference from baseline) 0.17 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0 0.13
Investment (% difference from baseline) – 2.5 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 4 – 4.2 – 4.5 – 4.8 -5 – 5.1 – 5.2
Long-term interest rate 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.17 0.18 0.2 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.3 0
Deficit/GDP 
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.96 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.01 0.99 1.1 1.09 1.05 1.02 1.08
Debt/GDP
(absolute difference from baseline, % points)
0.36 1.35 2.39 3.33 4.22 5.12 5.9 6.76 7.65 8.4 13.1
NB: Description of shock: the primary budget balance is increased by 0.88 GDP points compared with baseline for the period 1993–2010.
Source: Simulations with the European Commission QUEST II model. 178
Part IV
The quality of public finances:
What role within the EU framework 
for economic policy coordination?

Summary
Besides recognising that achieving and maintaining
sound budgetary positions is essential for its success, the
Lisbon strategy has highlighted the importance of
improving the quality of public finances. This part of the
report endeavours to clarify the role of the quality of
public finances within the EU framework of economic
policy coordination and investigates possibilities for
improving the quality of public finances in practice.
The analysis proposes a broad definition of the quality of
public finances. According to this definition quality con-
cerns the allocation of resources and the most effective
and efficient use of those resources in relation to identi-
fied strategic priorities. Regarding the priorities, the EU
Lisbon strategy includes sustainable growth, full
employment, social cohesion and competitiveness. A
full discussion of all these aims would go beyond the
scope of this report. Therefore, the first part of the chap-
ter focuses on the link between fiscal policy and long-
term growth, while recognising the partial nature of such
an analysis. It begins with a review of the recent litera-
ture on the link between the composition of public
expenditure and revenue and long-term growth. The
findings of existing studies confirm the importance of
taking into account both the costs (i.e. higher taxation)
and benefits (i.e. reaching policy objectives) of public
spending to undertake a meaningful analysis of such a
link. The major difficulties that have been encountered
in existing empirical studies concern the question of
which expenditures should be considered as ‘productive’
(i.e. growth-enhancing) and which are instead to be clas-
sified as ‘unproductive’. Although there is a degree of
agreement that a few categories of public expenditure
can quite safely be included among ‘productive’ public
expenditures because they are directly aimed at produc-
tivity improvements (e.g. R & D, education and infra-
structure investment) there is no consensus among
researchers concerning the impact of most expenditure
items on long-term growth. This lack of consensus is
reflected by the fact that available classifications of ‘pro-
ductive’ expenditure in the EU range between 5 and
44 % of total public expenditure, depending on which
expenditure categories are seen as ‘productive’. Macro-
economic data on the composition of public expenditure
in fact cannot account for the relevant heterogeneity of
expenditure items within a given category concerning
their impact on productivity growth. In view of these dif-
ficulties, the report also investigates the microeconomic
approach to identifying productive expenditure, which is
to analyse individual projects on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis. On this aspect, the analysis concludes that cost-
benefit analysis is theoretically sound, widely used in
practice and that the scope for learning from interna-
tional practices is large given that several countries have
undertaken projects to refine the methodology for apply-
ing cost-benefit analysis at national level.
A macroeconomic approach has also been adopted to
investigate patterns and determinants of the recomposi-
tion of public expenditure across EU countries. It
focuses on two questions: (i) how did the composition
of public expenditure change over time and (ii) what
may have been the driving factors of changes in the
composition of public expenditure? The outcome for
the Member States for which data were available shows
that, over the period of 1991–2002, social protection
and healthcare expenditure increased their share in total
expenditure. This suggests that the main drivers of
expenditure composition over the medium/long-term
are the underlying upward pressures such as those
related to ageing and that the discussion on reallocating
funds in line with priorities cannot abstract from such
ongoing tendencies.
A microeconomic and institutional perspective is
adopted to investigate the second part of the definition of
quality, i.e. the effective and efficient use of resources
towards identified priorities. It shows that several Mem-
ber States have introduced reforms to the budgetary
process that aim at achieving society’s priorities in the
most efficient and effective way by linking public
expenditure to policy outcomes (performance-budget-181
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4ing). In this respect, the empirical literature arrives at a
balanced judgement as to what can be achieved through
such reforms, especially given difficulties in identifying
appropriate outcome targets, while still concluding that
sizeable efficiency gains may be possible through such
reforms.
The next sections of the part then continue the institu-
tional analysis by showing how strategies for better con-
trolling public expenditure, reallocating funds to their
most ‘productive’ uses and lasting fiscal consolidation
on the expenditure side can contribute to a higher growth
potential. Firstly, effective expenditure control is a pre-
condition for performance-budgeting. Secondly, effec-
tive medium-term expenditure frameworks can also
facilitate the political decision-making process of reallo-
cation funds between broad expenditure categories.
Thirdly, the analysis shows that countries with stronger
institutional frameworks for expenditure control gener-
ally showed expenditure-based fiscal consolidation,
while many other countries relied on raising revenues in
times of fiscal consolidation. The implementation of
such strategies of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation
depends not only on the introduction of the appropriate
budgetary institutions, however, but also requires the
political will to do so. In this respect, the data show that
many of the countries that had established a track record
of expenditure control — while at the same time
strengthening budgetary institutions that aim at using
existing funds better — have almost immediately used
the increased room for manoeuvre and slackened the
reins in recent years.
Finally, this part of the report stresses that issues related to
the composition of the budget are a national competency. In
addition, the EU has an important role to play in encourag-
ing public finances that are supportive of the objectives of
the Union, in particular those of the Lisbon strategy. Over-
all, the analysis implies that the allocation of resources and
the monitoring of action undertaken to pursue identified pri-
orities should have a greater role in the analysis and conduct
of fiscal policy. To this end the broad economic policy
guidelines (BEPGs) should contribute more effectively, as
well as other EU processes, such as the European employ-
ment strategy and the open method of coordination of social
protection, to improve the quality of public finances.
Progress should also include, firstly, the exchange of
information on how strategic priorities have been fixed
with respect to national budgets and what the experi-
ences with implementing them have been. Secondly, fur-
ther improvements in data availability are needed — in
particular regarding the functional classification of gov-
ernment expenditure — since this is a necessary condi-
tion for an appropriate analysis of the contribution of
public finances to agreed priorities. Thirdly, a proper
design and implementation of medium-term expenditure
frameworks and progress in cost-benefit analysis and
performance-budgeting would help to improve both the
control and allocation of existing funds.182
1. Introduction
The Lisbon strategy has highlighted the strategic impor-
tance of improving both the sustainability of public
finances and their quality. However, while the EU fiscal
framework lays down the principles and procedures for
achieving fiscal sustainability, the principles for improv-
ing the quality of public finances have not yet been inte-
grated in a systematic way within the framework of EU
policy coordination or within the EU fiscal framework.
A consensus seems to have developed that it is important
to redirect public expenditure towards ‘productive’
items and to ensure that tax structures strengthen the
growth potential (1), but there is no sufficient under-
standing yet on the best way of making such an approach
operational. The central theme in this part is to discuss
the concept of quality in the EU framework of economic
policy coordination, with the purpose of facilitating a
policy discussion on how the quality of public finances
could be improved in practice. Naturally, the question of
what could be done at the level of the Member States and
what could be done at the level of the EU is an important
issue and it will therefore be addressed in Section 2, tak-
ing subsidiarity as the guiding principle.
Section 2 starts with conceptual issues. It proposes a
broad definition of the concept of quality and shows how
quality fits with the existing objectives of the EU frame-
work for economic policy coordination. Sections 3 and 4
then view the topic of quality from different perspectives
in order to identify possible policy instruments. As a
starting point of the analysis, Section 3 takes a macr-
oeconomic perspective that concentrates on the potential
contribution of budgetary aggregates and items (i.e. the
composition of the budget) to long-term growth. It then
compares the composition of public expenditure across
countries and over time and presents an empirical analy-
sis of the factors that may have influenced changes in
individual expenditure categories. It ends with a short
review of the possible interaction between the size of the
public sector and the long-term growth rate. Next, Sec-
tion 4 takes a microeconomic perspective that focuses on
the tools and institutions that can be helpful for enhanc-
ing the quality of public finances in practice. It concen-
trates on cost-benefit analysis as the principal tool for
identifying ‘productive’ investment (which includes all
social costs and benefits from government intervention
and thereby also addresses issues related to ensuring a
sustainable economic development), and on institutional
arrangements for linking public expenditure to policy
outcomes in order to improve the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public expenditure. Furthermore, this section
also shows how the relevant policy objective from a
microeconomic perspective (an efficient allocation of
resources) and a central policy objective in the macro-
economic approach (i.e. long-term growth) are related.
Section 5 then draws the whole analysis together by
focusing on the consistency of fiscal sustainability and
quality. It shows how strategies for better controlling
public expenditure, fiscal consolidation on the expendi-
ture side and reallocating funds to their best uses can
contribute to long-term growth. Finally, it should be
noted that the approach throughout the whole of this part
is to briefly discuss theory and to concentrate more on
empirical comparisons across EU countries (2) where
data were available.
¥1∂ See guideline 14 in Council recommendations of 26 June 2003 on the
broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and the
Community (for the 2003–05 period) (2003/555/EC).
¥2∂ The new Member States have always been included in the analysis where
data were available.183
2. The concept of quality
2.1. The three dimensions of budgeting
The overall objectives of the broad economic policy
guidelines (BEPGs) as the overarching instrument for
economic policy-making in the EU are defined in the
Treaty, Article 98: ‘Member States shall conduct their
economic policies with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Community, as
defined in Article 2, and in the context of the broad eco-
nomic guidelines referred to in Article 99(2). The Mem-
ber States and the Community shall act in accordance
with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition, favouring an efficient allocation of
resources …’. Article 2 then provides a list of objectives
that includes ‘to promote economic and social progress
and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced
and sustainable development …’.
Within this general framework, the coordination of fiscal
policies at the level of the EU is geared towards ensuring
sound public finances. This includes aggregate fiscal
discipline as well as the principle of automatic stabilisa-
tion over the economic cycle. However, these are not the
only functions of national budgets. Apart from these
macroeconomic functions, national budgets also per-
form the function of the allocation of public resources.
More specifically, it is generally accepted that it is pos-
sible to examine budgetary policies ‘in three dimen-
sions’ (Atkinson and van den Noord, 2001), to ‘identify
budgetary outcomes at three levels’ (World Bank, 1998)
or to distinguish ‘three objectives of budgeting’ (Schick,
2002). These three dimensions, levels or objectives of
budgeting are:
• aggregate fiscal discipline;
• allocation of resources in accordance with strategic
priorities;
• efficient and effective use of resources in the imple-
mentation of strategic priorities.
An alternative way of rewriting the three dimensions of
budgeting — which aligns them better with the present
focus of the EU fiscal framework on macroeconomic
aspects — has been proposed by Diamond (2003):
• to ensure fiscal control and fiscal discipline;
• to provide a degree of stabilisation of the economy;
• to promote allocative and technical efficiency in
service delivery through procedures that provide
incentives for greater productivity.
The first requirement aims at making sure that the total
amount of money a government spends will be closely
aligned to what is affordable in the medium and long
term. This remains particularly important in the euro
zone given the need for consistency between national
fiscal policies and the single monetary policy as well as
in the European Union as a whole given the need to cater
for the costs of ageing. The second requirement, to pro-
vide for a degree of stabilisation of the economy, also
remains particularly important given that the single mon-
etary policy can only be geared towards the euro zone as
a whole so that national fiscal policies need to be able to
react flexibly to asymmetric economic developments.
Therefore, with respect to fiscal policy, analysis at the
level of the EU has concentrated on the role and effec-
tiveness of the automatic stabilisers (e.g. European Com-
mission, 2002a) while stressing the importance of allow-
ing the automatic stabilisers to operate symmetrically
over the cycle. In sum, at the level of the EU, in light of
the creation of the single currency the most urgent task
has been to achieve enhanced coordination of the macro-
economic function of national budgets. It has also been
pointed out in the literature (e.g. Diamond, 2003) that
once budget systems are able to fulfil the requirements of
aggregate discipline and a degree of (automatic) stabili-
sation, it will be possible to devote more attention to
allocative and technical efficiency. Such a development
is much in line with the way attention in the EU fiscal184
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sions of sustainability, automatic stabilisation and qual-
ity. In fact, by taking the three dimensions of budgeting
of fiscal sustainability, automatic stabilisation and qual-
ity as a starting point, it becomes possible to propose a
definition of the concept of quality, where the quality of
public finances concerns the allocation of resources
and the efficient and effective use of those resources
in relation to identified strategic priorities (1). The
advantage of using this definition would be that it
focuses on the link between public expenditure and pol-
icy objectives, while it does not specify the policy objec-
tives ex ante. Put differently, it is the role of the political
process to prioritise the objectives, and the role of budg-
eting to achieve these objectives in the best way. In this
respect, the Lisbon process has specified priorities such
as sustainable growth, full employment, social cohesion
and competitiveness.
A relevant question is whether there are trade-offs
between the three dimensions of budgeting or whether
they are mutually consistent. In this respect, previous
work of the European Commission (e.g. European Com-
mission, 2002a) has highlighted the consistency of fiscal
sustainability and automatic stabilisation: a budgetary
position of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ creates room
for manoeuvre for the automatic stabilisers to operate
symmetrically over the economic cycle. In addition, this
part will illustrate the consistency of sustainability and
quality. Firstly, lowering the debt level — especially in
high-debt countries — decreases the flow of interest
payments and creates room for increasing ‘productive’
expenditure (Section 3.4). Secondly, a fixed budget con-
straint fosters the use and development of budgetary
techniques and institutions that aim at increasing the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the use of public
resources (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Finally, quality can also
be seen as consistent with sustainability given that a
higher potential growth rate will facilitate maintaining a
sustainable fiscal position. Thus, this part argues that the
three dimensions of sustainability, automatic stabilisa-
tion and quality are mutually reinforcing if they are
applied properly.
2.2. Quality: What role within the EU 
framework for economic policy 
coordination?
This section discusses how the broad economic policy
guidelines (BEPGs) could contribute to improve the qual-
ity of public finances. Over the last few years, the role of
the BEPGs has evolved towards the central policy docu-
ment at the level of the EU for identifying guidelines on
how to attain strategic priorities, while at the same time
attention has also shifted towards monitoring the imple-
mentation of the recommendations through implementa-
tion reports. In addition, it seems appropriate to address the
topic of quality in the BEPGs given the objective of the
BEPGs as specified in the EU Treaty of ‘an efficient allo-
cation of resources’. Furthermore, it is also consistent with
the fact that the allocation of resources through the budget,
including the composition of public expenditure and reve-
nues, is at the heart of the national political decision-mak-
ing process. The BEPGs fully respect national competen-
cies in this respect, as is reflected in the relevant Treaty
provisions (‘Member States shall conduct their economic
policies in the context of the BEPGs’). At the same time,
this Treaty provision spells out the obligation for Member
States to conduct their economic policies within the con-
text of the priorities as set out in the BEPGs, so that policy
discussions at the level of the EU could be useful with
respect to the exchange of information; for learning from
international experiences; for identifying best practices
and for peer pressure to improve policy outcomes in line
with strategic priorities. In addition, a contribution to the
quality of public finances can be given by the Union’s ini-
tiative for growth, through which the European Council
has established a roadmap for increased investment in
physical and human capital to complement structural
reforms. Furthermore, other policy processes such as the
European employment strategy and the open method of
coordination on social protection can also contribute to rel-
evant aspects of the quality of public finances. However, in
what follows, only the role of the BEPGs will be discussed.
In order to clarify the role of the quality of public
finances in the BEPGs further, the remainder of this part
will examine to what extent a macroeconomic perspec-
tive on quality may help in identifying guidelines with
respect to the growth-enhancing role of public finances.
Thereafter, a microeconomic perspective on quality
would serve to investigate possibilities for a more effec-
tive and efficient use of resources for reaching strategic
priorities, whether defined at national or at EU level.
¥1∂ There would be other possibilities as well, however, for defining the con-
cept of quality, since one could also take the traditional ‘Musgravian’
functions of the State (efficient allocation of resources, redistribution and
stabilisation) as a starting point and define quality as the best way of per-
forming these functions.185
3. A macroeconomic perspective on quality
3.1. Introduction
A full discussion on quality of public finances would
consider all possible policy objectives (sustainable
growth, social cohesion, etc.) and investigate what fiscal
policy can do to achieve them in the most effective and
efficient way and whether or not there would be trade-
offs between different policy objectives. However, such
an extended analysis would go beyond the scope of this
part. Instead, as a starting point for further analysis of the
contribution of fiscal policy to the objectives of the Lis-
bon strategy, it concentrates on the link between fiscal
policy and long-term growth only. Hence, any findings
following from this partial analysis should be seen as
preliminary.
The focus on the link between fiscal policy and long-
term growth does not imply that fiscal policy is the only
variable that may influence growth. Levine and Renelt
(1992) have identified more than 50 variables that are
significantly correlated to growth in at least some stud-
ies. When conducting a systematic sensitivity analysis of
a number of these partial growth correlations, they find
that most of the correlations are fragile, as it is nearly
always possible to find alternative explanatory variables
that cause the partial correlation as identified previously
to disappear. This finding also applies to a wide array of
fiscal variables, including capital formation, education
and defence. In response, Sala-i-Martin (1997) uses a
different concept of ‘robustness’ and finds that 22 out of
59 variables are strongly related to growth. However,
still no measure of government spending (including
investment) appears to affect growth in a significant
way. Focusing more directly on fiscal policy, Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) make a similar point: the link
between most fiscal variables and growth turns out to be
statistically fragile since it depends heavily on what
other control variables are included in the regression (1).
Hence, it should be admitted from the start that the
uncertainty surrounding the partial correlations between
fiscal policy variables and growth remains large and that
our understanding of which variables cause economic
growth is very limited. This is particularly the case in the
fiscal area where the causality often might run from
growth to fiscal variables. In sum, from a policy point of
view, a broad perspective is needed to identify policies
that could raise low structural growth rates within the
EU. Such an approach is taken in the Sapir report (2003),
which identifies a six-point agenda for improving the
growth potential of the EU economy (2). The perspective
of this section is narrower and concentrates on the link
between fiscal policy and long-term growth only.
3.2. Fiscal policy and long-term growth
Virtually all studies on the link between fiscal policy and
long-term growth start from Solow’s neoclassical
growth model that implies that in the long run steady-
state growth rate is constant and driven by exogenous
factors of population growth and technological change.
Fiscal policy can only affect the level of output in the
steady state and the adjustment path through its impact
on savings. For example, lower taxes on capital can lead
to increased savings and to a higher growth rate until a
new steady state has been reached.
The transitional dynamics cannot be ignored, however,
given that it may take a long time for the economy to
adjust to a new steady state (3). One of the criticisms of
the neoclassical growth model points out that it is diffi-
cult to find reasons in these models why the government
¥1∂ Nevertheless, the share of pubic investment in transport and communica-
tion and the government’s budget surplus are consistently correlated with
growth in their cross-section of countries. Furthermore, government reve-
nue/GDP rises with per capita income (Wagner’s law) in both the cross-
section and the historical data sets.
¥2∂ The six-point agenda calls on the EU and its members: (1) to make the sin-
gle market more dynamic; (2) to boost investment in knowledge; (3) to
improve the macroeconomic policy framework for EMU; (4) to redesign
policies for convergence and restructuring; (5) to achieve more effective-
ness in decision-taking and regulation; and (6) to refocus the EU budget.
¥3∂ See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995): ‘Convergence speeds that are consist-
ent with the empirical evidence imply that the time required for substantial
convergence is typically in the order of several generations’.186
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fore allow the possibility of government intervention for
correcting market failures when there are externalities.
This leads to the conclusion that investment in human
and physical capital may affect the steady-state growth
rate. This point can be illustrated on the basis of the fol-
lowing production function (see Gerson, 1998, for an
extensive description (1)):
(1)  
Where t is time, Y is output, K and L are capital and
labour and At and Bt represent the quality of the stock of
labour and capital. This equation states that total output
at any moment in time depends on the volume and pro-
ductivity of capital and labour.
In the neoclassical model, the production function inhib-
its decreasing returns to both capital and labour and At
and Bt are exogenous. Consequently, the economy will
tend to a constant capital/labour ratio, where the return
from additional investment equals its cost. When, by
contrast, endogenously determined increases in At and Bt
ensure that the marginal product of physical capital does
not tend to zero when the amount of capital per worker
increases, policies that affect the incentives to invest in
either physical or human capital can have permanent
effects on the long-run growth rate.
The basic message for fiscal policy is summarised in
Table IV.1 where ‘productive’ expenditure is defined as
expenditure with a positive effect on the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital and/or labour (At and Bt in equation
(1)), while distortionary taxes are taxes that distort the
decision to invest in capital or labour and — hence —
might have negative growth effects.
The empirical literature on ‘productive’ government
expenditure has been summarised in European Commis-
sion (2002a). In sum, there seems to be a tendency
towards the conclusion that public infrastructure
investment (2), education and R & D investment are pos-
itively correlated to long-term growth, even if the mag-
nitude of the impact is questionable and the effects may
not be linear. However, it should be borne in mind that
the positive effects of fiscal policy on long-term growth
ultimately depend on the extent to which it is able to
address externalities and not on the specific category of
expenditure (3). For example, spending on social secu-
rity will also be ‘productive’ if it delivers insurance that
the market is not able to deliver due to market failures
and informational problems.
On the whole, the empirical evidence in support of
endogenous growth through fiscal policy remains mixed.
Jones (1995) presents evidence against the endogenous
growth hypothesis on the basis of time-series data for the
United States that indicate a lack of persistent change in
growth rates. By contrast, several recent empirical stud-
ies have also attempted to estimate the combined impact
Table IV.1
Fiscal policy aggregates and long-term economic growth
Budgetary aggregates Classification Theory: Effect on growth Possible examples
Expenditure Productive Positive effect on marginal 
productivity of capital 
and labour
Investment in transport 
and communication, education, 
R & D, healthcare
Unproductive Effect on marginal productivity 
zero or negative
Expenditure on economic 
services, recreation
Taxation Distortionary Distorting supply or demand 
of capital and labour
Taxation on income and profit
Non-distortionary No distortion of supply 
or demand of capital and labour
Proportional tax on consumption
Source: Adapted on the basis of Gemmell and Kneller (2003) and Gerson (1998).
¥1∂ The literature on endogenous-growth models starts with Romer (1986).
Yt f AtKt BtLt[ , ]=
¥2∂ In this respect, the European initiative for growth targets public and private
investment in networks and knowledge. See also the communication from
the Commission on a European initiative for growth (2003b). 
¥3∂ Section 4.2 on cost-benefit analysis will develop this point further.187
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(as well as several ‘control’ variables in some cases) on
growth (Kocherlakoty and Yi, 1997; Kneller et al., 1999
and 2001; Romero de Avila and Strauch, 2003). The
basic argument is that both sides of the budget (revenues
and expenditures) should be taken into account in esti-
mating the effects of fiscal policy on long-run growth.
Indeed, these studies typically find that results are not
statistically significant when only the revenue or
expenditure side is included in the growth regression
given that positive effects of ‘productive’ spending and
negative effects of distortionary taxation could be offset-
ting. Results become statistically significant, however,
and coefficients have the theoretically predicted sign
when both the expenditure and revenue side are included
in the regression. These results support the notion that
the composition of expenditure and revenues matter for
long-term growth and that policies to improve the com-
position of both expenditure and revenue could have
positive effects on long-term growth. As noted, from a
policy perspective one should also know the degree of
uncertainty surrounding different estimates. This, of
course, applies to the robustness of the coefficients to
alternative specifications and to the confidence intervals
around the estimated coefficients (1), but also to a key
question: which part of total expenditure could be con-
sidered to be ‘productive’ and which part of total taxa-
tion could be considered to be distortionary?
3.3. From theory to practice: Comparing 
composite indicators
From a policy perspective, it is highly relevant to know
which expenditure categories might be ‘productive’ or
‘unproductive’ and which classes of taxes may be more
distortionary than others. Therefore, Table IV.2 com-
pares different measures of ‘productive’ public expendi-
ture and distortionary taxation as used in the empirical
literature. Obviously, choices for a particular measure
are often driven by considerations of data availability.
For example, it is widely recognised that public invest-
ment (‘gross fixed capital formation’) is not a particular
good measure of ‘productive’ expenditure (see, e.g.
European Commission, 2003, Part III, where one of the
arguments is that a narrow focus on physical capital
ignores the importance of human capital). However, the
advantage of using this measure is that long time-series
are available which facilitates the use of advanced
econometric techniques. Alternatively, R & D and
investment in transport and communication would be
obvious candidates of any measure of ‘productive’
expenditure, but for these categories data availability
remains a serious problem. The main message from
Table IV.2 is that differences in macroeconomic esti-
mates of ‘productive’ expenditure as a share of total
expenditure can be enormous. At one side of the spec-
trum is the study by Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell
(1999, 2001). In their main analysis, ‘productive’
expenditure consists of general public services, defence,
education, health, housing, transport and communica-
tion. On the basis of data for 2001 this would imply that
44 % of total expenditure would be ‘productive’ for both
the euro zone and EU-15. At the other end of the extreme
is the study by Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) that
uses public investment as a proxy for ‘productive’ public
expenditure. This reduces the amount of ‘productive’
public expenditure to only 5 % of total expenditure for
both the euro zone and EU-15. A middle position is
taken by the recent work of Thöne (2003) that identifies
‘productive’ expenditure in Germany and calculates that
in 2002, the federal budget on ‘Public expenditure for
growth and sustainable development’ (PEGS) amounted
to 21 % of federal expenditure. But also in this case,
results are highly sensitive to change in the classification
since this study draws attention to the fact that the exclu-
sion of the category of ‘children’s allowance’ (as part of
the category of ‘family policy’ in Table IV.2) reduces the
PEGS from 21 to 10 % of total federal expenditure in
2002. Similar arguments also apply to the revenue side
of the budget, where results for distortionary taxes can
change from about 30 to 60 % of total revenues depend-
ing on the question of whether or not social security con-
tributions are classified as distortionary.
These large differences in empirical estimates point out
a fundamental problem that empirical macroeconomic
studies face: data that correspond to the theoretical clas-
sification into ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ expendi-
ture or distortionary and non-distortionary taxation are
not available at the macroeconomic level. Instead, data
available in national accounts have to be used, either on
the basis of the economic or on the basis of the functional
classification, while assuming that all expenditure in a
particular category is either ‘productive’ or ‘unproduc-
tive’. For example, there are good reasons to believe that
¥1∂ Gemmell and Kneller (2003) use the coefficients as calculated in Kneller,
Bleaney and Gemmell (2001) to estimate confidence intervals of the possi-
ble growth effects of changes in the composition of revenues and expendi-
tures for EU countries over the 1990s. Results suggest a net effect on the
structural growth rate that typically ranges from + 0.3 to – 0.3 percentage
points. One should keep in mind, however, that these results are based on a
regression involving OECD countries and not EU countries separately.188
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improve human capital and therefore will contribute to
raising the growth potential. But this does not mean that
all expenditure labelled as education is always good for
growth (for example, a school with no teachers would
not contribute much to improving the growth potential).
Similarly, on the revenue side, the question of whether or
not to label social security contributions as distortionary
would depend on the specifics of its design such as the
question of whether there are close links between
benefits and entitlements. Thus, the macroeconomic
approach may be useful to identify budgetary categories
that are on average more ‘productive’ or distortionary
than others, but in the end all government intervention
has to be investigated individually with respect to its
design and the question of whether or not its benefits out-
weighs its costs. Such an approach will be followed as
part of the microeconomic perspective in Section 4.2 on
cost-benefit analysis.
During the last few years, attempts have also been made
to arrive at composite indicators, in order to relate the
Table IV.2
Comparing classifications of ‘productive’ expenditure items and distortionary taxation
Study on ‘productive’ 
expenditure
Fölster 
and Henrekson (1998)
Kneller, Bleaney 
and Gemmell 
(1999, 2001)
Kneller, Bleaney 
and Gemmell (2001): 
measure used in 
sensitivity analysis
Romero de Avila 
and Strauch (2003)
Thöne (2003): 
Public expenditure for 
growth 
and sustainable 
development 
Expenditure items 
classified as 
‘productive’
— subsidies to R & D
— education
— transport and 
communication 
— general public 
services
— defence
— housing
— transport and 
communication
— education
— health
— general public 
services
— defence
— housing
— transport and 
communication 
— public investment — schools and nursery 
schools
— colleges, 
universities and other 
education
— science and R & D 
outside universities
— family policy
— active labour 
market policies
— public health 
service
— environmental and 
nature protection
— promotion of 
renewable energies
Total 
(% of total 
expenditure)
Typically less than 
20 % in OECD 
countries in 1985
44 % for both 
the euro zone 
and EU-15 in 2001 (1)
20 % for both 
the euro zone 
and EU-15 in 2001 (1)
5 % for both the euro 
zone and EU-15 
in 2001
21 % of German 
federal expenditure 
in 2002
Taxation items 
classified as 
distortionary 
Not addressed — taxation on income 
and profit
— social security 
contributions
— taxation on payroll 
and manpower
— taxation on 
property
Not addressed — direct taxation on 
property and income
Not addressed
Total 
(% of total revenues)
64 % for the euro 
zone and 63 % 
for EU-15 in 2001 (2)
29 % for the euro 
zone and 33 % 
for EU-15 in 2001 (2)
(1) The total for ‘productive’ expenditure as calculated is an approximation given that transport and communication expenditure are left out of the calculation since no
data were available for these subcategories of economic affairs. 
(2) Approximation on the basis of ESA 95 categories of D4 (property income), D5 (current taxes on income and wealth) and D61 (social contributions). The figure for
total distortionary taxation as calculated on the basis of Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) include D4 and D5.
NB: The totals for Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999, 2001) and Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) are based on own calculations on the basis of the Ameco and
NewCronos databases. 189
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achievement of strategic goals of government interven-
tion. The use of such composite indicators could be espe-
cially relevant from the perspective of the EU if it allows
meaningful comparison across countries. Therefore, it
may be useful to summarise the methodology and the
outcomes of different indicators. It should be noted from
the start, however, that the indicators discussed below
(i.e. European Commission, 2002a, and Afonso et al.,
2003) aim at measuring different concepts so that the
outcomes should not be compared.
Table IV.3 summarises the methodology as used for the
two indicators. The indicator in European Commission
(2002a) aims at measuring the contribution of public
expenditure in different countries to long-term growth.
On the basis of a literature review of the link between
expenditure items and long-term growth, it derives an
assumed impact of different expenditure categories
(inputs) on long-term growth (outcome). The impact
does not need to be linear as it can be negative (as with
interest payments); positive provided that expenditure is
kept within certain limits (e.g. social expenditure, indi-
cated by +/– in Table IV.3) or positive for a larger range
of values (for example R & D). Finally, the indicator is
calculated as an index in which all expenditure items
receive the same weight. A noticeable aspect is that the
ranking as produced by this indicator is positively corre-
lated with the size of the public sector (a correlation
coefficient of 0.49). This results from the methodology
employed since expenditure items with an assumed pos-
itive correlation to growth outweigh the items with an
assumed negative correlation to growth.
The indicator as used in Afonso et al. (2003) aims at
measuring the efficiency of the public sector in reaching
a range of objectives of government intervention. These
include performance indicators with respect to the tradi-
tional ‘Musgravian’ functions of government (i.e. alloc-
ative efficiency, stabilisation and the distribution of
income) and public performance indicators in the field of
public administration (e.g. reducing corruption), educa-
tion (e.g. secondary school enrolment), health (e.g. life
expectancy) and public infrastructure. The final effi-
ciency indicator is calculated as the ratio of performance
indicators (outcomes) by a measure of public expendi-
ture related to that indicator (input), based on the
assumption that this amount of money is used to achieve
that outcome. Finally, in calculating public sector effi-
ciency for each country, all performance indicators
receive the same weight. The ranking as produced by this
indicator is negatively correlated to the size of the public
sector (correlation coefficient of – 0.69), as a result of the
methodology in which performance indicators are
divided by a measure of ‘relevant’ expenditure for each
indicator, so that higher expenditure lowers efficiency.
To summarise, it seems clear that the different indicators
serve different purposes, use a different methodology
and thus also produce different rankings. The main
advantage of the use of such indicators would be that
they allow an aggregate comparison across countries and
thus can give generalised policy messages. The main
weakness of aggregate indicators is that strong assump-
tions have to be made in order to calculate such a syn-
thetic indicator. In this respect, both studies as referred
to in this section indicate that calculations are for illus-
trative purposes only, given that devising and calculating
any indicator involves a number of arbitrary choices. In
addition, the microeconomic approach as it will be dis-
cussed in Section 4 will stress the importance of individ-
ual project appraisal in order to guide decision-making
in practice.
3.4. The composition of public expenditure
The conclusions of the previous sections on the impact
of fiscal policy on long-term growth refer to the rele-
vance of shifting expenditure towards ‘productive’ items
and making taxation less distortionary. At the same time,
the previous sections also highlighted that the available
data at the macroeconomic level do not necessarily cor-
respond entirely to the theoretical classification of ‘pro-
ductive’ or distortionary. Therefore, the analysis of the
composition of the budget in this section does not inves-
tigate whether the ‘productive’ part of expenditure has
increased or decreased. Instead, it focuses on more pre-
liminary questions: what are the differences in the com-
position of public expenditure across countries, how did
the composition change over time and what may have
been driving factors of changes in the composition?
In this respect, previous studies (e.g. European Commis-
sion, 2002a, and Atkinson and van den Noord, 2001)
have analysed changes in the composition on the basis of
the national accounts classification according to transac-
tions. However, the functional classification of govern-
ment expenditure can also be useful for making inter-
country comparisons of the extent to which governments
are involved in economic and social functions and thus
be particularly suitable to analyse issues related to qual-
ity. These data are available for all EU-15 countries for190
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Member States (see Box IV.1). Therefore, improving the
availability of data remains a key priority. In the mean-
time, this section already anticipates a full analysis on
the basis of the functional classification by analysing
developments over time on the basis of a subset of coun-
tries for which longer time-series were available.    
3.4.1. Comparing the composition of public 
expenditure across countries
The main conclusions from the analysis of the trends in
public expenditure in European Commission (2002a) are
that a large part of the growth in public expenditure until
the first half of the 1990s can be attributed to the rise in
expenditure on social protection and that differences in
expenditure on social protection also explain to a large
extent the differences in size of the public sector between
Member States, reflecting — at least partly — differ-
ences in preferences.
The data on the functional classification of public
expenditure in EU countries in Table 4 show that social
protection is by far the largest category of government
spending (see also Revelin, 2003). This category mainly
covers benefits for subcategories such as sickness and
disability, old age, family and children, unemployment
and other forms of social benefits (1). Differences
between countries range from 7 % of GDP in Ireland to
24 % of GDP in Sweden and Denmark. The second lar-
gest category is that of general public services that
includes expenses related to executive and legislative
organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs, for-
eign economic aid, general services, research and devel-
opment, interest payments and other expenses related to
debt. However, it excludes expenditure on items specif-
ically related to one of the other functions such as R & D
Table IV.3
Comparing the methodology of composite indicators
Expenditure items (inputs) Outcomes Calculation 
methodology
Ranking of EU 
countries resulting 
from indicator
Composition of public 
expenditure, EC (2002)
Education (+)
R & D (+)
Gross fixed capital formation (+)
Healthcare (+)
Active labour market policies (+)
Compensation of employees (+/–)
Collective consumption (+/–)
Old age and survivor (+/–)
Unemployment benefits (+/–)
Other social expenditures (+/–)
Interest payments (–)
Assumed effects of inputs 
on long-term economic 
growth on the basis 
of literature review 
(as indicated by + or – 
for every expenditure item) 
Index whereby 
all expenditure items 
receive same weight
FR
DE
FI
SE
AT
NL
ES
IE
PT
BE
DK
UK
EL
IT
Public sector efficiency, 
Afonso et al. (2003) 
Expenditure categories related 
to outcome indicators
Goods and services
Education 
Health
Social transfers
Public investment
Total expenditure
‘Opportunity’ indicators 
representing
Administration
Education
Health
Public infrastructure
‘Musgravian’ indicators 
representing
Distribution
Stability
Economic performance
Index of performance 
indicators divided by 
‘relevant’ expenditure 
for each indicator
UK, ES, EL
IE
PT
AT
FI
NL
DE
DK
BE
FR
SE
IT
Source: Adapted from European Commission (2002a) and Afonso et al. (2003).
¥1∂ For a complete overview of the contents of the COFOG classification, see
the link to COFOG on http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry.191
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the highest in the high-debt countries Italy, Belgium and
Greece. Spending on health and education generally
amounts to around 5 to 6 % of GDP each in most Mem-
ber States, with highs of 8 % GDP on health in France
and 8.3 % on education in Denmark. In most countries,
the category of economic affairs adds up to 5 to 6 % of
GDP. It covers items such as support programmes and
subsidies to mining, manufacturing, agriculture, energy
and service industries. It also includes public spending
on infrastructure such as transport and communications.
Finally, the category of others generally amounts to
around 6 % of GDP in most Member States. This cate-
gory covers defence; public order and safety; environ-
ment protection; housing and community amenities and
recreation, culture and religion.
3.4.2. Changes in the composition of public 
expenditure over time
Graphs IV.1 and IV.2 show the development of the com-
position of the budget over time. Data on the functional
classification are available since 1991 for eight countries
(BE, DK, DE, EL, IT, LU, PT, UK). Therefore, the graphs
show the aggregate developments for these countries
only. Changes in the composition are shown as a percent-
age of GDP and as a percentage of total expenditure. Over
the period as a whole, total expenditure rose to above
50 % of GDP in 1995, then decreased in the run-up to
EMU to 46 % of GDP and was still at this level in 2002.
Regarding the changes in the composition, the biggest
increase was recorded in social protection (+ 1.7 percent-
age points (p.p.) of GDP and + 6 p.p. in total expenditure),
followed by healthcare (+ 0.5 p.p. of GDP and +1.9 p.p. in
total expenditure). Expenditure on education remained
stable at 4.8 % of GDP and thus increased its share in total
expenditure (+ 0.6 p.p.). The biggest decrease in expendi-
ture was recorded for the category of general public serv-
ices (– 2.4 p.p. of GDP and – 4.1 p.p. in total expendi-
ture), followed by economic affairs (– 1.3 p.p. of GDP
and – 2.4 p.p. in total expenditure). Overall, at the aggre-
gate level, these data show that the composition of public
expenditure has shifted mainly from general public serv-
ices and economic affairs towards social protection and
health over the period 1991–2002.
3.4.3. Explaining changes in the composition 
of public expenditure
From a policy perspective, an important question is what
could have been the driving factors of changes in the
composition as registered. In order to investigate this
Table IV.4
Government expenditure by function, 2001
(% of GDP)
Social
protection
General public 
services Health Education
Economic
affairs Others
Total 
expenditure
BE 17.2 10.2 6.6 6.2 4.4 4.9 49.5
DK 24.0 8.6 5.4 8.3 3.8 5.2 55.3
DE 21.8 6.3 6.4 4.2 4.4 5.3 48.3
EL 19.4 10.9 3.7 3.1 5.1 5.6 47.8
ES 13.4 5.5 5.3 4.3 4.3 6.4 39.4
FR 20.4 6.4 7.9 6.0 5.2 6.5 52.5
IE 7.2 3.7 6.3 4.3 5.0 7.1 33.6
IT 17.8 9.6 6.4 5.0 4.0 5.7 48.5
LU 17.1 4.7 4.9 4.7 2.8 5.0 39.1
NL 17.5 8.2 4.1 4.8 5.6 6.5 46.6
AT 21.5 8.5 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.8 51.8
PT 13.6 6.6 6.8 7.0 5.5 6.6 46.2
FI 20.6 6.5 6.0 6.5 4.7 4.9 49.2
SE 23.9 8.5 6.6 7.7 4.4 6.1 57.2
UK 15.7 4.4 6.2 4.6 2.6 5.8 39.2
Euro zone 19.1 7.2 6.4 5.0 4.6 5.8 48.1
EU-15 18.7 6.8 6.4 5.1 4.2 5.8 46.9
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Figures for subcategories are not available in the Eurostat database. There-
fore R & D expenditure is not shown as a separate category.192
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(Continued on the next page)
A breakdown of total general government expenditure of EU Member States, on the basis of the data as reported to Eurostat
by the statistical authorities of the Member States, can be made according to ESA 95 main aggregates and according to the
functional classification of general government expenditure.
In the main aggregates of general government, expenditure is classified according to transactions on the basis of the fol-
lowing main ESA 95 categories:
• collective consumption;
• social benefits in kind;
• social transfers other than in kind;
• interests;
• subsidies;
• gross fixed capital formation;
• other.
This classification is the one used in the annual assessment of budgetary positions according to the code of conduct on the
content and format of the stability and convergence programmes. With a delay of three months, data are reported through
the data transmission programme under ESA 95. While it is a useful tool to assess the broad development of public expen-
ditures, with some useful breakdowns between current and capital expenditures, it does not give details on which kind of
goods and services are provided by the general government.
Data availability: For annual accounts, data are available from 1991 until 2002 for all 15 Member States. For new Member
States, data are missing for Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia and are incomplete for a number of other countries. 
In the classification of general government expenditure by function (COFOG), total general government expenditure is
divided into 10 functional categories:
• general public services;
• defence;
• public order and safety;
• economic affairs;
• environment protection;
• housing and community amenities;
• health;
• recreation, culture and religion;
• education;
• social protection.
This classification gives deeper insight into the composition of public expenditures, and broadly allows identifying the
main functions of the State. It allows for the examination of trends in government outlays on particular functions over time,
without distortions from organisational changes in government. For every individual function, expenditure can be divided193
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panel data for all Member States. As explanatory varia-
bles were included economic variables, demographic
variables and political variables (see Box IV.2 for the
details). Results indicate that, taken together, these vari-
ables do reasonably well in explaining variation in
expenditure on relatively homogeneous categories such
as social protection, health and education, but that it is
more difficult to explain developments in heterogeneous
categories such as general public services and economic
affairs. With respect to underlying upward pressures, the
results already confirm a statistically significant upward
effect of ageing on healthcare expenditure, despite the
short period over which regressions were estimated and
despite the fact that the biggest impact from ageing is
still to come (in the EU, the population with age above
65 rose by 6.6 million people during 1991–99, while it is
projected to rise by 42 million people over the next dec-
ades). Regarding temporary effects, falling unemploy-
ment levels may have had a favourable impact during the
second half of the 1990s (4.5 million people less in the
EU between 1994 and 2001, while increasing again by
1.3 million people between 2001 and 2003), while a tem-
porary effect related to EMU qualification is close to
being statistically significant for the category of eco-
nomic affairs. Furthermore, results also confirm the pos-
itive role lower debt levels may play in freeing up
resources for expenditure on ‘productive’ items and that
expenditure on health and education increases with
potential GDP (as a proxy for welfare).
Overall, the analysis in this section suggests that
underlying upward pressures such as those related to
ageing already exert upward pressures on several
expenditure categories. The implication is that any
framework for the definition of strategic expenditure
priorities and the reallocation of expenditure towards
the priorities cannot abstract from such ongoing ten-
dencies. These results are much in line with the find-
ings of a recent study by the OECD that summarises
trends in expenditure on the basis of detailed expendi-
ture surveys for 21 OECD countries (Joumard et al.,
2004) and concludes that: ‘the spending pressures
stemming from the continued expansion of social pro-
grammes have been partly compensated by transient or
one-off factors’. The long-term projections for age-
Box IV.1 (continued)
further into sub-functions. For example, the category of social protection contains subcategories such as sickness and dis-
ability, old age, survivors and unemployment. In addition R & D is included as a subcategory of general public services,
but R & D specifically related to one of the other functions is included as a subcategory for these other categories. Data are
collected through the data transmission programme under ESA 95, with 12 months of delay.
Data availability: Data under the COFOG classification are available from 1990 until 2002, but the data are far from com-
plete. Data are available only for the 10 main categories but not for subcategories. For France, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Austria, Finland and Sweden data are only available after 1995. From 1995 until 2001 data are complete for EU-15, with
the exception of Spain for which data are available only since 1999. No data are available for the new Member States.
According to Regulation (EC) No 1267/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2003 amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 with respect to the time limit for transmission of the main aggregates of national
accounts, several countries have a derogation up to 2005 to provide the information under the COFOG classification. In
particular, Austria, Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal do not have to recalculate backwards some data, while Spain and
Sweden can submit data with a longer delay (21 and 16 months, respectively).
In sum, the most complete and updated breakdown of total expenditure is the classification according to ESA 95 transactions.
However, this classification does not provide information on the functions that are carried out by the government, such as
education, healthcare and pensions. These data are available in the functional classification of government expenditure. Data
availability has improved during recent years, but the coverage is still far from complete, both across countries (since data for
the new Member States are not yet available) and over time (EU aggregates are available for three years only). In addition, no
data are available for the subcategories, so that it is not possible to assess changes in the composition of total expenditure with
respect to important subcategories such as transport, primary, secondary and tertiary education, unemployment and pensions.
Thus, an improvement in the analysis of changes in the composition of public expenditure hinges on the availability of longer
time-series for the functional classification and its subcategories for all Member States. At the same time, the costs of addi-
tional data collection — such as an increased reporting burden for the Member States — should also be taken into account
and weighed against the benefits of additional analysis on the composition of public expenditure.194
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upward pressures on public spending can be expected
to intensify further, while at the same time there would
be little scope for strategies of raising additional reve-
nues given the already high ratios of total revenues to
GDP. This increases the importance of a clear focus on
spending priorities — which includes being selective
as to what can or should be achieved through govern-
ment intervention — and an efficient and effective use
of public resources in reaching them.     
Graph IV.1:  The composition of expenditure as a % of GDP
Source: Commission services. Countries included are BE, DK, DE, EL, IT, LU, PT, UK.
Graph IV.2:  The composition of expenditure as a % of total expenditure
Source: Commission services. Countries included are BE, DK, DE, EL, IT, LU, PT, UK.
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(Continued on the next page)
In order to investigate the driving factors of changes in the composition, regressions were run using panel data for all EU
Member States. The basic approach is to regress individual expenditure items on economic variables, demographic vari-
ables and political variables. In vector notation:
Much of the literature that regresses budgetary variables has used the economic classification of expenditure (e.g. Mulas
Granados, 2003) in order to take advantage of long time-series that are available. However, in order to study issues of qual-
ity, the functional classification of government expenditure may be more relevant. The drawback is that the longest period
over which these data are available is the period of 1990–2002, so one should keep in mind that the period may be too short
to properly capture structural trends.
For the economic variables, potential GDP, the output gap and the level of debt are included for all expenditure items.
Potential GDP is included since expenditure on a specific item may increase with welfare. The output gap is included in
order to capture the effect of the cycle. The debt level is included given that, other things being equal, the larger the stock
of accumulated debt, the higher the flow of interest payments to be paid by governments (which may crowd out other
expenditure). The debt level may also capture a possible sustainability effect and the need for budgetary consolidation. In
addition, the regression for spending on social protection was also run with an alternative specification that includes unem-
ployment instead of the output gap, given that the automatic stabilisers mainly operate on the expenditure side through
expenditure on unemployment benefits so that the changes in the level of unemployment may better capture this effect
(since unemployment usually reacts with a lag on the cycle).
For the demographic variables, changes in the population aged 24 or younger are included for the category of education.
Changes in the population from the age of 65 have been included for social protection (since it includes old age as a sub-
category) and health. A priori it would be questionable whether the estimation period of 1990–2002 is long enough for the
demographic variables to show a significant effect. Finally, the political variables under consideration contain a dummy
for the year preceding the decision on membership of EMU (i.e. 1999 for Greece and 1997 for all other euro-zone coun-
tries) given that some countries undertook some special consolidation efforts in this year. Furthermore, an election dummy
was included given that several papers have found empirical evidence of an electoral budget cycle (e.g. Buti and van den
Noord, 2003). However, the results for this variable were not significant and therefore this variable has not been included
in the regressions for which results are reported. A possible explanation for the non-significance of the election dummy
might be that Buti and van den Noord concentrate on the role of elections on discretionary expenditure (i.e. corrected for
the role of the cycle), while the focus here is on total expenditure which included the effects of the cycle and discretionary
changes.
All items have been estimated in first differences, except for debt (in order to better capture a possible ‘sustainability
effect’). Debt is lagged one period to overcome endogeniety (reverse causation) problems, given that higher spending may
lead to a higher deficit and thus higher debt. Moreover, individual expenditure categories are assumed to be too small to
have a direct effect on short-term output and any positive effect of ‘productive’ expenditure (e.g. health, education) on
long-term growth will take time to materialise. Therefore, no instrumental variable approach has been used for potential
GDP and the output gap. The estimation method is fixed effects panel data, allowing for robust standard errors with respect
to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Table IV.5 contains the result for the estimated equations, with standard errors in parentheses and *,** and *** indicating
significance at 10, 5 and 1 % confidence. All expenditure categories are specified in billion EUR in constant market prices,
so that the coefficients represent the change in real spending in billion EUR as a result in changes in the explanatory vari-
ables. Generally, coefficients have the expected sign. The positive effect of potential GDP (as a proxy of higher welfare)
on spending is significant for health and education. Not surprisingly, results also confirm the effect of unemployment on
∆ex.itemi t, ci ∆ec'i t, α ∆dem'i t, β pol'i t, γ εi t,+ + + +=196
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The possible correlation between the size of the public
sector and long-term economic growth, and the robust-
ness of this correlation, is subject to a lively debate in
the literature. On the one hand Fatàs et al. (2003) show
a negative association between total revenues and the
trend growth rate for EU countries. They link this result
to the debate on the quality of public finances and rec-
ommend reducing the burden of taxes and social contri-
butions on factor incomes (along with shifting public
spending to ‘productive’ uses). On the other hand, Lev-
ine and Renelt (1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and
Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson (1997) all show for different
cross-sections of countries that the partial correlation
between the size of the public sector and growth (i.e.
without checking for other variables that are correlated
to long-term growth) is not robust to the inclusion of
Box IV.2 (continued)
expenditure on social protection. Furthermore, results show a statistically significant procyclical pattern of expenditure on
health. An explanation might be that sick-report incentives are procyclical: in a downturn, with unemployment rising,
people might be less tempted to report sick if absenteeism increases the risk of job loss (Arai and Thoursie, 2001). The
negative effect of debt is also significant for several categories, which confirms the link between fiscal discipline and qual-
ity given that a lower debt level reduces interest expenditure and thereby creates room for ‘productive’ expenditure.
Regarding demographics, despite the short period covered by the regression and the fact that the biggest impact of ageing
is still to come, the data already confirm a significant effect of ageing on health expenditure. For the political variables, the
EMU dummy is not statistically significant for any of the individual expenditure categories, although it is close to signif-
icant for the category of economic affairs. In addition, it should be noted that the regressions do much better in explaining
variation in spending on homogeneous categories such as social protection, health and education than in explaining com-
posite categories such as general public services and economic affairs (see differences in R-squared in Table IV.5).
In order to verify the robustness of the results, the regressions were also run in an alternative specification where all vari-
ables where scaled. Expenditure variables were defined in per capita terms and as explanatory variables were included
income per capita, the dependency ratio (i.e. population 65+ years of age as a percentage of the population 15 to 64 years
of age), unemployment (percentage of civilian labour force), debt as a percentage of GDP and the EMU dummy (results
not reported). Again, the coefficients generally showed the expected sign. As in the original specification, the dependency
ratio was statistically significant for health but not for social protection. A noticeable difference is that the EMU dummy
was statistically significant for general public services in the alternative specification.
Table IV.5
Changes in expenditure categories: Explanatory variables
Protential
GDP
Output
gap
Unemploy-
ment
Lagged 
debt level Pop. 65+ Pop. – 24 Dummy EMU No obs. R
2
Social 
protection
– 0.05
(0.16)
– 0.06
(0.06)
– 0.025***
(0.008)
6.95
(25.5)
– 0.16
(1.01)
110 0.70
Social 
protection
0.11
(0.14)
0.93*
(0.51)
– 0.017*
(0.01)
11.96
(25.2)
– 0.48
(1.04)
110 0.73
General public 
services
– 0.19
(0.35)
– 0.23
(0.22)
– 0.003
(0.021)
– 1.76
(1.94)
120 0.11
Health 0.23***
(0.08)
0.083*
(0.04)
– 0.006*
(0.003)
11.97*
(6.61)
0.12
(0.42)
110 0.53
Education 0.095**
(0.04)
0.008
(0.02)
– 0.003
(0.002)
0.007
(0.016)
– 0.06
(0.17)
110 0.43
Economic 
affaires
0.16
(0.13)
0.030
(0.045)
– 0.0089
(0.0060)
– 0.06
(0.40)
110 0.14
Other 0.045
(0.070)
0.027
(0.031)
0.0012
(0.003)
– 0.06
(0.40)
124 0.11
Total 
expenditure
0.44
(0.33)
– 0.26
(0.15)
– 0.017***
(0.006)
– 3.58**
(1.85)
251 0.94197
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growth. In particular, it becomes statistically insignifi-
cant already after checking for only one alternative
explanatory variable, initial income. This variable is
considered since many growth models imply the exist-
ence of a catching-up effect: economies which initially
have a relatively low GDP level have a tendency to
grow faster than richer countries, which are closer to
their steady state. But then Fölster and Henrekson
(1998) find a tendency towards a more robust negative
growth effect of the size of the public sector (i.e.
including initial income) for a panel of rich countries
after correcting for various econometric problems (1).
A full econometric discussion in the context of the EU
is not possible due to the low number of cross-country
observations (academic studies typically use large
cross-sections of countries) (2). This section therefore
only aims to position EU Member States with respect to
several possible interpretations of the link between the
size of the public sector and the long-term growth rate
and to discuss whether such interpretations are sup-
ported by empirical data (3). In particular, the following
hypotheses are investigated:
Catching up: countries with a lower initial GDP 
per capita might show higher trend growth rates
Graph IV.3 shows the effect of catching up. It confirms
a negative correlation between initial income (GDP per
capita) and the long-term growth rate. On average, new
Member States grow faster than the existing Member
States, which had a higher initial income.
Wagner’s law: the demand for government services 
and hence the size of the public sector might increase 
with the level of income
According to Wagner’s law, one might expect that the
demand for government services will grow as coun-
tries become richer. Thus, countries that already have
a higher GDP per capita would be expected to have a
larger public sector. However, Graph IV.4 does not
completely confirm this pattern. It shows that many
EU countries with similar levels of GDP per capita
(measured relatively to EU-15) show large differences
in the size of their public sector. For example, GDP per
head relative to that of EU-15 is 106 in Sweden and
105 in the UK, but the size of the public sector
amounts to 55 % of GDP in Sweden, while it is 37 %
of GDP in the UK. In this respect, Fölster and Henrek-
son (1998) draw attention to the fact that Wagner’s law
may operate especially at low levels of income and that
the relationship may break down at the highest levels
of income. Furthermore, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000)
argue that public spending is not a natural develop-
ment that accompanies the growth of per capita
income, but rather results from explicit policy deci-
sions. An important element in this regard is also the
organisation of social protection. If it is mainly pro-
vided through the public sector, this will increase the
share of the public sector in GDP. Stronger reliance on
private social protection arrangements will, by con-
trast, result in a smaller public sector.
Differences in preferences across countries: countries 
with a stronger preference for income equality have 
a larger public sector and a lower degree of income 
inequality
Graph IV.5 investigates the role of differences in pref-
erences across countries, assuming that the size of the
public sector is a proxy for public policies to reduce
inequality (4). It confirms a negative correlation
between the size of the public sector and the degree of
income inequality. It shows that differences in the size
of the public sector between Member States can — at
least partly — be explained by differences in prefer-
ences for income redistribution.
Distortionary taxation: after a certain point, 
the negative effects of taxation outweigh the positive 
effects of ‘productive’ spending on trend growth
Graph IV.6 shows the correlation between total reve-
nues and average five-yearly growth rates. The nega-
tive correlation as found in Fatàs et al. (2003) is con-
firmed. Hence, the data confirm that — on average —
countries with a smaller public sector have recorded
higher growth rates in recent years. At the same time,
the data also confirm that — on average — countries
with a smaller public sector had a lower initial GDP. As
¥1∂ In particular simultaneity and heteroscedasticity.
¥2∂ Graphs 3 to 6 only show the partial correlations for a cross-section of all
EU countries without making statistical inferences about causality or about
the significance of the coefficients given that this would give rise to prob-
lems of omitted variable bias and reverse causation.
¥3∂ In line with the literature, figures as reported are five-yearly averages. In
principle, cyclically adjusted data could also be used, but these are not yet
available for all new Member States.
¥4∂ These data on the equality of the income distribution were not available for
the new Member States.198
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of distortionary taxation and catching up on long-term
growth in this small dataset. Finally, differences in
preferences regarding the income distribution (equity)
also play a role in explaining differences in size.
Simulations with macroeconometric models can pro-
vide additional insights into the correlation between
the size of the public sector and long-term growth, as
they provide the opportunity to keep ‘other’ variables
such as initial income constant. European Commission
(2003) presents an overview of the effects of fiscal
consolidation on growth on the basis of the QUEST
model. In this model, short-run Keynesian effects and
the medium- to long-term effects of distortionary tax-
ation interact when the size of the public sector is
changed. It turns out that all simulations of budgetary
consolidation through higher taxes show negative
growth effects in the medium run, since the tax rises
increase the distortions in the economy and lower out-
put. Fiscal adjustment based on expenditure cuts, on
the other hand, lead to negative GDP effects in the
short run, but these are reversed in the medium to long
run. Moreover, empirical evidence in European Com-
mission (2003) on expansionary consolidation sug-
gests that fiscal adjustments based on expenditure cuts
are more likely to coincide with higher growth rates
than consolidation periods based on tax increases. In
terms of policy recommendations, emphasis has there-
fore been put on growing evidence that successful and
lasting consolidation appears to occur when the bulk of
the adjustment takes place on the expenditure side,
both in terms of sustaining an improved budget bal-
ance and achieving a positive growth effect (1). Section
5.1 will continue this analysis by investigating the
interaction between budgetary institutions that foster
expenditure control and fiscal consolidation on the
expenditure side of the budget.      
¥1∂ See also European Commission (2000a) on the factors determining the
success of a budgetary adjustment.
Graph IV.3:  Catching up: Initial income and growth rates
NB: Real growth as an average of 1998–2002 and initial GDP per head is measured in PPS (EU-15 = 100) as an average over 1993–97.
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 4Graph IV.4:  Wagner’s law: Income per capita and size of the public sector
NB: Size is measured as primary expenditure as a percentage of GDP. GDP per head in PPS (EU-15 = 100). Figures shown are averages 1998–2002.
Source: Commission services.
Graph IV.5:  Preferences: Size of the public sector and inequality of income distribution
NB: Figures are for 1998. Inequality of income distribution is measured as the ratio between the top (highest income) 20 % of a Member State’s population
and the bottom (poorest) 20 % of the Member State’s population. Size is measured as cyclically adjusted primary expenditure in 1998.
Source: Commission services.
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T h e  q u a l i t y  o f  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e sGraph IV.6:  Distortionary taxation: Total revenues and growth rates
NB: Total revenues as a percentage of GPD and real growth rate are averages 1998–2002.
Source: Commission services.
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4. A microeconomic perspective on quality
4.1. Institutionalising quality within 
the budget process
The ‘top-down’ macroeconomic perspective on quality
helps to underpin the strategic importance of redirecting
public expenditure towards ‘productive’ uses and
reducing distortionary taxation in order to raise the
growth potential of the EU economy. At the same time,
it can only provide for broad generalisations on the ques-
tion of separating ‘productive’ from ‘unproductive’
expenditure in practice. This is exactly where the ‘bot-
tom-up’ approach of the microeconomic perspective
becomes useful as it provides the tools needed to support
decision-making in practice. This entails a shift in focus
from cross-country differences in fiscal aggregates
towards the techniques and institutions that can be used
to improve the quality of public finances, i.e. the effec-
tive and efficient use of resources in reaching strategic
priorities. In particular, it will be shown in this section
that the technique of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) pro-
vides for the essential criterion for distinguishing
between ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ public
investment in practice. Furthermore, the fiscal institu-
tions for performance-budgeting help to focus on strate-
gic objectives and the most efficient use of resources in
reaching them, irrespective of the specific topic they are
applied to. In fact, full CBA is especially relevant for
large investment projects with a long time horizon, while
performance-budgeting offers the opportunity of extend-
ing the use of cost-benefit comparisons to all or to a large
part of government expenditure, by systematically relat-
ing the benefits of government intervention (what is the
objective?) to its costs (i.e. public expenditure to reach a
particular policy outcome).
Developing such mechanisms for balancing costs and
benefits at national level is especially relevant for the
ministries of finance given that budgeting is subject to a
common pool problem. From the perspective of an indi-
vidual spending ministry or from the perspective of a
local government, the benefits of extra spending can usu-
ally be readily identified while at the same time the costs
will be less visible given that they are spread out over the
public at large. The consequence is that individual min-
istries or local governments may fail to internalise the
full costs when making their spending bids and may
thereby create a continuous pressure for increasing the
size of the public sector. With limited resources avail-
able and pressures on the expenditure side likely to
increase further, a strong role for the ministry of finance
to internalise the costs of all extra spending and to
increase the efficiency of government intervention
becomes more important, and with it the development of
mechanisms that institutionalise the process of doing so.
In this respect, fiscal rules that ensure overall fiscal sus-
tainability need to be complemented with institutions
that ensure the effective and efficient use of funds within
overall budget constraints. The national fiscal rules for
controlling public expenditure in a medium-term frame-
work have already been discussed in European Commis-
sion (2003), so that the analysis in this part can concen-
trate on the ‘quality’ side of the matter.
4.2. Cost-benefit analysis
4.2.1. Micro versus macro
As an introduction to CBA, it may be useful to clarify
how the macroeconomic and the microeconomic per-
spective on quality are related. According to economic
theory, what matters in the end is an allocation of
resources that maximises social welfare. This allocation,
in turn, depends on the social welfare function, which
itself reflects the preferences of individuals (hence, the
social welfare function can contain ‘traditional’ eco-
nomic variables such as the level and distribution of
income but also ‘broader’ aspects of the quality of life
including employment conditions, a clean environment
and security). However, the problem with applying this
approach in practice is that one cannot measure interper-
sonal utility directly in a way that allows a comparison
across different individuals. As a result, it is also not pos-
sible to measure social welfare in a direct way.202
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offer different ways to solve this problem. Macroeco-
nomic studies concentrate on the contribution of fiscal
policy to long-term growth and thereby to social welfare
by assuming that growth is an intermediate objective that
increases welfare. Applied microeconomic studies, on
the other hand, solve the problem that the social welfare
function is non-discernable in another way and judge the
contribution of individual projects to social welfare rela-
tive to the base case, i.e. what would have happened in
the absence of the project. Hence, the macroeconomic
and the microeconomic approaches take a different route
towards the same ultimate objective of maximising
social welfare.
In this respect, it should also be noted that the philosophy
underlying both approaches is very similar. Firstly, in
the macroeconomic approach the ability of fiscal policy
to have an impact on long-term growth depends on the
presence of externalities, which provide the reason why
government intervention might be ‘productive’. In the
same vein, in cost-benefit analysis the key issue in deter-
mining whether public investment is ‘productive’ is to
take social costs and benefits into account, including
externalities. Secondly, the sections on the macroeco-
nomic approach have stressed the importance of taking
both the benefits of public expenditure and their finan-
cing costs into account in determining the overall impact
of government intervention. CBA does the same and
applies the principle not to the economy as a whole but
to individual projects instead.
4.2.2. Identifying ‘productive’ public investment
Microeconomic theory provides for a rather nuanced
answer to the question of what is ‘productive’ govern-
ment intervention given that — at the margin — a ‘pro-
ductive’ project is a project for which the social benefits
exceed the social costs (i.e. it creates a ‘social surplus’).
For each individual project, CBA examines whether this
criterion has been met in calculating its net present value
by discounting future social costs and benefits. Put dif-
ferently, the basic technique and the economic principles
of CBA are the same whether applied to, for example,
industrial estates and technology parks (with positive
social benefits such as the diffusion of entrepreneurial
knowledge and the birth of new productive companies
and possible negative environmental costs such as noise
and pollution), health infrastructure (with positive social
benefits such as avoided lost working days due to ill
health), infrastructure networks (with positive social
benefits such as time saved or increases in local earnings
due to the setting-up of new enterprises and negative
externalities such as those related to environmental
impact).
A comprehensive theoretical description of the use of
CBA is outside the scope of this report (1). Several issues
are worth mentioning, however, before concentrating on
an empirical discussion of the use of CBA across EU
countries in Section 4.2.3.
Firstly, the difference between CBA and cost-effec-
tiveness analysis. In cost-benefit analysis, the identifi-
cation of different project alternatives is essential: the
method aims at valuing net costs or benefits of different
projects to society and then selecting the best option.
Cost-effectiveness, on the other hand, is a method of
evaluation that compares the costs of alternative ways of
producing the same output. Thus, cost-effectiveness
analysis does not include the first step of selecting the
best projects and starts with the step of producing the
output at the lowest costs. Therefore, CBA is the appro-
priate method for an economic analysis of different
options of reaching a particular objective of government
intervention, while cost-effectiveness analysis could be
used when benefits cannot be valued.
Secondly, the valuation of non-market costs and ben-
efits. The aim of CBA is to value all costs and benefits
of a particular project in order to calculate the net social
surplus. Obviously, the process of valuation could be
based on market prices where available. However, the
common rationale for government intervention is to pro-
vide services that are not provided efficiently by the mar-
ket, so how to value costs and benefits for which no mar-
ket prices are available? This question goes to heart of
the economic rationale of CBA. In essence, the available
techniques aim at simulating a market and inferring a
value either by using revealed preference techniques or
stated preferences. Revealed preferences are based on
existing markets and observed prices. From this, implicit
prices for non-market aspects are inferred, for example
by studying the effect of noise on housing prices. Stated
preferences are based on the response to questionnaires,
either on the basis of questions that ask for direct valu-
ation or asking preferences and then inferring a value.
Naturally, each method has its pros and cons. The scien-
tific basis of revealed preferences is stronger than that
for stated preferences, and its results are less easy to
¥1∂ For a theoretical discussion, see Drèze and Stern (1987).203
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not always be available. In practice, the application of
these techniques is the topic of specialised research in
different sectors (e.g. valuing health benefits, environ-
mental impacts and time saved as a result of infrastruc-
ture investment). A recurrent theme in the empirical
applications is that the uncertainty margins in various
estimates may be large. Obviously, this complicates to
some extent the use of CBA in practice and highlights
the importance of carrying out sensitivity analysis as a
part of CBA (1).
Thirdly, the inclusion in CBA of considerations
related to the distribution of income. The standard
(normative) criterion underlying CBA is whether or not
the project creates a social surplus. A policy creates a
social surplus if it leads to a potential Pareto improve-
ment which implies that the ‘winners’ of a project or pol-
icy could in principle compensate the ‘losers’ so that the
‘losers’ are at least as well off as in the base case and the
winners are better off. In the standard approach, the
change in the social surplus simply adds up costs and
benefits without considering the distribution of those
costs and benefits. However, the effects of different
projects on social welfare may depend also on the distri-
bution of the costs and the benefits, given that the mar-
ginal utility of extra income may depend on the income
of an individual. As a general rule, it is often assumed
that as income is doubled, the marginal utility of con-
sumption to individuals falls by half (HM Treasury,
2003; European Commission, 2002). Thus, the tradi-
tional criterion in CBA of simply maximising aggre-
gated income has come under criticism given that dis-
tributive effects should also be taken into account. There
are two ways to do so. The first is to adjust the weighing
of costs and benefits for different income groups so that
costs and benefits to low-income groups would receive a
higher weight. In this way, effects on the distribution of
income are taken into account within CBA. The second
is to continue to use base CBA on the criterion of max-
imising aggregate income, to evaluate the redistributive
effects of the project separately and then to combine all
information in the final decision-making process.
Fourthly, the role of CBA in the decision-making
process. CBA can be useful in all stages of the decision-
making process. During the first phase of identifying the
options, a full CBA may not be feasible for each option,
given the large amount of information that is required to
make a complete CBA. A pre-feasibility study may help
to concentrate on the most promising alternatives. A full
CBA should subsequently be prepared in order to allow
a well-informed final decision. However, in practice not
all costs and benefits can always be valued and the deci-
sion-maker may want to consider additional objectives
to the one used in CBA of maximising generalised
income (for example the distribution of income if it has
not been reflected already in the CBA). These effects
have to be reported separately as they cannot be included
in the CBA. A common technique for including addi-
tional objectives in the decision-making process is
through multi-criteria analysis. This involves the identi-
fication of additional objectives, weighing them and then
ranking different projects in terms of their impact on the
weighed objectives. However, the process of introducing
additional objectives and weighing them inevitably
increases subjectivity in the decision-making process. It
should reflect political priorities, therefore, and cannot
be made by technical experts carrying out CBA.
4.2.3. Cost-benefit analysis: Learning from 
international experiences
In principle, the use of CBA allows for the comparison
across projects in their contribution to social welfare. In
practice, however, methodological differences in the
application often complicate such comparisons. There-
fore, at the national level, many countries have under-
taken efforts during the last years to harmonise the meth-
odology used for project appraisal. For example, in the
Netherlands a large-scale research project was under-
taken on the use of CBA in analysing large infrastructure
projects with the aim of improving the scientific basis for
decision-making. The project resulted in a broad consen-
sus on the importance of cost-benefit analysis in the
evaluation of major infrastructure projects and on the
outlines of the way in which such analysis needs to be
made (Centraal Planbureau, 2000). In the United King-
dom, the new edition of the ‘Green book, appraisal and
evaluation in central government’ (HM Treasury, 2003)
incorporates revised guidance to encourage a more thor-
ough, long-term and analytically robust approach to
appraisal and evaluation. It is relevant to all appraisals
and evaluations and states that the relevant costs and
benefits to government and society of all options should
be valued, and the net benefits or costs calculated. Fur-
thermore, at the level of the EU, CBA of investment
projects is explicitly required for larger projects concern-
¥1∂ In addition, the pooling of knowledge in overview studies can also be use-
ful for improving the estimates (an example is in the transport sector,
ECMT, 1998), although it should always be kept in mind that estimated
values depend on the context in which they were estimated.204
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instrument for pre-accession countries. While Member
States are responsible for the prior appraisal, the Com-
mission has to evaluate the quality of this appraisal in
order to admit the project proposal to co-financing and to
determine the co-financing rate. In this context, the
Regional Policy DG has recently updated its guide for
CBA of investment projects (European Commission,
2002b). It indicates that, despite differences of pro-
cedures and methods among the different funds, the eco-
nomic logic of analysis and the methodology should be
homogeneous.
In sum, both at the national level and also within the
European Commission efforts have been undertaken to
improve the use of CBA as a decision-making tool for
identifying ‘productive’ projects. At the same time, com-
parative cross-country research on the use of CBA is
hard to find. A rare example is Florio (2003), which
compares differences in the financial and economic rate
of return of investment projects sponsored by the Euro-
pean Union, the EBRD and the World Bank. Its main
finding is that cost-benefit analysis generates larger var-
iability of rates of return than financial analysis. The sug-
gested interpretation is that while for financial analysis
the techniques are fairly standard across sectors, tech-
niques in cost-benefit analysis (and valuing externalities
in particular) are less uniform. The authors therefore call
for international comparative research into the methods
used across countries, sectors and institutions.
A rare example of such a comparison across EU countries
is the study by Dings et al. (2000). It contains a compari-
son of differences and similarities of the use of CBA for
large infrastructure projects in Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Denmark and the European Commis-
sion. It finds that in all cases the use of CBA is standard
practice or prescribed by law. There is an increasing
acceptance of CBA as a decision-making tool and in most
individual projects studied CBA played an important role
in the political decision-making process. Furthermore, it
also finds that the EU fiscal framework, in setting out the
rules for fiscal discipline, has played an important role in
increasing the acceptance of CBA. It has enhanced the
awareness of the importance of fiscal discipline and thus
of the need of a well-structured decision-making process.
In all countries, projects have been undertaken that aim at
refining the methodology. More recent revisions of CBA
have increased the degree to which externalities are being
valued. However, in line with Florio (2003), the results
suggest that the largest part of the uncertainties in the cal-
culation is still due to difficulties and variations in the val-
uation of externalities.
Another line of research concentrates on the inputs into
CBA and compares estimated costs with actual costs. Fly-
vbjerg et al. (2002) built a database of 258 infrastructure
projects and found that costs are underestimated for
almost 9 of out 10 projects. For the sample as a whole,
actual costs are on average 28 % higher than estimated
costs, while for the 181 projects located in Europe, the
average cost escalation is 26 %. Cost underestimation
appears to be a global phenomenon and has not decreased
over the past 70 years. The implication of such systematic
misrepresentation at the time of decision-making is a
decrease in the quality of public finances, since non-viable
projects might go ahead, while alternative viable projects
might not go ahead. Thus, the consequences are a less effi-
cient allocation of resources and a decrease in social wel-
fare. In explaining the phenomenon, the authors point out
that the incentive structures for large projects may be
geared towards underestimation of costs. When a project
goes forward, the groups that benefit can be readily iden-
tified (engineers, contractors, bankers, landowners, con-
struction workers, lawyers, developers), while a large part
of the costs would be spread out over the public at large.
In fact, this is an example of the ‘common pool’ problem
as referred to in Section 4.1 (1). Thus, it would seem that
ministries of finance have a key interest in improving the
incentive structure in the decision-making process, by
improving checks and balances and by involving inde-
pendent specialists in carrying out the projections under-
lying CBA (2).
Overall, an appropriate conclusion therefore seems to be
that many efforts have been undertaken at national level
to improve the consistency and scope of available tech-
niques to better distinguish between ‘productive’ and
‘unproductive’ projects, thereby improving the quality
of public finances and contributing to a more efficient
allocation of resources. At the same time, the evidence
suggests that further improvements can be made, in par-
ticular with respect to the valuation (in monetary terms)
of social costs and benefits in different sectors and the
incentives in the decision-making process that lead to a
systematic optimism bias. This suggests that there may
¥1∂ The theory of the common pool problem has also been applied to the rela-
tionship between the Ministry of Finance and individual spending minis-
tries in Hallerberg (2004) and to the interaction between the central
government and local governments in Rodden et al. (2003).
¥2∂ In this respect, HM Treasury (2003) requires that optimism bias should be
accounted for explicitly in all appraisals. 205
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involving national experts that have been involved in
projects of improving the consistency in the methodol-
ogy of CBA and its application to improve the decision-
making process in practice.
4.3. Performance-budgeting
4.3.1. Budgetary institutions: Inputs, outputs or 
outcomes?
As indicated, CBA is used especially for large invest-
ment projects with a long time horizon. The concept of
quality does not only apply to public investment, how-
ever, as it requires that all public expenditure is used to
achieve the priorities of society (such as a sustainable
development) in the most efficient and effective way. A
starting point of the analysis could be the observation
that a government that aims at maximising the social
welfare of its citizens needs to be constantly informed
about the preferences of its citizens and needs to respond
to changes in preferences. This is particularly relevant in
a context where preferences change over time due to
changes in technology, demographics and social struc-
tures. It is also relevant in a context where resources are
scarce so that their best uses have to be found within a
fixed budget constraint. The application of traditional
budgeting sometimes created problems in this context.
Firstly, a focus on inputs in the budget provides no visi-
bility on how successful a programme is in achieving its
objectives. Secondly, it does not allow consideration of
alternative and possibly more efficient ways to achieve
the same objective. Hence, in response, several countries
have explored ways in recent years to shift attention out-
wards and to increase the responsiveness of the delivery
of goods and services in line with changing preferences.
A prominent development has been a (renewed) interest
for structural reforms to the budget process that aim at
strengthening the link between the allocation of
resources and performance in reaching stated objectives.
A central idea has been that a clearer focus on outputs or
policy outcomes (1) may improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the use of scarce resources so that sav-
ings can be achieved while at the same time performance
in achieving policy objectives would be maintained or
even improved.
The question, of course, is whether these reforms have
indeed produced the desired effects. The discussion on
this question can be summarised on the basis of the three
main elements of performance-budgeting as identified
by the OECD (2003):
1. A clear ex ante specification of the performance 
(outcomes/outputs) expected for each programme 
or agency
The relevant question is whether and how policies con-
tribute to the objectives of government intervention (i.e.
outcomes). In practice, however, it may not always be
possible to describe policy outcomes in a measurable
and specific way. In some cases outcomes can only be
achieved over many years, or can only be described in a
general way (for example, improving human capital).
Furthermore, policy outcomes may be affected by a
range of factors outside the direct control of a particular
government agency. In this respect, outputs may be more
easy to control and specify (for example, years of educa-
tion or use of R & D funds), but at the same time a focus
on outputs might distract attention from the original rea-
son for government intervention. In addition, it has been
pointed out that there may be a danger of a certain degree
of over-emphasis on objectives that can be quantified at
the expense of objectives that cannot be so easily quan-
tified (Smith, 1995). However, applications of perform-
ance-budgeting in practice recognise that formulating
measurable outcomes may not always be possible and
therefore do not establish direct causal links between
performance and budget appropriations.
2. Devolution of decision-making authority and freedom 
to reallocate funds towards ‘productive’ items
The philosophy in performance-budgeting is to shift
attention from control ex ante on budgetary inputs to
accountability ex post on the basis of results. A relaxa-
tion of input controls can give managers and agencies
more freedom to use their expertise in finding and
designing the best programmes. In return they will be
held more accountable for the achieved results (Schick,
2003). Furthermore, there are two preconditions for an
approach of relaxing input controls (Diamond, 2003).
Firstly, every agency should face a tight overall budget
constraint within which it can operate, since increased
flexibility requires certainty over the funds that are avail-
able to reach the stated targets. Therefore, steps towards
performance-budgeting have usually been taken in par-
allel with introducing or strengthening medium-term
expenditure frameworks. Secondly, it also requires the
¥1∂ Outcomes refer to policy impact, while outputs measure production or
services delivered.206
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ments and to intervene if necessary.
3. A link between performance and budget 
appropriations
The crucial issue is how to link performance and the allo-
cation of resources. In this respect, Schick (2003) distin-
guishes two definitions of performance-budgeting.
Broadly defined, a performance budget is any budget
that presents what agencies have done or expect to do
with the money provided to them. Strictly defined, a per-
formance budget is only a budget that explicitly links
each increment in resources to an increment in outputs or
other results.
In practice many countries that measure performance have
avoided a direct link between performance and budget
appropriations. Canada, Denmark, Finland and Sweden
have all introduced initiatives to promote performance
without explicitly tying performance to budgeting (Dia-
mond, 2003) (1). In the same vein, on the basis of evidence
for the states in the United States, Moynihan (2003) (2)
reports that the links between performance measures and
resource allocations are weak. While 47 of 50 states claim
to use some form of performance-budgeting, there is no
evidence that any state relies on a strict performance sys-
tem. One reason might be that, if performance cannot be
precisely defined, it would be difficult to link funding and
performance. In addition, it has been pointed out that even
if a programme performs badly, it may continue to be
funded if it concerns an essential government function,
while a well-performing programme may not receive
additional funding if it is considered to be a marginal func-
tion of government.
To summarise, much of the literature on performance-
budgeting stresses the importance of moving ‘beyond
rhetoric’ and to give a balanced assessment of what can
and has been achieved. In this respect, Moynihan (2003)
points out that performance information is most widely
used by managers seeking to improve the operational
efficiency of their programmes. Furthermore, perform-
ance-budgeting can enrich policy debates and help to
identify and prioritise desired outcomes, especially when
embedded in a broader strategy of managing for results.
In the same spirit, and on the basis of an early assessment
of reform in Australia, France, New Zealand, Sweden
and the UK, the OECD (1997) points out that there are
strong reasons to believe that ‘restructuring public man-
agement’ has brought sizeable efficiency gains, while
there is no reason to believe that outcomes have either
improved or deteriorated.
4.3.2. Performance-budgeting by EU Member 
States: An empirical discussion
Table IV.6 shows an overview of current practices in EU
Member States with respect to performance-budgeting
on the basis of the OECD/World Bank budgeting prac-
tices and procedures database. It is based on answers
provided by national authorities to the OECD/World
Bank survey of budget practices and procedures that was
launched in February 2003. In interpreting the data, it
should be kept in mind that the OECD and the World
Bank are working to improve the questionnaire and the
reliability of the answers. Furthermore, answers may
give an overview of institutional arrangements in place,
but do not give an indication of the extent to which a cul-
ture of performance is embedded in national organisa-
tions. Institutional reform is not a sufficient condition for
improving performance, and it cannot be concluded on
the basis of institutional characteristics alone whether
one country performs better than the other.
The survey was set up in a way to obtain information on
the extent to which countries measure performance and
also on the use of the data in the decision-making pro-
cess. The first three columns in Table IV.6 summarise
the extent to which Member States measure performance
(i.e. as reported by the countries themselves). When
looking at the degree to which performance data are rou-
tinely included in budget documentation, and the extent
to which this includes performance targets, it turns out
that Spain, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Sweden
include performance data for a large majority of pro-
grammes, while the UK could also be expected to be in
this category (3) (although answers given for the UK are
incomplete in this respect). The degree to which the per-
formance data include performance targets differs from
all programmes in Spain to around 25 % of programmes
in Denmark and Sweden. No performance data are
included in the budget data in Ireland, Italy, Austria, Por-¥1∂ In addition, New Zealand and the UK have attempted to employ formal con-
tractual agreements between the government and chief executive offices
(New Zealand) or for all main departments covering 130 targets in key areas
of government (UK, 2002 spending review) to ensure performance.
¥2∂ Based on the findings of research conducted by the government perform-
ance project, see www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/
¥3∂ See UK Treasury website on 2002 spending review and public service agree-
ments: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr02/psa/207
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2 0 0 4tugal and Hungary, while results for other Member
States vary from less than 25 % of programmes in Bel-
gium to more than 50 % in France. The fourth column
investigates the question of whether expenditures are
specifically linked to output or outcome targets. A large
majority of Member States links expenditure to ‘some’
or ‘a few’ targets, while Spain and the Netherlands link
expenditure to all output or outcome targets. In sum, the
whole range of possibilities is observed in practice, from
the inclusion of performance data for all programmes to
the use of no performance data in budget documentation
at all.
The last three columns summarise the use of perform-
ance data in the decision-making process. In a majority
of countries, performance data are used in determining
budget appropriations, but there is no evidence that
appropriations are related to results in a direct manner.
This is confirmed by answers in the last column, where
only three countries indicate that the size of the budget is
affected when performance targets are not met. There-
fore, among the EU countries that use performance-
budgeting, almost all of them seem to use the broad form
of performance-budgeting. Results also indicate that pol-
iticians generally use performance measures in the deci-
sion-making process, although it is not clear how the
information is used, and whether this may have affected
the decisions taken. As regards the use of sanctions when
performance data are not met (which relates to the ques-
tion of making managers manage), results generally
show that sanctions are absent, or show that compliance
with the targets is related to the pay of the persons that
are responsible for reaching the targets. 
To conclude, the results indicate widely diverging
budgetary practices with respect to performance-budg-
eting among EU Member States. Results range from
practices quite close to the strict form of performance-
budgeting in Spain, to more broad forms in the Nether-
lands and the Nordic countries, a middle group of coun-
tries which use performance data but not for all pro-
grammes and several countries that do not use
performance data at all. The wide range of practices
would seem to indicate that the scope for learning from
international experiences — on the basis of the exper-
tise as concentrated within the OECD — might be large
and thereby also the scope for improving the quality of
public finances with respect to the identification of key
objectives of government intervention and bringing
about efficiency savings in reaching them. In particu-
lar, this includes the pros and cons of measuring per-
formance for some, most or all programmes and the use
of performance data in order to improve the decision-
making process.208
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5. Expenditure control, 
reallocation and fiscal consolidation
5.1. Expenditure control, reallocation 
and fiscal consolidation: Formulating 
hypotheses
5.1.1. Expenditure control and reallocation
Improving the quality of public finances requires that
resources are (re)allocated in line with strategic priori-
ties. In this respect, Section 3.4.3 highlighted that exist-
ing trends in public expenditure such as those related to
ageing cannot be ignored in the discussion on reallocat-
ing funds towards the priorities. In addition, this section
investigates the topic of reallocation further. The pur-
pose is to investigate whether and how budgetary insti-
tutions can facilitate the process of reallocation. This
section formulates hypotheses that will be confronted
with available empirical evidence in Section 5.2.
In this context, the previous section already discussed
that effective medium-term expenditure frameworks are
a precondition for increased managerial flexibility to
reallocate funds to their most ‘productive’ uses within
broad expenditure classes. In addition, Schick (2002)
argues that medium-term expenditure frameworks can
also be used to facilitate reallocation between broad
expenditure categories. In this case, reallocation should
take place not at the level of spending departments, but
within the Cabinet when the envelopes for each sector
are set, by permitting some sectors increases above the
baseline projections while others should produce
decreases.
These two aspects of the link between expenditure con-
trol and reallocation have been summarised in the two
boxes on the left of Graph IV.7. The hypothesis that fol-
lows is that only countries with effective control of broad
categories of expenditure will be able to pursue a suc-
cessful strategy of giving managers the freedom to
reallocate resources within broad expenditure catego-
ries. This hypothesis is relevant given that managing and
budgeting for performance — if implemented through
proper sequencing — may possibly lead to sizeable effi-
ciency gains (Section 4.3.1). In addition, it also contains
the hypothesis that the use of these medium-term
expenditure limits for each spending sector or major
spending department may facilitate reallocation between
broad expenditure categories. In essence, these hypothe-
ses focus on ways to better spend (allocate) a given
amount of public money (resources), whereby realloca-
tion towards ‘productive’ items can be one element of a
strategy for increasing the growth potential. 
5.1.2. Expenditure control and fiscal consolidation
Apart from the recommendation to reallocate funds
towards identified priorities, previous policy recommen-
dations have also focused on the topic of ‘high quality’
fiscal consolidation. As indicated also in Section 3.5, the
available evidence seems to suggest that fiscal adjust-
ments based on expenditure cuts are more likely to coin-
cide with higher growth rates than consolidation periods
based on tax increases. Furthermore, Alesina and Ard-
agna (1998) point out that fiscal consolidation efforts
based on expenditure cuts, especially where they focus
on reducing transfers and government wages, are more
likely to have a lasting effect on budget deficits than con-
solidations based on higher revenues. If, in turn, such a
lasting reduction in budget deficits translates into a per-
manent reduction in budget deficits, then it should lead
to increased capital accumulation and translate into a
higher per capita potential output (see Part III of this
report).
A previously unaddressed question is whether and how
budgetary institutions might facilitate expenditure-based
fiscal consolidation. An obvious starting point would be
to ask whether a stronger institutional setting for control-
ling expenditure facilitates expenditure-based fiscal con-212
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tain the hypothesis that countries with more effective
medium-term expenditure frameworks might be able to
better control public expenditure and thus might be more
likely to show fiscal consolidation on the expenditure
side of the budget than countries with less effective insti-
tutions for controlling public expenditure.
As is shown in Graph IV.7, the combination of these
hypotheses indicates how effective control of public
expenditure through properly designed medium-term
expenditure frameworks might foster not only fiscal dis-
cipline (see also European Commission, 2003) (1) but
also the quality of public finances by facilitating the
reallocation of existing funds as well as lasting expendi-
ture-based fiscal consolidation.
5.2. Expenditure control, reallocation 
and fiscal consolidation: Empirical 
discussion
Table IV.7 confronts the hypotheses of Graph IV.7 with
available empirical data. The first column is taken from
the survey into national medium-term expenditure rules
in European Commission (2003a). It summarises the
experience with expenditure rules in EU countries. As
can be seen in Table IV.7, in the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, Sweden, and the UK there was a general
perception (2) that the expenditure rules had contributed
to expenditure control. Overall, these countries were
characterised by expenditure rules that were more bind-
ing and more ambitious than in other countries.
The second and third columns refer to the question
whether fiscal consolidation efforts were balanced
towards the expenditure or the revenue side of the
budget and whether the consolidations were lasting. A
practical question is which definitions to use for
consolidation periods and lasting effects. As argued in
European Commission (2003a) the definition of fiscal
consolidation can be based either on the size of the fis-
cal consolidation or on the persistence of the fiscal
consolidation. The second column uses a definition
based on the size of fiscal consolidation, in line with
definitions used in the literature (3). In this way, the
table focuses on large consolidation efforts in a single
Graph IV.7:  The consistency of expenditure control and quality
Effective medium-term
expenditue frameworks ...
... facilitate lasting budgetary 
consolidation
(expenditure-based)
... facilitate reallocation between 
expenditure categories; 
are a procondition 
for reallocation within 
expenditure classes
Increase growth potential; 
efficient allocation of resources
¥1∂ European Commission (2003a) also addresses the consistency between
expenditure rules and automatic stabilisation, by allowing the automatic
stabilisers to operate on the expenditure side.
¥2∂ Given the difficulty of isolating the impact of expenditure rules on expend-
iture trends from other relevant factors, the survey asked for a summary
statement on the experience with the expenditure rules. 
¥3∂ See notes under Table IV.7 for the exact definitions. 213
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that, where countries with stronger expenditure control
consolidated, the efforts were indeed balanced towards
the expenditure side (i.e. in Finland, Sweden and the
UK). An exception is the Netherlands that showed a
consolidation on the revenue side in 1993, which can
be explained by the fact that this was one year before
the introduction of its expenditure rules in 1994. How-
ever, a problem with the definition on the basis of the
size of the consolidation is that only a few observa-
tions are available since expenditure rules were intro-
duced in most Member States in the 1990s. Therefore,
the third column uses an alternative definition that sig-
nificantly reduces the size of the consolidation in a sin-
gle year and stresses the persistence of the fiscal con-
solidation over consecutive years. The justification for
using this definition could be that if fiscal institutions
would have an impact on the composition of fiscal
consolidation, one might expect a gradual, structural
and lasting impact, while any large fiscal consolidation
in a particular year might be expected to be due more
to political factors. The outcome in the fourth column
of Table IV.7 now shows that in all countries with
stronger expenditure control periods of fiscal consoli-
Table IV.7
Expenditure control, fiscal consolidation and performance-budgeting
Member State Experience with 
expenditure rule: 
Contribution to 
expenditure control? (1)
Fiscal consolidation 
expenditure or revenue 
based? (2)
Fiscal consolidation 
expenditure or revenue 
based? (alternative 
definition) (3)
Index of performance-
budgeting (4)
BE Difficult to assess given 
non-binding status
R (1993) R (1993–98) 2.25
DK Difficult to assess given 
specification of average 
target over several years
E (1996–99) 4.25
DE No R (1993–94) 2.125
R (1996–99)
EL Difficult to assess E (1994) R (1993–94) 1.75
R (1996–98)
ES Too early to assess E (1996–97) 5.5
R (2001–03)
FR No R (1994–97) n.a
IE Rule abandoned R (2003) 0
IT Too early to assess R (1997) R (1993) 2
R (1997)
NL Yes R (1993) R (1993) 5.25
E (1996)
AT Yes E (1995–97) 0.5
E (2000–01)
PT Too early to assess R (2002) R (2002–03) 1.75
FI Yes E (2000) E (1998–2000) 3.25
SE Yes E (1996) E (1994-98) 3.125
UK Yes E (1997-98) E (1994-99) n.a.
(1) European Commission (2003a), Table V.3.
(2) Definition of fiscal consolidation: the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance improves by at least 2 percentage points of GDP at time t or by at least 1.5 points
in two consecutive years.
(3) Definition of fiscal consolidation: any period in which the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance shows a cumulative improvement of at least 1.5 percentage
points and in which the budget balance does not deteriorate in a single year.
(4) Index as calculated on the basis of Table 7, where scoring for the first four columns/questions in Table 7 is based on the percentage of programmes (e.g. 0.5 points
if performance data are included for more than 50 % of programmes) and scoring is based on answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in last three columns (i.e. 0.5 points for yes
and 0 points for no).
Source: Commission services.214
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lands that switched to expenditure-based consolidation
after the introduction of its expenditure rule in 1994. In
almost all other countries, periods of fiscal consolida-
tion where balanced towards the revenue side. In inter-
preting these results one should keep in mind, how-
ever, that the causality may not necessarily run from
expenditure frameworks to expenditure-based consol-
idation, since it might also be that countries with
stronger preferences for expenditure-based consolida-
tion have introduced more effective expenditure
frameworks to implement such strategies.
In addition, if the control of broad classes of expendi-
ture is indeed a precondition for the devolution of man-
agerial power within these classes, as part of a strategy
of managing and budgeting for performance, the Neth-
erlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the UK would
be candidates for pursuing such strategies. Further-
more, other candidates could be Spain, which intro-
duced expenditure ceilings for the first time in 2003 so
that its contribution to expenditure control could not
yet be assessed and Denmark, which used an ambitious
expenditure target but formulated it over a number of
years and also changed it during those years so that it
became difficult to assess its effectiveness.
In this respect, Section 4.3.2 concludes that apart from
Austria (1) all these countries are using strategies of
performance-budgeting. This conclusion is repeated in
the third column of Table IV.7 on the basis of a simple
index of performance-budgeting. The crucial question,
of course, is whether these institutional reforms have
led to efficiency savings and a more effective use of
resources. As indicated already, available studies point
to the importance of moving ‘beyond rhetoric’ while
still indicating that efficiency gains can be sizeable.
Unfortunately, the hypothesis that expenditure control
facilitates reallocation between broad categories could
not be tested due to a lack of available data.
Taken together, these results indicate that controlling
public expenditure may be an important precondition
for improving the quality of public finances. Establish-
ing fixed budget constraints for broad classes of
expenditure may support a better use of expenditure
within these fixed constraints. When needed, it may
also facilitate the political decision-making process for
reallocation expenditure between these categories in
line with changing priorities and support a strategy of
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation.
5.3. The return of politically motivated 
fiscal expansions?
In interpreting the results of the previous paragraph, it
should be kept in mind that the introduction of institu-
tional arrangements is not a sufficient condition for
strengthening either expenditure control or perform-
ance, since institutions can be effective only when
they are supported by political will and by a culture of
budgeting for discipline and performance. In order to
illustrate this point, Table IV.8 shows developments
in cyclically adjusted primary public expenditure in
recent years. It appears that many of the countries
with positive experiences with expenditure rules have
slackened the reins in recent years, since the UK,
Sweden and the Netherlands and to a lesser extent
Finland and Denmark all show a recent substantial
¥1∂ In this respect it should be pointed out that Austria did not use a rule that
aimed at controlling broad classes of expenditure. Instead, it used a rule
that focused on administrative expenditure at the central level of govern-
ment (i.e. planned cuts in personnel). See European Commission (2003a),
Table V.3.
Table IV.8
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure 
(% of GDP)
2000 2003
BE 42.9 45.7
DK 51.1 52.7
DE 44.9 45.7
EL 42.0 41.5
ES 36.8 36.9
FR 49.8 51.8
IE 30.6 33.4
IT 41.6 43.6
NL 43.2 45.3
AT 49.0 47.8
PT 42.3 44.9
FI 46.9 48.6
SE 53.7 56.7
UK 36.7 40.7
Source: Source: Commission services.215
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2 0 0 4upward movement in public expenditure (1). In other
words, countries that have created room for man-
oeuvre through prudent behaviour in the past seem to
have used at least part of it in recent years. The rea-
sons for the expansionary periods may be different —
such as an expansion in expenditure after years of
high growth and in the face of elections in the Nether-
lands or decisions to follow an expansionary policy as
in the UK — but results are similar: a weakening of
fiscal discipline so that two of these countries are now
close to or above that 3 % limit of the EU fiscal rules
and may have (had) to prepare themselves again for
new rounds of fiscal consolidation. More generally,
the erosion of political ownership of the discipline
rules has also been analysed in political-economy
terms in Buti and Giudice (2002) and Buti and van den
Noord (2003), where it is stated that short-term gains
at the national level of higher deficits may have out-
weighed the systematic costs in violating the rules.¥1∂ In addition, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, France and Italy also show sub-
stantial increases on the expenditure side in recent years.216
6. Conclusion
According to the definition as proposed in this part,
enhancing the quality of public finances requires the allo-
cation of budgetary resources and the effective and effi-
cient use of those resources towards identified strategic
priorities. With respect to the priorities, the analysis in this
part concentrates on the link between fiscal policy and
long-term growth. Overall, it confirms the relevance of
reallocating public expenditure towards ‘productive’ uses
and lowering the burden of distortionary taxation in a con-
text where priority is given to raising the growth potential
of the EU economy. At the same time, it stresses the
importance of microeconomic analysis on the question of
separating what is ‘productive’ from what is not.
If priority is given to stepping up the debate on the
quality of public finances at the level of the EU, it
seems necessary to start with the exchange of informa-
tion with respect to national priorities regarding the
composition of the budget, as well as the development
of the budgetary tools and institutions that support
decision-making in practice. The aim of this part has
been to contribute to such a debate by analysing not
only broad trends regarding the composition of public
expenditure at macroeconomic level, but also the role
of cost-benefit analysis in identifying ‘productive’
investment, the contribution of budgetary institutions
to better using existing funds and the role of effective
medium-term expenditure frameworks as a precondi-
tion for reallocation of expenditure within broad cat-
egories, while at the same time facilitating the political
decision-making process on reallocation of expenditure
between broad categories.217

Part V
Member State developments 
1. Belgium
In the 2002 update of the stability programme, the target
for the general government accounts was a balanced
budget. This target was based on much stronger eco-
nomic growth than actually took place. Still, the budget
recorded a small surplus. The budget benefited from a
decrease in interest payments and a strict control of
expenditures but also from sizeable one-off measures.
Without these measures the budget deficit would have
stood at about 1 % of GDP. The debt target for 2003 in
the 2002 update of the stability programme was 102.3 %
of GDP. The actual debt was even lower at 100.5 % of
GDP due to the abovementioned one-off measures, as
well as due to some financial operations (1).
¥1∂ These include the sale of financial assets of Credibe (formerly the Central
Mortgage Credit Office) and the reimbursement of loans granted by Fadels
(Fund for the Repayment of Social Housing Debt).
Table V.1
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Belgium 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance 0.1 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.7
— Total revenue 50.5 51.7 49.4 48.6
 Of which: — current taxes 30.6 30.2 29.9 29.3
— social contributions 16.7 16.4 16.2 16.0
— Total expenditure 50.5 51.5 49.9 49.4
 Of which: — collective consumption 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.2
— social transfers (4) 30.1 30.9 30.8 30.3
— interest expenditure 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.8
— gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
Primary balance 6.1 5.8 4.7 4.1
Pm Tax burden 46.6 45.9 45.4 44.5
Government debt 105.8 100.5 97.4 94.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance 0.1 0.7 0.0 – 0.5
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 6.2 6.3 5.1 4.3
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.5
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Primary balance 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.8
Government debt 106.1 102.3 97.6 93.6 90.1 87.0
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.8 2.5 2.1
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in November 2003.
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Belgium.220
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most recent updated stability programme is focused on
employment promoting measures, notably through the
reduction in social contributions. However, the budget-
ary outcome is also influenced to a large extent by the
temporary tax regulation (déclaration libératoire
unique), the income tax reform and the anticipation of
subsidies and transfers to SNCB (railway company).
Another important measure is the decision to increase
health expenditure by 4.5 % annually in real terms. Fur-
ther details are given in the accompanying table.
Following weak economic development in 2003, the tar-
get for the 2004 budget was revised in the most recent
update of the stability programme, which targets a bal-
anced budget, compared to a surplus of 0.3 % of GDP in
the previous update. The Commission’s spring 2004
forecast projects a deficit of 0.5 % of GDP. The differ-
ence between the target in the updated programme and
the spring 2004 forecast is not only due to the fact that
the Commission only takes into account measures
already announced and approved but also a more cau-
tious approach by the Commission. The spring 2004
forecast assumes that no additional revenue is expected
from the temporary tax regulation. In addition, it
assumes that employment growth is less favourable than
expected in the updated programme. According to the
forecast, the cyclically adjusted budget moves from a
surplus of 0.7 % of GDP to balance in 2004. However,
the deterioration disappears if one-off measures are
excluded.
The updated stability programme targets a balanced
budget in 2005. The spring 2004 forecast on the other
hand projects a further deterioration of the budget deficit
by 0.2 percentage points, to 0.7 % of GDP, based on the
usual no-policy change assumption. This means that the
improvement in the business cycle is not enough to off-
set the loss of revenue from one-off measures. 
The debt level is particularly high in Belgium but it is
also declining rapidly. A fall by more than 6 percentage
points to about 94 % of GDP is projected in the spring
2004 forecast over the period 2003–05.
Table V.2
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Belgium
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Déclaration libératoire unique (0.3 % of GDP)
• Income tax reform (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Reductions in social contributions (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Increase in 2004 in income taxes withheld in 2004 at the expense 
of 2005 (0.1 % of GDP)
• Bringing forward subsidies and transfers to SNCB from 2004 to 2003 
(0.4 % of GDP) (1)
(1) This measure was taken after the budget but it has been included in the forecast.
Source: Commission services and Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Budget.221
2. Czech Republic
The general government balance recorded a deficit of
12.9 % of GDP in 2003. This compares with a targeted
deficit of 7.3 % set in the 2003 pre-accession economic
programme (PEP). The very large deviation from target
was mainly due to a one-off imputation of State guaran-
tees to the general government deficit (about 6–7 % of
GDP). Without this one-off operation the deficit would
be actually lower than planned in the PEP owing to a
higher than projected growth and a revised base level for
GDP. Government debt was 37.6 % of GDP in 2003.
The State budget for 2004 was approved on 3 Decem-
ber 2004. It reflected the fiscal measures as presented in
the 2003 PEP. The three major expenditure-side meas-
ures are a cut in the wage bill of the central government
administration, reductions in discretionary spending of
individual ministries, and reductions in sickness bene-
fits. These three measures together constitute more than
three quarters of all expenditure cuts. On the revenue
side, a shift is foreseen in the structure of budget reve-
nues — a reduction in corporate income tax should be
more than offset by an increase in VAT and in excise
duties. Further details are given in the accompanying
table.
The target for the general government deficit in 2004 in
the 2003 PEP is 5.9 % of GDP. In the Commission’s
spring 2004 forecast, the projected outcome in nominal
values is slightly worse than the one targeted by the gov-
ernment, but because of the upward revision of GDP, the
Table V.3
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Czech Republic
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance (3) – 6.4 – 12.9 – 5.9 – 5.1
— Total revenue 45.6 45.0 45.0 44.1
 Of which: — current taxes 20.7 21.1 21.0 20.7
— social contributions 15.1 15.0 14.8 14.6
— Total expenditure (3) 52.0 57.9 50.9 49.2
 Of which: — collective consumption 10.9 10.0 9.8 9.6
— social transfers (4) 23.9 23.1 22.9 22.7
— interest expenditure 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
— gross fixed capital formation 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2
Primary balance (3) – 5.0 – 11.7 – 4.6 – 3.8
Pm Tax burden 35.8 36.2 35.9 35.3
Government debt 28.9 37.6 40.6 42.4
Pm Real GDP (2) 2.0 2.9 2.9 3.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) Including UMTS receipts of 0.09 % of GDP in 2001, 0.02 % of GDP in 2002 and 2003, and 0.16 % of GDP in 2004.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.222
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ation reflects a less optimistic view on the final outcome
of cuts in government consumption. It also takes into
account the risk of imputation of a part of remaining
State guarantees.
The debt ratio is rather low, at around one third of GDP,
but its dynamics is worrying. It jumped from 28.9 % in
2002 to 37.6 % of GDP in 2003. In 2004 and 2005, gov-
ernment debt is expected to further increase from 40.6 %
of GDP in 2004 to 42.4 % of GDP in 2005.
Table V.4
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Czech Republic
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Broadening the VAT base
• Transferring of some goods and services from the reduced VAT rate 
(5 %) towards the standard one (22 %)
• Increase of the excise duty on spirits and tobacco
• Reduction of the corporate income tax rate (from 31 % in 2003 to 
24 % in 2006)
• Increase of social security contribution base of self-employed 
persons (to 50 % of the difference between revenues and costs, 
instead of the previous 35 %)
• Cuts in the wage bill of the public sector (2 % of public sector jobs 
are to be lost annually over the period 2004–06)
• Reduction in sickness benefits
• Cuts in discretionary spending of individual ministries (mainly cuts 
in military expenditures, in the State subsidy for housing savings 
programmes, in subsidies to businesses, and in the operating costs 
of ministries)
• Parametric changes in the PAYG pension pillar
• Cuts in social assistance and social care benefits
Source: Commission services.223
3. Denmark
The general government balance in 2003 is estimated to
be a surplus of 1.5 % of GDP. This is below the 2.2 % of
GDP target in the 2002 update of the convergence pro-
gramme. The main reason for the lower outturn is GDP
growth, which is estimated to have been 0.4 % in 2003 (1),
compared to the 2.2 % assumed in the convergence pro-
gramme update. This comparatively robust surplus is
due to the fact that tax revenues remained strong. In par-
ticular corporate tax revenues were high. Moreover, as
private consumption grew by more than 1 %, revenues
from indirect taxes held up relatively well.
The debt/GDP ratio in 2003 was 45 %, compared to the
target of 42  % in the update of the convergence pro-
gramme. The deviation is due to lower than foreseen sur-
¥1∂ GDP growth in 2003 was revised from 0.0 to 0.4 % subsequent to the pub-
lication of the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast. Table V.5 is based on
the Commission’s spring forecast, and therefore does not take account of
this revision.
Table V.5
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Denmark 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.5
— Total revenue 57.3 57.5 56.9 56.2
 Of which: — current taxes 46.9 47.3 46.8 46.5
— social contributions 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
— Total expenditure 54.9 55.4 55.8 54.7
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5
— social transfers (4) 36.3 37.1 37.1 36.4
— interest expenditure (4) 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.3
— gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7
Primary balance 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.8
Pm Tax burden 48.9 49.4 49.0 48.5
Government debt 47.2 45.0 42.3 40.0
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance 1.0 2.1 1.4 1.5
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 3.8 4.7 3.9 3.7
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.0 0.0 2.1 2.2
Convergence programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.1 
Primary balance 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.3 
Government debt 45.5 42.7 41.2 38.7 36.4 27.5 
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.1 1.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in November 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Denmark. 224
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for consolidated government debt.
The agreement on the budget for 2004 was concluded on
8 November 2003. On the expenditure side, it includes
measures to improve transport infrastructure. In line
with the agreement with local governments earlier in
2003, the growth in real public consumption is to be lim-
ited to 0.7 % in 2004. On the revenue side, the budget
incorporated the largest part of the income tax cuts of the
tax reform (see Table V.6).
On 23 March 2004, an agreement in the parliament was
reached based on the fiscal package presented by the
government earlier in the month. The new measures
include the full implementation of the tax reform in 2004
(originally planned for 2004–07); the suspension of con-
tributions to a mandatory savings scheme (1 % of gross
income) in 2004 and 2005; public investment and social
and health spending earmarked for 2005 is brought for-
ward to 2004; increased labour market expenditure on
training of unemployed. The direct impact on public
finances of the larger tax cuts is, however, to a large
extent offset by the fact that the contributions to the man-
datory savings are tax deductible, implying that tax rev-
enues will rise when the contributions to the savings
scheme are not paid.
The target for general government balance in the year
2004 in the 2003 update of the convergence programme
is a surplus of 1.3 % of GDP. 
This target has been revised down from 2.2 % in the pre-
vious programme update, inter alia, due to expected
lower revenues as a consequence of tax reductions. The
Commission’s spring 2004 forecast foresees a general
government surplus of 1.1 % of GDP.
The difference from the target of the 2003 update of the
convergence programme is due to the fact that the Com-
mission foresees higher unemployment and incorporates
the effects of the March 2004 fiscal package. The fiscal
stance in 2004 as measured by the change in the cycli-
cally adjusted balance is a considerable easing relative to
2003. However, it should be kept in mind that the
increase in the cyclically adjusted balance in 2003 was
not due to tight fiscal policy (1).
The Commission’s spring forecast foresees a rise in the
surplus to 1.5 % of GDP in 2005. The forecast is based
on a no-policy change assumption, but incorporates the
changes brought about by the March 2004 fiscal pack-
age, where expenditure and revenue changes are brought
forward to 2004. The target for 2005 in the 2003 update
of the convergence programme is a general government
surplus of 1.8 % of GDP. The difference vis-à-vis the
Commission forecast is due to effects of the recent fiscal
measures and higher labour market expenditure.
Due to the successive general government surpluses, the
government debt ratio continues to decline. In the Com-
mission’s spring forecast it is projected to fall to 42  %
of GDP in 2004 and to 40 % in 2005. This is slightly
above the path for the debt ratio foreseen in the last
updated Danish convergence programme.
¥1∂ Revenues from corporate taxes and the pension fund yield tax, in particu-
lar, tend to be volatile in Denmark and at times weakly correlated to the
business cycle, and can thus distort the cyclically adjusted budget bal-
ances. The Danish authorities therefore exclude these and certain other
revenue items in their calculations of cyclically adjusted balances.
Table V.6
Main budgetary measures for 2004, Denmark
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Full implementation in 2004 of the tax cuts of the tax reform: the 
level for middle-bracket income tax is raised; an earned-income tax 
credit is introduced (2/3 % of GDP)
• Temporary suspension of (tax deductible) contributions to 
mandatory saving raises revenues (1/4 % of GDP)
• Lower excise duties on alcohol, tobacco, soft drinks
• Bringing forward public investments and health spending
• Increased expenditure on training of unemployed
• Growth of real public consumption limited to 0.7 %
Source: Commission services, Danish Ministry of Finance.225
4. Germany
The general government budget deficit rose from 3.5 %
of GDP in 2002 to an estimated 3.9 % of GDP in 2003,
thus breaching the 3 % reference value for the second
consecutive year. In its update of the stability pro-
gramme of December 2002, the German authorities had
foreseen a deficit of 2  % of GDP for 2003. This was
based on expected real GDP growth at 1  % of GDP. In
fact, Germany recorded – 0.1 % real growth in 2003,
which led to considerable tax revenue shortfalls and
higher social spending. Government debt amounted to
64.2 % of GDP, also breaching the 60 % reference value
for the second consecutive year.
The budget for 2004 is shaped by four major develop-
ments. Firstly, a large reduction in income tax rates as
a consequence of tax relief laws passed in 2000 will
be implemented. Secondly, structural measures in the
public pension and health systems with budgetary
Table V.7
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Germany 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 3.5 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 2.8
— Total revenue 45.0 45.0 44.5 44.3
 Of which: — current taxes 22.6 22.7 22.4 22.3
— social contributions 18.4 18.6 18.5 18.2
— Total expenditure 48.5 48.9 48.0 47.1
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.6
— social transfers (4) 30.6 31.1 30.5 29.9
— interest expenditure 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
— gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
Primary balance – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.3
Pm Tax burden 40.6 40.7 40.4 40.1
Government debt 60.8 64.2 65.6 66.1
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.5 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.5
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.7
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.2 – 0.1 1.5 1.8
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.5 – 4.0 – 31/4 – 21/2 – 2 -11/2
Primary balance – 0.4 – 0.9 – 1/4 1/2 1 11/2
Government debt 60.8 64 65 651/2 651/2 65
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.2 – 0.1 1.7 21/4 21/4 21/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in December 2003 (with addendum in January 2004), projections are rounded.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and addendum to the 2003 update of the stability programme of Germany.226
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government expects large revenues from a tax
amnesty on undeclared interest earned abroad.
Fourthly, a number of small consolidation measures
(reductions in tax allowances and subsidies) have
been passed into law.
The budget for 2004 was finalised in late December
2003. As a result, the German authorities provided an
addendum to the update of the stability programme in
January 2004, which projects a general government
deficit of 3  % of GDP as the target for 2004. In the
Commission services’ spring 2004 forecast, the out-
come is projected at 3.6 % of GDP. The difference is
mainly due to budgetary developments not foreseen in
the update, in particular a low Bundesbank profit in
2003 (which is relevant for the 2004 budget) and the
postponement of the road toll to 2005. In addition, the
Commission made a cautious assumption on the
expected revenue from the tax amnesty. The spring
forecast projects the cyclically adjusted deficit at
3.0 % of GDP in 2004, showing an improvement by
0.2 percentage points compared to 2003. This falls
short of the reduction projected in the update of the
stability programme. The difference can be mainly
explained by the subsequent downward revision of
0.2 percentage points of the 2003 deficit and the one-
time budgetary effects for 2004 described above.
For 2005, the Commission services project a general
government deficit of 2.8 % of GDP, with growth of real
GDP at 1.8 %. This is above the German Government
projection of a 2  % deficit contained in the updated sta-
bility programme, which was based on a growth projec-
tion higher by about  a percentage point. Under its no-
policy-change assumption, the Commission projection
incorporates those structural measures for 2005 that
were passed into law in 2003. In line with recent devel-
opments, it also assumes continuing restraint in the
remuneration of public sector employees. This explains
the projection of a falling government expenditure share
in 2004 and 2005. If growth in 2005 turns out lower than
projected or if the structural measures do not show the
expected consolidation effect, Germany clearly risks
breaching the 3 % reference value in 2005 for the fourth
consecutive time.
The Commission’s spring 2004 forecast projects the debt
ratio at 65.6 and 66.1 % of GDP in 2004 and 2005,
respectively. This increase reflects the high deficits and
results in the debt ratio remaining above the 60 % refer-
ence value both in 2004 and 2005.
Table V.8
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Germany
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Second and part of third stage of income tax rate reduction 
(– 0.7 % of GDP)
• Tax amnesty (+ 0.2 % of GDP)
• Basket of reductions in tax allowances
• Increase in tobacco tax
• Reduced coverage of public health insurance (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Adjustments in public pension system (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Numerous small cuts in other transfers and subsidies
Source: Commission services, Ministry of Finance of Germany.227
5. Estonia
The general government posted a surprise surplus of
2.6 % of GDP in 2003. This compares with a targeted
surplus of 0.4 % of GDP in the August 2003 update of
the pre-accession economic programme. This positive
result was achieved mainly through strong growth of
4.7 %, but also through improved tax collection, despite
additional election-induced spending in 2003, and con-
siderable deficits of some local governments (notably
Tallinn). This outcome of the general government con-
firms once again a healthy tendency towards conserva-
tive budget forecasts. Government debt represented a
mere 5.8 % of GDP in 2003, according to the reporting
of government deficit and debt levels submitted in
March 2004, and as confirmed by the first Estonian con-
vergence programme of 13 May 2004.
For 2004, the government originally had targeted a bal-
anced general government budget, on the assumption
that a strong adjustment phase of domestic demand
would set in. The convergence programme, however,
suggests that the unexpectedly high level of revenues in
2003 will have a strong carry-over effect on the 2004
budget. Indeed, budget execution figures for the first few
months of 2004 suggest once again strong revenue per-
formance. As a result, the general government budget
target was revised upwards to a 0.7 % of GDP surplus in
the convergence programme.
Tax cuts that are being implemented starting in 2004,
along with increased social benefits, and the EU acces-
sion-related expenditure requirements are expected to
Table V.9
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Estonia 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance (3) 1.8 2.6 0.7 0.0
— Total revenue 39.6 41.2 43.4 42.2
 Of which: — current taxes 22.1 23.3 23.7 23.4
— social contributions 12.3 12.3 11.8 11.4
— Total expenditure (3) 37.9 38.6 42.8 42.2
 Of which: — collective consumption 8.6 9 9.5 8.4
— social transfers (3) (4) 13.0 13.8 14.6 14.3
— interest expenditure 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
— gross fixed capital formation 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.3
Primary balance (3) 2.1 2.9 1.0 0.3
Pm Tax burden 34.4 36.1 36.5 35.8
Government debt 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.3
Pm Real GDP (2) (4) 6.0 4.7 5.4 5.9
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) GDP was revised upwards on 18 May 2004, to 7.2 % (from 6 %) in 2002, and to 5.1 % (from 4.7 %) for 2003, following the introduction of new national accounts
rules, definitions and classifications fully compatible with ESA 95.
Source: Commission services, Estonian Ministry of Finance.228
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2005. On the other hand, projected higher tax revenues,
the introduction or increase of VAT rates and excise
duties upon EU accession (implementing requirements
of the EU acquis), and strict expenditure control are
expected to offset part of the budgetary deterioration
(see table for details). On the whole, for 2004 a reduced
surplus of around 0.7 % of GDP is projected, whereas for
2005 a balanced budget is forecast. Overall, a period of
quite significant fiscal easing is envisaged for the early
years of EU membership. Estonia is earmarking 11 % of
central government expenditure in the 2004 budget for
EU-related funding purposes. Following the positive
outturn in 2002/03 together with a cautious forecasting
strategy, Estonia should for the foreseeable future be in
a position to run budgets close to balance or in surplus.
The medium-term fiscal strategy has been presented
within the framework of the country’s first conver-
gence programme 2004 in May 2004, very much
along the lines of the 2003 PEP. Estonia’s plans to
proceed with the ongoing tax reform are quite ambi-
tious, but cautiously implemented in a sequenced
way. They are based on the principles of a simple tax-
ation with a broad tax basis, low tax rates and a low
and declining overall tax burden. A proportional per-
sonal income tax equals the corporate flat tax rate,
whereby for the latter, generous tax exemptions for re-
invested earnings are granted, in order to stimulate
investment.
Government debt in Estonia is expected to further
decrease, from 5.8 % of GDP in 2003 to 5.4 % of GDP
in 2004 and 5.3 % of GDP in 2005. Government debt is
backed up by a ‘national stabilisation’ reserve fund of
the central government, which amounts to around 3.8 %
of GDP. This fund has been built up since 1997 through
privatisation receipts and budget surpluses.
Table V.10
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Estonia
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Personal income tax: increase in tax-free thresholds for low income 
tax bracket (– 1.2 % of GDP)
• Increases in excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and fuel
(+ 0.6 % of GDP) (1)
• Introduction of heavy vehicle tax (+ 0.05 % of GDP)
• VAT: abolition of tax-free trading in shipping and aviation within EU 
(+ 0.25 % of GDP) (1)
• VAT: introduction of VAT for pre-ordered periodical papers and 
magazines subscription (+ 0.01 % of GDP) (1)
• VAT: electricity generated by wind and hydro-power lose their VAT-
free status, introduction of a 18 % VAT rate (+ 0.002 % of GDP) (1)
• VAT: abolition of VAT incentives for foreign aid and foreign aid 
loans (+ 0.3 % of GDP) (1)
• VAT: refund to travellers from third countries (– 0.01 % of GDP) (1)
• VAT: change of VAT regime for finance lease (+ 0.3 % of GDP) (1)
• Deferment of moment of VAT taxation, by introduction of VAT 
clearing system among EU Member States 
(– 0.55 % of GDP, with one-off accruals effect in 2004) (1)
• Introduction of parent-benefit scheme (+ 0.4 % of GDP)
• Increase in teachers’ salaries (+ 0.001 % of GDP)
• One-off increase in pensions, in addition to normal indexation 
(– 0.05 % of GDP)
• Introduction of new spending category: Estonian payment 
to EU budget (+ 0.8 % of GDP) (1)
• EU co-financing, under assumption of full absorption 
of funds, estimated at 11 % of total government expenditure 
(+ 3.4 % of GDP) (1)
(1) Introduced upon EU accession, these measures become effective only from 1 May 2004.
Source: Commission services, Estonian Ministry of Finance, Estonian pre-accession economic programme 2003.229
6. Greece
According to the second revised EDP notification
communicated by the Greek authorities on 4 May 2004
and validated by Eurostat, the general government
balance recorded a deficit in 2003, of 3.2 % of GDP,
despite strong economic growth of 4.2 % achieved
during the year. The debt ratio reached 103 %. In the
light of this evidence the Commission has decided to
initiate the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for
Greece. 
During a mission by Eurostat and the Economic and
Financial Affairs DG to Athens late in April 2004, it
became clear that there will be significant further, and as
regards deficits almost certainly upward revisions for
2003 and earlier years, when the customary EDP notifica-
tion is made in September 2004. The recently notified def-
icit compares with a deficit of 1.7 % of GDP according to
a first notification sent early March 2004, which was mod-
ified at the end of the same month, providing a figure of
Table V.11
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Greece
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 1.4 – 3.2 – 3.2 – 2.8
— Total revenue 45.3 44.2 44.0 44.1
 Of which: — current taxes 24.1 23.4 22.9 22.8
— social contributions 14.1 14.6 14.8 15.0
— Total expenditure 46.7 47.1 47.2 46.9
 Of which: — collective consumption 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.2
— social transfers (4) 22.7 23.4 23.7 23.8
— interest expenditure 6.2 5.7 5.6 5.5
— gross fixed capital formation 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.2
Primary balance 4.7 2.7 2.4 2.7
Pm Tax burden 36.3 36.7 36.4 36.3
Government debt 104.7 103.0 102.8 101.7
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.7 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.8
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 4.4 2.1 1.5 1.7
Pm Real GDP 3.9 4.2 4.0 3.3
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 0.5 0.0 n.a.
Primary balance n.a. 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.3 n.a.
Government debt 104.7 101.7 98.5 94.6 90.5 n.a.
Pm Real GDP (3) 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.8 n.a.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure. For 2003, a revision of the data on general government balance was done in April 2004.
(2) Submitted in December 2003. 
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Greece. 230
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0.9 % of GDP set in the December 2002 update of the sta-
bility programme. This significant slippage is attributable
first to extraordinary factors (expenditure overruns related
to the preparation of the Olympic Games and compensa-
tion for weather damages), secondly, to a lack of control
over primary spending (social transfers and public sector
wages) and finally to revenue shortfalls (VAT, income
taxes and property income). With a positive output gap of
1.5 % in 2003, up from 0.8 % in 2002, the sharp deterio-
ration of the government balance cannot be attributed to
cyclical factors. The estimated cyclically adjusted deficit
rose from 1.7 % of GDP in 2002 to 3.9 % of GDP in 2003,
and the primary surplus fell from 4.7 to 2.5 % respec-
tively. At the end of 2003, the debt ratio was reported at
103.0 % of GDP as compared with 100.2 % of GDP set in
the December 2002 update of the stability programme.
The difference of the 2.8 percentage points is due partly to
the higher general government deficit and partly to the
stock-flow adjustments. 
The target for the general government deficit in 2004 set in
the December 2003 updated stability programme is 1.2 %.
In the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, the projected
outcome for 2004 is significantly worse than this target,
with the general government deficit forecast at 3.2 % of
GDP. This is due firstly, to the significant base-year effect
from the higher deficit in 2003 (notice that Commission
2004 spring forecasts were based on the then available first
revised notification of 30 March which indicated a lower
2003 deficit than that of the second revised 4 May notifica-
tion); secondly, to the impact of the 2003 social package,
which seems to have been understated in the expenditure
projections; and finally, to the lower than officially pro-
jected growth in tax revenues, given the recent tax reform.
The overall budgetary cost of the package of new meas-
ures approved by the parliament in December 2003, is
estimated at EUR 2.36 billion (or 1.4 % of GDP), mostly
in 2004. On the revenue side, a new tax policy will be
introduced, the main characteristics of which are: tax
incentives for investment and employment, the introduc-
tion of an objective tax payment control system and tax
reductions on car registrations. On the expenditure side,
the social package provides for: an increase in public
sector wages and pensions and in grants to social secu-
rity funds and medical care agencies; and measures to
support farmers and low incomes. Based on the adjusted
wage law that implements the outcome of the collective
bargaining process between the government and the
unions of the public sector employees, the budget will
implement an increase in wages and pensions of 7.7 %.
The projected worsening of the general government bal-
ance as compared to 2003 in combination with an
expected positive output gap, reflects the pro-cyclical,
expansionary nature of fiscal policies in Greece. Accord-
ing to the forecast, the cyclically adjusted budget position
and the cyclically adjusted primary balance in 2004 will
both deteriorate by 0.2 percentage points, and 0.5 percent-
age points respectively, indicating a move further away
from a budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus.
Under the usual assumption of unchanged policy, a mar-
ginal improvement is expected to take place in 2005,
assuming that some primary expenditure related to the
preparation of the Olympic Games will not be recurring
in 2005. The general government deficit is forecast at
2.8 % of GDP as against the target of 0.5 % of GDP set
in the December 2003 update of the stability programme.
According to the spring forecast, the debt ratio is pro-
jected to decline in the period 2004–05, albeit at a slow
pace, given still high stock-flow adjustments and debt-
increasing financial transactions. Debt is projected at
102.8 % of GDP at the end of 2004 and at 101.7 % of
GDP at the end of 2005, as compared with 98.5 % of
GDP and 94.6 % of GDP, respectively, in the December
2003 update of the stability programme.
Table V.12
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Greece
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Tax incentives for investment
• Introduction of an objective tax payment control
• Tax reductions for cars and bicycles
• Support to farmers and to low incomes
• Public wages and pensions
• Grants to social security funds and medical care
Source: Commission services.231
7. Spain
Despite the effects of a reform of personal income tax
and slower than expected growth (3 against 2.4 % finally
registered), the initial fiscal targets for 2003 were overa-
chieved. Compared with the balanced budget objective
of the 2003 budget law and the 2002 updated stability
programme, the outturns were a surplus of 0.3 % of
GDP. This result can be explained by several factors,
including the strong domestic demand and the resilience
of job creation. In particular, the social security subsec-
tor recorded a surplus of 1.0 % of GDP, while the State
and territorial governments registered deficits of 0.4 and
0.3 % of GDP, respectively. The debt ratio continued to
decrease to 50.8 % of GDP, lower than the previously
envisaged 53.1 % in the 2002 updated stability pro-
gramme.
The 2004 budget law approved in December 2003
included a balanced budget target for the general govern-
Table V.13
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Spain
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6
— Total revenue 39.9 39.9 40.0 40.1
 Of which: — current taxes 22.6 22.5 22.6 22.7
— social contributions 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.7
— Total expenditure 39.9 39.5 39.6 39.5
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.8
— social transfers (4) 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.4
— interest expenditure 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3
— gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6
Primary balance 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9
Pm Tax burden 36.2 36.2 36.3 36.4
Government debt 54.6 50.8 48.0 45.1
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.0
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.3
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Primary balance 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6
Government debt 54.5 51.8 49.6 47.7 45.7 43.8
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted on 12 January 2004.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Spain.232
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tralisation in Spain, this budget only refers to the central
government and its autonomous bodies and the social
security subsector. The main expenditure priorities in the
budget were active labour market policies, the justice
system and civilian security and pensions. On the rev-
enue side, further social security contribution rebates are
planned so as to promote employment on a permanent
basis. On the expenditure side, the lowest and widow-
hood pensions were set to increase while the pension
reserve fund was planned to reach 1.6 % of GDP. Further
details are given in the accompanying table.
The 2003 updated stability programme retains the bal-
anced budget target for 2004 previously set in the budget
law. The Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, in con-
trast, envisages a surplus of 0.4 % of GDP, partially
based on the better than expected outturn registered in
2003. In addition, within a context of economic recov-
ery, indirect taxes and social security contributions are
expected to remain buoyant, supported by strong job cre-
ation, whereas direct tax receipts should regain some
strength as the effects of the 2003 personal income tax
reform fade away. According to the Commission fore-
cast, the cyclically adjusted budget position in 2004 is
set to improve slightly, while the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary balance is expected to remain unchanged.
In 2005, based on a no-policy change assumption, the
government budget balance is foreseen to show a surplus
of 0.6 % of GDP, compared with a small surplus of
0.1 % of GDP envisaged in the 2003 updated stability
programme. However, this forecast is clearly subject to
policy changes that could be announced by the new gov-
ernment that gained office in April 2004.
According to the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, the
debt/GDP ratio is expected to continue to decline during
the forecasting period, falling to around 45 % of GDP by
end-2005. This compares with the more conservative
forecast in the 2003 updated stability programme, which
projects a debt/GDP ratio of 47.7 % in 2005.
Table V.14
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Spain
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Social security rebates to promote employment on a permanent 
basis (– 0.3 % of GDP)
• Freeze of income tax brackets (0.1 % of GDP)
• Lowest and widowhood pension increases (0.1 % of GDP)
• Justice system and civilian security (less than 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in the reserve fund for pensions (0.4 % of GDP, financial 
operation that does not affect the general government balance)
Source: Commission services.233
8. France
The general government deficit is estimated to have
increased from 3.2 % of GDP in 2002 to 4.1 % of
GDP in 2004. This compares with a targeted deficit of
2.6 % of GDP in the 2002 update of the stability pro-
gramme. The deviation from target can be mainly
attributed to a deterioration in cyclical conditions:
real GDP growth was only 0.2 % in 2003, as against
2.5 % expected in the 2002 updated stability pro-
gramme. However, about one third of the slippage is
directly linked to a significant overspending. General
government expenditures in real terms increased by
about 2.0 % in 2003, compared to the 1.2 % rise
planned in the 2002 update of the stability pro-
gramme. The largest part of the expenditures overrun
can be attributed to slippages in categories of expen-
ditures which are not directly influenced by cyclical
developments, namely health expenditures and local
authorities’ expenditures.
Table V.15
Budgetary developments 2002–07, France
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 3.2 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 3.6
— Total revenue 50.2 50.6 50.7 50.5
 Of which: — current taxes 26.6 26.3 26.3 26.4
— social contributions 18.2 18.5 18.5 18.2
— Total expenditure 53.5 54.7 54.4 54.1
 Of which: — collective consumption 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.4
— social transfers (4) 32.5 33.3 33.1 33.0
— interest expenditure 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
— gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2
Primary balance – 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.5
Pm Tax burden 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.5
Government debt 58.6 63.7* 64.6 65.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.8 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.3
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.2 0.2 1.7 2.4
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.1 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.9 – 2.2 – 1.5
Primary balance 0.1 – 0.9 – 0.6 0.1 0.9 1.6
Government debt 59.0 61.4 62.8 63.2 62.8 61.8
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.2 0.5 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts for the years 2004 and 2005. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with
the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure. 
(2) Submitted on 11 December 2003. 
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
* Notified by France after the official EDP notification of 1 March 2004.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of France.234
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GDP growth and debt-increasing stock-flow adjust-
ments amounting to 1.3 percentage points of GDP (1),
the debt/GDP ratio rose by 4.4 percentage points in 2003
to 63.7 % of GDP.
The budget for 2004 plans a marked slowdown in public
spending. After increasing by 3.8 % in 2002 and about
2 % in 2003, real general government expenditures are
projected to increase by 1.1 % in 2004. This target is
planned to be achieved through (i) a stabilisation of State
expenditures in real terms; (ii) a sharp deceleration in
health expenditures; (iii) a tightening of eligibility con-
ditions to unemployment benefits; (iv) a slowdown in
local authorities expenditures. On the revenue side, dis-
cretionary measures are planned to trigger an increase in
the tax burden by 0.1 percentage points of GDP:
increases in excise duties and in local taxes will more
than offset targeted cuts in social contributions and in the
income tax (see table for details). Finally, non-fiscal rev-
enues are planned to increase by 0.1 percentage points of
GDP, due to sales of real estate properties and payments
from State-owned companies.
The French authorities confirmed in March 2004 the tar-
get set in the finance law of a 2004 government deficit at
3.6 % of GDP. The Commission services, in their spring
2004 forecast, projected the 2004 deficit at 3.7 % of
GDP. In this forecast, it is assumed that expenditures
plans included in the budget will be respected, except for
a slippage in the health sector. Based on the method
agreed by the Council, the macroeconomic and budget-
ary projections of the spring 2004 Commission forecast
are consistent with a reduction in the cyclically adjusted
deficit by  % of GDP. This is 0.15 percentage points
less than the adjustment included in the 2003 update of
the stability programme. The difference stems notably
from (i) the slippage in expenditures incorporated in the
Commission forecast and (ii) the fact that the potential
growth estimate resulting from the Commission forecast
is slightly lower than that implicit in the 2003 update of
the stability programme.
According to the latest forecasts of the French authori-
ties, the general government deficit will be reduced from
3.6 % of GDP in 2004 to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005. Most of
the adjustment would be achieved through a further
decline in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, warranted by a
freeze in State expenditures in real terms and the savings
generated by the implementation of the reform of the
health insurance system that is currently being designed.
The Commission projects the general government deficit
to decline only marginally to 3.6 % of GDP in 2005.
Based on the assumption of unchanged policy, real gen-
eral government expenditures are projected to increase
by 2.2 % in real terms in 2005, in line with the trend
observed in the last five years. The Commission forecast
incorporates tax cuts for a total amount of 0.15 % of
GDP (mostly cuts in social contributions).
The Commission projects the debt/GDP ratio to increase
further in 2004–05. This ratio would reach 65.6 % in
2005, more than three times the level of 1980 (20.7 % of
GDP). Developments in the debt are projected to reflect
those of the deficit and nominal GDP, since no signifi-
cant stock-flow operations are incorporated in the fore-
cast.
¥1∂ The stock-flow operations consist mainly of the recapitalisation of the
public company France Telecom in spring 2003 (0.6 % of GDP) and a
large decrease in deposits (0.7 % of GDP) resulting from a financial trans-
action with the Pension Reserve Fund.
Table V.16
Main measures in the budget for 2004, France
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Cut in the income tax (0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in the income tax credit (0.05 % of GDP)
• Increases in excise duties (tobacco, energy) (0.15 % of GDP)
• Increase in local taxes
• Stabilisation of State expenditure in real terms
• Tightening of eligibility conditions to unemployment benefits
• Specific measures aimed at curbing the rapid growth of healthcare 
spending (reimbursement of medicine, increase in the forfait 
hospitalier)
Source: Commission services, Ministry of Finance of France.235
9. Ireland
The general government balance is estimated to have
recorded a small surplus in 2003, of 0.2 % of GDP. This
compares with a targeted deficit of 0.7 % of GDP set in
the December 2002 update of the stability programme.
The deviation from the target in 2003 owes to a tax over-
shooting driven by capital taxes and savings on expend-
iture, especially on interest payments and discretionary
capital spending. Government debt represented one third
of GDP in 2003.
The budget for 2004 was unveiled on 3 December 2003
together with the updated stability programme for the
period 2004–06. On the expenditure side, it implements
a further reduction in the growth rate of current discre-
Table V.17
Budgetary developments 2002–06, Ireland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance (4) – 0.2 0.2 – 0.8 – 1.0
— Total revenue 33.1 34.6 34.3 33.7
 Of which:  — taxes 23.7 24.9 24.9 24.6
 — social contributions 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8
— Total expenditure (4) 33.3 34.3 35.1 34.7
 Of which:  — collective consumption 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.8
 — social transfers (5) 18.0 19.1 19.6 19.4
 — interest expenditure 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
 — gross fixed capital formation 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.8
Primary balance (4) 1.2 1.6 0.6 0.3
Pm Tax burden 28.6 30.0 29.9 29.6
Government debt 32.3 32.0 32.4 32.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.9 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.5 1.5 1.1 1.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 6.9 1.2 3.7 4.6
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
General government balance (4) – 0.2 – 0.4 – 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.1
Primary balance (4) 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3
Government debt 32.4 33.1 33.3 33.5 33.3
Pm Real GDP (3) 6.9 2.2 3.3 4.7 5.2
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in December 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Including UMTS receipts of 0.2 % of GDP in 2002.
(5) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Ireland.236
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return to positive growth in discretionary capital spend-
ing after the cut in 2003. On the revenue side, there was
a more modest hike in indirect taxes than in recent bud-
gets, while the personal income tax system was only par-
tially adjusted for inflation. Further details are given in
the accompanying table.
The target for the general government deficit in 2004 in
the updated stability programme is 1.1 % of GDP (2). In
the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, the projected
outcome in 2004 is slightly better than targeted (deficit
of 0.8 % of GDP) mainly reflecting base effects. The
spring forecast projects the cyclically adjusted deficit to
widen by  % of GDP. Given that the 2003 outcome
incorporates a one-off yield of some 0.4 % of GDP from
advancing the date of payment of capital gains tax, this
points to a broadly neutral fiscal stance in 2004. How-
ever, it is subject to the caveat that calculations of the
cyclically adjusted balances are surrounded by a high
degree of uncertainty that is linked especially to the dif-
ficulty of estimating the output gap in Ireland.
Given the non-indexed nature of Irish tax and social ben-
efit systems, the no-policy change assumption for 2005
in the spring 2004 forecast is made operational, in the
absence of previously announced measures, by freezing
average tax rates and adjusting social transfer payments
by the forecast CPI inflation rate (with a small top-up).
On these assumptions, the spring forecast projects the
deficit to widen to 1.0 % of GDP, again somewhat better
than the target in the updated stability programme (defi-
cit of 1.4 % of GDP). This target includes a technical
provision for unspecified future budget measures (at a
full-year cost of  % of GDP, which is subject to review
in light of emerging economic conditions) as well as a
contingency provision (against unforeseen develop-
ments) of 0.4 % of GDP.
The debt ratio is projected to remain broadly stable in
2004–05, at around one third of GDP and non-general
government assets are continuing to be built up in the
National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) (3).
¥1∂ The term ‘discretionary’ refers, in this context, to the concept of ‘voted’
current spending, for which annual approval by Parliament is required. It
excludes, inter alia, the service of the national debt and the contribution to
the EU budget.
¥2∂ This was confirmed in the March 2004 reporting of government deficits
and debt levels in spite of a much better outturn for 2003, namely a deficit
of 0.4 % of GDP in the stability programme compared to a surplus of
0.2 % of GDP in the March 2004 reporting.
¥3∂ Around 1 % of GNP annually is set to be aside for the pre-funding of the
pension liabilities. At the end of 2003, it was worth 7 % of GDP.
Table V.18
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Ireland
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Increases in excise duties (tobacco, auto diesel and petrol; 
0.2 % of GDP)
• Increase in the ‘employee credit’ (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• No other changes in the parameters of the personal income tax 
system
• Increase in social welfare benefit rates by between 6 and 8 %
(0.4 % of GDP)
• Further implementation of benchmarking (1)
• Further implementation of the national development plan 2000–06
(1) The benchmarking process was initiated in mid-2000 to adjust pay rates in the public sector by reference to rates in the private sector for comparable jobs. The
benchmarking body’s report of mid-2002 recommended pay increases differentiated by grade, leading to an 8.9 % rise in public sector pay costs. The national
agreement foresees a gradual implementation of the benchmarking awards, with a first tranche (25 %) paid retrospectively to December 2001 in the course of 2003,
a second tranche (50 %) in early 2004 and the final tranche (25 %) by mid-2005; payment of the final two tranches is conditional on further progress on flexibility
and modernisation and on maintenance of the industrial peace.
Source: Commission services and Department of Finance (2004 budget).237
10. Italy
In 2003, the general government deficit was 2.4 % of
GDP, compared with a targeted deficit of 1.5 % of GDP
set in the 2002 updated stability programme. At first
sight, the divergence of the budgetary outturn in 2003
from the original target would appear to result exclu-
sively from an overestimation of economic growth.
Upon closer examination, however, the figures show that
much higher than initially planned temporary receipts
from one-off measures on the revenue side (a general-
ised amnesty for under-declaration of past tax liabilities
and a compulsory levy on tax collectors) compensated a
shortfall in revenues for the given growth assumptions.
On the expenditure side, lower than officially expected
interest expenditure partly compensated higher current
and capital expenditure (also a result of much lower than
planned sales of real assets). Overall, the improvement
brought about by temporary measures in 2003 is esti-
mated to have been in excess of 2 percentage points of
GDP. Despite this, the erosion of the primary surplus
continued, with the balance declining by more than half
Table V.19
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Italy
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 2.3 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 4.0
— Total revenue 45.6 46.5 45.4 44.7
 Of which: — current taxes 29.0 28.2 28.2 28.0
— social contributions 12.8 13.1 13.2 13.2
— Total expenditure 47.9 48.9 48.7 48.7
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.4
— social transfers (4) 28.8 29.2 29.5 29.2
— interest expenditure 5.8 5.3 5.0 5.2
— gross fixed capital formation 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.8
Primary balance 3.5 2.9 1.8 1.2
Pm Tax burden 42.1 42.9 41.6 41.3
Government debt 108.0 106.2 106.0 106.0
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.2 – 1.9 – 2.6 – 3.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 3.5 3.4 2.4 1.6
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.4 0.3 1.2 2.1
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 0.0
Primary balance 3.4 2.8 2.9 3.5 4.4 5.1
Government debt 106.7 106.0 105.0 103.0 100.9 98.6
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.4 0.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted on 1 December 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and updated stability programme of Italy.238
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revision of government debt data, the debt ratio fell to
106.2 % of GDP from 108.0 % in 2002, thanks to priva-
tisation operations carried out at the end of the year in
conjunction with the transformation of ‘Cassa Depositi e
Prestiti’, the formerly public deposits and loans bank,
into a joint-stock company.
The 2004 budget and related legislation were adopted by
parliament at the end of December 2003. The legislation
includes tax breaks for R & D investment and additional
funding for renewals of contracts for public sector employ-
ees. Corrective measures comprise further securitisation
and sales of publicly-owned real assets, a tax amnesty for
urban zoning regulation violations and an extension of the
terms of the tax amnesty introduced in 2003. In addition,
small savings in expenditure are to be achieved as a result
of the privatisation of the ‘Cassa Depositi e Prestiti’.
In the 2003 updated stability programme (USP2003) the
general government deficit in 2004 was targeted at 2.2 %
of GDP (incorporating the measures set out in the budget),
built on an economic growth forecast of 1.9 %. In the
Commission 2004 spring (COM2004) forecast the pro-
jected budgetary outturn is a deficit of 3.2 % of GDP in
spite of sizeable one-off measures amounting to around
1 percentage point of GDP (slightly less than in the official
forecast). Real GDP growth in 2004 is forecast at 1.2 %.
On 7 May 2004 the government released new objectives
for this year which largely mirror the COM2004 forecast.
With real GDP growth projected at 1.2 %, the nominal
deficit is targeted at 2.9 % of GDP. The difference com-
pared to the COM2004 forecast of 3.2 % of GDP is
largely due to a classification issue. As in the USP2003,
the new official target incorporates the saving from classi-
fying ANAS, the agency charged with investment in and
maintenance of the State road network, outside the general
government sector. The budgetary impact in 2004 is
around 0.2 % of GDP. According to the COM2004 fore-
cast the cyclically adjusted deficit in 2004 would widen by
over  a percentage point of GDP and the cyclically
adjusted primary surplus would deteriorate even more. In
the USP2003 the cyclically adjusted deficit showed a mar-
ginal improvement; the cyclically adjusted primary sur-
plus was projected to remain unchanged.
The COM2004 forecast for 2005 is based on legislation
currently in force, an approach which underestimates some
expenditure items, namely compensation of public sector
employees and government investment. In the absence of
budgetary correction, the deficit would reach 4 % of GDP,
reflecting the expiry of one-off measures (no tax amnesties
and considerably lower sales of real assets compared to the
previous year). Interest expenditure is expected to increase
as a percentage of GDP, reversing a trend established over
the previous eight years and signalling that the margins for
gains from refinancing older higher-rate bonds with new
issues at lower rates are almost exhausted. A sizeable
budgetary correction would be needed to achieve the offi-
cial target of a deficit of 1.5 % of GDP set in the USP2003.
In the COM2004 forecast the debt ratio is projected to
remain broadly stable at 106.0 % of GDP in 2004 and
2005. In the new official forecast the debt/GDP ratio in
2004 is projected at 105.9 %, up from 105.0 % in the
USP2003. The upward revision also reflects the impact of
debt-increasing transactions, confirming the persisting
and even increasing divergence between the fabbisogno
— a deficit measure based on cash flows and including
transactions with financial assets but excluding proceeds
from privatisation — and the EDP deficit. In 2004, the
fabbisogno is now officially estimated at 5.3 % of GDP,
2.3 percentage points above the EDP deficit.
The planned marginal decline in debt/GDP ratio in 2004
would be achieved only thanks to privatisations and dis-
posals of other financial assets, the proceeds of which are
estimated at EUR 21 billion, around 1.6 % of GDP.
Table V.20
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Italy
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Tax amnesty for zoning regulation violations (0.2 % of GDP)
• Extension of the terms of the tax amnesty introduced in 2003 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Tax settlement scheme (0.3 % of GDP)
• Renewals of contracts for public sector employees (0.1 % of GDP)
• Securitisation and sales of publicly-owned real assets (0.4 % of GDP 
on top of 0.3 % of GDP already established)
• Savings in expenditure because of privatisation of the Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti and SACE (0.1 % of GDP)
Source: Ministry for Economy and Finances.239
11. Cyprus
For 2003 the general government budget deficit rose to
6.3 % of GDP, compared to a targeted deficit of 1.9 % as
provided in the 2002 pre-accession economic pro-
gramme (PEP) and 5.4 % in the 2003 PEP. Similarly to
the slippage in 2002, the above-target deficit can partly
be ascribed to continued modest growth of the European
economy, reverberating repercussions of 11 Septem-
ber 2001 and other terrorist attacks, the Iraq War and
SARS, all of which contributed to diminishing external
tourism demand feeding into lower than expected GDP
growth (2.0 % compared with 2.8 % in the 2002 PEP).
Furthermore, another factor adversely affecting public
finances was higher than originally planned defence out-
lays, and a discretionary increase in expenditures partly to
offset the economic downturn. At the same time, the tax
reform that started in July 2002 (with a shift from direct
taxes to VAT and excise duties) aimed at a neutral impact
on public finances. However, this reform was not applied
as originally planned since compensatory measures were
introduced to secure broad political support. With these
developments, the government debt ratio increased from
67.1 % of GDP in 2002 to 72.2 % of GDP in 2003.
The fiscal consolidation programme introduced in the
2003 PEP of September last year — after the previous
one was effectively abandoned in the course of the year
— no longer targets a budget balance over the medium
term, while in the meantime the PEP deficit targets for
2004 and 2005 have again been revised upwards. The
budget for 2004 focuses on further implementation of
tax reform and on current expenditure restraint through,
inter alia, a ceiling on defence expenses (investment is
not targeted for cutback). Further details are given in the
accompanying table.
Table V.21
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Cyprus
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 4.6 – 6.3 – 4.6 – 4.1
— Total revenue 37.2 40.2 37.5 37.6
 Of which: — current taxes 25.4 27.3 n.a. n.a.
— social contributions 7.0 6.9 n.a. n.a.
— Total expenditure 41.7 46.4 42.1 41.7
 Of which: — collective consumption 10.4 11.1 n.a. n.a.
— social transfers 19.1 19.3 n.a. n.a.
— interest expenditure 3.2 3.3 n.a. n.a.
— gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.8 n.a. n.a.
Primary balance – 1.3 – 3.0 n.a. n.a.
Pm Tax burden 32.4 34.3 n.a. n.a.
Government debt 67.1 72.2 74.6 76.9
Pm Real GDP (2) 2.0 2.0 3.4 4.1
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definition used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
Source: Commission services. 240
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in the March 2004 reporting of deficit and debt levels is
4.3 % of GDP, up from 3.7 % of GDP still targeted in the
2003 PEP. The Commission’s spring 2004 forecast is
largely in line with this target but, given the mixed his-
torical record of fiscal consolidation and upward deficit
revisions by the government, it assumes that objectives
will not be completely met. Hence, the deficit is pro-
jected at 4.6 % of GDP.
For 2005, the spring 2004 forecast projects a modest def-
icit decline to 4.1 % of GDP, above the 2003 PEP gov-
ernment target of 2.8 %. Here again the forecast assumes
that revenue and expenditure targets will not be fully
met, for similar reasons as in 2004.
Given these deficit developments, the debt ratio in 2004–
05 is projected to rise to nearly 77 % of GDP at the end
of the period.
Table V.22
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Cyprus
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Increase of public service fees
• Measures to improve tax administration and compliance 
• Containment of defence outlays
• Reduction of agricultural subsidies
• Slower pace of civil service employment growth
• Other expenditure containing measures
Source: Commission services.241
12. Latvia 
In 2003, the general government deficit is estimated to
be 1.8 % of GDP (1). This is about 1 percentage point
lower than the targeted deficit of 2.9 % set in the 2003
pre-accession economic programme. The deviation was
mainly due to better-than-expected tax revenues, itself
representing improvements in tax collection as well as
higher-than-expected growth (7.4 % compared to 6.5 %
respectively), and close monitoring of expenditure by
the government. In fact, total government expenditure
did not reach the initially allocated amount. The reduc-
tion of the general government budget deficit was also
due to an improvement in the balance of both the local
government and the social security sectors. The 2004
budget was adopted by the parliament on 13 Novem-
ber 2003. On the revenue side, a shift is foreseen in the
structure — decreases in corporate income tax and social
security contributions should be offset by an increase in
VAT and excise duties. On the expenditure side, the
budget includes provisions for ongoing public adminis-
tration and pension reforms. Further details are given in
the accompanying table.
The target for the general government deficit in 2004 is
2.1 % of GDP.
This is in line with the commitment of the Latvian
authorities to pursue a gradual reduction of the gen-
eral government deficit and to keep the deficit below
3 % of GDP as stipulated in the document ‘Statement
¥1∂ The general government debt and deficit figures should be treated with
caution, since the data submitted for the excessive deficit procedure were
not yet validated by Eurostat. The current methodology used by the
Latvian authorities is not fully consistent with ESA 95 accounting stand-
ards and suffers from low source data reliability.
Table V.23
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Latvia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 2.0 
— Total revenue 41.9 41.5 39.6 38.4
 Of which: — current taxes 21.6 21.2 21.5 22.3 
— social contributions 10.1 9.7 9.3 8.9 
— Total expenditure 44.6 43.3 41.8 40.4
 Of which: — collective consumption 9.6 9.2 9.1 9.0 
— social transfers (3) 21.7 21.1 20.3 19.5 
— interest expenditure 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 
— gross fixed capital formation 3.3 2.4 2.3 2.1
Primary balance – 1.8 – 1.0 – 1.4 – 1.2
Pm Tax burden 31.9 31.6 30.7 30.4
Government debt 15.5 15.6 16.0 16.1
Pm Real GDP (2) 6.1 7.5 6.2 6.2
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.242
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2004–08’.
In the Commission services’ spring 2004 forecast, the
projected outcome is slightly higher than targeted (a def-
icit of 2.2 % of GDP) mainly reflecting more cautious
growth expectations (a 6.2 % annual growth rate rather
than 6.7 %). Also contributing are different estimates on
by how much revenues are set to decrease following the
lowering of the corporate income tax rate and the change
in the VAT legislation.
Based on a no-policy change assumption, the Commis-
sion services’ spring 2004 forecast projects the general
government deficit to decrease slightly to 2.0 % of
GDP in 2005. The projected outcome is slightly more
optimistic than the one targeted by the government
(2.2 % of GDP) (1). The difference is mainly due to the
Commission’s slightly higher estimate of tax revenues.
The government debt/GDP ratio is expected to increase
modestly from 15.6 % at end-2003 to 16.0 % of GDP by
the end of 2004 and 16.1 % in 2005.
¥1∂ The convergence programme of the Republic of Latvia 2004–07 projects a
general government budget deficit of 2.2 % of GDP.
Table V.24
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Latvia
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Alignment of the VAT legislation leading to an increase of the rate 
on various products to 18 % (base rate) or 9 % (reduced rate)
• Broadening the VAT base
• Increase of the excise duty on spirits and tobacco and fuel
• Reduction of the corporate income tax rate 
(from 22 % in 2003 to 15 % in 2004)
• Reduction of social insurance payments base rate from 35.09 to 
33.09 %
• Some parametric changes in the PAYG pension pillar
• Wage increases in public sector
• Increased expenditure for training of unemployed
Source: Commission services.243
13. Lithuania
The general government deficit is estimated to have
increased slightly from 1.4 % of GDP in 2002 to 1.7 % in
2003. This compares with a targeted deficit of 2.4 % set in
the budget for 2003. The deviation from the target was due
to a tax overshoot induced by significantly higher than
anticipated output growth. Against the background of
higher revenue collection than expected in the first half of
2003, the government decided to allocate additional
expenditure by means of a supplementary budget in July
2003, which prevented a reduction of the deficit in 2003
compared to 2002. The government debt accounted for
21.9 % of GDP in 2003.
The budget for 2004 was approved by the parliament in
December 2003. On the expenditure side, the budget imple-
ments a marked acceleration in capital expenditure growth,
largely related to new investment projects co-financed by
the EU. The growth rate of current expenditure is also
planned to accelerate, although more moderately, mainly
driven by salary increases for public sector workers, higher
subsidies to farmers and higher social welfare benefits (e.g.
pensions and child benefits). The revenue side is expected
to be positively influenced by increases in excise duties for
tobacco and petrol and higher VAT rates for heating of res-
idential buildings implemented upon EU accession. The
transition costs of the pension reform (i.e. introduction of a
second pillar pension scheme) are expected to be significant
in 2004, although the voluntary option of participation in
the second pillar for all age groups makes it difficult to
quantify its impact on the budget.
The general government deficit target published in the
budget for 2004 was 2.95 % of GDP, but the government
recently revised the target down to 2.7 % of GDP. In the
Table V.25
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Lithuania
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 1.4 – 1.7 – 2.8 – 2.6
— Total revenue 33.8 33.9 34.7 34.7
 Of which: — current taxes 20.4 22.1 22.2 22.2
— social contributions 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.2
— Total expenditure 35.2 35.6 37.4 37.3
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.8
— social transfers (3) 21.8 22.2 22.6 22.5
— interest expenditure 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3
— gross fixed capital formation 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2
Primary balance 0.1 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.3
Pm Tax burden 29.3 30.9 30.8 30.4
Government debt 22.8 21.9 22.8 23.2
Pm Real GDP (2) 6.8 9.0 6.9 6.6
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.244
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outcome is slightly worse than the present target (deficit of
2.8 % of GDP), mainly explained by higher estimated cur-
rent expenditure.
The Commission’s spring 2004 forecast foresees a defi-
cit of 2.6 % of GDP in 2005. The forecast is based on the
no-policy change assumption but present deliberations
about tax changes could materialise into policy actions
that would likely lead to revised projections.
The debt ratio is projected to increase slightly from
21.9 % of GDP in 2003 to about 23.2 % by 2005, to a
large extent reflecting higher general government deficits.
Table V.26
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Lithuania
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Increases in excise duties (tobacco and petrol)
• Alignment of VAT rates with EU leading to higher rates for heating 
of residential buildings
• Salary increases for public sector workers (mainly within health and 
education sectors)
• Significant increase in subsidies to farmers
• Increases in social welfare benefits (e.g. pensions, child benefits)
• Further implementation of the restitution for losses of rouble 
savings
• Pension reform (introduction of a second-pillar scheme) (1)
(1) The immediate impact of the creation of the second pillar is accounted for as higher expenditure because the pension contributions assigned to the second pillar are
still collected by the government and transferred to the new pillar.
Source: Commission services.245
14. Luxembourg
The general government balance in 2003 is estimated to
have reached a small deficit of 0.1 % of GDP, which is a
slightly better outturn than the target deficit of 0.3 % of
GDP projected in the 2002 update of the stability pro-
gramme. Some special factors account for this outcome,
such as a speed-up in the collection of back taxes,
higher-than-expected social security contributions, and
additional indirect tax revenues due to the start of opera-
tions of a few large multinational companies in the
Grand Duchy in the course of last year. Some expendi-
ture overruns were compensated by lower interest pay-
ments. Luxembourg has the lowest debt ratio among EU
Member States and this ratio declined somewhat in
2003, by 0.8 % of GDP, to 4.9 % of GDP, partly reflect-
ing changes in net financial assets.
The amended budget for 2004 was unveiled on 3 Decem-
ber 2003 and voted in the Chamber of Deputies on
Table V.27
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Luxembourg
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance 2.7 – 0.1 – 2.0 – 2.3
— Total revenue 47.0 47.1 46.8 46.8
 Of which: — current taxes 30.3 30.0 29.0 28.3
— social contributions 12.4 13.0 13.0 12.8
— Total expenditure 44.3 47.3 48.8 49.1
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.4 8.0 8.2 8.1
— social transfers (4) 26.2 28.0 28.2 28.0
— interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
— gross fixed capital formation 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.8
Primary balance 3.0 0.1 – 1.9 – 2.2
Pm Tax burden 41.5 41.8 40.7 39.7
Government debt 5.7 4.9 4.5 3.8
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance 2.7 1.3 0.6 1.2
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2.9 1.5 0.8 1.3
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.3 1.8 2.4 3.1
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 2.4 – 0.6 – 1.8 – 2.3 – 1.5 n.a.
Primary balance 2.7 – 0.4 – 1.6 – 2.1 – 1.5 n.a.
Government debt 5.7 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.4 n.a.
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.3 1.2 2.0 3.0 3.8 n.a.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in November 2003. 
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Luxembourg. 246
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weak, as the lagged effect of the economic downturn still
would take its toll on business taxes in particular. On the
expenditure side, total current expenditure is expected to
grow at a high rate of around 9 %, similar to 2003.
Spending on healthcare and social transfers would con-
tinue to increase rapidly. The government has
announced a freeze in hiring in most of the public sector
to curb expenditure growth. Public investment is
planned to remain buoyant at around 3 % of GDP. How-
ever, a large part of this investment expenditure is
planned to be financed out of the reserves of so-called
special funds, which were built up during past years with
high surpluses. Further details are given in the accom-
panying table.
The target for the general government balance in 2004 is
a deficit of 1.8 % of GDP according to the 2003 update
of the stability programme. For 2004, the Commission
services’ spring 2004 forecast projects a slightly larger
widening of the deficit, to 2.0 % of GDP, mainly reflect-
ing base effects. The continued strong growth of expend-
iture despite sluggish revenue is the main reason for the
projected substantial widening of the deficit. Weak rev-
enue is driven both by the tax reforms implemented in
2001 and 2002, and by cyclical factors. The spring fore-
cast projects the cyclically adjusted deficit to remain
broadly stable at a surplus of around 1 % of GDP. How-
ever, this figure should be treated with caution in view of
the large margins of uncertainty surrounding estimates
of potential growth in Luxembourg.
Under a no-policy change assumption the Commission’s
spring forecast projects the deficit to increase somewhat
further in 2005, to 2.3 % of GDP, in line with the target
in the 2003 stability programme update. The deteriora-
tion in the balance would take place in spite of an
expected pick up in tax receipts. This is due to the fact
that the positive impact of the economic upturn on tax
revenue would feed through only with a substantial
delay. Thus, the planned deceleration in current expend-
iture growth to slightly below 4 % would not be suffi-
cient to prevent the deficit from rising.
According to the Commission’s spring forecast, the debt
ratio would decrease somewhat further, from 4.9 % of
GDP in 2003 to 3.8 % of GDP in 2005. While the debt of
central government is being largely repaid, this would be
partly offset by a rise in the debt of local government.
Table V.28
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Luxembourg
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Deceleration in the collection of back business taxes 
(continuing impact of operation started in 2003)
• Increase in excise duties on petrol (0.25 % of GDP) and tobacco 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Sale of real estate (0.3 % of GDP)
• Larger part of public investment in multi-annual capital 
spending plan financed out of assets accumulated in special funds
• Increase of international development aid from 0.82 % 
of GDP to 0.84 % of GDP
• No recruitment of additional civil servants in central government, 
except in education and police (0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in doctors’ and dentists’ fees and indexation 
of fees on prices
Source: Commission services.247
15. Hungary
In 2003 the general government deficit turned out to be
5.9 % of GDP. The initial target of a deficit of 4.5 % of
GDP for 2003, as set in the budget for 2003, as well as
the later revised higher target, was significantly over-
shot. Higher than expected spending occurred in a
number of areas, such as on subsidies, on housing loans
and on prescribed drugs (0.35 % of GDP), interest
expenditure (0.2 % of GDP) and unforeseen pay-outs
due to a legal ruling regarding eligibility for a supple-
ment to childcare fees (0.15 % of GDP). Weaker tax rev-
enues were mostly due to lower than envisaged personal
income and corporate taxes. The debt ratio in 2003
almost reached the 60 % of GDP reference value, with
59.0 % of GDP, up from 57.1 % in 2002.
The budget for 2004 was adopted by parliament in
December 2003. On the revenue side major changes in
the tax system are being implemented. A rise in indirect
tax rates (VAT and excise taxes) is expected to lead to
higher revenue. Direct tax rates (both personal income
tax and corporate taxes) were lowered, while numerous
tax allowances and credits were eliminated. This should
contribute to a decline in corporate tax revenues, while
personal income tax revenues are expected to remain
broadly stable.
On the expenditure side a reduction in the growth rate of
discretionary spending is foreseen. A real wage freeze in
the public sector, and the ongoing reduction of the number
of public employees should contribute to the reduction of
the high growth rate in the nominal wage bill observed
over the last three years. The substantial tightening of
housing subsidies and the recent freezing of subsidised
pharmaceutical products’ prices should help prevent the
Table V.29
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Hungary
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 9.3 – 5.9 – 4.9 – 4.3
— Total revenue 44.5 44.5 n.a. n.a.
 Of which: — current taxes n.a. 26.6 n.a. n.a
— social contributions n.a. 12.6. n.a. n.a
— Total expenditure 53.7 50.4 n.a. n.a.
 Of which: — collective consumption n.a. 7.9 n.a. n.a.
— social transfers n.a. 24.7. n.a. n.a. 
— interest expenditure 4.1 4.4 4.0 3.9
— gross fixed capital formation 4.9 4.0 4.5 4.6
Primary balance – 5.1 – 2.0 – 0.9 – 0.5
Pm Tax burden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Government debt 57.1 59.0 58.7 58.0
Pm Real GDP (2) 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
Source: Commission services. 248
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are given in the accompanying table.
In January, the initial budget deficit target for 2004 of
3.8 % was revised to 4.6 % of GDP. In addition, a series
of expenditure cuts equivalent to around 1 % of GDP
were announced, in order to meet the revised target.
Additional correction measures have been announced in
case the revised target might be in danger of being
missed. However, while the measures adopted so far
should provide a basis for a significant narrowing of the
budget deficit, the revenue shortfall and the overspend-
ing of 2003 indicate that the achievement of the revised
target for 2004 is subject to risks. The spring 2004 fore-
cast projects a deficit of 4.9 % of GDP in 2004, some-
what above the revised target.
In 2005, expenditure linked to the co-financing of EU-
related investment projects, and the realisation of other
postponed investment projects might limit the scope for
a deficit reduction. On the basis of a no-policy change
assumption, the spring 2004 forecast projects a narrow-
ing of the deficit to 4.3 % of GDP.
The government debt ratio is expected to decrease mod-
erately to 58.7 % in 2004 and further to 58.0 % of GDP
in 2005.
Table V.30
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Hungary
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Increase of VAT rates due to EU harmonisation, while maintaining 
the high top rate of 25 %. Increase of excise tax rates
• Increase in social security contribution rates
• Cuts in rates and extension of brackets in personal income tax, 
while elimination of numerous tax allowances and credits 
(on balance, income should remain as in 2003 in real terms)
• Decrease of corporate tax rate from 18 to 16 %
• Reduction of public employment (approximately 10 % 
for central government and 6 % in other public areas)
• Reduction of transfers to the wage bill of local government, which 
are supposed to induce reduction of local-government employees
• Adoption of two correction packages 
(to the tune of about 1 % of GDP)
• Reduction of housing loan subsidies
• Freezing of subsidised drug prices
Source: Commission services.249
16. Malta
The general government deficit recorded a substantial
increase to 9.7 % of GDP in 2003 from 5.7 % in 2002.
This figure compares negatively to the target of 4.5 % of
GDP set in the 2002 pre-accession economic pro-
gramme. The principal reasons for this deviation are
lower tax collection due to weak GDP growth and in the
restructuring of Maltese shipyards and the accounting of
the associated debt assumed by the general government
sector. The latter brought about an increase in public lia-
bilities of 3.2 % of GDP. Principally, as a result of the
high deficit, the debt/GDP ratio attained 72.0 % of GDP,
from 61.7 % of GDP in 2002.
The 2004 budget was presented in November 2003. On
the revenue side, receipts are expected to increase by MTL
102 million or 5.3 percentage points of GDP, 50 % of this
amount being due to inflows under the Italian financial
protocol (a cooperation treaty between Malta and Italy)
and from EU funds. Other revenue increases stem from
stronger enforcement in tax collection, mainly in the real
estate sector, and VAT rate and excise increases. On the
expenditure side, recurrent payments are forecast to
increase by 3.6 % of GDP, linked to increases in social
benefits and debt interest. Capital expenditures will rise to
6.6 % of GDP, with the increase largely attributable to a
major hospital construction project.
Both the 2003 PEP and the latest reporting of deficit and
debt level point to a general government deficit in the
range of 5.3–5.4 % of GDP. The Commission’s 2004
spring forecast raises this figure to 5.9 % of GDP based
on economic growth developments in 2004 somewhat
lower than projected in the PEP (1.4 % compared with
2.5 % respectively).
Table V.31
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Malta
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 5.7 – 9.7 – 5.9 – 4.5
— Total revenue n.a. n.a. 40.2 40.4
 Of which: — current taxes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— social contributions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— Total expenditure n.a. n.a. 45.3 44.0
 Of which: — collective consumption n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— social transfers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— interest expenditure 3.7 3.6 2.6 2.5
— gross fixed capital formation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Primary balance – 2.0 – 6.1 – 3.3 – 2.0
Pm Tax burden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Government debt 61.7 72.0 73.9 75.9
Pm Real GDP (2) 1.7 0.4 1.4 2.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
Source: Commission services.250
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projects a general government deficit of 4.5 % of GDP in
2005, whilst the 2003 PEP target is a deficit of 4.1 % of
GDP and the current budget target is 4.3 % of GDP.
The debt/GDP ratio is expected to further increase to
73.9 % of GDP and to 75.9 % of GDP in 2004 and 2005,
respectively.
Table V.32
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Malta
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• VAT rate increase (from 15 to 18 %). Additional receipts 
(MTL 21 million or 1.1 % of GDP) will be credited 
to the health account. Increase in excises on tobacco
• Actions against tax evasion, namely on property sales
• Italian financial protocol and EU funds (MTL 48 million 
or 2.5 of GDP)
• Strengthen transparency and control over expenditure
• Creation of sub-accounts in strategic sectors to enhance 
expenditure scrutiny
Source: Commission services.251
17. Netherlands
According to provisional data for 2003, the general gov-
ernment deficit increased to 3.2 % of GDP, from 1.9 %
of GDP in 2002. This compares with a targeted deficit of
1.6 % of GDP deficit in the 2002 stability programme
update. The deficit increased despite substantial consol-
idation efforts equivalent to around 1.2 % of GDP,
largely in the form of structural reductions in expendi-
ture. The weakening of central government revenues in
response to the economic slowdown was the main reason
for the deterioration in the government balance but a
larger-than-foreseen deficit of local authorities also
played a role. The debt ratio increased from 52.6 % of
GDP in 2002 to 54.8 % of GDP in 2003 mainly due to
the combination of an increasing deficit and weak nom-
inal GDP growth.
The budget for 2004 was presented to parliament on
16 September 2003. The 2004 budget included a further
Table V.33
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Netherlands
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.3
— Total revenue 45.9 45.6 45.1 44.8
Of which: — current taxes 24.6 24.0 23.7 24.0
— social contributions 14.9 15.5 15.6 14.9
— Total expenditure 47.8 48.8 48.6 48.1
Of which: — collective consumption 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.3
— social transfers 24.9 26.1 26.4 26.0
— interest expenditure 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0
— gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3
Primary balance 1.2 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3
Pm Tax burden 39.5 39.4 39.2 38.9
Government debt 52.6 54.8 56.3 58.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.7
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.2 – 0.8 1.0 1.6
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 1.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 0.9 – 0.6
Primary balance 1.7 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.1
Government debt 52.4 54.0 54.5 53.7 53.0 52.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.2 0.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in October 2003. 
(3) Annual % change. 
Source: Commission services and stability programme of October 2003.252
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1.2 % of GDP. The measures in the budget consist to a
large extent of expenditure cuts on social security,
healthcare public wages and subsidies, but also incorpo-
rate some tax-revenue-raising measures. In response to a
projected further worsening of public finances since the
submission of the 2004 budget, the government decided
on 16 April 2004 on additional savings measures equiv-
alent to 0.6 % of GDP. This additional package of meas-
ures intends to achieve a deficit of below 3 % of GDP
from 2004 onwards, and consists mainly of further cost
reductions in healthcare, and of a series of smaller meas-
ures (some of them of a one-off nature) to increase reve-
nue in 2004. Further details are given in the accompany-
ing table.
The medium-term projections in the budget are the same
as in the 2003 stability programme update. Despite the
consolidation efforts, the deficit was projected to reach
2.3 % of GDP in 2004 according to the budget, the same
estimated figure as for 2003. However, the most recent
data show that the deficit reached 3.2 % of GDP in 2003.
Under the assumption of no changes in fiscal policy, the
Commission’s spring 2004 forecast projected the deficit
to rise further to 3.5 % of GDP in 2004. The deviation
from the target in the budget mainly stems from the
upward revision of the 2003 deficit and from the impact
of weaker-than-expected economic activity on tax reve-
nue. In addition, higher tax deduction of mortgage inter-
est and pension premiums in the wake of rises in house
prices and falls in global asset prices also play a role. The
spring forecast, published on 7 April 2004, did not yet
incorporate the additional package of measures decided
on by the government on 16 April. It projects the cycli-
cally adjusted balance to improve from – 2.0 % of GDP
in 2003 to – 1.7 % in 2004 in response to fiscal tighten-
ing. This is an improvement of the same order of magni-
tude as foreseen in the 2002 updated stability pro-
gramme.
As public finances respond with a lag to the cycle and
fiscal tightening, the deficit is projected to decrease only
somewhat in 2005, to 3.3 % of GDP, according to the
Commission’s spring forecast. This is a less favourable
projection than the 0.9 % of GDP deficit expected in the
2003 updated stability programme and reflects the sub-
stantial downward revisions to economic growth and
upward adjustments to the deficit data and projections
that occurred in the mean time. In view of the severity of
the economic downturn, the cyclically adjusted balance
is expected to develop more favourably, reaching a def-
icit of 1.3 % of GDP in 2005 according to the Commis-
sion’s spring forecast. Also for 2004 the spring forecast
neither took into account the impact of the measures for
2004 decided by the Dutch authorities on 16 April 2004
nor the package of roughly equal size announced for
2005 but not yet specified.
In the spring forecast, the debt ratio is expected to rise
further in 2005, to around 58  % of GDP in response to
the projected rise in the deficit and still weak GDP
growth.
Table V.34
Main measures in the budget for 2004 and additional package, Netherlands
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Higher contributions for healthcare
• Broadening of the tax base by limiting tax-deductibility 
of mortgage interest payments
• Termination of subsidies to employ low-skilled workers
• Freeze in public sector wage increases
• Reductions in social security expenditure by tightening eligibility 
for unemployment and invalidity benefits
• Reduction in healthcare expenditure 
• Reduction in subsidies
• Delay of planned expenditures on public consumption 
and investment
Source: Commission services.253
18. Austria
In 2003, the budgetary position weakened markedly. The
deficit widened by more than a full percentage point from
0.2 % of GDP in 2002 to 1.3 %, in line with the target set
out in the November 2003 update of the stability pro-
gramme. Expenditure exceeded the budget, reflecting a
sharper-than-expected rise in unemployment and addi-
tional discretionary spending such as an increase in social
transfers, an extra pay-rise for public sector employees,
additional labour market expenditure foreseen in the fiscal
stimulus package, topped by deferred flood-related spend-
ing. Tax revenues, by contrast, developed more favourably
than budgeted. Helped by a considerably lower interest
burden, the debt/GDP ratio developed more favourably
than expected. Interest expenditure amounted to 3.3 % of
GDP, some 0.3 percentage points below the projection of
the updated stability programme. Government debt stood
at 65 % of GDP at the end of 2003 compared with a target
of 66.4 %, helped by higher growth of nominal GDP.
Table V.35
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Austria
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 1.9
— Total revenue 51.0 49.9 49.5 47.7
 Of which: — current taxes 28.9 28.7 28.6 27.4
— social contributions 16.6 16.5 16.3 16.2
— Total expenditure 51.2 51.0 50.7 49.7
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.6
— social transfers (4) 30.2 30.8 30.6 30.4
— interest expenditure 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1
— gross fixed capital formation 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
Primary balance 3.1 2.0 2.0 1.2
Pm Tax burden 44.2 43.9 43.6 42.4
Government debt 66.6 65.0 65.5 65.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 1.8
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 3.1 2.2 2.3 1.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.4 0.7 1.8 2.5
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 0.1 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.4
Primary balance 3.5 2.4 2.8 1.9 2.2 2.8
Government debt 66.7 66.4 65.8 64.1 62.3 59.9
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.4 0.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in November 2003.
(3) Annual % change. 
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Austria.254
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effect, including certain family-related tax relief measures,
which were originally planned for 2005. In total, the bud-
getary impact amounts to some EUR 0.75 billion or almost
0.4 % of GDP. Taxes for low and middle incomes were
lowered through higher tax allowances and preferential tax-
ation for retained profits will be introduced. Moreover, non-
wage labour costs, in particular for older workers, were
reduced, a measure that had been repeatedly postponed.
Already in 2003, the 13th monthly VAT prepayment was
abolished. By contrast, social contributions increased and
energy and mineral oil taxes were raised as of 2004, with a
view to aligning energy taxation to the EU average. Last but
not least, the two economic stimulus packages and a
‘growth’ package, passed since December 2002, continue
to burden budgetary spending (see Table V.36).
On balance, the tax measures and the rise in social con-
tributions largely offset each other and therefore the
impact on the general government budget should be neu-
tral. As regards deficit-decreasing effects, expected sav-
ings from the pension reform for private and federal
employees are considerable, largely outpacing the
increase in discretionary spending. However, several
factors prevent a narrowing of the deficit. Firstly, certain
tax relief measures, originally planned for 2005 and
worth some 0.1 percentage points of GDP, were brought
forward. Secondly, the finance ministry revised down-
wards the expected surpluses of the sub-federal govern-
ment levels by 0.2 percentage points to 0.5 % of GDP.
Last but not least, central bank profits (in 2003 but
affecting the 2004 budget) turned out considerably lower
due to low interest rates and the depreciation of the US
dollar. As a result, and despite the expected acceleration
in domestic demand, the general government deficit is
estimated to remain in the same order of magnitude as in
2003, which is  percentage point above the target set in
the updated stability programme. With real GDP growth
expected to resume its trend rate, the deficit in cyclically
adjusted terms is expected to remain unchanged. In
2005, the second step of the tax reform consisting of a
sizeable income tax relief for both households and enter-
prises will take effect. The Austrian parliament passed
the respective bill in the beginning of May. The wage
and income tax relief and tax cuts for enterprises will
amount to some 0.5 % of GDP each. In addition, excise
duties with negligible revenue impact (‘Bagatell-
steuern’) will be abolished. In total, the tax cuts planned
for 2005 are worth some 1.0 % of GDP. To some, albeit
small, extent these revenue shortfalls will be offset by
continued structural savings from the pension and
administrative reforms. Despite the projected strength-
ening of domestic demand and the closing of the output
gap, the general government deficit is projected to widen
some 2 % of GDP, which is  percentage point above
the target set in the November 2003 stability programme
update.
Reflecting the expected deficit developments but helped
by rather favourable interest rate developments, govern-
ment debt will decline only slowly. According to the
Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, and taking into
account more recent data, the debt/GDP ratio is expected
to fall to some 65  % by 2005.
Table V.36
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Austria
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• First phase of income tax relief (some 0.3 % of GDP)
• Family-related tax measures (new tax deductions for single income 
earner families with children, 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in energy taxes
• Rise in social contributions
• Reduction in non-wage labour costs
• Reform of public administration (staff reduction, current cost cuts)
• Pension reform — private (ASVG) and federal employees
• Wage increases 2004 for civil servants
• Increase in discretionary expenditure (R & D, universities, 
agriculture, sport and culture, ODA)
• Continued impact of increase in family allowances
Source: Commission services, Ministry of Finance of Austria.255
19. Poland
In 2003, the general government deficit estimated at
4.1 % of GDP was slightly lower than expected. This is
mainly due to a higher than initially foreseen growth
rate. As the Eurostat decision on the classification of
funded pension schemes (1) is of a generic nature with
the individual cases to be assessed in time for the report-
ing due by 1 September 2004, this figure still considers
the open pension funds as part of the government
sector (2). The debt ratio in 2003 stands at 45.4 % of
GDP as compared to 41.2 % of GDP in 2002, a level
0.6 percentage points higher than expected at the begin-
ning of the year. This difference is mainly due to lower
privatisation receipts.
The budget for 2004, voted by the Parliament on
19 December 2003, unveiled an important increase of the
financing needs of the government and a significant wid-
ening of the deficit despite the acceleration of growth. It is
based on (over)optimistic macroeconomic assumptions.
The stock of government debt, measured according to the
Polish methodology, would approach the second pru-
dence threshold of 55 % of GDP (3). The 2004 budget is
¥1∂ Eurostat news release 30/2004, ‘Classification of funded pension schemes in
case of government responsibility or guarantee’, 2 March 2004.
¥2∂ This figure might increase to 5.7 % if the open pension funds are classified
outside the general government sector.
¥3∂ The Polish Constitution and the Public Finance Act require guarantees to be
included in the calculations of the public debt. The Public Finance Act pro-
vides for a series of prudence procedures when the public debt ratio breaks
the levels of 50, 55 and 60 % of GDP. If the public debt exceeds 55 % of
GDP in year t, in year t+2 the State Treasury debt/GDP ratio assumed in the
budget made in year t+1 cannot exceed the ratio observed in year t.
Table V.37
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Poland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 3.6 – 4.1 – 6.0 – 4.5
— Total revenue 41.3 41.0 40.8 41.2
 Of which: — current taxes 21.6 22.0 21.5 21.1
— social contributions 15.0 14.7 14.3 14.4
— Total expenditure 44.9 45.1 46.8 45.7
 Of which: — collective consumption 9.1 9.2 9.0 8.8
— social transfers (3) 26.3 25.8 25.4 25.4
— interest expenditure 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3
— gross fixed capital formation 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7
Primary balance – 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.8 – 1.2
Pm Tax burden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Government debt 41.2 45.4 49.1 50.3
Pm Real GDP (2) 1.4 3.7 4.6 4.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services.256
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Table V.38 below). No major measures are foreseen on
the expenditure side, except for the ones resulting from the
reform of local governments. A ‘medium-term fiscal strat-
egy’, which indicates the way forward without, however,
showing the precise measures, has been unveiled shortly
after the presentation of the budget draft by the govern-
ment (October 2003). The ‘programme of public spending
rationalisation and reduction’ (‘Hausner plan’) assumes in
turn a reduction of social and administrative spending
over the period 2004–07. The 2004 budget has not been
amended to incorporate the savings foreseen for 2004 by
the ‘Hausner plan’. In the Commission’s spring 2004 fore-
cast, the general government balance is projected to
increase substantially to 6 % of GDP notwithstanding the
strengthening of economic growth. The projected out-
come is more pessimistic than the one targeted by the gov-
ernment in its first convergence programme (5.7 % of
GDP) (1). Eventual savings, announced in the ‘Hausner
plan’, will be offset by additional expenditures resulting
from higher indexation of old-age and disability pensions
and the unforeseen magnitude of the zloty depreciation in
2003 inducing an increased contribution to the EU budget.
The rise in indirect taxation is not expected to neutralise
the decline in the revenues from the corporate tax. It is
projected that the deficit will fall in 2005 to 4.5 % of GDP.
The fiscal adjustment would be mainly cyclical with a
positive role played by positive net inflows from the EU
budget. The forecast takes into account eventual savings
reflected in the bills voted in parliament (mainly changes
in the indexation of pension schemes, in the allocation of
the pre-retirement benefits and in the rural pension sys-
tem) in March 2004.
The government debt ratio is expected to be slightly
above 49 % of GDP by the end of 2004 and to exceed
50 % in 2005 (2) mainly because of delays in the privati-
sation process and the depreciation of the zloty against
the euro in 2003, boosting the domestic currency value
of the Polish government debt denominated in foreign
exchange.
¥1∂ The 2003 PEP (August 2003) targeted a general government deficit of 5 %
for 2004.
¥2∂ If the open pension funds are classified outside of the government sector,
these figures might increase by approximately 4.5 percentage points.
Table V.38
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Poland
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 27 to 19 %
• Introduction of the possibility to pay the corporate income tax rate 
of 19 % for small companies (self-employed), which paid so far 
taxes according to the personal income tax thresholds, 
if they renounce all tax exemptions and rebates
• Alignment of the VAT legislation leading to an increase of the rate 
on various products to 22 % (e.g. construction materials) 
and an increase in excise taxes
• Introduction of a flat tax of 19 % on capital income (e.g. dividends)
• Local governments’ reform: gradual transfer of personal 
and corporate income tax revenues from the central budget to local 
authorities (self-governments) and a simultaneous reduction 
of subsidies
• No other major measure is included in the 2004 budget law despite 
savings foreseen in the ‘Hausner plan’
Source: Commission services.257
20. Portugal
The general government deficit for 2003 is estimated at
2.8 % of GDP. This compares with a targeted deficit of
2.4 % of GDP set in the January 2003 update of the stabil-
ity programme. The deviation from target is due to a mas-
sive tax shortfall (excluding the sale of tax and social
security contributions arrears), resulting from the unanti-
cipated decline of GDP in 2003 by an estimated 1.3 %. On
the expenditure side, by contrast, the government has been
broadly successful in securing the planned restraint.
Together, these revenue and expenditure developments
would have led to a government deficit clearly above 3 %
of GDP in 2003. In order to prevent this, the Portuguese
authorities relied on two one-off measures, worth in total
2.1 % of GDP. The government debt/GDP ratio continued
to rise in 2003, approaching the 60 % benchmark.
The budget for 2004 was presented to parliament in
October 2003, then approved and ratified by the end of
Table V.39
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Portugal
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 2.7 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 3.8
— Total revenue 43.4 44.6 43.2 43.0
 Of which: — current taxes 24.7 24.7 23.5 23.4
— social contributions 12.2 12.6 12.7 12.7
— Total expenditure 46.1 47.5 46.6 46.9
 Of which: — collective consumption 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.1
— social transfers (4) 25.6 26.5 26.5 26.3
— interest expenditure 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1
— gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.9 3.1 3.7
Primary balance 0.3 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.8
Pm Tax burden 36.9 37.2 36.0 35.9
Government debt 58.1 59.4 60.7 62.0
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.7 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.5
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.4 – 1.3 0.8 2.2
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.1
Primary balance 0.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.5 2.0
Government debt 58.0 59.5 60.0 59.7 58.6 57.0
Pm Real GDP (3) 0.4 – 0.8 1.0 2.5 2.8 3.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in December 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Portugal.258
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two-stage reduction in the corporate tax rate, introduces
significant rises in the prices of marketed government
services and plans sales of real estate amounting to 0.7 %
of GDP. On the expenditure side, it implements for a sec-
ond year running a quasi-freeze of employment and
wage scales in the central government. Further details
are given in the accompanying table.
The Commission services’ 2004 spring forecast projects
a general government deficit of 3.4 % of GDP for 2004,
thereby significantly above the official target of a deficit
of 2.8 % of GDP (1). The difference can basically be
accounted for by three elements: (i) projected growth of
GDP is  percentage point lower in the Commission
forecast; (ii) base effects due to the significant amount of
one-off measures adopted in 2003, mainly affecting the
revenue side; and (iii) the partial substitution of the
one-off measures taken in 2003, i.e. from 2.1 % of GDP
to a so far planned value of 0.7 % of GDP. Excluding
one-off measures, the spring forecast projects a marked
narrowing of the cyclically adjusted deficit in 2004 by
1 percentage point of GDP.
¥1∂ This was confirmed in the March 2004 reporting of government deficits
and debt levels (in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93,
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000).
Table V.40
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Portugal
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Reduction in the corporate tax rate from 30 to 25 % 
(0.1–0.2 % of GDP)
• Reform of the real estate tax system
• Rises in the prices of marketed government services
• Planned sales of real estate worth a total of EUR 1 billion 
(0.7 % of GDP)
• A 10 % cut in working expenditure in the central government
• A quasi-freeze of employment and wage scales in the central 
government
Source: Commission services.259
21. Slovenia
In 2003, the general government deficit came to 1.8 % of
GDP — slightly better than projected in the 2003 pre-
accession economic programme (1.95 %), thanks to a
determined fiscal policy, and against the background of
faltering growth. On the revenue side, taxes on profits and
capital gains increased markedly, while substantial savings
on interest payments materialised due to lower than antici-
pated inflation. After unexpected shortfalls leading to fail-
ures in achieving the targets and frequent revisions of
budgets in previous years, fiscal consolidation seemed to
be on track in 2003. Government debt declined to 27.1 %
of GDP in 2003.
In December 2003, the Parliament adopted a supplemen-
tary budget for 2004. The budget implementation bill stip-
ulates a novel measure: in case of a revenue shortfall due
to an economic downturn the government has the discre-
tion to reduce expenditure proportionally — up to SIT
15 billion (0.25 % of GDP) in the course of the year, with-
out having to propose the budget to be amended. If unfa-
vourable macroeconomic conditions persist, an up to SIT
10 billion (0.17 % of GDP) budget deficit overrun will
nevertheless be accepted at the end of the year. Moreover,
the agreement on public sector wages for 2004–05, which
introduced forward-looking indexation — with antici-
pated rather than actual domestic inflation and also taking
into account EU inflation and the euro/tolar exchange rate
— is expected to contain budget expenditure as wages
constitute an important part of general government spend-
ing. Furthermore, indexation of some social benefits has
also been weakened (see Table V.42 for details on the
public finance measures in 2004).
According to the March 2004 fiscal notification, the tar-
get for the general government deficit in 2004 is 1.6 %
of GDP. At 1.7 %, the Commission services project a
Table V.41
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Slovenia
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 1.8
— Total revenue 41.5. 41.6. 42.3 42.3
 Of which: — current taxes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— social contributions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— Total expenditure 43.9 43.6. 44.0 44.0
 Of which: — collective consumption n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— social transfers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
— interest expenditure 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
— gross fixed capital formation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Primary balance – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
Pm Tax burden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Government debt 27.8 27.1 28.3 28.2
Pm Real GDP (2) 2.9 2.3 3.2 3.6
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
Source: Commission services.260
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modating government consumption in an election year
was assumed (1).
Despite the planned measures in revenue policy —
reforming the direct taxes as well as improving the tax
administration — and expenditure limits, the general
government budget deficit is projected to increase mar-
ginally to 1.8 % of GDP in 2005.
On the one hand, the introduction of the real estate tax,
which will replace the current local tax, is expected to
have a neutral fiscal effect.
On the other hand, the corporate income tax will increase
the general government revenues by broadening the tax
base and eliminating loopholes in the legislation while
the new personal income tax regime, designed to disbur-
den the lowest income classes from 2005, will adversely
affect the revenues. On the expenditure side, the meas-
ures enhancing cost-effectiveness and flexibility will
result in savings, which will be partly offset by addi-
tional spending commitments related to EU accession
(Schengen border).
The debt ratio is relatively low and will remain so in the
future. In the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, the
government debt is projected to increase from 27.1 % of
GDP in 2003 to 28.3 % this year and then stabilise
around that level.¥1∂ The European Parliament elections took place in June while national par-
liamentary elections are due in November. 
Table V.42
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Slovenia
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Further harmonisation of excise duties on spirits and tobacco with 
the acquis
• Containing the rise in public wages and social benefits through 
weakened indexation mechanisms
• Increasing cost effectiveness of the public administration 
(cuts in discretionary spending of individual ministries mainly 
through rationalisation of material costs)
• Further restructuring (reallocation of expenditure items favouring 
investment in education and research and promoting regional 
cohesion)
Source: Commission services.261
22. Slovakia
After the 2002 election year, the newly formed Slovak
government initiated a fiscal turn-around. The budget for
2003 targeted a general government deficit of 5.0 % of
GDP (down from 5.7 % of GDP in 2002). During the
budget execution, the government took additional meas-
ures against emerging risks, which occurred in particular
in the form of underperforming VAT revenues, for
instance by advancing excise tax increases from the
beginning of 2004 to August 2003. In the end, the gen-
eral government deficit turned out to be much lower than
planned and amounted to 3.6 % of GDP — partly due to
spending postponements. The budget for 2004 reflects
the major part of the public finance reform agenda of the
current government. At the beginning of 2004, far-reach-
ing tax reforms took effect, consisting mainly of the
introduction of a flat income tax and a unified value
added tax, both at a rate of 19 %. The tax reform package
leads to a shift from direct to indirect taxation and is
likely to strengthen incentives and growth. On the
expenditure side, the 2004 budget incorporates notably a
multitude of incentive-enhancing measures in the area of
social transfers. Table V.44 lists major measures. In
addition, the budget for 2004 is, for the first time,
affected by the contributions to and transfers from the
EU associated with Slovakia’s membership as of 1 May
2004.
The budget passed by parliament last December is in line
with a general government deficit target of 4.0 % of
GDP for 2004. The Commission’s spring 2004 forecast
projects that the government will basically meet this tar-
get. These estimates are subject to the caveat that budget
forecasts are relatively uncertain in the present wide-
ranging reform environment.
Table V.43
Budgetary developments 2002–05, Slovakia 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 5.7 – 3.6 – 4.1 – 3.9 
— Total revenue (4) 45.2 49.1 42.0 43.1 
Of which: — current taxes 19.5 18.3 17.5 17.6 
— social contributions 13.6 14.0 13.2 13.6 
— Total expenditure (4) 50.9 52.7 46.1 47.0 
Of which: — collective consumption 11.3 11.2 10.9 10.7 
— social transfers (3) 20.6 20.3 19.7 19.2 
— interest expenditure 3.6 2.4 2.7 2.9 
— gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 
Primary balance – 2.1 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.0 
Pm Tax burden 33.0 32.3 30.7 31.2 
Government debt 43.3 42.8 45.1 46.1 
Pm Real GDP (2) 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.1 
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Annual % change.
(3) In kind and other than in kind.
(4) Revenue and expenditure ratios are not consolidated.
Source: Commission services. 262
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dicts a general government deficit of 3.9 % of GDP.
As in 2004, the forecast is based on already passed
reform measures on the revenue and expenditure side
— with the notable exception of some specified health
reform measures. The forecast includes the effect of
the introduction of a mandatory funded pension pillar
in 2005. So far, the government has not indicated any
additional measures to compensate for the associated
increase of the general government deficit of some
0.7 % of GDP.
The debt/GDP ratio is likely to hover between 45 and
46 % of GDP in 2004/05.
Table V.44
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Slovakia
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
The tax reform package leads to a considerable shift from direct 
to indirect taxation, increases the transparency of the tax system 
and is likely to strengthen incentives and growth. Elements 
of the package are:
• introduction of a flat tax rate of 19 % for both individual 
and corporate income taxation, coupled with the removal 
of tax exemptions;
• introduction of a unified VAT tax rate of 19 %;
• abolition of some less significant taxes (inheritance tax, gift tax) 
and amendments to some others (real estate tax, vehicle tax).
In addition, the health and social insurance contribution rates payable 
by employers and employees have been reduced, albeit 
to a less significant extent, i.e. to a still relatively high total level 
of roughly 48 % of gross wages.
The reforms on the expenditure side effect in particular the area 
of social transfers. Inter alia, the following incentive-enhancing 
measures have been implemented:
• changes in key parameters of the pay-as-you-go pillar 
of the pension system (e.g. benefit formula, indexation, retirement 
age) — while a funded pension pillar will be instituted in 2005;
• various changes in other components of the social insurance system 
(e.g. sickness benefits), of social assistance and of social benefits 
(e.g. child benefits);
• changes in the healthcare system (e.g. full impact of introduction 
of co-payments).
Source: Commission services.263
23. Finland
In 2003, the general government balance continued to be
in surplus, at 2.3 % of GDP. This was in line with the tar-
get set in the November 2003 update of the stability pro-
gramme. The overall budgetary outturn was in line with
expectations, although central government finances
posted a surplus 0.3 % of GDP compared with a pro-
jected deficit of 0.1 %. This derived from higher indirect
tax revenues and also from savings in subsidies and
transfer payments and lower interest expenditure. How-
ever, the social security surplus was slightly lower than
anticipated, whereas the local government deficit was
close to target. The debt ratio in 2003 was 45.3 % of
GDP, while the target in the updated stability pro-
gramme was 45.1 %. The 2.7 percentage points rise in
the debt ratio from 42.6 % of GDP in 2002 follows
mainly from a technical change in the classification of
central government debt as the repo portfolio was
removed from the State Treasury’s balance sheet.
Table V.45
Budgetary developments 2002–07, Finland
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance 4.3 2.3 2.0 2.1
— Total revenue 54.4 52.7 52.6 52.2
 Of which: — current taxes 33.1 32.1 31.6 31.3
— social contributions 12.4 12.1 12.3 12.4
— Total expenditure 50.1 50.5 50.7 50.1
 Of which: — collective consumption 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8
— social transfers (4) 30.9 31.3 31.5 31.4
— interest expenditure 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7
— gross fixed capital formation 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7
Primary balance 6.5 4.1 3.8 3.8
Pm Tax burden 46.1 44.8 44.5 44.4
Government debt 42.6 45.3 44.5 44.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance 3.7 2.3 2.1 2.2
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 5.9 4.2 3.9 3.9
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.7
Stability programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 4.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2
Primary balance 4.4 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8
Government debt 42.7 45.1 44.7 44.9 45.0 44.6
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.2 1.4 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in November 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Finland.264
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on 19 December. Expenditures will go up by 4 % in real
terms from 2003. Half of the increase derives from
appropriation increases forced by current legislation and
decisions made by the previous government, and the
other half from the spending increases included in the
new government’s programme and compensations paya-
ble to other government levels due to income tax cuts.
Revenues are set to grow by over 1 %, even though the
government has cut taxes on income and alcohol.
The target for the general government surplus in 2004 in
the semi-annual economic survey of the Ministry of
Finance is 1.9 % of GDP (1.7 % in the November 2003
update of the stability programme) (1). The Commis-
sion’s spring 2004 forecast of the general government
surplus is 2.0 % of GDP (2) for 2004. It implies that the
cyclically adjusted surplus will remain virtually
unchanged at some 2 % of GDP during 2004–05. In
2004, the cyclically adjusted surplus will decrease by
some 0.3 percentage points from 2003, indicating a
slightly expansionary stance in fiscal policy.
Given the no-policy change assumption in the forecast
for 2005, the general government finances are foreseen
to record a surplus of 2.1 % of GDP, which is in line with
the surplus target presented in the November 2003
update of the stability programme.
According to the spring 2004 forecast, the debt ratio is
seen to decrease slightly from 44.5 % of GDP to
44.3 % during 2004–05. The economic survey from
the Ministry of Finance sees debt ratio ease to 44.7 %
of GDP in 2004.
¥1∂ Starting from 2003, the national accounts definition and the EDP defini-
tion of the general government balance will differ due to swap-interest
payments. The difference in 2003 was 0.2 percentage points, the EDP def-
inition of general government surplus being at 2.3 % of GDP and the
national accounts definition at 2.1 %.
¥2∂ EDP definition, Ministry of Finance will continue to use the national
account definition.
Table V.46
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Finland
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Decrease in earned income taxation (0.5 % of GDP)
• Decrease in excise duty on alcohol by an average of 33 % 
(0.2 % of GDP) 
• Increase in active labour market policy measures (0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in central government transfers to local government 
(0.3 % of GDP)
Source: Ministry of Finance (budget for 2004).265
24. Sweden
The general government balance is estimated to have
recorded a surplus in 2003, of 0.7 % of GDP. This com-
pares with a targeted surplus of 1.5 % of GDP set in the
November 2002 update of the convergence programme.
The deviation from the projection is due to higher-than-
projected primary expenditures, in particular transfer pay-
ments. This was however partially offset by lower-than-
projected interest expenditure. Moreover, the tax hikes in
the local government sector offset weaker-than-expected
tax revenue for central government linked to weaker-than-
forecast economic growth. The government debt/GDP
ratio continued to fall and was 51.9 % of GDP in 2003.
Table V.47
Budgetary developments 2002–06, Sweden 
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.7 
— Total revenue 58.1 59.5 59.1 58.9 
 Of which:  — taxes 35.2 36.3 36.2 36.2 
 — social contributions 15.0 14.7 14.5 14.4 
— Total expenditure (4) 58.1 58.8 58.9 58.3 
 Of which:  — collective consumption 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 
 — social transfers (5) 37.9 38.8 38.8 38.4 
 — interest expenditure 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 
Primary balance (4) 2.9 2.9 2.5 3.1 
Pm Tax burden 50.4 51.0 50.7 50.6 
Government debt 52.6 51.9 51.8 50.5 
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2.4 2.9 2.6 3.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.6 
Convergence programme (2) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
General government balance (4) 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.9 
Primary balance (4) 3.4 3.0 3.2 4.1 4.6 
Government debt 52.7 51.7 51.5 50.0 48.3 
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.9 1.4 2.0 2.6 2.5 
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definition used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in December 2003. In the 2004 spring Fiscal Policy Bill released on 15 April, the following projections were made: GDP growth: 2.5 % in 2004, 2.6 %
in 2005 and 2.5 % in 2006. General government budget balance (% of GDP): 0.3 % in 2004; 0.6 % in 2005; 1.1 % in 2006. Government debt (% of GDP): 52.1 %
in 2004, 51.5 % in 2005, and 50.6 % in 2006.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) This figure corresponds to the updated convergence programme’s concept of ‘net lending with accruals taxes’, which best reflects Statistics Sweden’s revised meth-
odology to report tax receipts.
(5) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Sweden.266
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The updated convergence programme for the period
2003–06, drawing fully on the budget, was submitted to
the Commission on 1 December 2003. Expenditure in
relation to GDP is expected to fall in 2004. New expend-
iture-increasing measures adopted in the budget were
very small in size and offset by cost-cutting measures,
though some additional measures have been announced
since the release of the budget, described in the accom-
panying table. This reflects to a large degree the virtually
non-existing budgetary margin included under the
expenditure ceiling at the central government level in
2004. Therefore, the previously announced expenditure
ceiling for 2004 may be considered to have been binding
for the government when preparing the budget. Reve-
nues by contrast are expected to remain unchanged in
2004, influenced also by the announced tax hikes at the
local government level.
The updated convergence programme projects a general
government surplus in 2004 of 0.6 % of GDP (1). In the
Commission services’ spring 2004 forecast, the 2004 out-
come is somewhat worse than projected by the Swedish
authorities (surplus of 0.2 % of GDP) reflecting to a large
part the Commission’s worse outlook for the labour mar-
ket and also some additional factors. Subject to the caveat
that calculations of the output gap are surrounded by a
large degree of uncertainty in Sweden, the spring forecast
projects the cyclically adjusted surplus to narrow by  %
of GDP and the cyclically adjusted primary surplus to nar-
row less. This suggests a slightly expansionary fiscal
stance in 2004. By contrast, the calculations in the Com-
mission’s assessment of the updated programme sug-
gested a somewhat restrictive fiscal stance. This differ-
ence is due both to additional expenditure measures and a
smaller effect of the cycle in the spring forecast.
On current policies the spring forecast projects an increase
in the surplus to 0.7 % of GDP in 2005, which is below the
projection in the updated convergence programme of a sur-
plus of 1.4 % of GDP (2). Half of the difference is due to the
new measures announced by the government in December
2003 (the ‘three-party negotiations package’ together with
the Left and the Green parties). The other half is mainly due
to higher transfer payments to households, in particular as a
result of a weaker labour market performance foreseen in
the Commission’s spring forecast.
In the spring Fiscal Policy Bill released on 15 April, the
expenditure ceilings set in the September 2003 budget
were confirmed though the 2004–06 budgetary margins
were narrowed further. Gradually higher surpluses in the
government finances were projected though consider-
ably lower than the projections in the September 2003
budget. In 2004, a surplus of 0.3 % of GDP is projected,
followed by 0.6 and 1.1 % of GDP in 2005 and 2006,
respectively. The bill’s estimate of the structural budget
balance in 2004 is almost unchanged compared with the
September 2003 budget, reflecting an estimate of a more
negative output gap in this bill (going forward to 2006).
The fiscal stance in 2005–06 is assessed to be restrictive,
but less so than in the September 2003 budget.
General government debt, which mainly lies in central
government, is projected to rise as the central govern-
ment is expected to remain in deficit until 2005. This rise
is however slower than nominal GDP growth and the
debt ratio is therefore projected to continue to decline in
2004–05, to slightly above 50 % of GDP.
¥1∂ This figure corresponds to the updated convergence programme’s concept
of ‘net lending with accrual taxes’, which best reflects Statistics Sweden’s
revised methodology to report tax receipts. According to the previous
methodology, the surplus projection in the 2003 update was 0.4 % of GDP. 
¥2∂ See previous footnote. For 2005, the surplus projection according to the
previous methodology was 1.2 % of GDP.
Table V.48
Main measures in the budget for 2004, Sweden
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Green tax swap (increase of energy taxes and a reduction 
of labour taxes) and a reduction of wealth and inheritance taxes 
(– 0.1 % of GDP) (1)
• Additional resources to the Swedish National Labour Market 
Administration for labour market programmes and also 
for life-long learning activities (0.2 % of GDP) (2)
(1) At the same time, the 2003 updated convergence programme estimated tax rises at the local government level of 0.1 % of GDP. 
(2) These measures were introduced with the December 2003 ‘three-party negotiations package’
Source: Commission services, Swedish Ministry of Finance (budget for 2004).267
25. United Kingdom
The outturn for the general government balance is esti-
mated (in budget 2004) to be a deficit of 3.2 % of GDP
in financial year 2003/04 — compared with a deficit of
2.4 % projected in budget 2003. This result, worse than
expected, appears to be mostly due to differences in the
composition of GDP, with lower-than-expected growth
in wages implying lower receipts from income tax and
social security contributions. Corporation tax receipts
were lower than expected, while higher discretionary
expenditure related to the Iraq War also contributed.
General government debt is estimated to be 39.8 % of
GDP at the end of 2003/04, higher than the 39 % that had
been projected in the 2003 budget.
The latest budget was released on 17 March 2004, setting
out a number of discretionary policy changes, which over-
Table V.49
Budgetary developments 2002–07, United Kingdom
(% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2002 2003 2004 2005
General government balance – 1.6 – 3.2 – 2.8 – 2.6
— Total revenue 39.5 39.6 39.5 39.6
 Of which:  — taxes 29.1 28.7 28.6 28.7
 — social contributions 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.0
— Total expenditure 41.1 42.8 42.3 42.2
 Of which:  — collective consumption 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
 — social transfers (5) 25.9 27.0 26.6 26.4
 — interest expenditure 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1
 — gross fixed capital formation 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0
Primary balance 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.5
Pm Tax burden 36.5 36.7 36.7 36.8
Government debt 38.5 39.9 40.1 40.6
Pm Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.5 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.3
Pm Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.2
Pm Real GDP (3) 1.6 2.2 3.0 2.8
Convergence programme (2) 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
General government balance (4) – 2.1 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.0
Primary balance (4) – 0.5 – 1.7 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.3
Government debt 37.9 39.3 40.2 40.8 41.1 41.4
Pm Real GDP (3) 1 1/4 2 1/4 3 1/4 2 3/4 2 1/2 2 1/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2004 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the
excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Submitted in December 2003.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Figures include UMTS receipts of 0.1 % of GDP in each year.
(5) In kind and other than in kind.
Source: Commission services, convergence programme of the United Kingdom and 2003 pre-budget report.268
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Measures with the largest fiscal impact included a new
package aimed at increasing compliance with direct taxes,
a one-off transfer to the over-70s to assist with living
expenses, and, in line with usual practice, a rebuilding of
the precautionary margin against overspend in annually
managed government spending. Further details are given
below in the accompanying table.
The 2004 budget also set out new estimates and projec-
tions for the public finances, updating those set out in the
December 2003 convergence programme update. The
general government balance is expected to improve over
the course of 2004, to show a deficit of 2.6 % for 2004/
05. In the Commission’s spring 2004 forecast, the pro-
jected outcome for calendar year 2004 is slightly less
optimistic, at 2.8 % of GDP, largely reflecting a more
conservative estimate of the recovery in revenues —
despite forecasts for GDP growth broadly similar to the
‘cautious’ forecasts used by the government to forecast
the public finances. While estimates of the output gap
inherently involve a degree of uncertainty, the cyclically
adjusted deficit is projected to narrow by 0.3 percentage
points, reflecting to a large extent the falling-away of
expenditures associated with the Iraq War.
In 2005, under a no-policy change assumption, the
spring 2004 forecast projects a further improvement in
the general government balance, to a deficit of 2.6 % of
GDP. Again, the deficit is projected to remain slightly
higher than official projections of 2.4 % in the 2005/06
financial year. As well as differences in view over reve-
nue growth, the difference also reflects a more optimistic
growth projection used by the UK authorities. In partic-
ular, the ‘cautious’ growth rate for GDP used by the gov-
ernment to project the public finances (3.0 % in 2005/
06) is above the Commission forecast of 2.8 % for the
2005 calendar year.
According to the Commission forecast, the general gov-
ernment debt/GDP ratio, is expected to rise modestly
over the forecast period, from 39.9 % of GDP in 2003 to
reach 40.6 % in 2005. Nonetheless, government debt
remains at a prudent level well below the 60 % reference
value.
Table V.50
Main measures in the budget for 2004, United Kingdom
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• Direct taxes compliance package (+ 0.1 % of GDP by 2006/07)
• Minimum rate of tax, distributed profits 
(+ 0.04 % of GDP by 2006/07)
• GBP 100 payment to the over-70s (– 0.04 % of GDP in 2004/05 only)
• Resetting of the margin against overspend in annually managed 
expenditure (– 0.1 % of GDP in 2004/05, – 0.2 % of GDP in 2005/06)
• Scheme to allow local government to retain a proportion of growth 
in local non-domestic rates revenue (– 0.02 % of GDP by 2006/07)
Source: Source: HM Treasury, budget 2004.269
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1. Glossary
Accession countries Countries that will become mem-
bers of the EU in May 2004 and include Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Automatic stabilisers Various features of the tax and
spending regime which react automatically to the eco-
nomic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the
budget balance tends to improve in years of high growth,
and deteriorate during economic slowdowns.
Broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) Annual
guidelines for the economic and budgetary policies of
the Member States. They are prepared by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council of Ministers responsible
for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin).
Budget balance The balance between total public
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a posi-
tive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance
indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State
budgetary positions, the EU uses general government
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, primary
budget balance and primary structural balance.
Budgetary rules Rules and procedures through which
policy-makers decide on the size and the allocation of
public expenditure as well as on its financing through
taxation and borrowing.
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget bal-
ance in percentage of GDP brought about by a change in
the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on
average.
Candidate countries Countries that wish to accede to
the EU. Besides the accession countries, they include
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement con-
tained in the Stability and Growth Pact, according to
which Member States should, over the medium term,
achieve an overall budget balance close to balance or in
surplus.
Code of conduct on the format and content of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes Policy document
endorsed by the Ecofin Council in July 2001 setting
down the information requirements and key definitions
to be followed by Member States in preparing their sta-
bility or convergence programmes.
Convergence programmes Medium-term budgetary
and monetary strategies presented by each of those
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. They
are updated annually, according to the provisions of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Prior to the third phase of
EMU, convergence programmes were issued on a volun-
tary basis and used by the Commission in its assessment
of the progress made in preparing for the euro. See also
stability programmes.
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due
to changes in interest rates and exchange rates triggered
by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy.
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the
change in the budget balance that follows automatically
from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the
reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in
the output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing
and structural budget balance.
Cyclically adjusted budget balance See structural
budget balance.
Demand and supply shocks Disturbances that affect the
economy on the demand side (e.g. changes in private
consumption or exports) or on the supply side (e.g.
changes in commodity prices or technological innova-
tions). They can impact on the economy either on a tem-
porary or permanent basis.273
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2 0 0 4Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of people who
receive government transfers, especially pensions, rela-
tive to those who are available to provide the revenue to
pay for those transfers.
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on personal or
corporate incomes and property.
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget bal-
ance and in its components under the control of govern-
ment aiming at stabilising the economy. It is usually
measured as the residual of the change in the balance
after the exclusion of the budgetary impact of automatic
stabilisers. See also fiscal stance.
Early-warning mechanism Part of the preventive ele-
ments of the SGP, activated when there is significant
divergence from the budgetary targets set down in a sta-
bility or convergence programme.
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly
the Monetary Committee, renamed the Economic and
Financial Committee as of January 1999. Its main task is
to prepare and discuss (Ecofin) Council decisions with
regard to economic and financial matters.
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior
officials whose main task is to prepare discussions of the
(Ecofin) Council on structural policies. It plays a large
role in the preparation of the BEPGs, and it is active on
policies related to labour markets, methods to calculate
cyclically adjusted budget balances and ageing popula-
tions.
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of tax
revenue (labour income, capital income, consumption)
to their respective tax bases.
ESA 95/ESA 79 European accounting standards for the
reporting of economic data by the Member States to the
EU. As of 2000, ESA 95 has replaced the earlier ESA 79
standard with regard to the comparison and analysis of
national public finance data.
Excessive deficit procedure (EDP) A procedure
according to which the Commission and the Council
monitor the development of national budget balances
and public debt in order to assess the risk of an excessive
deficit in each Member State. Its application has been
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also stability programmes and Stability and Growth
Pact.
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a
subset of) public expenditure.
Fiscal consolidation A continuous improvement in the
budget balance, either specified by the amount of the
improvement or the period over which the improvement
continues.
Fiscal decentralisation The transfer of authority and
responsibility for public functions from the central gov-
ernment to intermediate and local governments or to the
market.
Fiscal federalism A subfield of public finance that
investigates the fiscal relations across levels of govern-
ment.
Fiscal impulse The estimated effect of fiscal policy on
GDP. It is not a model-free measure and it is usually cal-
culated by simulating an econometric model. The esti-
mates presented in the present report are obtained by
using the Commission services’ model QUEST.
Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy,
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal per-
formance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, debt, or a major component thereof. See also
budgetary rule, expenditure rules.
Fiscal stance A measure of the discretionary fiscal pol-
icy component. In this report, it is defined as the change
in the primary structural budget balance relative to the
preceding period. When the change is positive (negative)
the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive).
General government As used by the EU in its process
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general
government sector covers national government, regional
and local government, as well as social security funds.
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to and
from the EU budget.
Government budget constraint A basic condition
applying to the public finances, according to which total
public expenditure in any one year must be financed by
taxation, government borrowing, or changes in the mon-
etary base. In the context of EMU, the ability of govern-274
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prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment, sustainabil-
ity.
Government contingent liabilities Obligations for the
government that are subject to the realisation of specific
uncertain and discrete future events. For instance, the
guarantees granted by governments to the debt of private
corporations bonds issued by enterprise are contingent
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay
depends on the non-ability of the original debtor to hon-
our its own obligations.
Government implicit liabilities Government obliga-
tions that are very likely to arise in the future in spite of
the absence of backing contracts or law. The government
may have a potential future obligation as a result of legit-
imate expectations generated by past practice or as a
result of the pressure by interest groups. Most implicit
liabilities are contingent, i.e. depend upon the occur-
rence of uncertain future events.
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter A statistical technique
used to calculate trend GDP and output gaps by filtering
actual GDP.
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the pro-
duction stage, and not on the income and property aris-
ing from economic production processes. Prominent
examples of indirect taxation are value added tax (VAT),
excise duties, import levies, energy and other environ-
mental taxes.
Interest burden General government interest payments
on public debt as a share of GDP.
Maastricht reference values for public debt and defi-
cits Respectively, a 60 % general government debt/GDP
ratio and a 3 % general government deficit/GDP ratio.
These thresholds are defined in a protocol to the Maas-
tricht Treaty on European Union. See also excessive def-
icit procedure.
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of total
debt in terms of when it is due to be paid back. Interest
rate changes affect the budget balance directly to the
extent that the general government sector has debt with
a relatively short maturity structure. Long maturities
reduce the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes
in the prevailing interest rate. See also public debt.
Minimal benchmarks Values indicating a budgetary
position that would provide a cyclical safety margin for
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely during eco-
nomic slowdowns without leading to excessive deficits.
The minimal benchmarks are estimated by the European
Commission. They do not cater for other risks such as
unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate
shocks and should not be confused with the ‘close-to-
balance or in surplus’ medium-term requirement of the
Pact.
Monetary conditions index (MCI) An indicator com-
bining the change in real short-term interest rate and in
the real effective exchange rate to gauge the degree of
easing or tightening of monetary policy.
Mundell-Fleming model Macroeconomic model of an
open economy which embodies the main Keynesian
hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity preference). In spite
of its shortcomings, it remains useful in short-term eco-
nomic policy analysis.
NAIRU Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemploy-
ment.
Non-Keynesian effects Supply-side and expectations
effects which reverse the sign of traditional Keynesian
multipliers. Hence, if non-Keynesian effects dominate,
fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.
Old-age dependency ratio Population aged over 65 as a
percentage of working age population (usually defined
as persons aged between 15 and 64).
One-off measure Transitory budget effects resulting
directly from a policy initiative. A temporary measure
implies an improvement/deterioration of the budget that
does not lead to a reliable improvement/deterioration in
the intertemporal budgetary position.
Output gap The difference between actual output and
estimated potential output at any particular point in time.
See also cyclical component of budget balance.
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG) Pension sys-
tem in which current pension expenditures are financed
by the contributions of current employees.
Pre-accession economic programmes (PEPs) Annual
programmes submitted by candidate countries which set
the framework for economic policies. The PEPs consist275
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macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public
finance issues and an outline of the structural reform
agenda.
Pre-accession fiscal surveillance framework (PFSF)
Provides the framework for budgetary surveillance of
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It closely
approximates the policy coordination and surveillance
mechanisms at EU level.
Policy-mix The overall stance of fiscal and monetary
policy. The policy-mix may consist of various combina-
tions of expansionary and restrictive policies, with a
given fiscal stance being either supported or offset by
monetary policy.
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of
interest payments on general government debt.
Primary structural budget balance The structural (or
cyclically adjusted) budget balance net of interest pay-
ments.
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which ampli-
fies the economic cycle by increasing the structural pri-
mary deficit during an economic upturn, or by decreas-
ing it in a downturn. It can be contrasted with
(discretionary) counter-cyclical policy that has the oppo-
site effects. A neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically
adjusted budget balance unchanged over the economic
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See also
tax-smoothing.
Production function approach A means to estimate the
potential level of output of an economy on taking inputs
on labour and capital as well as trend factor productivity
into account. This is used to estimate the output gap that
is a key input in the estimation of cyclical budget com-
ponent.
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general
government sector. It includes the total nominal value of
all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State,
except that part of the debt which is owed to other public
institutions in the same Member State.
Public goods Those goods and services that are con-
sumed jointly by several economic agents and for which
there is no effective pricing mechanism that would allow
private provision through the market.
Public investment The component of total public
expenditure through which governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide.
Public–private partnerships (PPP) Agreements that
transfer to the private sector investment projects that tra-
ditionally have been executed or financed by the public
sector. To qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a
public function, involve the general government as the
principal purchaser, be financed from non-public
sources and engage a corporation outside the general
government as the principal operator that provides sig-
nificant inputs in the design and conception of the
project and bears a relevant amount of the risk.
Quality of public finances The part of the EU fiscal
framework that relates to the allocation of resources and
the efficient and effective use of those resources in rela-
tion to identified strategic priorities.
Quasi-fiscal activities Activities promoting public pol-
icy goals carried out by non-government units.
QUEST The Economic and Financial Affairs DG’s
macroeconomic model of the EU Member States plus
the United States and Japan.
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive theoret-
ical assumptions on the consumer’s behaviour (inter alia
infinite horizon for decision-making), the impact of fis-
cal policy does not depend on whether it is financed by
tax increases or by a widening deficit. The basic reason-
ing behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and was
revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s.
Securitisation Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with the
intention of paying interest and capital out of the pro-
ceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or from future
revenue flows.
Sensitivity analysis An econometric or statistical simu-
lation designed to test the robustness of an estimated
economic relationship or projection, given various
changes in the underlying assumptions.
Significant divergence A sizeable excess of budget bal-
ance over the targets in the stability or convergence pro-
grammes, that triggers the early warning mechanism of
the SGP.276
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debt accumulation or decumulation arising from a posi-
tive or negative differential between the interest rate paid
on public debt and the growth rate of the national econ-
omy. See also government budget constraint.
Social security contributions (SSC) Mandatory contri-
butions paid by employers and employees to a social
insurance scheme to cover for pension, healthcare and
other welfare provisions.
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997,
the SGP clarifies the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
regarding the surveillance of Member State budgetary
policies and the monitoring of budget deficits during the
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two Council
regulations setting out legally binding provisions to be
followed by the European institutions and the Member
States and two resolutions of the European Council in
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also excessive deficit pro-
cedure.
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary strate-
gies presented by those Member States that have already
adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according
to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also convergence programmes.
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment
(also known as the debt-deficit adjustment) ensures con-
sistency between the net borrowing (flow) and the vari-
ation in the stock of gross debt. It includes the accumu-
lation of financial assets, changes in the value of debt
denominated in foreign currency and remaining statisti-
cal adjustments.
Structural budget balance The actual budget balance
adjusted for its cyclical component. The structural bal-
ance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the
budget balance, when taking into account the automatic
effect on the budget of the economic cycle. It is referred
to also as the cyclically adjusted budget balance. See
also primary structural budget balance.
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and
debt that ensure that the latter does not grow without
bound. While conceptually intuitive, an agreed opera-
tional definition of sustainability has proven difficult to
achieve.
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances. They measure the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over a given projection period to achieve a predeter-
mined level of debt at the end of that projection period.
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be kept
stable in order to minimise the distortionary effects of
taxation, while leaving it for the automatic stabilisers to
smooth the economic cycle. It is also referred to as neu-
tral discretionary fiscal policy. See also cyclical compo-
nent of fiscal policy.
UMTS Third generation of technical support for mobile
phone communications. Sale of UMTS licences gave
rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 2001.
Wagner’s law Theory according to which public spend-
ing — since it comprises ‘luxury goods’ with high elas-
ticity to income — would tend to rise as a share of GDP
as per capita income increases.
Welfare state Range of policies designed to provide
insurance against unemployment, sickness and risks
associated with old age.277
2. References
Afonso, A., L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi (2003), ‘Public
sector efficiency: An international comparison’, ECB
Working Paper, 242.
Agell, J., T. Lindh and H. Ohlsson (1997), ‘Growth and
the public sector: A critical review essay’, European
Journal of Political Economy, 13, pp. 33–52.
Alesina, A., and S. Ardagna (1998), ‘Tales of fiscal
adjustment’, Economic Policy, 27, pp. 489–545.
Alesina, A., M. de Broeck, A. Prati, and G. Tabellini
(1992), ‘Default risk on government debt in OECD
countries’, Economic Policy, 15, pp. 427–63.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (2004), ‘The European Union: A
politically incorrect view’, NBER Working Paper, 10342.
Allan, W., and T. Parry (2003), ‘Fiscal transparency in
EU accession countries: Progress and future challenges’,
IMF Working Paper, 163.
Amato, G. (2002), ‘Verso un DPEF Europeo?’, Nuova
Economia — Nuova Società, 4, pp. 15–19.
Arai, M. and P. S. Thoursie (2001), ‘Incentives and
selection in cyclical absenteeism’, FIEF Working Paper
Series, 167.
Artis, M. and M. Buti (2001), ‘Setting medium-term fis-
cal targets in EMU’, in Brunila, A., M. Buti and D.
Franco, The Stability and Growth Pact, the architecture
of fiscal policy in EMU, Palgrave.
Atkinson, P. and P. van den Noord (2001), ‘Managing
public expenditure: Some emerging policy issues and a
framework for analysis’, OECD Economics Department
Working Paper, 285.
Azariadis, C. (1993), Intertemporal macroeconomics,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Bagnai, A. (2004), ‘Keynesian and neoclassical fiscal
sustainability indicators, with applications to EMU
member countries’, unpublished paper.
Balassone, F., D. Franco and S. Zotteri (2004), ‘Public
debt: A survey of policy issues’, paper presented at the
sixth Banca d’Italia Workshop on Public Finance, Peru-
gia, 1–3 April 2004.
Ball, L., and G. Mankiw (1995), ‘What do budget defi-
cits do?’, in Budget deficits and debt: Issues and option,
Kansas City, Federal Reserve of Kansas City.
Ballabriga, F., and C. Martinez-Mongay (2002), ‘Has
EMU shifted policy?’, European Commission, Eco-
nomic Paper, 166.
Ballabriga, F. and C. Martinez-Mongay (2004), ‘Sus-
tainability of EU public finances’, European Commis-
sion, mimeo.
Barnhill, T. M., and G. Kopits (2003), ‘Assessing fiscal
sustainability under uncertainty’, IMF Working Paper, 79.
Barrel, R. and K. Dury (2001), ‘Will the SGP ever be
breached?’, in Brunila, A., M. Buti and D. Franco, The
Stability and Growth Pact, the arhitecture of fiscal pol-
icy in EMU, Palgrave.
Barro, R. (1974), ‘Are government bonds net wealth’,
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 6, pp. 1095–17.
Barro, R. (1990), ‘Government spending in a simple
model of endogenous growth’, Journal of Political
Economy, 98, pp. 103–25.
Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), Economic
growth, McGraw Hill.
Bayoumi, T. A., M. Goldstein and G. Woglom (1995),
‘Do credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers? Evi-278
P a r t  V I
R e s o u r c e sdence from US states’, Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 27, pp. 1046–59.
Beg, D., F. Canova, P. De Grauwe, A. Fatás and P. Lane
(2002), Surviving the slowdown: Monitoring the Euro-
pean Central Bank 4, CEPR.
Begg, D., B. Eichengreen, L. Halpern, J. Von Hagen and
C. Wiplosz (2003), ‘Sustainable regimes of capital move-
ments in accession countries’, CEPR Policy Paper, 10.
Bernheim, B. D. (1987), ‘Ricardian equivalence: An
evaluation of theory and evidence’, NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual, 2, pp. 263–304.
Bernoth, K., J. Von Hagen and L. Schuknecht (2003),
‘The determinants of the yield differential in the EU gov-
ernment bond market’, ZEI, University of Bonn, mimeo.
Bishop, G. (2003), ‘The future of the Stability and
Growth Pact’, International Finance, 6(2), pp. 1–12.
Blanchard, O. (1984), ‘Current and anticipated deficits,
interest rate and economic activity’, NBER Working
Paper, 1265.
Blanchard, O. (1985), ‘Debts, deficits, and finite hori-
zons’, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 223–47.
Blanchard, O. (1990), ‘Suggestions for a new set of fis-
cal indicators’, OECD Working Papers, 79.
Blanchard, O., J. C. Chouraqui, R. P. Hagemann and N.
Sartor (1990), ‘The sustainability of fiscal policy: New
answers to an old question’, OECD Economic Studies, 15.
Blanchard, O., and S. Fischer (1989), Lectures on
macroeconomics, Boston, the MIT Press.
Blanchard, O., and F. Giavazzi (2002), ‘Current account
deficits in the euro area: The end of the Feldstein-Hori-
oka puzzle?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2,
pp. 147–209.
Bordo, M. D. and L. Jonung (1998), ‘A return to the con-
vertibility principle? Monetary and fiscal regimes in his-
torical perspective: The international evidence’, in A.
Leijonhufvud (ed.), Monetary theory as a basis for mon-
etary policy, London, MacMillan.
Bosworth, B. (1993), Saving and investment in a global
economy, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution.
Bovenberg, L. A. (1988), ‘Long-term interest rates in the
United States: An empirical analysis’, IMF Staff Papers,
35(2), pp. 382–90.
Brook, A. M. (2003), ‘Recent and prospective trends in
real long-term interest rates: Fiscal policy and other driv-
ers’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 367.
Buiter, W. (2003), ‘Ten commandments for a fiscal rule in
the E(M)U’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(1),
pp. 84–99.
Buiter, W. and C. Grafe (2002), ‘Patching up the Pact:
Some suggestions for enhancing fiscal sustainability and
macroeconomic stability in the enlarged European
Union’, CEPR Discussion Paper, 3496.
Buti, M., D. Franco and H. Ongena (1998), ‘Fiscal disci-
pline and flexibility in EMU: The implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact’, Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 14(3), pp.81–97.
Buti, M. and G. Giudice (2002), ‘Maastricht fiscal rules
at ten: an assessment’, Journal of Common Market Stud-
ies, 40(5): 823–47.
Buti, M. and P. van den Noord (2003), ‘Discretionary
fiscal policy and elections: the experience of the early
years of EMU’, OECD Economic Department Working
Papers, 351.
Calmfors, L. and G. Corsetti (2003), ‘How to reform
Europe’s fiscal policy framework’, World Economics, 4(1),
pp. 109–16.
Campbell, J. Y. (1995), ‘Some lessons from the yield
curve’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(3),
pp. 129–452.
Canzoneri, M., R. Cumby and B. Diba (2001), ‘Is the
price level determined by the needs of fiscal solvency?’,
American Economic Review, 91, pp. 1221–38.
Canzoneri, M., R. Cumby and B. Diba (2002), ‘Should
the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be
concerned about fiscal policy?’, in Rethinking Stabilisa-
tion Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.279
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4Caselli, F., A. Giovannini and T. Lane (1998), ‘Fiscal
discipline and the cost of public debt service: Some esti-
mates for OECD countries’, IMF Working Paper, 55.
Catão, L. and M. E. Terrones (2003), ‘Fiscal deficits and
inflation’, IMF Working Paper, 65.
Cebula, R. J. (1998), ‘Empirical note on the impact of
US Federal Government budget deficits on bank interest
rates’, Applied Economics Letters, 5, pp. 415–18.
Cebula, R. J. (1999), ‘Budget deficits, capital flows, and
long-term interest rates: Co-integration findings for the
United Kingdom’, International Atlantic Economic
Review, 5.
Cebula, R. J. (2000), ‘Impact of budget deficits on ex
post real long-term interest rates’, Applied Economic
Letters, 7, pp. 177–79.
Cebula, R. J. (2003), ‘Budget deficits and interest rates in
Germany’, International Atlantic Economic Review, 9,
pp. 64–68.
Centraal Planbureau (2000), ‘Evaluatie van infrastructuur-
projecten, Leidraad voor Kosten-Baten Analyse’, 2000.
Chalk, N. A. (2000), ‘The sustainability of bond-finan-
cial deficits: An overlapping generations approach’,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 45 (2), pp. 293–328.
Chalk, N., and V. Tanzi (2002), ‘Impact of large public
debt on growth in the EU’, in M. Buti, J. Von Hagen and
C. Martinez-Mongay (eds.), The behaviour of fiscal
authorities, Basingstoke, Palgrave.
Cheng, B. S. (1998), ‘The causality between budget def-
icit and interest rates in Japan: An application of times
series analysis’, Applied Economic Letters, 5(7),
pp. 419–22.
Chinn, M. and E. Prasad (2000), ‘Medium-term determi-
nants of current accounts in industrial and developing
countries: An empirical exploration’, IMF Working
Paper, 46.
Chinn, M. and J. Frankel (2003), ‘The euro area and
world interest rates’, paper presented for the CEPR/ESI
conference on ‘The euro area as an economic entity’,
Eltville, September.
Chouraqui, J. C., R. P. Hagemann and N. Sartor (1990)
‘Indicators of fiscal policy: A re-examination’, OECD
Working Paper, 78.
Codogno, L., C. Favero and A. Missale (2003), ‘EMU
and government bond spreads’, Economic Policy, Octo-
ber, pp. 504–32.
Collignon, S. and S. Mundschenk (1999), ‘The sustaina-
bility of public debt in Europe’, Economia Internazion-
ale, 52(1), pp. 101–59.
Conway, P. and A. Orr (2002), ‘The GIRM: a global
interest rate model’, Westpac Institutional Bank Occa-
sional Paper, September.
Darrat, A. F. (2002), ‘On budget deficits and interest
rates: Another look at the evidence’, International Eco-
nomic Journal, 16, pp. 19–29.
Denis, C., K. McMorrow and W. Roeger (2002), ‘Pro-
duction function approach to calculating potential
growth and output gaps — estimates for the EU Member
States and the US’, European Economy, Economic
Papers, 176.
Deroose, S., S. Langedijk and W. Roeger (2004), ‘Review-
ing adjustment dynamics in EMU: from overheating to
overcooling’, European Commission, Economic Papers,
198.
Dhantine, J. P., F. Giavazzi, and E. L. Von Thadden
(2000), ‘European financial markets after EMU: A first
assessment’, CEPR Discussion Paper, 2413.
Diamond, J. (2003), ‘Performance-budgeting: Managing
the reform process’, IMF Working Paper, 33.
Diamond, P. (1965) ‘National debt and neo-classical
economic growth’, American Economic Review, 55,
pp. 1125–50.
Dings, J. M. W., B. A. Leurs and A. N. Bleijenber (2000),
Economische beoordeling van grote infrastructuurpro-
jecten, leren van internationale ervaringen, Delft.
Draghi, M., F. Giavazzi, and R. C. Merton (2004),
‘Transparency, risk management and international
financial fragility’, Geneva Reports on the World Econ-
omy, Geneva and London, CEPR and ICMB.280
P a r t  V I
R e s o u r c e sDrèze, J. and N. Stern (1987), ‘The theory of cost-benefit
analysis’, in Handbook of Public Economics, edited by
Auerbach, A. J. and M. Feldstein, North-Holland.
Easterly, W. and S. Rebelo (1993), ‘Fiscal policy and
economic growth’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 32,
pp. 417–58.
ECMT (1998), ‘Efficient transport for Europe, policies
for internalisation of external costs’, European Confer-
ence of Ministers of Transport, OECD Publications
Service, Paris.
Economic Policy Committee (2001), ‘Budgetary chal-
lenges posed by ageing populations: The impact of pub-
lic spending on pension health and long-term sustaina-
bility of public finances’, EPC/ECFIN/655/01-EN final.
Economic Policy Committee (2003), ‘Budgetary chal-
lenges posed by ageing populations: The impact on pub-
lic spending on education’.
Edwards, S. (2004), ‘Thirty years of current account
imbalances, current account reversals and sudden stops’,
NBER Working Paper, 10276.
Elmendorf, D. W. (1993), ‘Actual budget deficit expec-
tations and interest rates’, Harvard Institute of Economic
Research, May.
Elmendorf, D. W. (1996), ‘The effect of deficit-reduc-
tion laws on real interest rates’, Federal Reserve Board,
October.
Elmendorf, D. W., and G. Mankiw (1999), ‘Government
debt’, in Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1C,
edited by Taylor J. B. and M. Woodford, Amsterdam,
Elsevier.
Eichengreen, B and C. Wyplosz (1998), ‘The Stability
Pact: More than a minor nuisance?’, in Begg, D.,
C. Wyplosz, J. von Hagen and K. Zimmermann (eds),
EMU: Prospects and challenges for the euro, pp. 65–114.
(Oxford: Blackwell).
European Commission (1982), European Economy, 14.
European Commission (1990), ‘One Market, One
Money’, European Economy, 44.
European Commission (1995), ‘Broad economic policy
guidelines’, European Economy, 60.
European Commission (2000), ‘Public finance in EMU
— 2000’, European Economy, 3.
European Commission (2001a), ‘Public finance in EMU
— 2001’, European Economy, 3.
European Commission (2001b), ‘Annual review —
2001’, European Economy, Brussels.
European Commission (2002a), ‘Public finance in EMU
— 2002’, European Economy, 3.
European Commission (2002b), Guide to cost-benefit
analysis of investment projects, Regional Policy DG,
European Commission.
European Commission (2003a), ‘Public finance in EMU
— 2003’, European Economy, 3.
European Commission (2003b), ‘Communication from
the Commission: A European initiative for growth’,
Brussels COM(2003) 690 final.
Evans, P. (1987a), ‘Interest rates and expected future
budget deficits in the US’, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 95(1).
Evans, P. (1987b), ‘Do budget deficits raise nominal
interest rates? Evidence from six countries’, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 20(2).
Ewing, B. T. and M. A. Yanochik (1999), ‘Budget defi-
cits and the term structure of interest rates in Italy’,
Applied Economics Letters, 6, pp. 199–201.
Faini, R. (2004), ’Fiscal policy and interest rates in
Europe’, paper presented at the sixth Banca d’Italia
Workshop on Public Finance, Perugia, 1–3 April 2004.
Fatàs, A., A. Hughes-Hallet, A. Sibert, R. Strauch and J.
von Hagen (2003), ‘Stability and Growth in Europe:
Towards a better pact’, Monitoring European integra-
tion 13, CEPR, London.
Fatàs, A. and I. Mihov (2003), ‘Constraining fiscal pol-
icy discretion in EMU’, Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 19, pp. 112–31.281
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4Feldstein, M. and P. Bacchetta (1991), ‘National savings
and international investment’, in D. Bernheim and J.
Shove, eds., National Savings and Economic Perform-
ance, pp. 201–20, Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press.
Feldstein, M. and C. Horioka (1980), ‘Domestic savings
and international capital flows’, Economic Journal, 90,
pp. 314–29.
Fiorito, R. (2002), ‘Più incompleto che stupido:
osservazioni e proposte sul Patto di stabilità e crescita’,
Iscona, Finanza Pubblica e Contabilità Nazionale,
Rome.
Fischer, S., R. Sahay and C. Vegh (2002), ‘Modern
hyper and high inflations’, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 40, pp. 837–80.
Florio, M. (2003), ‘Cost-benefit analysis and the rates of
return of development projects: An international com-
parison’, Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano, Development
Studies Working Papers, 182.
Flyvbjerg, B., M. Skamris Holm and S. Buhl (2002),
‘Underestimating costs in public work projects, error or
lie?’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3).
Fölster, S. and M. Henrekson (1998), ‘Growth and the
public sector: A critic of the critics’, European Journal
of Political Economy, 15, pp. 3337–58.
Ford, R. and D. Laxton (1995), ‘World public debt and
real interest rates’, IMF Working Paper, 30.
Franco, D. (1993), L’espansione della spesa pubblica in
Italia (1960–90), Il Mulino, Bologna.
Frenkel, J. A. and A. Razin (1996), Fiscal policies and
growth in the world economy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Gale, W. and P. Orszag (2003), ‘The economic effects of
long-term fiscal discipline’, Urban-Brookings Tax Pol-
icy Centre, Discussion Paper, 8.
Gali, J. and R. Perotti (2003), ‘Fiscal policy and mone-
tary integration in Europe’, Economic Policy, 37,
pp. 533–72.
Gemmell, N. and R. Kneller (2003), ‘Fiscal policy,
growth and convergence in Europe’, New Zealand
Treasury Working Paper, 14.
Gerson, P. (1998), ‘The impact of fiscal policy variables
on output growth’, IMF Working Paper, 1.
Giannaros, D. and B. Kolluri (1989), ‘The impact of
budget deficits on real interest rates: An international
empirical investigation’, International Economic Jour-
nal, 3(2).
Giovannini, A. (1985), ‘Saving and the real interest rate
in LDCs’, Journal of Development Economics, 18,
pp. 197–218.
Giudice, G. and A. Montanino (2003), ‘Il Patto di stabil-
ità e crescita’, Rivista di Politica Economica, 3(7–8),
pp. 185–274.
Giudice, G., A. Turrini and J. in’t Veld (2003), ‘Can fis-
cal consolidations be expansionary in the EU? Ex post
evidence and ex ante analysis’, European Commission,
Economic Papers, 195.
Gramlich, E. (1990) ‘Fiscal indicators’, OECD Working
Paper, 80.
Grier, K. and G. Tullock (1989), ‘An empirical analysis
of cross-national economic growth’, Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 24, pp. 259–76.
Hagen von, J. (2002) ‘More growth for stability: reflec-
tions on fiscal policy in euroland’, ZEI University of
Bonn.
Hagen von, J., A. Hugues-Hallet and R. Strauch (2001),
‘Budgetary consolidation in EMU’, European Commis-
sion, Economic Papers, 148.
Hallerberg, M. (2004), Institutions and fiscal perform-
ance: Domestic budgets in a united Europe: Fiscal gov-
ernance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU, book
manuscript, forthcoming in 2004 with Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Halleberg von, M., R. Strauch and J. von Hagen (2001),
‘The use and effectiveness of budgetary rules and norms
in the EU Member States’, report prepared for the Dutch
Ministry of Finance by the Institute of European Integra-
tion Studies, Bonn.282
P a r t  V I
R e s o u r c e sHelbling, T. and R. Wescott (1995), ‘The global real
interest rate’, Staff Studies for the World Economic Out-
look, IMF, Washington, DC.
Heller, P. S., R. D. Haas and A. S. Mansur (1986), ‘A
review of the fiscal impulse measure’, IMF Occasional
Paper, 44.
Heller, P. S. (2003), Who will pay?, Washington, DC,
IMF.
HM Treasury (2003), The Green Book, Appraisal and
Evaluation in Central Government, Treasury Guidance,
London.
HM Treasury (2004), The Stability and Growth Pact: A
discussion paper, March 2004.
Hodson, D. (2004), ‘Macroeconomic coordination in the
euro area: The scope and limits of the open method’,
forthcoming in the Journal of European Public Policy.
Hodson, D. and I. Maher (2004), ‘Soft law and sanc-
tions: Economic policy coordination and the reform of
the Stability and Growth Pact’, forthcoming in the Jour-
nal of European Public Policy.
Honohan, P. and D. Klingebiel (2000), ‘Controlling fis-
cal costs of banking crises’, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper, 2421.
IMF (1996), World economic outlook, October, Wash-
ington, DC, IMF.
IMF (2001), World economic outlook, May, Washing-
ton, DC, IMF.
IMF (2003), World economic outlook, September.
Jones, C. I. (1995), ‘Time series tests of endogenous
growth models’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2.
Joumard, I., P. M. Kongsrud, J. S. Nam, R. Price (2004),
‘Enhancing the effectiveness of public spending: experi-
ence in the OECD countries’, OECD Economics Depart-
ment Working Paper, 380.
Kharas, H., and D. Mishra (2001), ‘Fiscal policy, hidden
deficits, and currency crises’, in S. Devarajan, F. H. Rog-
ers, and L. Squire, eds., World Bank Economists’
Forum, Washington, DC, World Bank.
Keereman, F. (1999), ‘The track record of the Commis-
sion forecasts’, European Commission, Economic
Papers, 137.
Kitchen J. (1996), ‘Domestic and international financial
market responses to federal deficit announcements’,
Journal of International Money and Finance, 15(2),
pp. 239–54.
Kneller, R., M. Bleaney and N. Gemmell (1999), ‘Fiscal
policy and growth: Evidence from OECD countries’,
Journal of Public Economics, 74, pp. 171–90.
Kneller, R., M. Bleaney and N. Gemmell (2001), ‘Test-
ing the endogenous growth model: Public expenditure,
taxation and growth over the long run’, Canadian Jour-
nal of Economics, 34, pp. 36–57.
Kopits, G. and J. Craig (1998), ‘Transparency in govern-
ment operations’, IMF Working Paper, 158.
Knot, K. and J. De Haan (1995), ‘Fiscal policy and inter-
est rates in the European Community’, European Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 11.
Knot K. and J. de Haan (1999), ‘Deficit announcements
and interest rates: Evidence for Germany’, Journal of
Policy Modeling, 21(5), pp. 559–77.
Kocherlakoty, N. and K. M. Yi (1997), ‘Is there endo-
genous long-term growth? Evidence from the US and the
UK’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, May,
pp. 235–62.
Kontolemis, Z. (2003), ‘Exchange rates as a matter of
common concern? Policies in the run-up to euro’, Euro-
pean Commission, Economic Papers, 191.
Lane, P. and R. Perotti (1998), ‘The trade balance and fis-
cal policy in the OECD’, European Economic Review, 42,
pp. 887–95.
Larch, M. and M. Salto (2003), ‘Fiscal rules, inertia and
discretionary fiscal policy’, European Economy Eco-
nomic Paper, 194.
Laubach, T. (2003), ‘New evidence on the interest rate
effects of budget deficits and debts’, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Working Paper, 12.283
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4Leeper, E. (1991), ‘Equilibria under active and passive
monetary policies’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 27,
pp. 129–47
Lemmen, J., and C. Goodhart (1999), ‘Credit risks
and European government bond markets: a panel data
econometric analysis’, Eastern Economic Journal, 25,
pp. 77–107.
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992), ‘A sensitivity analysis
of cross-country growth regressions’, American Eco-
nomic Review, 82, pp. 942–63.
Lindé, J. (2001), ‘Fiscal policy and interest rates in a
small open economy’, Finnish Economic Paper, 14(2).
Mackenzie, G. A. (1989), ‘Are all summary indicators of
the stance of fiscal policy misleading?’, IMF Staff
Papers, 36, pp. 743–70.
Melitz, J. (2002), ‘Debt, deficits and the behaviour of
monetary and fiscal authorities’, in Buti M., J. Von
Hagen and C. Martinez-Mongay (eds.), The behaviour of
fiscal authorities, Basingstoke, Palgrave.
Meyer, C. (2004), ‘Carrot, stick and good arguments:
principles for the reform of economic policy coordina-
tion’, Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary,
24 January 2004.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and K. Moriyama (2004), ‘Fiscal
adjustment in EU countries. A Balance Sheets
Approach’, paper presented at the sixth Banca d’Italia
Workshop on Public Finance, Perugia, 1–3 April 2004.
Mongelli, F. P. (1996), ‘The effects of European eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU) on national fiscal sus-
tainability’, IMF Working Paper, 72.
Montanino, A., B. Przywara and D. Young (2004),
‘Expenditure on education: the implication for economic
growth and public finances’, forthcoming European
Economy Economic Papers.
Moynihan, D. P. (2003) ‘Performance-based budgeting:
Beyond rhetoric’, The World Bank PREM notes 78,
February 2003.
Mulas Granados, C. (2003), ‘The political economy of
fiscal adjustments in the European Union’, Centro de
Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (1998), Foundations of
international macroeconomics, Boston, MIT Press.
O’Donovan, B., A. Orr and D. Rae (1996), ‘A world
interest rate model’, National Bank of New Zealand,
Financial Research Paper, 7.
OECD (1997), Modern budgeting, Paris.
OECD (2001), ‘Structural budget balances: A methodo-
logical note’, http://www.oecd.org/Sources-and-methods/
structural_budget_calculation.htm.
OECD (2003), ‘Performance movement reforms and the
role of the centre of government’, GOV/PUMA/MPM
(2003) 2.
Orr, A., M. Edey and M. Kennedy (1995), ‘Real long-
term interest rates: The evidence from pooled time-
series’, OECD Economic Studies, 25.
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2002), ‘Fiscal discipline and policy
coordination in the euro zone: Assessment and propos-
als’, note for the GEA Meeting of April 16.
Plosser, C. I. (1982), ‘Government financing decisions
and asset returns’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 9,
pp. 325–52.
Plosser, C. I. (1987), ‘Fiscal policy and the term struc-
ture’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, pp. 343–67.
Polackova Brixi, H. and A. Schick (2002), eds., Govern-
ment at risk, Washington, DC, World Bank.
Polackova Brixi, H. and A. Mody (2002), ‘Dealing with
government fiscal risk: An overview’, in Polackova
Brixi, H. and A. Schick (2002), eds., Government at risk,
Washington, DC, World Bank.
Polackova Brixi, H, A. Schick, and L. Zlaoui, ‘The chal-
lenges of fiscal risks in transition: Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Bulgaria, in Polackova Brixi, H. and A. Schick
(2002), eds., Government at risk, Washington, DC,
World Bank.
Quigley, M. R. and S. Porter-Hudak (1994), ‘A new
approach in analysing the effect of deficit announce-
ments on interest rates’, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 26, pp. 894–902.284
P a r t  V I
R e s o u r c e sReinhart, V. and B. Sack (2000), ‘The economic conse-
quences of disappearing government debt’, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2.
Rendu de Lint, C., and D. Stolin (2003), ‘The predictive
power of the yield curve: A theoretical assessment’,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, pp. 1603–22.
Revelin, G. (2003), ‘Government expenditure by main
function: EU countries compared’, Statistics in Focus,
Eurostat.
Ricciuti, R. (2003), ‘Assessing Ricardian equivalence’,
Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(1).
Rodden, J., G. Eskeland and J. Litvack (eds.) (2003),
Fiscal decentralisation and the challenge of hard budget
constraints, MIT Press.
Roeger, W., and J. in’t Veld (1997), ‘QUEST II: A
multi-country business cycle and growth model’ Euro-
pean Commission, Economic Papers, 123.
Romer, D. (1996), Advanced macroeconomics, New
York, McGraw-Hill.
Romer, P. (1986), ‘Increasing returns and long-run
growth’, Journal of Political Economy, 94(5),
pp. 1002–37.
Romero de Avila, D. and R. Strauch (2003), ‘Public
finances and long-term growth in Europe: Evidence
from a panel data analysis’, ECB Working Paper, 246.
Rubin, R., P. Orszag and A. Sinai (2004), ‘Sustained budget
deficits: Longer-run US economic performance and the risk
of financial and fiscal disarray’, Paper presented at the
AEA-NAEFA joint sessions (5 January 2004).
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997), ‘I just ran two million regres-
sions’, American Economic Review, 87(2), pp. 178–83.
Sapir, A., P. Aghion, G. Bertola, M. Hellwig, J. Pisani-
Ferry, D. Rozati, J. Viñals and H. Wallace (2003), ‘An
agenda for a growing Europe’, report of an independent
high-level study group established on the initiative of the
President of the European Commission.
Sargent, T. J. and N. Wallace (1981), ‘Some unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic’, Federal Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis Quarterly Review, Fall, pp. 1–17.
Schadler, S., P. Drummond, L. Kurijs, Z. Murgasova,
and R. van Elkan (2004), ‘Euro adoption in the accession
countries. Vulnerabilities and strategies’, paper pre-
sented at the Conference on euro adoption in the acces-
sion countries — Opportunities and challenges, Czech
National Bank, Prague, 2–3 February 2004.
Schick, A. (2002), ‘Does budgeting have a future’,
OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2(2).
Schick, A. (2003), ‘The performing state, reflection on
an idea whose time has come but whose implementation
has not’, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3(2).
Seater, J. (1993), ‘Ricardian equivalence’, Journal of
Economic Literature, 31, pp. 142–90.
Sims, C. (1994), ‘A simple model for the study of the
price level and the interaction of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy’, Economic Theory, 4, pp. 381–99.
Smith, P. (1995), ‘On the unintended consequences of
publishing performance data in the public sector’, Inter-
national Journal of Public Administration, 18(2–3),
pp. 277–310.
Stockman, A. (1981), ‘Anticipated inflation and the cap-
ital stock in a cash-in-advance economy’, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 8, pp. 387–93.
Tanzi, V. and L. Schuknecht (2000), Public spending in
the 20th century: A global perspective, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Temple, J. (1999), ‘The new growth evidence’, Journal
of Economic Literature, 1, pp. 112–57.
Thomas, jr., L. B. and A. Abderrezak (1988), ‘Long-
term interest rates: The role of expected budget deficits’
Public Finance Quarterly, 16(3), pp. 341–56.
Thorbecke, W. (1993), ‘Why deficit news affects inter-
est rates’, Journal of Policy Modeling, 15(1), pp. 1–11.
Thöne, M. (2003), ‘Public expenditure for growth and
sustainable development (PEGS): Conceptual, empirical
and quantitative issues’, summary and main conclusions
of a study commissioned by the German Federal Minis-
try of Finance, Cologne Centre for Public Finance.285
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4Tirole, J. (1985), ‘Asset bubbles and overlapping gener-
ations’, Econometrica, 53, pp. 1499–1528.
Vamvoukas, G. A. (1997), ‘A note on budget deficits
and interest rates: Evidence from a small open econ-
omy’, Southern Economic Journal, June, pp. 803–11.
Van den Noord, P. (2000), ‘The size and role of auto-
matic stabilizers in the 1990s and beyond’, OECD Eco-
nomics Department Working Paper, 230.
Wachtel. P. and J. Young (1987), ‘Deficit announce-
ments and interest rates’, The American Economic
Review, 77, pp. 1007–12.
Weil, P. (1987), ‘Permanent budget deficits and infla-
tion’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, pp. 393–410.
Woodford, M. (1994), ‘Monetary policy and fiscal sol-
vency in a cash in advance economy’, Economic Theory,
4, pp. 345–80.
Wren-Lewis, S. (2003), ‘Changing the rules: Why we
should not accede to EMU’s current fiscal regime’, New
Economy, Vol. 10(2), pp. 73–78.
Wyplosz, C. (1999), ‘Economic policy coordination in
EMU: Strategies and institutions’, paper presented at the
German–French Economic Forum in Bonn, 12 January.
Wyplosz, C. (2002a), ‘Fiscal policy: Institutions versus
rules’, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 3238.
Wyplosz, C. (2002b), ‘Fiscal discipline in EMU: Rules
and institutions’, paper prepared for Group of Economic
Analysis of the European Commission, 16 April 2002.286
3. Useful Internet links
European Union
European Commission europa.eu.int/comm
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/economy_finance/
index_en.htm
European Council ue.eu.int/
European Parliament www.europarl.eu.int/
Economics and Finance Ministries
Belgium treasury.fgov.be/interthes Ministère des Finances/Ministerie van Financen
Denmark www.fm.dk Ministry of Finance
Germany www.bundesfinanzministerium.de Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Spain www.mineco.es/ Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
France www.finances.gouv.fr Ministère Économie, Finances et l’Industrie
Ireland www.irlgov.ie/finance Department of Finance
Italy www.tesoro.it Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze
Luxembourg www.etat.lu/FI Ministère des Finances
Netherlands www.minfin.nl Ministerie van Financien
Austria www.bmf.gv.at Bundesministerium für Finanzen
Portugal www.min-financas.pt Ministério das Finanças
Finland www.vn.fi/vm Ministry of Finance
Sweden finans.regeringen.se Finansdepartementet
United Kingdom www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Her Majesty’s Treasury
Bulgaria www.minfin.bg Ministry of Finance
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Ministry of Finance
Czech Republic www.mfcr.cz Ministry of Finance
Estonia www.fin.ee Ministry of Finance
Hungary www.p-m.hu Ministry of Finance
Latvia www.fm.gov.lv Ministry of Finance
Lithuania www.finmin.lt Ministry of Finance
Malta mfea.gov.mt Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
Poland www.mofnet.gov.pl Ministry of Finance
Romania www.mfinante.ro Ministry of Finance
Slovakia www.finance.gov.sk Ministry of Finance
Slovenia sigov1.sigov.si/mf Ministry of Finance
Turkey www.maliye.gov.tr Ministry of Finance287
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U  
2 0 0 4Japan www.mof.go.jp Ministry of Finance
United States www.ustreas.gov Department of the Treasury
Central banks
European Union www.ecb.int European Central Bank
Belgium www.nbb.be Banque Nationale de Belgique/
Nationale Bank van België
Denmark www.nationalbanken.dk Danmarks Nationalbank
Germany www.bundesbank.de Deutsche Bundesbank
Greece www.bankofgreece.gr Bank of Greece
Spain www.bde.es Banco de España
France www.banque-france.fr Banque de France
Ireland www.centralbank.ie Central Bank of Ireland
Italy www.bancaditalia.it Banca d’Italia
Luxembourg www.bcl.lu Banque centrale du Luxembourg
Netherlands www.dnb.nl De Nederlandsche Bank
Austria www.oenb.co.at Oestereichische Nationalbank
Portugal www.bportugal.pt Banco de Portugal
Finland www.bof.fi Suomen Pankki
Sweden www.riksbank.com Sveriges Riksbank
United Kingdom www.bankofengland.co.uk Bank of England
Bulgaria www.bnb.bg Bulgarian National Bank
Cyprus www.centralbank.gov.cy Central bank of Cyprus
Czech Republic www. cnb.cz Czech National Bank
Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania
Slovakia www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia
Slovenia www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia
Turkey www.tcmb.gov.tr Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Japan www.boj.or.jp Bank of Japan
United States www.federalreserve.gov Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Statistical Offices
European Union europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat Eurostat
Belgium www.bnb.be National Bank of Belgium
Denmark www.dst.dk Danmarks Statistik
Germany www.statistik-bund.de Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
Greece www.statistics.gr National Statistical Service of Greece288
P a r t  V I
R e s o u r c e sSpain www.ine.es Instituto Nacional de Estadística
France www.insee.fr Institut National de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques
Ireland www.cso.ie Central Statistics Office
Italy petra.istat.it Istituto nazionale di statistica
Luxembourg statec.gouvernement.lu Service Central de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques
Netherlands www.cbs.nl Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
Austria www.oestat.gv.at Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt
Portugal www.ine.pt Instituto Nacional de Estatística
Finland www.stat.fi Tilastokeskus/Statistics Finland
Sweden www.scb.se Statistiska Centralbyrån/Statistics Sweden
United Kingdom www.statistics.gov.uk Office for National Statistics
Bulgaria www.nsi.bg National Statistical Institute
Cyprus www.pio.gov.cy/dsr Statistical Service
Czech Republic www.czso.cz Czech Statistical Office
Estonia www.stat.ee Statistical Office
Hungary www.ksh.hu Central Statistical Office
Latvia www.csb.lv Central Statistical Bureau
Lithuania www.std.lt Statistics Lithuania
Malta www.nso.gov.mt National Statistics Office
Poland www.stat.gov.pl Polish Official Statistics
Romania www.insse.ro National Institute of Statistics
Slovakia www.statistics.sk Statistical Office
Slovenia www.sigov.si/zrs Statistical Office
Turkey www.die.gov.tr State Institute of Statistics
Japan www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm Statistics Bureau/Statistics Centre
United States www.fedstats.gov/ Federal Statistical Agencies
International organisations
Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org
ERBD www.ebrd.com
IMF www.imf.org
OECD www.oecd.org
United Nations www.un.org
World Bank www.worldbank.org
World Trade Organisation www.wto.org289

List of contents of European EconomyBasic editions
1, November 1978
• Annual Economic Report 1978–79
• Annual Economic Review 1978–79
2, March 1979
• European monetary system
— Texts of the European Council of 4 and 
5 December 1978
3, July 1979
• Short-term economic trends and prospects
• The European monetary system
— Commentary
— Documents
4, November 1979
• Annual Economic Report 1979–80
• Annual Economic Review 1979–80
5, March 1980
• Short-term economic trends and prospects
• Adaptation of working time
6, July 1980
• Short-term economic trends and prospects — 
Borrowing and lending instruments looked at
in the context of the Community’s financial 
instruments
7, November 1980
• Annual Economic Report 1980–81
• Annual Economic Review 1980–81
8, March 1981
• Economic trends and prospects — 
The Community’s borrowing and lending 
operations recent developments
9, July 1981
• Fifth medium-term economic policy programme 
— The main medium-term issues: an analysis
10, November 1981
• Annual Economic Report 1981–82
• Annual Economic Review 1981–82
11, March 1982
• Economic trends and prospects — Unit 
labour costs in manufacturing industry and in 
the whole economy
12, July 1982
• Documents relating to the European 
monetary system
13, September 1982
• The borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1981
14, November 1982
• Annual Economic Report 1982–83
• Annual Economic Review 1982–83
15, March 1983
• Economic trends and prospects — Budgetary 
systems and procedures — Industrial labour 
costs — Greek capital markets
16, July 1983
• Business investment and the tax and financial 
environment — Energy and the economy: 
a study of the main relationships in the countries 
of the European Community — 
The foreign trade of the Community, 
the United States and Japan
17, September 1983
• The borrowing and lending activities 
of the Community in 1982
18, November 1983
• Annual Economic Report 1983–84
• Annual Economic Review 1983–84
19, March 1984
• Economic trends and prospects —
Industrial labour costs — Medium-term budget 
balance and the public debt — The issue of 
protectionism
20, July 1984
• Some aspects of industrial productive 
performance in the European Community: 
an appraisal — Profitability, relative factor prices 
and capital/labour substitution in the Community, 
the United States and Japan, 1960–83 — 
Convergence and coordination of 
macroeconomic policies: some basic issues
21, September 1984
• Commission report to the Council and to 
Parliament on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community in 1983
22, November 1984
• Annual Economic Report 1984–85
• Annual Economic Review 1984–85
23, March 1985
• Economic trends and prospects 1984–85
24, July 1985
• The borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1984
25, September 1985
• Competitiveness of European industry: 
situation to date — The determination of 
supply in industry in the Community — 
The development of market services in the 
European Community, the United States and 
Japan — Technical progress, structural 
change and employment
26, November 1985
• Annual Economic Report 1985–86
• Annual Economic Review 1985–86
27, March 1986
• Employment problems: views of businessmen 
and the workforce — Compact — 
A prototype macroeconomic model of the 
European Community in the world economy
28, May 1986
• Commission report to the Council and to 
Parliament on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community in 1985
29, July 1986
• Annual Economic Review 1986–87
30, November 1986
• Annual Economic Report 1986–87
31, March 1987
• The determinants of investment — 
Estimation and simulation of international 
trade linkages in the Quest model
32, May 1987
• Commission report to the Council and to 
Parliament on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community in 1986
33, July 1987
• The economy outlook for 1988 and budgetary 
policy in the Member States — Economic trends 
in the Community and Member States
34, November 1987
• Annual Economic Report 1987–88
35, March 1988
• The economics of 1992
36, May 1988
• Creation of a European financial area
37, July 1988
• Commission report to the Council and to 
Parliament on the borrowing and 
lending activities in the Community in 1987
38, November 1988
• Annual Economic Report 1988–89
39, March 1989
• International trade of the European Community
40, May 1989
• Horizontal mergers and competition policy in 
the European Community
41, July 1989
• The borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1988 — Economic 
convergence in the Community: 
a greater effort is needed
42, November 1989
• Annual Economic Report 1989–90
43, March 1990
• Economic transformation in Hungary and Poland
44, October 1990
• One market, one money
45, December 1990
• Stabilisation, liberalisation and devolution
46, December 1990
• Annual Economic Report 1990–91
47, March 1991
• Developments on the labour-market in 
the Community — Quest — A macroeconomic 
model for the countries of the European 
Community as part of the world economy
48, September 1991
• Fair competition in the international market: 
Community State aid policy — The ecu and 
its role in the process towards monetary union
49, 1993
• Reform issues in the former Soviet Union
50, December 1991
• Annual Economic Report 1991–92
51, May 1992
• The climate challenge: Economic aspects of the 
Community’s strategy for limiting CO2 emissions
52, 1993
• The European Community as 
a world trade partner
53, 1993
• Stable money — sound finances: Community 
public finance in the perspective of EMU
54, 1993
• Annual Economic Report for 1993
55, 1993
• Broad economic policy guidelines and 
convergence report
56, 1994
• Annual Economic Report for 1994
57, 1994
• Competition and integration — Community 
merger control policy
58, 1994
• 1994 broad economic policy guidelines — Report 
on the implementation of macrofinancial 
assistance to third countries
59, 1995
• Annual Economic Report for 1995
60, 1995
• 1995 broad economic policy guidelines
61, 1996
• Annual Economic Report for 1996
62, 1996
• 1996 broad economic policy guidelines
63, 1997
• Annual Economic Report for 1997
64, 1997
• 1997 broad economic policy guidelines
65, 1998
• Commission’s recommendation concerning the 
third stage of economic and monetary union — 
Convergence report 1998 — Growth and 
employment in the stability-oriented framework 
of EMU
66, 1998
• 1998 broad economic policy guidelines
67, 1999
• 1999 Annual Economic Report
68, 1999
• 1999 broad economic policy guidelines
69, 1999
• The EU economy: 1999 review
70, 2000
• 2000 broad economic policy guidelines — 
Convergence report 2000 — Proposal for 
a Council decision for the adoption by Greece 
of the single currency on 1 January 2001
71, 2000
• The EU economy: 2000 review
72, 2001
• 2001 broad economic policy guidelines
73, 2001
• The EU economy: 2001 review
Investing in the future
Reports and studies
1-1993
• The economic and financial situation in Italy
2-1993
• Shaping a market economy legal system
3-1993
• Market services and European integration: 
the challenges for the 1990s
4-1993
• The economic and financial situation in Belgium
5-1993
• The economics of Community public finance
6-1993
• The economic and financial situation in Denmark
1-1994
• Applying market principles to government 
borrowing — Growth and employment: 
the scope for a European initiative
2-1994
• The economic and financial situation in Germany
3-1994
• Towards greater fiscal discipline
4-1994
• EC agricultural policy for the 21st century
5-1994
• The economics of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP)
6-1994
• The economic interpretation between the EU and 
eastern Europe
7-1994
• The economic and financial situation in Spain
1-1995
• The economic and financial situation in 
the Netherlands
2-1995
• Report on the implementation of macrofinancial 
assistance to the third countries in 1994
3-1995
• Performance of the European Union labour market
4-1995
• The impact of exchange-rate movements on 
trade within the single market
1-1996
• The economic and financial situation in Ireland. 
Ireland in the transition to EMU
2-1996
• The CAP and enlargement — Economic effects 
of the compensatory payments
3-1996
• Ageing and pension expenditure prospects in 
the western world
4-1996
• Economic evaluation of the internal market
1-1997
• The economic and financial situation in Portugal 
in the transition to EMU
2-1997
• The CAP and enlargement — Agrifood price 
developments in five associated countries
3-1997
• The European Union as a world trade partner
4-1997
• The welfare state in Europe — Challenges and 
reforms
5-1997
• Towards a common agricultural and rural policy 
for Europe
6-1997
• The joint harmonised EU programme of business 
and consumer surveys
1-1998
• Getting environmental policy right — 
The rational design of European environmental 
policy
2-1998
• The economic and financial situation in Austria
3-1998
• Income benefits for early exit from 
the labour market in eight European countries — 
A comparative study
1-1999
• The economic and financial situation in Finland
2-1999
• Income insurance in European agriculture
3-1999
• State aid and the single market
4-1999
• Liberalisation of network industries
5-1999
• Italy’s slow growth in the 1990s
6-1999
• Generational accounting in Europe
1-2000
• The report on the implementation of 
the 1999 broad economic policy guidelines
2-2000
• Public debt and fiscal policy in EMU
3-2000
• Public finances in EMU — 2000
4-2000
• Performance of the European Union labour 
market — Joint harmonised EU programme of 
business and consumer surveys
1-2001
• Current issues in economic growth
2-2001
• Report on the implementation of 
the 2000 broad economic policy guidelines
3-2001
• Public finances in EMU — 2001
4-2001
• The budgetary challenges posed by ageing 
populations
5-2001
• The efficiency defence and the European system 
of merger control
Special editions
Special issue 1979
• Changes in industrial structure in the European 
economies since the oil crisis 1973–78 — 
Europe — its capacity to change in question
Special edition 1990
• The impact of the internal market by industrial 
sector: the challenge for the Member States
Special edition No 1/91
• The economics of EMU
Special edition No 2/91
• The path of reform in central 
and eastern Europe
Special edition No 1/92
• The economics of limiting CO2 emissions
New numbering
2002
1-2002
• Report on the implementation of the 2001 
broad economic policy guidelines
2-2002
• Economic forecasts — Spring 2002
3-2002
• Public finances in EMU — 2002
4-2002
• 2002 broad economic policy guidelines
5-2002
• Economic forecasts — Autumn 2002
6-2002
• The EU economy: 2002 review
Special Report No 1/2002
• Responses to the challenges 
of globalisation
Special Report No 2/2002
• European integration and the functioning 
of product markets
New numbering
2003
1-2003
• Report on the implementation of the 2002 
broad economic policy guidelines
2-2003
• Economic forecasts — Spring 2003
3-2003
• Public finances in EMU — 2003
4-2003
• Broad economic policy guidelines
(for the 2003–05 period)
5-2003
• Economic forecasts — Autumn 2003
6-2003
• The EU economy: 2003 review
2004
1-2004
• Report on the implementation of the 2003–05 
broad economic policy guidelines
2-2004
• Economic forecasts — Spring 2004
3-2004
• Public finances in EMU — 2004

ORDER FORM
for European Economy
ORDER FORM — Annual subscription
European Economy 
Main issues ISSN 0379-0991
Special reports ISSN 1684-033X
Price of annual subscription (six issues minimum per year):
EUR 150
Date: Signature: ......................................................
Number 
of copies:
Name and address:
ORDER FORM — Single issue
European Economy 
Main issue ISSN 0379-0991
ISBN . . . . . . . . . 
Special report ISSN 1684-033X
ISBN . . . . . . . . . 
Title requested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Price of single issue: EUR 50
Date: Signature: ......................................................
Number 
of copies:
Name and address:
Office des  
publications officielles  
des Communautés européennes 
L-2985  Luxembourg   
Office des publications officielles
des Communautés européennes
L-2985 Luxembourg
Office des publications officielles
des Communautés européennes
L-2985 Luxembourg
Bu
lle
tin
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n 
> 
Bu
lle
tin
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
W
an
t t
o 
ke
ep
 tr
ac
k 
of
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
’s
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
?
O
n 
th
e I
nt
er
ne
t, 
co
ns
ul
t t
he
 B
ul
le
tin
 o
f th
e E
ur
op
ea
n U
nio
n,
th
e 
so
ur
ce
 o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
U
ni
on
’s
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
ht
tp
://
eu
ro
pa
.eu
.in
t/a
bc
/d
oc
/o
ff/
bu
ll/
en
/w
el
co
m
e.h
tm
Pu
bl
ish
ed
 m
on
th
ly
 in
 th
e o
ffi
ci
al
 E
U
 la
ng
ua
ge
s a
nd
, f
ro
m
 th
e J
an
ua
ry
/
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
00
4 
iss
ue
 o
nw
ar
ds
, i
n 
th
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
s 
of
 th
e 
ne
w
 M
em
be
r
St
at
es
, t
he
 B
ul
le
tin
 o
ffe
rs
 s
um
m
ar
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 d
ec
isi
on
s, 
co
m
m
un
ic
a-
tio
ns
, e
ve
nt
s, 
et
c.
 o
cc
ur
rin
g 
ea
ch
 m
on
th
, u
nd
er
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 su
bje
ct
he
ad
in
gs
, t
og
et
he
r w
ith
 sp
ec
ifi
c r
ef
er
en
ce
s t
o 
th
e l
eg
al
 b
as
e a
nd
 ea
rli
er
te
xt
s.
St
ar
tin
g 
fro
m
 t
he
 J
an
ua
ry
/F
eb
ru
ar
y 
20
03
 i
ss
ue
, 
th
e 
ne
w
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c
v
er
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
Bu
lle
tin
 (d
esc
rib
ed
 o
ve
rle
af)
 w
ill 
be
 en
ha
nc
ed
 w
ith
 a
se
ar
ch
 e
ng
in
e 
an
d 
lin
ks
 to
 o
ffi
ci
al
 d
oc
um
en
ts 
(O
J a
nd
 C
OM
).
Pa
pe
r 
ve
rs
io
n
Th
is 
ve
rs
io
n,
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
on
 s
ub
sc
rip
tio
n,
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 t
he
 O
ffi
ce
 f
or
O
ffi
ci
al
 P
ub
lic
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
m
m
un
iti
es
, c
an
 b
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
fro
m
 sa
le
s a
ge
nt
s t
hr
ou
gh
ou
t t
he
 w
or
ld
. T
he
 li
st 
of
 sa
le
s a
ge
nt
s c
an
 b
e
co
n
su
lte
d 
at
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
In
te
rn
et
 a
dd
re
ss
:
ht
tp
://
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
.eu
.in
t/g
en
er
al
/e
n/
sa
le
sa
ge
nt
s_
en
.h
tm
O
ffi
ce
 fo
r O
ffi
ci
al
 P
ub
lic
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
Co
m
m
un
iti
es
2,
 ru
e 
M
er
ci
er
, L
-2
98
5 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g 
—
 F
ax
 (3
52
) 2
9 2
9-4
46
19
St
ar
tin
g 
fr
om
 th
e J
an
ua
ry
/F
eb
ru
ar
y 2
00
3 i
ss
ue
 of
 th
e
Bu
lle
tin
 o
f th
e E
ur
op
ea
n U
nio
n —
El
ec
tr
on
ic
 v
er
sio
n
Se
ar
ch
•
B
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f w
or
ds
 in
 th
e 
he
ad
in
g 
an
d/
or
 te
xt
In
 th
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
s o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
•
B
y 
la
ng
ua
ge
, c
ov
er
in
g 
al
l t
he
 B
ul
le
tin
s p
ub
lis
he
d:
 s
in
ce
 1
99
4 
in
Fr
en
ch
; s
in
ce
 1
99
6 
in
 S
pa
ni
sh
, D
an
ish
, G
er
m
an
, G
re
ek
, E
ng
lis
h,
Ita
lia
n,
 D
ut
ch
, P
or
tu
gu
es
e,
 F
in
ni
sh
 a
nd
 S
w
ed
ish
; f
ro
m
 2
00
4 
on
-
w
ar
ds
, i
n 
th
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
s o
f t
he
 n
ew
 M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
Li
nk
s
•
To
 th
e t
ex
ts 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 in
 th
e O
ffic
ial
 Jo
urn
al 
of 
the
 Eu
rop
ea
n U
nio
n
an
d 
re
fe
rre
d 
to
 in
 th
e 
Bu
lle
tin
•
To
 th
e 
te
xt
s 
of
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
iss
io
n’
s 
le
gi
sla
tiv
e 
pr
op
os
al
s
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 (C
OM
 do
cu
me
nts
) r
efe
rre
d t
o i
n t
he
 B
ull
eti
n
ht
tp
://
eu
ro
pa
.eu
.in
t/a
bc
/d
oc
/o
ff/
bu
ll/
en
/w
el
co
m
e.h
tm

SALES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS 
 
Publications for sale produced by the Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities are available from our sales agents throughout the world. 
How do I set about obtaining a publication? 
Once you have obtained the list of sales agents, contact the sales agent of your choice and 
place your order.  
How do I obtain the list of sales agents? 
x Go to the Publications Office website at http://publications.eu.int/ 
x Or apply for a paper copy by fax: (352) 2929 42758 
 
 
European Economy appears six times a year. It contains important reports
and communications from the Commission to the Council and the
Parliament on the economic situation and developments ranging from the
Broad economic policy guidelines and its implementation report to the
Economic forecasts, the EU Economic review and the Public finance
report. As a complement, Special reports focus on problems concerning
economic policy.
Subscription terms are shown on the back cover and details on how to
obtain the list of sales agents are shown on the inside back cover.
Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are published under the
responsibility of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs of the European Commission, BU1, B-1049 Brussels, to which
enquiries other than those related to sales and subscriptions should be
addressed.
No 3 / 2004
ISSN 0379-0991
EUROPEAN
ECONOMY
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
Public finances in EMU
2004
EU
RO
PEA
N
 ECO
N
O
M
Y
N
o
 3
 / 2
0
0
4
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 50
European Economy (6 issues minimum per year): EUR 150
The annual subscription runs from 1 January to 31 December of each year.
Payments to be made only to sales agents on the list (see inside back cover for details).
These are surface mail rates; for air subscription rates please apply to the sales offices.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance
10
KC-AR-04-003-EN-C
,!7IJ2I9-eejfii!
ISBN 92-894-4958-6
